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Since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami devastated coastal areas of several countries in South East 
Asia, there has been renewed interest in disaster recovery operations. Although governments and 
aid organizations have increasingly focused on improving living conditions and reducing 
vulnerability to future disaster events during the recovery period, there has been limited 
understanding of what effective disaster recovery entails, and a lack of empirical assessments of 
longer-term recovery initiatives. Researchers, governments and aid organizations alike have 
increasingly identified the need for a systematic, independent, and replicable framework and 
approach for monitoring, evaluating and measuring the longer-term relief and recovery operations 
of major disaster events.  
Within this context, the research contends that a conceptualization of effective disaster recovery, 
referred to as ‘resilient disaster recovery’, should be built upon the holistic concepts of 
vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods. Using the resilient disaster recovery 
framework, the research aimed to develop an evaluative strategy to holistically and critically assess 
disaster recovery efforts. Using a case study of the 2006 Yogyakarta, Indonesia earthquake event, 
the research examined one long-term recovery effort in order to develop and test the usefulness and 
applicability of the resilient disaster recovery conceptualization and assessment framework. The 
research results further contributed to disaster recovery knowledge and academic literature through 
a refined conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery and further understanding of recovery as a 
process.  
The research used qualitative research approaches to examine the opinions and experiences of 
impacted individuals, households, and communities, as well as key government, academic and 
humanitarian stakeholders, in order to understand their perceptions of the long-term recovery 
process. Using the resilient disaster recovery approach, the research found that the recovery 
programming after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake contributed to reductions in visible 
manifestations of vulnerability, although the root causes of vulnerability were not addressed, and 
many villagers suffer from ongoing lack of access to assets and resources. While some aspects of 
resilience were improved, particularly through earthquake-resistant housing structures, resilience in 
other forms remained the same or decreased. Furthermore, livelihood initiatives did not appear to 
be successful due to a lack of a holistic approach that matched the skill and capital levels of 
impacted populations.  
Using the evidence from the 2006 Yogyakarta recovery effort, the research furthered knowledge 
and understanding of disaster recovery as a complex and highly dynamic process. The roles of a 
variety of actors and stakeholders were explored, particularly highlighting the role of civil society 
and the private sector in facilitating response and recovery. Furthermore, issues of conflict, the 
context and characteristics of place and scale, and the impact of disasters on income equality were 
explored. Through this research, an improved understanding of disaster resilient recovery and 
long-term recovery processes has been highlighted in order to facilitate improved and resilient 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this study is to explore the longer-term post-disaster recovery period with the aim 
to contribute conceptually to the disaster recovery literature, examine appropriate methods for 
evaluating long-term recovery, as well as provide an empirical assessment of one recovery effort. 
In order to introduce the topic of disasters and recovery, the introductory chapter begins with an 
overview of the key terms used in this research, followed by an overview of the social and 
economic impacts of disaster events. This overview will highlight the importance of the following 
research in order to contribute to an understanding of how effective disaster risk reduction 
initiatives can be implemented during the recovery period in order to reduce vulnerability to future 
events. Subsequently, the research objectives and questions are outlined in order to provide a 
foundation for the dissertation. To conclude, an overview of the dissertation structure is provided, 
summarizing the key components of each chapter.  
1.1 Background and Research Justification  
A disaster event can be defined as a “serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a 
society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, 
which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources” 
(UNISDR, 2009). Disaster events can originate from a variety of sources, including natural, 
technological and civil/political events arising from social unrest and conflict (Coppola, 2007). The 
focus of this dissertation will be on natural disasters,1 which are defined as “events that originate 
in, and are transmitted through, the environment” (Smith & Petley, 2009, p. 9). Although these 
disaster events originate from a natural trigger, it is increasingly recognized that human activities 
and development processes play a central role in creating vulnerability to these natural hazards 
(Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 1994; Pelling, 2003; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). 
A disaster event is the realization of a particular hazard: a natural hazard can be defined as “any 
natural process that threatens human life or property. The process itself is not a hazard; rather, it 
becomes a hazard only when threatening human interests” (Keller, Blodgett, & Clague, 2008, p. 6). 
                                                   
1
 Although the research focuses on natural disasters, it is increasingly recognized that there is difficulty in 
distinguishing between natural and other hazard sources, including technological and social/political hazards of 
conflict. The interconnections between natural processes and human actions are so intertwined that it can be 
difficult to distinguish between natural and human-influenced processes (i.e. large rainfall contributing to a river 
dam failure and resulting flood; earthquake causing damages to buildings, etc.) (Pelling, 2003; Smith & Petley, 
2009).    
2 
 
The degree of risk represents the likelihood that a natural hazard of a certain magnitude will occur, 
in combination with the expected levels of damages and impacts (Hyndman, Hyndman, & Catto, 
2009). In this sense, a natural phenomenon becomes a hazard when it threatens human populations 
and a disaster when the hazard interacts with human activities and structures, resulting in 
significant impacts. Thus, the disaster event represents an intersection between 
environmental/ecological conditions and the social/developmental processes that influence the 
vulnerability of people.   
Disaster events are complex, multi-dimensional phenomena, with a wide range of human, socio-
economic, cultural, political, and physical impacts (El-Masri & Tipple, 1997). While the disaster 
event itself presents an immediate shock to impacted populations, the ramifications of disaster 
events tend to be ongoing: 
Exposure to disaster impact is only the opening salvo. As the disaster unfolds, 
and far into the aftermath, the affected populations grapple with loss and change, 
consequences that persevere long after the risk for physical harm has dissipated. 
This trilogy of forces - exposure to hazard, massive personal and societal loss, 
and profound and enduring life change - characterize the nature of disaster 
(Shultz, Espinel, Galea, & Reissman, 2006, p. 69)  
Although natural hazards have been a risk for human communities for centuries, the number of 
disaster events and their associated impacts has been increasing, particularly since the 1960s 
(Abramovitz, 2001; Coppola, 2007; UNDP, 2004). For example, the number of disaster events 
occurring in the 1990s was over four times the number of disaster events recorded in the 1950s 
(Smith & Petley, 2009). As well, during the ten-year period from 1992 – 2001, the losses 
associated with natural disasters averaged US$65 billion per year, which represents a seven-fold 
increase since the 1960’s (Freeman, Keen, & Mani, 2003). Munich RE estimates that by the year 
2050, the costs associated with disaster events could exceed US$300 billion per year (UNISDR, 
2002). In many cases, these loss estimates only incorporate property damages and do not include 
the secondary impacts of livelihood disruption, reduced productivity or psychological trauma 
(Keller, Blodgett, & Clague, 2008).  
While these increasing rates could partly be attributed to improved quality of disaster reporting, the 
rising number and costs associated with natural disasters has been attributed to a number of factors, 
including precarious development practices, lack of infrastructure to handle hazardous events, 
development locations in high-risk sites, increased urbanization, and continuing levels of poverty 
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(El-Masri & Tipple, 1997; Smith & Petley, 2009). Within the context of climate change and 
increased pressure on, and conflict over, natural resources, the number of hazards is expected to 
continue to increase (Abramovitz, 2001; Bogardi, et al., 2005). The rising human, social, and 
economic costs of disaster events, along with the projected increases in the number of hazards, 
indicates that further understanding of the role of vulnerability reduction and adaptation capacities 
is required in order to determine how to reduce the risks of future disaster events occurring 
(Hyndman, Hyndman, & Catto, 2009).  
In the event a disaster does occur, governance capacity and hazard prevention measures in many 
countries, particularly less developed ones, are either not in place, or are unable to handle the 
magnitude of the event. In these instances, relief and recovery operations begin, often with the 
stated intention of returning the community to pre-disaster norms. Yet many have acknowledged 
that returning communities and households to pre-disaster norms leaves them in a position of 
vulnerability to future hazards (Birkmann & Fernando, 2008; McEntire, 1999; McEntire, Fuller, 
Johnston, & Weber, 2002; Mileti, 1999; Wisner, et al., 2004). Recently, researchers, humanitarian 
and government agencies have recognized the importance of reducing vulnerability to future 
disaster events as well as incorporating preparedness and mitigation initiatives as part of the post-
disaster recovery process.     
A vulnerability-reduction approach to disaster recovery was increasingly recognized after the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami that devastated many communities in South East Asia, particularly those in 
coastal areas of Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The overwhelming international 
response to the tsunami event led to increased interest in disaster recovery operations, resulting in a 
newly popularized approach to recovery termed ‘build back better’ (Kennedy, Ashmore, Babister, 
& Kelman, 2008; Lloyd-Jones, 2006). The ‘build back better’ approach is derived from 
vulnerability research and the theory that a ‘window of opportunity’ for disaster risk reduction and 
improved re-development is created during the post-disaster recovery period. During this period, 
local citizens may have increased awareness of disaster risks and place pressure on governments 
and organizations to use reconstruction funds to remedy the weaknesses in developmental policies, 
infrastructure and institutional arrangements (Christopolos, 2006; Clinton, 2006; UNISDR, 2005).   
It is within this context of renewed interest in disaster recovery operations that the importance of 
the research is situated. Although many government institutions and aid organizations have 
adopted the term ‘building back better’ to define their reconstruction and recovery activities, 
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defining what effective disaster recovery encompasses has been difficult. In many cases, the 
implicit definition of effective recovery programmes has focused on the speed of recovery, 
particularly building reconstruction (Kennedy, et al., 2008; Lizarralde, Johnson, & Davidson, 
2010); the effectiveness of funding distribution (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011); levels of community 
participation in the recovery process (Hidellage & Usoof, 2010); increased coordination and 
collaboration between various government and humanitarian organizations (Clinton, 2006; Maret 
& Amdal, 2010); as well as increased focus on livelihoods and economic recovery (Clinton, 2006; 
Mileti, 1999). In many of these conceptualizations, the definition of effective recovery is either: (1) 
one-dimensional, highlighting one or two aspects of recovery; (2) focused only on the initial 
process of implementing recovery as opposed to recovery outcomes, or; (3) emphasizes the 
behavior of humanitarian organizations as opposed to the process and outcomes of recovery for 
impacted communities.  
Alexander (2000) argues the concept of effective disaster recovery must be operationalized under a 
holistic framework that offers a comprehensive vision of the future. While a comprehensive 
framework is lacking, there has been some attempts to explore different understandings of 
‘building back better’, including Clinton’s (2006) 10 key propositions for disaster recovery, as well 
as Kennedy, et al.’s (2008) exploration of the ‘building back better’ concept as being primarily 
‘safer’. While Clinton’s (2006) 10 key propositions offer some insight into what effective recovery 
might achieve, the focus remains on strategies for implementing recovery operations from an 
organizational perspective, such as increasing accountability and reducing competition between aid 
agencies. Similarly, although Kennedy, et al. (2008) provide a conceptualization of recovery 
focused on safety, this approach has a tendency to focus on building reconstruction with limited 
emphasis on providing a holistic and comprehensive understanding of what effective disaster 
recovery entails for different stakeholders. 
Not only has there been a limited understanding of what effective disaster recovery entails, there 
has also been a lack of empirical assessments of longer-term disaster recovery initiatives 
(Edgington, 2010). In many cases, evaluations of recovery efforts focus on specific sectors or 
programs and there is a lack of information regarding how recovery continues after humanitarian 
and government organizations finalize their programs and leave the area. While the difficulties and 
methodological issues of holistically assessing longer-term recovery have been highlighted 
(Brown, et al., 2008; Cuny, 1983; Masten & Obradovic, 2008), there is still a need to engage in 
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comprehensive evaluations of long-term disaster recovery efforts. These assessments will provide 
valuable information to support the effective implementation of disaster risk reduction efforts 
during recovery periods in order to reduce vulnerability to future disaster events.     
Using the preceding as a base, this research contends that a conceptualization of effective disaster 
recovery, hereafter referred to as ‘resilient disaster recovery’, should be built upon the holistic 
concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods. While each of these concepts has 
been explored individually and will be discussed in further detail in chapter two, this research 
integrates them into a conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery (RDR) that can be used as a 
framework to guide empirical assessments of post-disaster recovery operations. The interpretation 
of resilient disaster recovery:  
1) Is rooted in the literature;  
2) Examines recovery from a variety of scales; 
3) Focuses on the root causes and structural processes that lead to conditions of vulnerability; 
4) Emphasizes improving the everyday living conditions of impacted populations; 
5) Highlights the role of agency, local capacities and resiliencies in reducing risk to future 
disaster events, and; 
6) Is based on empirical observation and field studies. 
Using a holistic approach to disaster recovery provides an opportunity to contribute to disaster 
literature through an understanding of the in-depth processes occurring during the recovery period 
itself. This also presents an opportunity to provide further information and lessons learned in order 
to facilitate improvements in recovery programming and contribute to increased resilience in 
disaster-impacted communities. Thus, the research seeks to fill three gaps in the literature: 1) the 
development of a holistic conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery; 2) empirically testing 
resilient disaster recovery as an evaluation framework in a post-disaster setting, and; 3) providing 
an empirical assessment of a long-term recovery effort. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The following dissertation examines the perceptions and opinions of impacted individuals, 
households and communities, as well as key stakeholders, after the 2006 Yogyakarta, Indonesia 
earthquake disaster in order to understand their perceptions of the long-term recovery process. 
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Specifically, the research seeks to contribute to disaster recovery literature through conceptualizing 
resilient disaster recovery and through an understanding of the process of recovery. Furthermore, 
the research seeks to provide an understanding of how the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and 
sustainable livelihoods are useful for analyzing and evaluating long-term disaster recovery efforts.  
1.2.1 Problem Statement 
Although large amounts of money have been spent to rebuild after disaster events, there is rarely 
any systematic and holistic examination of whether these expenditures achieve the intended goal of 
rebuilding communities in a ‘disaster resilient’ form (Labadie, 2008). Similarly, although 
vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods have been increasingly recognized in the 
hazards literature, there is limited integration of the three concepts in order to provide a framework 
for holistically evaluating disaster recovery efforts.  
1.2.2 Research Objectives  
The research has set out the following objectives: 
- To contribute to disaster recovery knowledge and academic literature through a 
conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery and further understanding of disaster 
recovery as a process;  
- To develop and test the usefulness and applicability of a combined sustainable livelihoods, 
resilience and vulnerability framework for evaluating disaster recovery; 
- To provide a holistic and critical analysis of one disaster recovery effort using concepts of 
vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods as a framework.  
1.2.3 Research Questions  
Based on the above objectives, this research will attempt to address four distinct research 
questions:  
1) Using the integrated concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods, 
termed the Resilient Disaster Recovery Assessment Framework (RDR-AF), did the 
recovery effort from the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake effectively ‘build back better’? 
2) Does the RDR-AF provide an appropriate and effective method for evaluating and 
assessing disaster recovery?  
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3) In what ways does the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake recovery experience inform and 
contribute to disaster recovery theory and literature? 
4) Based on the empirical evidence, how can the conceptualization of Resilient Disaster 
Recovery (RDR) be refined in order to provide an appropriate understanding of effective 
disaster recovery as a process? 
1.3 Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation is organized into eight chapters, including this introductory chapter. The 
introductory chapter has outlined some of the key definitions regarding hazards, risk and disasters, 
as well as an overview of the context of hazards research. Furthermore, the chapter highlighted the 
importance of recovery research in the context of increasing costs and expected frequency of 
disaster events. The chapter also outlined the key research objectives and research questions and 
provided a brief justification of the research.  
The second chapter outlines the background literature that is relevant for understanding the 
variables and factors that influence disaster events and disaster recovery, as well as providing a 
foundation for understanding the conceptual framework used for this research. The literature 
review highlights the current knowledge regarding disaster recovery, as well as identifying the key 
gaps that the research seeks to address. Concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable 
livelihoods are defined and modeled in order to provide a basis for the post-disaster conceptual 
framework outlined in chapter three.  
Chapter three outlines the methodological process of conducting the research, including the 
preliminary research framework and how the concepts of vulnerability and resilience are organized 
under the sustainable livelihoods capitals framework. The various data collection methods are 
delineated, including an overview of why qualitative research methods were selected in order to 
meet the research objectives. Next, a discussion of the data collection and analysis methods, as 
well as how the different data sources were triangulated and data sources cross-checked against 
each other is included. Finally, an overview of the challenges and limitations of conducting the 
research in a foreign country and language is provided. The strategies that were used to try to 
mitigate these challenges and limitations are highlighted before moving onto a discussion of the 
case study site.  
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Chapter four provides an overview of the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake event used as the case study 
for this research. The chapter begins by providing an overview of the history of Indonesia as well 
as the hazards and legal framework for preparing and responding to disaster events. This 
background information will be useful for understanding the context of the recovery operations 
after the earthquake in Yogyakarta as well as how these historical circumstances have contributed 
to conditions of vulnerability and marginalization to be discussed in later chapters. Consequently, 
an overview of the damages and destruction caused by the earthquake event is provided, as well as 
a summary of the recovery effort as implemented by the Indonesian government, a variety of 
humanitarian agencies organized under the UN cluster system, and the Java Reconstruction Fund. 
To conclude, an overview of the pre-existing conditions in the area that contributed to an effective 
recovery effort are outlined, providing a preliminary assessment of the recovery effort as viewed 
from the perspective of reconstruction and recovery organizations.  
Chapter five continues to provide background information regarding the individual villages 
selected for inclusion in the research. This chapter provides background information on the living 
conditions of affected populations in Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces, including an 
overview of the economic and living conditions, urban/rural characteristics, governance structure, 
as well as cultural and religious factors that are important for understanding the long-term recovery 
process. The process for selecting village sites is then outlined, followed by a brief overview of the 
conditions, characteristics and recovery experiences of each of the five village sites. The purpose 
of this section is to provide the reader with an understanding of the different experiences of each 
village. This section also provides an opportunity to disseminate the information villagers and 
village leaders felt was important to share with outsiders.  
The results chapter provides a holistic overview of the long-term recovery effort after the 2006 
Yogyakarta earthquake event. The vulnerabilities, resiliencies and livelihood capacities are 
outlined, including a discussion of how these processes were impacted by the earthquake event as 
well as the subsequent recovery effort. Using the sustainable livelihoods framework to organize the 
data, the various vulnerabilities and resiliencies associated with human, social, physical, natural, 
financial, political, and cultural capitals are reviewed. This provides an overview of the aspects of 
recovery that contributed to increased resilience and capacity to cope with future hazards, as well 
as the vulnerabilities that were both perpetuated or increased due to the disaster and recovery 
process. Through an analysis of the conditions and responses of the affected villages, as well as 
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responses from key stakeholders, the results chapter responds to one of the key objectives of the 
research: to provide empirical evidence to determine whether the recovery effort effectively 
implemented a resilient disaster recovery approach following the earthquake event. 
In chapter seven, the results outlined in chapter six are used to highlight the empirical, 
methodological and conceptual contributions of the research. First, the results are summarized 
under the conceptualizations of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods outlined in the 
literature review and methodology chapter. While the recovery after the 2006 Yogyakarta 
earthquake has generally been declared successful, the research provides a more detailed and 
holistic analysis, suggesting a complex relationship between vulnerability reduction and resilience 
building. Second, the RDR-AF model is examined as a methodological framework for evaluating 
recovery, with the results reaffirming the usefulness of the post-disaster framework used in the 
research. The key components of vulnerability, resilience and livelihoods were found to be 
relevant, including a focus on place and local conditions. There was a strong correlation between 
each of the three concepts although the complexity of these relationships was highlighted, 
particularly for vulnerability and resilience, and sustainable livelihoods and resilience. Thus it was 
determined that incorporating aspects of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods was 
useful for providing a holistic analysis of the long-term recovery effort after the 2006 Yogyakarta 
earthquake. Finally, the discussion chapter brings together the key insights from the research, 
connecting the results of the research to the recovery literature summarized in chapter two, as well 
as highlighting resilient disaster recovery as a process. The chapter concludes by bringing together 
the research results into a revised and refined conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery that is 
built upon the empirical evidence provided from the case study.  
The conclusion chapter brings the dissertation back full circle, providing an overview of how the 
research responded to the objectives and research questions outlined in this introductory chapter. 
The conclusion chapter also summarizes the practical recommendations for future recovery efforts, 
based on the research findings. Moreover, topics identified for further research are highlighted, 
indicating areas where there is a need for additional knowledge in order to contribute to ongoing 
disaster risk reduction and resilient recovery efforts.   
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Disaster management is the continuous process through which individuals, groups and 
communities attempt to avoid, minimize and/or recover from the risks and damages associated 
with hazardous events. The disaster management process involves all aspects of preparing for and 
recovering from disaster events, including mitigation, preparedness, relief/response and recovery 
(Henstra & McBean, 2005). Mitigation focuses on activities designed to reduce the risk associated 
with particular hazards, whereas preparedness includes the activities which improve the 
effectiveness of the community’s response to a disaster event. Response and recovery activities 
occur during the post-disaster period, attempting to fulfill basic needs before transitioning into 
longer-term rebuilding and recovery processes (EC, 2011). These four pillars of disaster 
management are intended to work together to reduce the human, physical and financial losses 
before, during and after a disaster event strikes (Phillips, 2009). Of these four phases, recovery is 
the most poorly understood and has been the least well researched (Barton, 1969; Coppola, 2007; 
Lloyd-Jones, 2006; Rubin, Saperstein, & Barbee, 1985; Schwab, 1998).    
In order to explore the impacts of the disaster recovery process in the aftermath of the 2006 
Yogyakarta earthquake event, it is necessary to outline the key terms, concepts and frameworks 
used for the research. The following chapter provides an overview of disaster recovery theory and 
literature, followed by the key concepts (vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods) 
incorporated into the framework for this research.  
2.1 Disaster Recovery 
Disaster recovery encompasses the process of rebuilding, reconstructing and repairing the damages 
associated with a hazardous event and returning affected areas to a functional condition (Coppola, 
2007). Within the disaster recovery literature, there are a variety of different terms, sometimes used 
synonymously with recovery, other times alluding to more specific components of recovery. In 
order to clarify how these different terms are used in this paper, recovery is used to denote all the 
activities, processes and outcomes occurring in the post-disaster period, whereas terms such as 
reconstruction, rehabilitation and restoration refer to specific aspects of recovery. Reconstruction 
almost exclusively refers to the rebuilding of physical structures that were damaged or destroyed in 
the disaster. Restoration suggests a return to prior conditions, indicating the reversion of physical 
or social aspects to pre-disaster norms. This is particularly associated with infrastructure, such as 
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transportation and communication (Haas, Kates, & Bowden, 1977). On the other hand, while 
rehabilitation also refers to some form of restoration, the term is generally used in association with 
people, as opposed to physical objects. The term also suggests an improvement on pre-existing 
conditions, as opposed to solely returning to pre-disaster form (Quarantelli, 1999).     
Disaster recovery can be further divided into two major phases: short-term recovery and long-term 
recovery. Within these two phases, the purpose, focus of activities, and the degree of planning are 
fairly distinct (Phillips, 2009). Short-term recovery activities can be generally associated with 
initial relief and response phases in the aftermath of a disaster event, although the focus has moved 
on from provision of basic needs. Here, the focus is on stabilizing the living conditions of affected 
populations in order to prepare for the longer-term recovery initiatives. Short-term recovery 
activities generally include the provision of transitional shelter, restoration of critical infrastructure 
and the clearance of debris (Coppola, 2007). Long-term recovery, on the other hand, focuses on 
rebuilding and rehabilitating individuals, households and communities, in order to return to some 
previous level of functioning, often stated as returning to ‘normal’. Longer-term recovery 
processes usually require a tremendous amount of resources, often involving a variety of 
stakeholders and actors, going beyond the provision of essential needs and ideally moves towards 
longer-term economic and social development (Coppola, 2007). While not always the case, 
Schilderman (2010) argues that aid approaches between these two phases should also shift. While 
initial recovery phases focus on supply-driven provision of relief, the longer-term recovery phase 
should focus on support-driven, people-centred reconstruction and rehabilitation. The longer-term 
phase of recovery is also increasingly viewed as a time for renewal and improvement on pre-
existing conditions, and is discussed further in section 2.1.2 (Kenny, Clarke, Fanany, & Kingsbury, 
2010).   
While the short-term recovery period is often easy to delineate, longer-term recovery is harder to 
define. Recovery activities have a tendency to transition into development activities, particularly in 
developing countries, thereby making it difficult to distinguish long-term recovery from on-going 
development projects (Anderson & Woodrow, 1998). In the case of major disaster events that 
required external assistance, long-term disaster recovery has been defined as the period in which 
external government and humanitarian organizations continue to be involved in reconstruction, 
recovery and capacity building activities (adapted from definitions of disaster by Blaikie, et al., 
1994; UNISDR, 2004; Wisner, et al., 2004). This implies the affected area is receiving some form 
12 
 
of specialized funding or programming specifically due to the disaster that goes beyond funding 
typical for the region. Furthermore, the implication is that recovery is finished once formal 
operations end. Often, there is little information regarding the potential ongoing processes of 
recovery that may continue in the aftermath of formalized programming: it is during this period 
that the research seeks to understand, assess and evaluate long-term recovery initiatives.   
As one of the key objectives of the research is to contribute to knowledge regarding the 
conceptualization and process of resilient disaster recovery, an overview of the current literature is 
required in order to establish existing knowledge and identify key gaps. The following section 
provides an overview of historical disaster recovery research and theory, followed by an overview 
of existing recovery paradigms and key gaps in the literature.  
2.1.1 Disaster Recovery Theory  
The earliest studies of disaster recovery focused on describing the processes that occur during the 
recovery period, as well as describing behavioral reactions both during and after disaster events. 
Barton (1969) summarized the existing disaster recovery literature up to 1970 with his work on the 
nature of social response to chronic and rapid-onset disaster events in both developing and 
developed country contexts. His work found patterns of organizational behavior, exploring how 
individuals and communities respond during recovery periods, including: 
1) The replacement of local government institutions that are often unable to effectively cope 
and respond with improvised emergency government agencies (such as a citizens committee or 
in conjunction with provincial/state or national agencies);  
2) The responsibility of relief and reconstruction activities tends to be given to voluntary, 
humanitarian organizations that often compete for funds and recognition, possibly leading to 
breakdown in coordination; 
3) Public response to organizations is driven both by rational assessment of achievements, as 
well as by symbolic actions; bureaucratic and emotionally neutral responses tend to create 
misunderstanding and even hostility; 
4) Antagonism and group conflicts may resurface during the recovery and reconstruction 
period overcoming the collaboration and solidarity experienced in the immediate aftermath of 
the disaster.  
5) As large-scale events overwhelm local capacity, major national programs are required to 
aid local responses and increase efficiency (Barton, 1969, p. 284).   
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One of the earliest studies to systematically analyze the recovery process was that of Haas, Kates, 
and Bowden (1977) who argued that “disaster recovery is ordered, knowable and predictable” (p. 
xxvi). After exploring the reconstruction and recovery efforts of four major disasters (three in the 
United States, one in Nicaragua), they developed a disaster recovery model that divided the 
recovery process into four distinct, but overlapping periods: 
1) Emergency Period: the initial period following the disaster, lasting a few hours or days, 
where the community begins to cope with losses of life, property and injury as well as 
initiating the beginning of cleanup. The normal functioning of the community is disrupted 
during this period. In disaster management cycles, the emergency period is generally referred 
to as the response phase. 
2) Restoration Period: covers the time where major services, transportation and 
communications are restored. Depending on the community and resources available, this 
period may take several weeks or months.  
3) Replacement Reconstruction Period: the city’s capital stock is rebuilt to pre-disaster levels, 
and social and economic activities return to pre-disaster levels or higher. 
4) Commemorative, Betterment and Developmental Reconstruction Period: involves three 
interrelated functions, including memorials and commemorations of the disaster events, major 
reconstruction activities to improve the city and to begin future growth and development 
(Haas, Kates, & Bowden, 1977, p. xxvii).  
According to the recovery model, the length of time required to complete each period is based on a 
logarithmic relationship, in that each period lasts approximately ten times longer than the previous 
period, although recovery and reconstruction times are also “a function of pre-disaster trends, the 
damages suffered, the resources available for recovery, and, to a lesser degree, leadership, planning 
and organizations” (Haas, Kates, & Bowden, 1977, p. 1). While Haas, Kates and Bowden’s (1977) 
model offered one of the first theories of disaster recovery, others have criticized the model for its 
linear, value-added approach, as well as its lack of explicit recognition of the politics involved in 
disaster recovery (Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Schwab, 1998).   
Geipel (1982) examined the role of historical heritage, culture and politics on the perception of 
hazards and the recovery process through the study of reconstruction after the 1976 Friuli 
earthquake in Italy. He discovered that the disaster event heightened pre-existing inequalities and 
that the “original hierarchy of functions, persons, and power relationships asserts itself rather more 
sharply than ever, and it is very hard even for relief policies to change” (Geipel, 1982, p. 180). 
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While the elderly and financially weak were disadvantaged as a result of the 1976 Friuli 
earthquake, merchants and trades people gained from the post-disaster recovery operations.  
Like Haas, Kartez and Bowden (1977), Geipel (1982) noted that the time required for 
reconstruction is a function of the damages suffered, pre-existing economic trends and the presence 
of local resources for recovery. Geipel’s work also focused on the conflicts experienced during the 
recovery period as planners and developers establish grandiose rebuilding plans that compete with 
local citizens’ ideas for reconstruction – which are usually to see the area rebuilt to pre-disaster 
norms. This is supported by other recovery research that found local citizens exert tremendous 
pressure on governments to rebuild the community to its pre-disaster form and that other forms of 
conflict arise from the distribution of relief and recovery aid (Mileti, 1999; Mustafa, 2003; 
Schwab, 1998). These findings are depicted in the conflict model of recovery in Figure 2.1.  
Figure 2.1: Conflict Model of Recovery 
 Source: (Geipel, 1982, p. 172) 
In Geipel’s (1982) model, there are a number of pre-existing potential conflicts (phase I), although 
the disaster event itself acts as a catalyst for solidarity, sacrifice and mutual helping (phase II). As 
external interventions begin and relief aid is distributed, conflicts begin to arise and during the 
reconstruction planning phase, conflicts reach a maximum (phase III). Issues of class, culture, and 

























the role of government and external intervention in the recovery process. As reconstruction comes 
to an end, the number of conflicts decreases as individuals’ and families become accustomed to the 
new circumstances and living arrangements (Geipel, 1982).   
Rubin, Saperstein, and Barbee (1985) explored the difficulties in measuring recovery as an 
outcome. After examining how previous research had attempted to use recovery as a dependent 
variable, they made the decision to conceptualize recovery as a process: “recovery is an ongoing 
process and, therefore, difficult to measure once and have that suffice” (Rubin, Saperstein, & 
Barbee, 1985, p. 14). Conceptualizing recovery as a process has a definitive impact on how 
assessments of recovery efforts are conducted and this view has been increasingly adopted in 
recovery research (Brown, et al., 2008; Mileti, 1999). Mileti (1999) focuses on recovery as a 
process incorporating “not just a physical outcome but a social process that encompasses decision-
making about restoration and reconstruction activities…[and] also stresses the nature, components, 
and activities of related and interacting groups in a systematic process and the fact that different 
people experience recovery differently” (p. 229 – 230).  
The recovery framework developed by Haas, Kartez and Bowden (1977) was critiqued by Rubin, 
Saperstein, and Barbee (1985) who found that the recovery process did not always imitate the 
sequential phases set out by their model and that “issues frequently crop up in simultaneous or 
illogical sequences” (p. 6). Rubin, Saperstein, and Barbee (1985) also found that local 
governments, particularly in the United States, have increased their capacity to respond to 
disasters, limiting the need to supplant them with emergency government agencies, as suggested by 
Barton (1969). For example, Lewis (1999) observed that supplanting indigenous administrative 
units with non-indigenous equivalents may result in reduced “local capacity to identify, assess and 
to adjust those structural weaknesses that exacerbate vulnerability” (p. 159). On the other hand, 
this finding is contradicted by research on more recent disaster events, particularly in developing 
countries, which found that the establishment of coordinating reconstruction and recovery agencies 
has helped facilitate the recovery process and increased communication and coordination among 
the many actors involved in reconstruction after large-scale disasters (for example: see 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) in Aceh, Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami) (Fengler, Ishan, & Kaiser, 2008). These findings indicate a need for further research on 
the characteristics of successful post-disaster recovery and reconstruction agencies. 
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Rubin, Saperstein, and Barbee (1985) developed a framework for examining important elements of 
the recovery process (see Figure 2.2). Unlike Haas, Kartez and Bowden (1977) and Geipel (1982), 
Rubin, Saperstein, and Barbee (1985) focus on the roles of leadership, organizational knowledge 
and the capacity to implement formalized programming as three key elements necessary to 
increase efficiency and reduce the length of disaster recovery.  













Source: (Rubin, Saperstein, & Barbee, 1985, p. 18) 
During the recovery process, recovery operations are influenced by larger-scale national policies 
and conditions, as well as the needs and demands of local populations. According to the model, if 
the community is able to effectively integrate knowledge, leadership and implementation capacity 
in order to meet the needs and demands of the local population, the overall community recovery 
program will be improved (Rubin, Saperstein & Barbee, 1985). While the focus is almost 
exclusively on political leadership, Alesch (2004) acknowledged that although local governments 
can influence community recovery, overall “whether a community system survives and becomes 
viable in the post-event setting depends in part on the individual choices of a critical mass of 
people and institutions (automata) in the community” (p. 7). This suggests further information is 
required regarding the role of political leadership and collective action during recovery periods.  
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17 
 
Berke, Kartez, and Wenger (1993) focused on inter- and intra-community relationships to explore 
the success of disaster reconstruction and recovery processes. The roles of horizontal and vertical 
linkages are explored in order to develop a typology of communities based on the types of 
relationships present. Horizontal relationships refers to the level of formal and informal integration 
of people and organizations in a equalitarian manner whereas vertical integration refers to the level 
of relations between various social units and organizations in the community to external social, 
economic and political institutions (Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993). The quality of both vertical 
and horizontal relationships can impact disaster recovery as they inevitably reflect the capacity to 
influence and organize effective recovery programs that meet the needs of the community and 
impacted households. As shown in Figure 2.3, the horizontal and vertical integration model of 
recovery suggests that Community type I is in an ideal position to recover effectively from a 
disaster event, whereas Community type IV may face significant difficulties during recovery due 
to lack of social cohesion and lack of access to and influence over external resources (Berke, 
Kartez, & Wenger, 1993).    
The horizontal and vertical integration model offers important insight into community 
characteristics that can influence the success of disaster recovery: they reflect access to power and 
links to important social networks. The model highlights the necessity for both vertical and 
horizontal social capital that increase community coping capacity and provides direction for 
community improvement. Unfortunately, there is little focus on the processes that create ‘strong’ 
and ‘weak’ communities, as well as how this can be achieved through the recovery process itself. 
Figure 2.3: Horizontal and Vertical Integration Model of Recovery 
                             Vertical 
Horizontal 
Strong Weak 
Strong Community Type I Community Type II 
Weak Community Type III Community Type IV 
Source: (Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993, p. 102) 
Some of the more recent research on disaster recovery has explored the geographical aspects of 
disasters and recovery processes. Concepts of place and the unique ways in which larger-scale 
processes manifest themselves in local conditions have been found to have an impact on the level 
of disaster impacts as well as capacities for overall recovery and rehabilitation (Cutter, 1996). 
Edgington (2010) explored these ideas in his research on disaster recovery after the 1995 Kobe 
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earthquake through the dual lenses of ‘geography of crisis’ and ‘geography of opportunity’. 
Understanding the ‘geography of crisis’ involves examining the spatial relationships that contribute 
to patterns of social and economic stresses following a disaster event. He argued that disasters 
create distinct spatial and social outcomes through the distribution of damages and victims, as well 
as responses to recovery initiatives. Thus, the experience of recovery will be different among 
different groups, actors and communities (Edgington, 2010). On the other hand, disaster events 
also create a ‘geography of opportunity’, whereby there is an explicit understanding of the unique 
role that disasters can play in terms of creating a space for rebuilding and community 
improvements (Edgington, 2010). This approach dovetails with recent understandings that view the 
recovery period as a ‘window of opportunity’ to implement disaster risk reduction initiatives 
(Birkmann, et al., 2010; Christopolos, 2006; Lloyd-Jones, 2006). In this sense, the disaster event 
can be seen as an opportunity to improve social conditions and overall functioning of the affected 
community.   
2.1.2 Disaster Recovery Paradigms 
As the disaster recovery literature matured throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, research has moved 
away from descriptions of the recovery process towards a paradigm for disaster management that 
incorporates mitigation components designed to reduce vulnerability and susceptibility to future 
disaster events. Mileti (1999) argued that a shift in thinking in disaster management is required to: 
adopt a global systems perspective; accept responsibility for hazards and disasters; anticipate 
ambiguity, constant change, and surprise; reject short-term thinking; take a broader, more general 
view of social forces and their role in hazards and disasters, and; embrace the principles of 
sustainable development (p. 26 – 29). Embracing the sustainable development movement as a core 
component of this proposed shift in thinking, Mileti (1999) advanced the sustainable hazards 
mitigation paradigm to consolidate ideas originally formulated decades ago by Gilbert White and 
colleagues, as well as integrating ideas from more recent research. The sustainable hazards 
mitigation approach has six central components, including: 
1) Maintaining and enhancing environmental quality: as a fundamental element of the 
sustainable development concept, hazard mitigation efforts should be linked to efforts to 
reduce environmental degradation.  
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2) Maintaining and enhancing people’s quality of life: exploration of the impacts of structure 
and agency in increasing individual, household and community access to various resources to 
increase their quality of life.   
3) Foster local resilience to and responsibility for disasters: particularly during the recovery 
period where political pressure to increase safety and build community coping capacity is high.  
4) Recognize that sustainable, vital local economies are essential. 
5) Identify and ensure inter- and intra-generational equality: leading to fair and equal 
distribution of resources and hazards across the population, including different regions, 
genders, ethnic groups and cultures.  
6) Adopt a consensus-building approach, beginning at the local scale through the process of 
local participation (Mileti, 1999, pp. 31-34).  
The sustainable hazards mitigation approach acknowledges that hazards and disasters are not 
experienced in isolation – they are linked to broader systems and processes (Mileti, 1999). 
Through this perspective, the similarity between the goals of vulnerability reduction and 
sustainability are acknowledged (Lewis, 1999). This approach connects disasters to everyday 
activities that have a bearing on disasters as well as viewing disaster reduction and recovery as a 
process. Furthermore, this approach relates disasters to development activities and explores the 
complex relationship between the two (McEntire, et al., 2002). Through the actions taken during 
the post-disaster recovery period “every action taken on account of one disaster must be designed 
and managed also to reduce vulnerability of the future. In this way, vulnerability reduction itself 
would be socially and environmentally sustainable development” (Lewis, 1999, p. 143).   
The sustainable hazards mitigation approach has been adopted by other researchers and 
organizations, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), through their 
sustainable recovery framework. This framework offers ten guiding principles for implementing 
“disaster risk reduction and the promotion of development that is participatory and equitable”, 
including mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in the recovery and development process; 
improving and maintaining coordination among disaster response and recovery organizations; 
promoting participatory and decentralized approaches; enhancing safety standards and integrating 
risk reduction into reconstruction, recovery and development; improving the living conditions of 
affected communities and sectors; building local and national capacities for increased resilience, 
risk management and sustainable development; taking advantage of previous or ongoing 
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initiatives; incorporating a gender sensitive approach; demonstrative effects; and continued 
monitoring, evaluation and learning (UNDP, n.d., pp. 3-8).  
An alternative disaster paradigm presented by David McEntire (see McEntire 1998; 2000; 2001) 
critiqued the sustainable hazards mitigation (sustainable recovery) approach, arguing that 
sustainable development is an unclear concept, does not directly contend with the root causes of 
disaster (namely vulnerability) (see also Wisner, et al., 2004) and is not particularly well suited to 
non-natural hazardous events, such as industrial/transportation accidents. Building upon the 
strengths of Mileti’s work, David McEntire’s concept of invulnerable development is defined as 
“development pursued in such a manner as to address vulnerabilities, and thereby decrease the 
probability that social, political and economic progress will be set back by disaster” (McEntire, 
1998, p. 216). This approach is specifically designed to reduce risk and susceptibility, as well as 
increasing resistance and resilience to disasters. Invulnerable development asks the question: ‘how 
can vulnerability be minimized in order to reduce occurrence of disaster and safeguard the progress 
of development?’ whereas sustainability asks ‘what should be done to promote the continuation of 
development?’ (McEntire, 2000, p. 59). The four tenets of the invulnerable development approach 
include: 
1) Development that initiates a variety of well-thought-out activities and programs designed 
to reduce existing vulnerabilities and avert the creation of additional vulnerabilities; 
2) Development that acts as a form of progress that attempts to avoid promoting or 
contributing to the probability of disaster; 
3) Development that seeks to promote social, political and economic advances while at the 
same time, minimizing the likelihood of those advances being reversed by a disaster event; 
4) Through the promotion of safe and continued progress, invulnerable development 
recognizes that the response of both the community and external agents after a disaster event 
can work to either perpetuate and further entrench vulnerability or to break out of the 
vulnerability cycle (McEntire, 2001, pp. 193-194).    
Although the concept of invulnerable development does not specifically relate to processes of 
recovery and reconstruction, the concept can be applied through all phases of a disaster. Through 
an explicit focus on vulnerability, the role of physical, social, cultural, political, economic, 
technological and developmental factors that contribute to disasters is recognized and offers an 
approach that focuses on the conditions that people have control over. Thus, if the invulnerable 
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development paradigm was adopted during the disaster recovery process, there would be an 
attempt to: 
1) Link development activities to vulnerability reduction;  
2) Foment a culture of safety, prevention and preparedness among all individuals, families, 
groups, businesses, organizations, communities, and nations around the world; and 
3) Increase the capacities, cooperation, coordination and effectiveness of all public, private and 
non-profit organizations and agencies involved in or related to disaster management and 
vulnerability reduction (McEntire, 2001, p. 193).    
Here, the post-disaster context is viewed as a period where efforts can be directed at increasing the 
resilience of individuals and communities in the face of future hazard threats. Thus, disaster events 
can provide a ‘window of opportunity’ to improve on pre-existing conditions during the recovery 
period. This ‘build back better’ approach has been increasingly incorporated into the vernacular 
and overall objectives of both governments and humanitarian organizations when framing their 
disaster recovery programs, particularly after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Alexander (2006) 
argues that in order for the concept of ‘build back better’ to be effective, it must be operationalized 
under a holistic framework that offers a comprehensive vision of the future. While a 
comprehensive framework in the recovery literature is lacking, Clinton (2006) outlines ten key 
propositions for building back better including: 
Proposition 1: Governments, donors, and aid agencies must recognize that families and 
communities drive their own recovery.  
Proposition 2: Recovery must promote fairness and equity.  
Proposition 3: Governments must enhance preparedness for future disasters.  
Proposition 4: Local governments must be empowered to manage recovery efforts, and donors 
must devote greater resources to strengthening government recovery institutions, especially at 
the local level.  
Proposition 5: Good recovery planning and effective coordination depend on good 
information.  
Proposition 6: The United Nations, World Bank, and other multilateral agencies must clarify 
their roles and relationships, especially in addressing the early stage of a recovery process.  
Proposition 7: The expanding role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Red 
Cross/Red Crescent Movement carries greater responsibilities for quality in recovery efforts.  
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Proposition 8: From the start of recovery operations, governments and aid agencies must create 
the conditions for entrepreneurs to flourish.  
Proposition 9: Beneficiaries deserve the kind of agency partnerships that move beyond rivalry 
and unhealthy competition.   
Proposition 10: Good recovery must leave communities safer by reducing risks and building 
resilience (Clinton, 2006, p. 3).  
These propositions incorporate many of the ideas from the post-disaster recovery literature, 
including addressing some of the underlying vulnerabilities and inequalities as well as linking 
recovery efforts to longer-term development and sustainable initiatives. On the other hand, 
propositions may create controversy through differing ideologies on development and the 
strategies used to achieve these goals. For example, Proposition 8 focuses on promoting 
entrepreneurship through a variety of means, including tourism, which may be in conflict with 
local desires or economic/political restrictions on entrepreneurship.  
In terms of measuring and analyzing the concept of ‘build back better’, Kennedy, et al., (2008) 
explore the difficulties in interpreting the meaning of ‘better’. A variety of factors influence the 
perceptions local people and aid organizations have of ‘better’, and trade-offs exist between the 
many potential forms of betterment. Within the tsunami recovery effort, the practical constraints of 
funding mandates, timelines and organizational foci, as well as different levels of concern for the 
product as opposed to the process, led to diminished opportunities to ‘build back better’. In trying 
to balance the variety of perceptions, needs and risks in the community, the interpretation in some 
sectors was to ‘build back faster’ as opposed to ‘build back better’ (Coppola, 2007; Kennedy, et 
al., 2008).  Based on these findings, it is clear that although governments and aid organizations 
may claim to be building back better, there is a lack of clarity of what ‘better’ entails and a lack of 
a conceptual framework to drive recovery efforts (Regnier, Bruno, Scuteri, & Miniati, 2008). 
2.1.3 Gaps in the Disaster Recovery Literature  
While the above sections have highlighted the disaster recovery and reconstruction knowledge that 
currently exists, this knowledge focuses on temporal descriptions of the recovery process, 
guidelines for improving recovery (particularly focusing on the behavior of NGOs and government 
organizations), or on strategies for successful recovery. A number of gaps exist in the literature in 
terms of conceptualizing effective and resilient disaster recovery, as well as understanding the 
impacts and processes of disaster recovery. The following section highlights some of the key gaps 
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in the recovery literature with a brief overview of how this research seeks to address some of these 
gaps.  
One of the key issues in terms of understanding disaster recovery is the lack of assessments and 
studies on the long-term impacts and processes of disaster recovery (Edgington, 2010). Despite the 
fact that large amounts of money have been spent to rebuild after disaster events, “there is rarely 
any systematic consideration of whether such lengthy projects actually achieve the goals for which 
they were implemented” (Labadie, 2008, p. 576). Alesch (2004) argues that expenditures have 
been based on simplified recovery theory that sees recovery mainly in terms of rebuilding and 
restoring buildings and infrastructure. Researchers and aid organizations alike have increasingly 
identified the need for a systematic, independent and replicable framework and approach for 
monitoring, evaluating and measuring the longer-term relief and recovery operations of major 
disaster events (Brown, et al., 2008). Cuny (1983) argues that methodologies for assessing 
recovery operations should focus on the contributions of the program to the community. These can 
be divided into short-term (exploring how well suffering was alleviated, support of local coping 
strategies, and the length of time between the disaster and full-recovery) and long-term 
contributions. The longer-term contributions are more difficult to assess and should include a 
measure of a) the program’s success in contributing to the development of capacity and skill of 
both local leadership and institutions; b) the spin-off benefits, including broader-scale development 
goals; and c) the level of increased safety and reduction of vulnerability to future hazards (Cuny, 
1983, pp. 158-159). 
Several researchers, including Brown et al. (2008) and Masten and Obradovic (2008), summarize 
methodological issues associated with evaluating disaster recovery. These include the timeframe 
and scale of the assessment, as well as the perceptions of the researcher: 
1) Timeframe: as the length of time of recovery can vary from place to place, overall 
declarations of success or failure for recovery operations may be premature. The overall fate of 
households and businesses may take years to be fully realized and employment and economic 
output may ebb and flow with the recovery process (i.e. large-scale reconstruction of buildings 
and infrastructure will have positive benefits for construction markets). Unpredictable events 
and the timelines of external organizations involved in the recovery effort may have an 
influence on the timeframe of recovery (see Alesch, 2004).  
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2) Scale: measuring recovery at different scales may produce different results based on 
different interpretations. A holistic approach should analyze recovery at various scales within 
the community to provide appropriate information on the context of recovery.  
3) Perceptions: As the evaluation is based on the goals and perceptions of the evaluator, 
overall assessments of recovery will be a reflection of the fundamental value-system of the 
evaluator (Alexander, 2006; Brown, et al., 2008; Masten & Obradovic, 2008).   
While there are some examples of evaluations on recovery and reconstruction projects, including 
USAID’s response to Hurricanes Mitch and Georges, as well the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, these 
evaluations have a tendency to focus on spending by aid organizations themselves as well as 
whether the intended goals were achieved (see Labadie, 2008; Fengler, Ishan, & Kaiser, 2008). In 
this sense, these evaluations were not necessarily focused on whether or not the people of the 
community had increased their standard of living and capacity to cope with future events. 
Assessments of this type align with Labadie’s (2008) performance auditing approach which uses 
the principles of financial statement audits to examine the “financial position, results of operations, 
and [whether] cash flows [are] in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles” (p. 
580). A similar approach was advocated by Winningham (2009) where evaluations of projects 
focused on whether they were completed, completed on time and in-line with budgeted planning. 
While specific project evaluations would be important to ensure the reputation of the aid 
organization in the eyes of donors, this approach does not necessarily ensure that the programming 
goals of the organization have led to sustainable development initiatives, invulnerable development 
and increased resilience in the face of future hazardous events.  
Thus, there is a gap in the literature in terms of identifying appropriate strategies, methods, and 
frameworks for assessing and evaluating long-term disaster recovery. This research attempts to fill 
these gaps in the recovery literature through its main objectives of providing a conceptualization of 
resilient disaster recovery that can be used as a methodological framework for assessing long-term 
recovery efforts. Through this approach, an empirical assessment of a long-term recovery effort 
will be completed and used to form an understanding of disaster recovery as a process and further 
contribute to the disaster recovery literature.     
2.2 Framing Disaster Recovery Assessments  
In order to fill these identified gaps in the literature, a framework for understanding and assessing 
resilient disaster recovery is required. For the purposes of this research, resilient disaster recovery 
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is defined using three key concepts, namely vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods. 
Each of these concepts has been included due to their contributions for understanding the processes 
that impact both the pre-, during, and post-disaster experience. The concepts of vulnerability, 
resilience and sustainable livelihoods are each discussed below, followed by an overview of why 
they were chosen and how they contribute to an understanding of holistic disaster recovery.  
2.2.1 Vulnerability 
As vulnerability is a concept used in a variety of literatures, there are different understandings and 
approaches (Birkmann, 2006). Villagrán’s (2006) review of the vulnerability literature determined 
that the term has been perceived through a variety of meanings, including: 
1. As a particular condition or state of a system before an event triggers a disaster, described 
in terms of criteria such as susceptibility, limitations, incapacities or deficiencies e.g. the 
incapacity to resist the impact of the event (resistance) and the incapacity to cope with an 
event (coping capacity); 
2. As a direct consequence of the exposure to a given hazard; and 
3. As the probability or possibility of an outcome of the system when exposed to an external 
event associated with a hazard, expressed in terms of potential losses such as fatalities or 
economic losses, or as the probability of the person or a community reaching or surpassing 
a certain benchmark (Villágran, 2006, p. 11).  
Within the hazards literature, recent approaches view vulnerability as a pre-existing condition, 
influenced by a variety of social, economic and political structures (Birkmann, 2007; Blaikie, et al., 
1994; Cannon, Twigg, & Rowell, 2003; Hewitt, 1997; Pelling, 2003). While many authors see 
vulnerability as similar to poverty, marginalization or other forms of disadvantage, others argue 
that these concepts are not one and the same (Cannon, Twigg, & Rowell, 2003). Cannon (2000) 
argues that the concept should have a predictive quality, in that an analysis of vulnerability should 
be able to predict vulnerable populations, since vulnerability “is supposedly a way of 
conceptualizing what may happen to an identifiable population under conditions of particular risks 
and hazards” (Cannon, Twigg, & Rowell, 2003, p. 4). In this sense, vulnerability, and the analysis 
thereof, should provide a measure and direction for mitigation interventions and strategies. 
Furthermore, this suggests that vulnerability occurs within particular contexts: there is recognition 
that vulnerability to one particular hazard does not necessarily translate into vulnerability to other 
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hazards, implying the need to identify what the individual, household or community is vulnerable 
to (Ellis, 2003).   
Anderson and Woodrow (1998) argue that through the exploration of vulnerability, an 
understanding of why the disaster occurred, the level of impact, as well as why particular groups of 
people were more or less severely impacted can be reached. While Cannon, Twigg, & Rowell 
(2003) emphasize the predictive quality of vulnerability, they also stress the human dimensions. 
Hazards impact individuals’, groups’ and communities differently, depending on a variety of 
factors, including levels of preparedness, ability to cope and recover, and livelihood strategies. 
Accordingly, “it is especially important to recognize this social vulnerability as much more than 
the likelihood of building to collapse or infrastructure to be damaged. It is crucially about the 
characteristics of people, and the differential impacts on people of damage to physical structures” 
(Cannon, Twigg, & Rowell, 2003, p. 5). By focusing on the socially constructed nature of 
vulnerability, the larger-scale processes that are a reflection of the power relations in a given 
society are emphasized (Blaikie, et al., 1994; Cannon, Twigg & Rowell, 2003; Hewitt, 1997). This 
is similar to Hewitt’s (1997) work which argued that access to power in a variety of forms was one 
of the fundamental processes impacting differing levels of vulnerability.  
From this perspective, vulnerability can be defined as “the characteristics and circumstances of a 
community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard” 
(UNISDR, 2009, p. 30). This definition provides an understanding of vulnerability as pre-existing 
condition that exists before, during and after a disaster event and will significantly impact coping 
capacity and levels of resilience. Thus, some of the main factors that influence levels of 
vulnerability include access to various forms of tangible and intangible assets (such as social and 
material goods), access to knowledge and information, and access to power and rights (Alexander, 
2000; Blaikie, et al., 1994; Chambers, 1989; Hewitt, 1997; Pelling, 2003).  
A number of effective vulnerability models have been outlined in the literature, including 
Chambers (1989) internal/external understanding of vulnerability; Watts & Bohle’s (1993) model 
of vulnerability that incorporates human-ecological perspectives, entitlement theory, political 
economy approaches, action theory approaches, models exploring access to assets, as well as crisis 
and conflict theory; Wisner & Luce’s (1993) examination of vulnerability and marginalization; 
Blaikie et al.’s (1994) and Wisner et al.’s (2004) pressure and release/access model of 
vulnerability; Cutter’s (1996) hazards of place model of vulnerability; the BBC (based on work by 
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Bogardi and Birkmann (2004) and Cardona (2004)), model of vulnerability outlined by Birkmann 
and Fernando (2008); as well as various understandings of the different types of vulnerability 
outlined by Liverman (1990), Hewitt (1997), Alexander (2000), Pelling (2003), and Cardona 
(2004). An overview of these vulnerability theories and models demonstrates how initial 
approaches to vulnerability, while incorporating both social and physical features, presented 
them as separate, independent processes. As the literature moved towards detailed analysis of 
social vulnerability, the physical and environmental processes were somewhat ignored. This 
led to a search for an understanding of vulnerability that incorporated both social and 
environmental processes and acknowledged the complex interactions between them. Through 
this shift in thinking, vulnerability theories have broadened from human-centred approaches 
that focused on the intrinsic vulnerability of the individual to approaches that incorporate 
coping capacities and the building of resilience. Birkmann (2007) notes how “the concept of 
vulnerability has been continuously widened and broadened towards a more comprehensive 
approach encompassing susceptibility, exposure, coping capacity and adaptive capacity, as 
well as different thematic areas, such as physical, social, economic, environmental and 
institutional vulnerability” (p. 21). Table 2.1 outlines some of the key concepts highlighted by 
these various models and theories of vulnerability.   
Table 2.1: Key Concepts in Vulnerability Theory and Models 
Concept Contributors 
Incorporate both internal (social) and external 
(environmental) processes 
(Birkmann & Fernando, 2008; Cardona, 2004; 
Chambers, 1989; Cutter, 1996) 
Importance of livelihood security 
(Blaikie et al., 1994; Watts & Bohle, 1993; Wisner 
et al., 2004) 
Access to various forms of assets 
(Blaikie et al., 1994; Chambers, 1989; Watts & 
Bohle, 1993; Wisner et al., 2004) 
Uniqueness of Place 
(Blaikie et al., 1994; Cutter, 1996; Joakim E. , 
2008; Liverman, 1990; Wisner et al., 2004) 
Importance of scale (particularly for assessment) (Wisner & Luce, 1993) 
Focus on the everyday (Wisner & Luce, 1993)  
Balance between structure and agency (Wisner & Luce, 1993) 
Feedbacks on the environment/hazards 
(Birkmann & Fernando, 2008; Cutter, 1996; 
Joakim, 2008; Wisner & Luce, 1993) 
Incorporating disaster mitigation and relief/reconstruction 
activities in the processes that affect levels of vulnerability 




Focus on the underlying causes of vulnerability 
(Blaikie et al., 1994; Hewitt, 1997; Watts & Bohle, 
1993; Wisner et al., 2004) 
Access to power/powerlessness 




(Alexander, 2000; Cutter, 1996) 
Dynamic nature of vulnerability 
(Birkmann & Fernando, 2008; Cutter, 1996; 
Joakim, 2008) 
Including capacity/resilience 
(Birkmann & Fernando, 2008; Cardona, 2004; 
Joakim, 2008) 
Types of Vulnerability, including   
  Deprived, willful, pristine, primary, secondary (Alexander, 2000) 
  Physical, social, human (Pelling, 2003) 
  
Physical fragility/exposure, socio-economic, lack of 
resilience
(Cardona, 2004)  
  
Physical, environmental, economic, social, political, 
technological, ideological, ecological, institutional, 
educational, health related, cultural
(Wilches-Chaux, 1993) 
  Exceptional, everyday (Lavell, 2004) 
  
Individual, organizational, community, 
infrastructural, political, economic, social, location, 
landscape, environmental
(Joakim, 2008) 
2.2.1.1 Pressure and Release Model of Vulnerability  
As noted above, a number of frameworks and models have been developed to provide an 
understanding of vulnerability within the context of hazards. From these frameworks and models, 
it is clear that the main points of convergence are related to:  
1) The exploration of vulnerability from a social-ecological perspective (see Blaikie, et al., 
1994; Bogardi & Birkmann, 2004; Cardona, 2004; Chambers, 1989; Cutter, et al., 2008; 
Wisner, et al., 2004; Wisner & Luce, 1993) 
2) Focus on place and the unique manifestations of larger-scale processes at the local level 
(see Cutter, 1996; Cutter et al., 2008; Liverman, 1990; Watts & Bohle, 1993)  
3) Conceptualizing vulnerability as a human rights/security issue (Blaikie, et al., 1994; 
Chambers, 1989; Pelling, 2003; Wisner, et al., 2004)  
4) Focusing on the root causes of vulnerability (Blaikie, et al., 1994; Pelling, 2003; Wisner, et 
al., 2004).   
The Pressure and Release model of vulnerability (PAR) developed by Blaikie, et al. (1994) is one 
of the key models to effectively integrate many the significant ideas in the vulnerability literature, 
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recognize the significance of examining vulnerability within the context of its underlying causes 
and origins and the PAR is a schematic expression of the complex interactions between the 
underlying social processes that create vulnerability and the hazard itself. The model is built upon 
the juxtaposition between these two opposing forces. In the PAR model, ‘pressure’ builds through 
increased vulnerability and exposure to hazards, while the ‘release’ conceptualizes the mitigation 
activities taken to reduce the impact of the disaster – the reduction of vulnerability (Blaikie, et al., 
1994). Figure 2.4 depicts the PAR model – specifically the progression of vulnerability from root 
causes through to their manifestations as unsafe conditions, and possibly, disaster.   
Figure 2.4: Pressure and Release Model - Progression of Vulnerability 
Source: (Blaikie, et al., 1994, p. 23)  
The pressure side of the model indicates a progression of vulnerability that starts with the Root 
Causes, including limited access to power, structures and resources, as well as vulnerabilities 
created through specific political and economic ideologies. These root causes are widespread 
processes that impact the distribution of resources and are a reflection of the distribution of power 
in a society (Blaikie, et al., 1994). Individuals and groups who are marginalized and lacking in 
power, either economically, politically and/or socially, are exposed to a double source of 
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vulnerability. These groups are less likely to have secure access to quality livelihoods and 
resources and they have a tendency towards lower priority for government action and intervention 
(Blaikie, et al., 1994).  
The Dynamic Pressures “channel the root causes into particular forms of insecurity” and are 
visibly manifested as unsafe conditions (Blaikie, et al., 1994, p. 24). These processes range from 
economic investments in human capital to macro demographic trends and environmental 
sustainability. The unsafe conditions in the PAR model present the visible manifestations of the 
root causes and are the actual populations that experience vulnerability during a disaster event. 
Unsafe conditions are the “specific forms in which the vulnerability of a population is expressed in 
time and space in conjunction with a hazard” (Blaikie, et al., 1994, p. 25). Therefore, each 
manifestation of vulnerability can be traced back to larger, widespread social, economic and 
political processes that work to generate vulnerable populations (Pelling, 2003).  
The Pressure and Release model has some limitations, including the explicit focus on the 
‘pressures’, or vulnerabilities, with little emphasis on the ‘releases’ that could increase resiliencies 
and overall coping capacity. There is also an inherent oversimplification of the juxtaposition of two 
opposing forces. This suggests that the hazard is separate from social processes and “independent 
of the conditions that create vulnerability” (Blaikie, et al., 1994, p.22). As well, the model presents 
a static depiction of vulnerability: in this model, “the generation of vulnerability is not adequately 
integrated with the way in which hazards themselves affect people…it exaggerates the separation 
of the hazard from social processes in order to emphasize the social causation of disasters” 
(Blaikie, et al., 1994, p. 46). Hence, the focus of the PAR model is the conditions which lead to 
disaster and does not address recovery from disaster.  
To address these concerns, Blaikie, et al. (1994) also developed the ‘Access’ model of 
vulnerability to examine micro-level access to various capabilities, assets and livelihood strategies 
that can be drawn upon to cope with a disaster event. Wisner, et al. (2004) updated the Access 
model, focusing on the “precise interactions of environment and society at the ‘pressure point’, at 
the point where and when the disaster starts to unfold” (p. 87). The Access model, shown in Figure 
2.5 is cyclical in nature and explores how individuals and households manage their access to assets 
and resources under the structure of social, political and economic systems (Blaikie, et al., 1994). 
In the Access model, specific hazards exist within time and space characteristics which may result 
in a trigger event for a disaster. Concurrently, during normal times, households are subject to both 
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unsafe conditions and political economy structures (social relations and structures of domination) 
that impact livelihood strategies and the various decisions made over time regarding livelihood 
opportunities. During a disaster, the trigger event breaks through social protections2, while the 
subsequent coping, reconstruction and recovery strategies may or may not attend to issues of 
vulnerability, lack of social protections and engage in actions to prevent further harm from hazards 
(Wisner, et al., 2004). The revised Access model effectively links to the PAR model, focusing on 
the role of livelihoods and how livelihoods are influenced by both structure and agency. The 
Access model also explicitly acknowledges the role of mitigation strategies and recovery 
operations in either perpetuating or reducing vulnerability.  
Figure 2.5: The Access Model 
 
Source: (Wisner, et al., 2004, p. 81) 
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The PAR and Access models were selected as the conceptualization of vulnerability in this 
research due to their explicit incorporation of many of the key ideas in the vulnerability literature. 
Together, the PAR and Access models provide a comprehensive analytical link between political 
and socio-economic models of vulnerability. Although emphasis on the physical and 
environmental aspects of vulnerability is limited, there is an explicit focus on the root causes of 
vulnerability. Similar to Chambers (1989), as well as Watts & Bohle (1993), Blaikie, et al. (1994) 
recognize the importance of access to various forms of assets, including access to power. The 
Access model also focuses on livelihood strategies, indicating the importance of incorporating a 
livelihoods perspective. The Access Model also explicitly acknowledges the role of recovery and 
reconstruction operations in perpetuating or reducing vulnerability, as well as incorporating aspects 
of structure and agency in the process of constructing vulnerabilities. This makes the PAR and 
Access models an ideal conceptualization of vulnerability to use in order to meet the research 
objectives set forth in chapter one (further discussion related to selection of the PAR and Access in 
included in chapter three).  
2.2.1.2 Vulnerability and Disaster Recovery 
Reducing vulnerability during the post-disaster reconstruction and recovery period has been 
identified as a key strategy to reduce the likelihood of future disaster events, and as such, was 
incorporated into the conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery (Birkmann, 2006; Joakim, 
2011; Pelling, 2003; Wisner, et al., 2004). Evidence has indicated that in some cases, the post-
disaster relief and reconstruction activities perpetuated systems of marginalization and 
vulnerability (see Mustafa, 2003; Wisner & Luce, 1993; Wisner, et al., 2004). In consequence, 
there is a need for an explicit focus on vulnerability reduction during the recovery period to attend 
to issues of marginalization and lack of social protections, and to engage in actions to prevent 
further harm from hazards.  
Recognizing the role of vulnerability during the disaster recovery period allows recovery programs 
to build on the previous research and knowledge developed in the field of vulnerability studies, and 
also provides a framework for identifying and planning the goals and objectives of recovery efforts 
(Lizarralde, Johnson, & Davidson, 2010). Vulnerability frameworks and models outline the various 
factors and processes that impact the ability of individuals, groups and communities to respond and 
cope with disaster events, providing an indication of the weaknesses in individual and community 
capacity to mitigate, cope, respond and recover from disaster events. Through the assessment of 
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the key components of various conceptualizations of vulnerability, strategies and policies for 
reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience in the face of future hazards can be achieved. 
Using vulnerability as a guideline for post-disaster recovery results in a new definition of recovery, 
whereby it is understood as “the process of improvement of pre-disaster conditions, targeted to 
achieving long-term local development and disaster risk reduction through the pairing of local and 
external resources” (Lizarralde, Johnson, & Davidson, 2010, p. 5). This links vulnerability theory 
to newer paradigms in disaster recovery where the focus is on sustainable mitigation practices, 
invulnerable development and slogans of building back better, although vulnerability concepts 
provide a more holistic understanding of ‘better’. Thus, the concept of vulnerability has important 
contributions for conceptualizing resilient disaster recovery.  
2.2.2 Resilience 
The concept of resilience originated in the ecological literature, particularly in the study of 
ecosystems, during the 1960’s and early 1970’s (Folke, 2006; Janssen, Schoon, Ke, & Borner, 
2006). Early understandings saw resilience as the “persistence of relationships within a system and 
is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb change of state variables, driving variables, 
and parameters, and still persist” (Holling, 1973, p. 17). As losses associated with hazardous events 
increased, disaster researchers began to explore concepts of resilience and acknowledged the need 
for “more inherently resilient social and technological systems, capable of absorbing shocks with 
grace and designed so that their failure does not lead to inevitable catastrophe” (Foster, 1993, p. 
93). While preliminary understandings of resilience focused on ecological systems, the following 
discussion focuses on resilience in the context of hazards and disasters.   
As the resilience concept has been increasingly used in the hazards literature, the number of 
definitions has begun to increase. Many authors describe resilience as the activities and capacities 
which allow communities and societies to withstand, rebound and bounce back after disaster 
events (Foster, 1995; Paton & Johnston, 2006; Ronan & Johnston, 2005). Ferrier (2008, p. 109) 
defines resilience as the “relative ability of a community to absorb the effects of a hazard event and 
quickly return to normal, or near-normal, operations”. Buckle, Mars & Smale (2000, p. 9) similarly 
define resilience although they argue that this approach appears somewhat static and fails to 
“identify that individuals, groups and communities may each possess degrees of resilience which 
will vary over time and within each of these categories”. While many definitions focus on the 
ability to quickly return to normal operations, other authors argue that communities will never 
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return to the pre-disaster state, as a disaster will result in changes to the physical, social and 
psychological reality of societal life (Alesch, 2004; Paton, 2006). Focusing solely on the ability to 
bounce back also assumes that resilient systems can achieve a state of equilibrium, whereas human 
and natural systems are more accurately seen as chaotic and non-equilibrating (Birkmann & 
Wisner, 2006). Paton (2006, p. 8) defines resilience as “a measure of how well people and societies 
can adapt to a changed reality and capitalize on the new possibilities offered”. In this sense, 
resilience concepts incorporate a measure of the adaptive and transformational capacity of 
individuals, groups and communities (Folke, Carpenter, Walker, Scheffer, Chapin, & Rockstrom, 
2010; Magis, 2010).  
From these various understandings, Maguire & Hagan (2007) conceptualize resilience along three 
different dimensions: resistance, recuperation and creativity (see also Adger, 2000). Resistance 
relates to the ability to withstand or absorb an external pressure or disturbance before long-term 
impacts are experienced. This view of resilience examines the amount of disturbance a system can 
absorb before changing state (Maguire & Cartwright, 2008). The amount of time it takes the 
community to ‘bounce back’ to previous levels of functioning is the recuperation approach to 
resilience. The faster a community is able to return to pre-disaster levels of functioning, the more 
resilient the community is. While these conceptualizations of resilience are common in the hazards 
literature, Maguire & Cartwright (2008) argue that the resistance and recuperation approaches are 
deterministic and fail to incorporate the dynamic nature of people and communities. The creativity 
approach to resilience, on the other hand, is related to the idea of increasing the functionality and 
resilience of the community after a disaster event. Creativity is the process of mitigating and 
“adapting to new circumstances and learning from the disaster experience” to create communities 
that have achieved greater resilience and functionality through the recovery process (Adger, 2000; 
Maguire & Hagan, 2007, p. 17). This is similar to the approach taken by the Resilience Alliance, 
where resilience is understood within three dimensions: the ability to absorb, the degree of self-
organization, and the capability for learning and adaptation (Kuhlicke, 2010).  
The notion of creative resilience leads into the growing body of literature that focuses not only on 
returning the community to its previous level of functionality, but also as a tool for improving 
overall welfare conditions (Kumpfer, 1999; Kulig, 2000; Paton, 2006; Ronan & Johnston, 2005). 
Folke (2006, p. 253) focuses on the positive aspects of disaster events, viewing them as having the 
“potential to create opportunity for doing new things, for innovation and for development”. In 
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other words, a hazardous event can be viewed as a catalyst for learning, transformation and growth 
in the community (Berkes, 2007; Kumpfer, 1999). This view of resilience “accepts that change is 
inevitable, rather than seeing change as a ‘stressor’ from which a community needs to recover its 
original state” (Maguire & Cartwright, 2008, p. 5). Conceptualizing resilience from a 
transformational perspective provides a more structured and nuanced understanding of ‘building 
back better’ strategies of recovery, and links to the idea of a ‘window of opportunity’.  In this 
sense, communities may use disaster events as a learning platform to initiate a move towards 
improved mitigation and preparedness programs, as well as increased emphasis on reducing 
vulnerabilities and building capacities (Birkmann, et al., 2010). This supports the use of a 
resilience conceptualization that integrates not only the capacity to absorb and cope with hazards, 
but also aspects of learning, transformation and adaptation.  
2.2.2.1 Attributes of Resilient Communities  
Many researchers have explored the different components or attributes that contribute to resilient 
communities, some of which are outlined in Table 2.2 below. These attributes focus on a variety of 
factors that may influence levels of resilience, including access to resources, the existence of 
institutions and policies to reduce risk in the community, the capacity to respond to hazardous 
events, as well as psycho-social components that explore individual and community perceptions, 
experiences and feelings. This overview of attributes indicates the broad scope of resilience and 
incorporates aspects from social, economic and political spheres.  
Table 2.2: Attributes of Resilient Communities 






Identification of four critical factors that interact to 
building social and ecological resilience: 
1) Learning to live with change and uncertainty 
2) Nurturing diversity in various forms 
3) Combining different types of knowledge and 
learning 
4) Creating opportunity for self-organization and 
cross-scale linkages  
Broad approach focusing on issues 
of scale and system dynamics, 
although there is limited 
recognition of the power structures 




Focuses on a capital-based approach to conceptualize 
resilience, using five categories: social, economic, 
physical, human and natural, building on concepts from 
the development and sustainable livelihoods literature 
Broad perspective of resilience that 
links into concepts of sustainable 
livelihoods although the 
operationalization of this approach 






Resources – required to ensure safety of community and 
core functions from hazard consequences; 
Competencies – required to mobilize, organize and use to 
confront/adapt to encountered problems/issues; 
Planning/Dev’t Strategies – integrate resources at each 
level to ensure coherent social capacity to capitalize on 
opportunities for change, growth and enhancement 
Sustained Availability – ensure resources/competencies 
available over changes and time  
While this approach incorporates 
access to various resources and 
human capital, focuses on positive 
change and incorporates a 
sustainable approach to resilience, 
there is under-emphasis on non-
capital forms of resilience, 
including informal social capital 




Focuses on economic resilience, taking place at three 
scales (micro, macro and meso) and distinguishing 
between: 
Inherent – ability under normal circumstances; and 
Adaptive – ability in crisis situations due to ingenuity or 
extra effort  
Recognizes different forms, 
temporal aspects and scales of 
resilience, although the focus is 
exclusively economic.  
(Pelling & 
High, 2005, p. 
309) 
Focusing on resilient adaptation, Pelling & High outline 
several components derived from the literature, including 
some degree of overproduction or excess capacity; 
overlapping functions; rapid flow of materials, 
investments and information; responsive decision-
making at an appropriate subsidiary level; diversification 
of inputs and of the economic base; alleviation of 
absolute poverty; learning from past events; mobilizing 
systems to redistribute costs including insurance; and, 
active experimentation and support for innovation. 
Focus on a variety of areas and 
aspects that produce resilient and 
adaptive communities although the 
focus appears exclusively at the 
systems level with little input on the 
role of individual and household 
factors 
(Kulig, 2000) 
Emphasis on 3 factors that lead to increased community 
resilience: 
1 – Interactions experienced as a collective group or 
community 
2 – Expressions of a sense of community 
3 – Community action 
Incorporates aspects of psycho-
social well-being although there is 
limited acknowledgement of other 
aspects of resilience.  
(Tobin, 1999) 
Combination of three theoretical models, including: 
1 – Mitigation model: reducing community risk through 
policies and standards; 
2 – Recovery model: policies to aid in relief and recovery 
operations, leading to re-accumulation of 
capital/resources; 
3 – Structural/Cognitive model: includes issues of 
societal changes, situational factors (i.e. socio-
demographics, community characteristics) and cognition 
(psychological/attitudinal).  
Good focus on resilience both 
before and after a disaster event, as 
well as psycho-social aspects of 
resilience. Over-emphasis on policy 
aspects of resilience, as opposed to 
building adaptive capacity among 
individual community members.  
From the table of resilient attributes, there are a number of themes that converge with the 
vulnerability literature, including a focus on access to resources, institutionalized capacity to 
respond and recover from disaster events, as well as developmental processes of poverty and socio-
economic conditions. This leads into the following discussion which links the concepts of 
vulnerability and resilience.  
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2.2.2.2 Linking Vulnerability and Resilience 
To this point, vulnerability and resilience have been discussed separately, although an emerging 
literature recognizes the complexity and similarities that exists between these two concepts. Adger 
(2006, p. 269) remarked: 
Vulnerability research and resilience research have common elements of interest 
– the shocks and stresses experienced by the social-ecological system, the 
response of the system, and the capacity for adaptive action. The points of 
convergence are more numerous and more fundamental than the points of 
divergence.  
Incorporating resilience with vulnerability concepts is important for three key reasons: “it helps 
assess hazards holistically in coupled human-environment systems; it stresses the ability of a 
system to deal with a hazard, absorbing the disturbance or adapting to it; and it helps explore 
policy options for dealing with uncertainty and future change” (Berkes, 2007; Haque & Etkin, 
2007, p. 279). Although the interconnections between vulnerability and resilience have been 
identified, there is some discrepancy regarding the nature of the relationship between the two 
concepts.   
The more common approach is highlighted in the climate change literature, through the definitions 
of vulnerability adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In this 
approach, vulnerability is seen as a function of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (Yohe 
& Tol, 2002). From this perspective, Smit and Wandel (2006) suggest that the concept of 
vulnerability explicitly incorporates, or is reflective of, the resilience of that system: vulnerability 
is not viewed as separate from resilience, but as an inherent part of vulnerability (Joakim, 2008; 
King & MacGregor, 2000; Yohe & Tole, 2002). This is similar to (Adger, 2000), who noted that 
resilience is a ‘loose antonym’ for vulnerability, in that resilience increases capacity to cope with 
stress, whereas vulnerability defines the level of exposure to stress. Thus, the IPCC approach views 
vulnerability and resilience as the positive and negative aspects of a singular concept that can be 
represented along a continuum (see Berkes, 2007; Birkmann & Wisner, 2006; Barnett, Lambert & 
Frey, 2008): when vulnerability is reduced, the level of resilience automatically increases 
(Kasperson & Kasperson, 2001).  
Conversely, the relationship between vulnerability and resilience can be defined as complex and 
‘process-oriented’, where the concepts are seen as inherently linked, although distinct (Cutter, et 
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al., 2008; Doberstein, 2009; Maguire & Cartwright, 2008; Sapountzaki, 2012). As Mayunga (2007) 
and Klein, Nicholls, and Thomalla (2003) note, defining resilience as the opposite of vulnerability 
results in circular reasoning and provides limited new knowledge. The complexity of the 
relationship between vulnerability and resilience can also be observed in contexts where increased 
resilience can also lead to increased vulnerability. In the case of flood management, protective 
structures such as levees and insurance can limit the number of events and help during recovery, 
although communities may become more vulnerable to future flood events through increased sense 
of security and further development on flood plains (Doberstein, 2009; Gunderson, 2010). Thus, as 
Buckle, Mars & Smale (2000, p. 13) argue, resilience is not “just the absence of vulnerability”. 
Instead, resilience should be understood through a multi-structural approach that encompasses 
broader concepts of adaptive capacity, exposure and the coupled human-environment system. In 
this way, resilience concepts focus on learning, re-organization and self-change, and it is 
understood that “vulnerability features may co-exist with characteristics that improve adaptive 
capacity” (Sapountzaki, 2012, p. 1268).  
Taking the process-oriented approach, this research proposes an understanding of the relationship 
between resilience and vulnerability conceptualized along two separate continuums (x-y axis), 
thereby creating a set of quadrants in which communities experience differential levels of 
resilience and vulnerability over time (see Figure 2.6). In the X-Y model, if all four hypothetical 
communities experienced similar exposure to a hazard, community three would likely experience 
the highest level of impacts and the most difficulty during the recovery period due to high 
vulnerability and low levels of resilience. On the other hand, community two, although 
experiencing high levels of vulnerability, may have less difficulty during the recovery period due 
to the ability to cope and adapt during the post-disaster period (specific examples of villages from 
the research will be further discussed in relation to the X-Y model in chapter seven). This is not to 
suggest that levels of vulnerability and resilience are static; in reality, levels would continuously 
fluctuate over time, reflecting the dynamic nature of social, political and economic processes, as 
well as individual, household and community choices that impact vulnerability and resilience. This 
highlights the need to incorporate both concepts (vulnerability and resilience) in understandings of 
resilient disaster recovery in order to provide a full overview of the strengths and weaknesses of 
individual, group and community capacity to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from 
hazardous events. Furthermore, approaching vulnerability and resilience as separate concepts 
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explicitly recognizes the resiliencies of individuals, households and communities, highlighting the 
capacities that already exist in impacted regions. 
Figure 2.6: X-Y Axis Relationship between Vulnerability and Resilience 
 
Although the relationship between vulnerability and resilience is presented along an axis, there 
may be some difficulty in the practical implementation of this conceptualization. As the 
relationship between these two concepts is rather complex, elements or themes of vulnerability and 
resilience may be difficult to separate along an X-Y axis. Furthermore, the contextualization of 
factors influencing these concepts suggests that factors selected for one context may not be suitable 
for other contexts (Birkmann, 2007). A further discussion of themes used to inform the data 
collection process will be included in chapter 3 where the preliminary conceptual framework for 
the research is outlined. 
2.2.2.3 Resilience and Disaster Recovery 
Incorporating resilience into a conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery not only links to 
ideas of ‘building back better’, but provides a more specific and nuanced understanding of what 










respond and recover from a disaster event, thereby providing an “effective way to cope with 
change characterized by surprises and unknowable risks” (Berkes, 2007, p. 283). Ride and 
Bretherton (2011, p. 7) define resilience in relation to natural hazards as “the capacity of a 
community to cope with the emergency, to rebuild, and to learn from the experience, such that the 
new physical, social, and political structures are better adapted to the environment”. Consequently, 
the concept of resilience is explicitly related to the process of recovery, and incorporates an 
adaptive component whereby resilient communities actively engage in the process of improving 
upon their pre-disaster conditions. Incorporating resilience concepts in a disaster recovery 
framework acknowledges the transformational capabilities of disaster-affected communities and 
highlights the role that disasters can play in providing an opportunity to improve upon institutional 
and development weaknesses highlighted in the vulnerability section.  
While resilience thinking has gained considerable interest over the past few years, there has been 
some criticism related to transferring an ecological, systems-based concept onto socially, 
politically and economically constructed contexts. The systems approach typically used to explore 
resilience has a tendency to ignore power relations in society and views many disaster mitigation 
and response interventions as neutral processes. This results in a de-politicization of the processes 
that create vulnerability and risk (Kuhlicke, 2010). Resilience concepts have also been criticized 
for the failure to acknowledge the downsides of strong levels of resilience in some contexts. For 
example, the resilience of some social systems, including gangs, dictatorships, and cultural 
traditions that perpetuate vulnerabilities, may not necessarily result in productive behaviors 
(Murphy, 2007).  
In order to overcome these criticisms, there is a need to incorporate a vulnerability perspective 
along with resilience. The vulnerability perspective provides an understanding of the social, 
economic, historical, cultural and political processes that lead to increased risk of disaster events, 
whereas the resilience perspective explores the opportunities for moving forwards and reducing the 
impacts of hazards in the post-disaster period. Through the incorporation of resilience, or 
capacities, individuals and communities are recognized as having capacities on which programs 
and resources can be built upon (IFRC, 1996). Acknowledging the role of resilience is particularly 
important for counteracting the tendency to view individuals impacted by a disaster event as 
‘helpless victims’ who require the assistance of ‘skilled’ outsiders, particularly in a North 
(developed countries) to South (developing countries) context. Handmer (2003) suggests that 
41 
 
focusing solely on vulnerability is unnecessarily negative, and suggests that resilience is more 
appealing when defining households and communities: 
We are all vulnerable, but we are also all resilient, and we all have adaptive 
capacity. Building resilience and capacity is politically appealing and a practical 
policy response to communities in difficulties – labeling or stigmatizing 
communities as particularly vulnerable or incapable is not usually politically 
appealing and is often strongly opposed by the communities involved (Handmer, 
2003, p. 60).    
Thus, the resilience approach is inherently more empowering as it recognizes the positive 
characteristics and attributes of individuals and communities that can be drawn upon to help build 
capacity to cope with future hazardous events. Similar to the important components of 
vulnerability, the attributes of resilient communities provides guidance for effective strategies to 
improve recovery operations after disaster events and should be incorporated into a 
conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery. 
2.2.3 Sustainable Livelihoods 
As discussed in section 2.2.1, vulnerability to disasters arises out of the social, economic and 
political context that distributes access to assets and power, as well as exposure to hazards, 
unequally among different people and different groups. As well, recovery from disaster events 
requires a shift from short-term relief activities into longer-term development initiatives. Although 
there is much discussion on defining the meaning associated with the term development (Fordham, 
2003), the following research takes a broad approach: development is defined as “an economic, 
social and political process which results in a cumulative rise in the perceived standard of living 
for an increasing proportion of the population” (Hodder, 2000, p. 3). Processes of development can 
act as a major force for change, including increasing modernity and reliance on technology, as well 
as changing livelihood activities and strategies. As such, development processes, particularly in 
developing countries, can have serious and direct impacts on hazards and environmental processes 
as well as vulnerability. Wisner (2003) outlines five common threads that link development and 
disasters, including: 
1. Governance and democratization: relates to issues of institutionalized access to resources, 
democratization of information, and good governance. 
42 
 
2. Civil society participation: implementation of both national level priority-setting of 
development and disaster risk reduction as well as increased participation in community-
based natural resource management, hazard mitigation and planning, and livelihood 
enhancement activities. 
3. Asset building and social protection: links concepts in both development and disaster risk 
reduction relating to sustainable livelihoods, social capital and access to resources. 
Recently, disaster mitigation and prevention activities have increasingly incorporated 
‘development’ asset-building processes that “emphasize the importance of social funds, 
pension arrangements, and other ways in which national resources can be used to spread 
risk and absorb shocks” (Wisner, 2003, p. 139).  
4. Public health and quality of life: in the context of both development and risk reduction, 
health is increasingly viewed as an important element of human dignity, quality of life, 
capabilities and productivity.  
5. Human rights and conflict management: as rights-based approaches have been increasingly 
adopted by aid organizations, the role of political, civil, economic, cultural and even 
livelihood rights in relation to vulnerabilities has been recognized. The role of conflict in 
creating and exacerbating vulnerabilities and extreme events has led to these issues being 
incorporated into disaster risk reduction and development agendas.  
McEntire et al. (2002, p. 271) argue that there is a complex relationship between disasters and 
development, in that “development often promotes disaster, disasters inhibit development, and 
better development practices are needed to prevent disasters”. The linkages between disasters and 
development have been increasingly recognized through international declarations and documents 
such as the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015 and various UNDP and UN/ISDR reports 
(Birkmann, 2006). The linkages between these development and disaster impacts are summarized 
by Mileti (1999, p. 29) who argues that “not only are disasters more likely to occur where 
unsustainable development has taken place, but also the occurrence of a disaster itself hinders 
movement toward sustainability because of its resulting environmental degradation, ecological 
imbalance, socioeconomic impacts, and lowered quality of life”. As such, disaster research and 
mitigation efforts are inherently linked to development, as the processes of development can either 
increase or decrease individual, household and community ability to cope with crisis situations and 
the overall environmental circumstances in which they live. 
The connection between disasters and development has also been acknowledged by many 
humanitarian organizations working at the ground level. These organizations have found that many 
recipients of disaster relief and development activities do not make a distinction between 
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development aid and crisis relief – for them, the process of making a living and maintaining basic 
living standards involves continually dealing with external shocks and stresses. Wisner (2003, p. 
143) argued that the “daily life of many people was a “permanent emergency””, and that disasters 
could be interpreted as “the extreme situation which is implicit in the everyday condition of the 
population”. Trujillo, Ordóñez, & Hernández (2000, p. 10) argue that: 
Emergencies are not external to the on-going development process, but are part 
of them. They constitute interruptions or crises which then have major 
repercussions on the development opportunities of a given community or area. 
Since disasters always have the potential to undermine development, measures 
to prevent, prepare for, and mitigate disasters should inform every plan and 
strategy for sustainable development.  
In order to explicitly acknowledge the connections between disasters, recovery and development, 
the conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery incorporates a sustainable livelihoods 
perspective.  
2.2.3.1 Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches to Development  
Increasingly, sustainable livelihoods concepts have been acknowledged as an important component 
of both development and post-disaster recovery operations. Sustainable livelihoods (SL) is an 
approach to development that places people, particularly the poor, at the centre of development 
(Ashley & Carney, 1999). While traditional measures of development focused on increasing levels 
of consumption, the SL approach measures development and increases in standards of living as 
“the ability to save and accumulate, to adapt to changes, to meet contingencies, and to enhance 
long-term productivity” (Chambers, 1987, p. 15). Although interest in sustainable livelihoods 
approaches increased dramatically as a result of its formal adoption by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) in the late 1990’s, SL concepts originated from participatory 
approaches to development, and famine and food security research in the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
indicating its roots are based in hazards and hazard mitigation (Hussein, 2002; Moran, Wright, 
Renehan, Szava, Rich, & Beard, 2007). In particular, the work of Robert Chambers in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s brought the ideas of sustainable livelihoods to the forefront of 
development research. Chambers and Conway (1992, p. 6) provide a definition of sustainable 
livelihoods that has been widely used and adapted by researchers, government institutions and aid 
organizations, and continues to be used to this day: 
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A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a 
means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover 
from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both 
now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.  
Livelihood activities have an impact on the level of exposure to hazardous events through the 
location of work and home activities (i.e. fishermen who live by the coast are at a higher risk of 
being vulnerable to storm surge and tsunami hazards), so these activities should be explored in any 
analysis of hazard risk and vulnerability. Livelihood activities can also have an impact on the 
environment leading to greater or lesser risk and severity of hazardous events (i.e. Abramowitz 
(2001) suggests development on hill slopes can increase the risk of landslide events as well as 
longer-term processes such as soil erosion, and agriculturalists who do not leave appropriate fallow 
periods between crop seasons can increase the impacts of soil degradation and drought events). 
These examples provide an indication of the linkages and feedbacks between human interactions 
with the environment and the impacts of the environment on human activities. Hence, using the 
sustainable livelihoods approach can provide a link between social, economic and environmental 
vulnerabilities (Birkmann & Wisner, 2006).  
Livelihood strategies and activities also impact the level of income, access to resources and assets 
that individuals and households can utilize in their response to hazardous events. Thus, particular 
livelihood strategies, and the associated assets they provide will influence the ability to cope and 
recover from disasters. As many of the key models of vulnerability (see Blaikie, et al., 1994; 
Chambers, 1989; Pelling, 2003; Wisner, et al., 2004) view access to and use of resources and assets 
as a key component of vulnerability, the relationship between vulnerability and livelihoods is 
important.  
Similar to vulnerability, the concept of livelihoods and the sustainable implementation of 
livelihood strategies have a variety of conceptual frameworks. The approach taken in this research 
is based on research by the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK3. Further 
discussion as to why DFID’s approach was selected will be discussed at the end of this section. 
DFID defines sustainable livelihoods as: 
The capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and 
activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can 
                                                   
3
 For a review of the strengths and weaknesses of the various other approaches to understanding sustainable 
livelihoods, please see Appendix 6. 
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cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the 
natural resource base (DFID, 1999, p. 1). 
There are six overarching objectives of the sustainable livelihoods approach used by DFID. These 
including the following: 
i) Improved access to high-quality education, information, technologies and training and 
better nutrition and health;  
ii) A more supportive and cohesive social environment; 
iii) More secure access to, and better management of, natural resources;  
iv) Better access to basic and facilitating infrastructure;  
v) More secure access to financial resources; and 
vi) A policy and institutional environment that support multiple livelihood strategies and 
promotes equitable access to competitive markets for all (DFID, 1999, p. 3). 
These overarching objectives can each be related back to vulnerability and resilience in that 
meeting each of these objectives would contribute to decreased vulnerability and increased 
resilience when responding to disaster events. These complementary approaches seek to achieve 
similar goals through the empowerment of the most vulnerable and increase coping capacity (to 
disasters and achieving secure and sustainable livelihoods). In order to operationalize the 
sustainable livelihoods concept, DFID created the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF), 
shown in Figure 2.7.  
The SLF framework is designed to provide a “checklist of important issues and sketches out the 
way these link to each other; draws attention to core influences and processes; and emphasizes the 
multiple interactions between the various factors which affect livelihoods” (DFID, 1999, p. 1). The 
SLF is a people-centered approach which examines the interactions between vulnerability, various 
capitals that people may have access to, and the structures and processes that impact livelihood 
strategies and outcomes. In the model, the ‘Vulnerability Context’ focuses on exposure to shocks, 
trends and seasonal shifts that have an impact on access to assets and livelihood outcomes. Shocks, 
in the form of hazardous events, conflicts or economic crisis, can destroy assets and limit the 
usefulness of livelihood strategies as well as require households to dispose of assets as a survival 
technique (DFID, 1999). Trends may have a more predictable nature and households and 
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communities may have adopted certain strategies to adapt to negative trends, although these trends 
may impact rates of return on selected livelihood activities. Seasonal shifts, which may impact 
prices, employment opportunities and food availability, represent “one of the greatest and most 
enduring sources of hardship for poor people in developing countries” (DFID, 1999, p. 3). If 
hazardous events occur during seasonal periods of hardship, this can severely limit the ability of 
individuals, households and communities to respond and recover from a disaster event. DFID 
(1999) argue that changes to the vulnerability context are usually achieved through external 
activities at the level of ‘Transforming Structures and Processes’ – activities which tend to focus 
on changes in policy and increased focus on improving the conditions of the poor.   
Figure 2.7: DFID's Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) 
Source: (DFID, 1999, p. 1) 
From Figure 2.7, the asset pentagon is a core component of the SLF and provides a 
conceptualization of the inter-relationships between the various forms of capital within the 
vulnerability context. The centre of the pentagon signifies zero access to assets, while points 
farther out towards the edge of the pentagon represents increased access. DFID (1999) notes the 
importance of recognizing the connections between capitals, in that increased or decreased access 
to one form of capital (i.e. land – natural capital) may increase or decrease access to other capitals 
(i.e. financial capital is increased through livelihood activities conducted on owned land). Each 




Table 2.3: Definitions of Various Forms of Capital 
Forms of Capital Definition 
Human 
Represents the skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health that together 
enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve their livelihood 
objectives. At a household level human capital is also a factor of the amount and 
quality of labour available.  
Natural 
Term used for the natural resource stocks from which resources flows and services 
useful for livelihoods are derived. There is a wide variation in the resources that make 
up natural capital, from intangible public goods such as the atmosphere and 
biodiversity to divisible assets used directly for production (trees, land etc.).  
Financial 
Denotes the financial resources that people use to achieve their livelihood objectives, 
including available stocks (savings in the form of cash, bank deposits or liquid assets) 
and regular inflows of money (including employment income, pensions, transfers 
from the state and remittances – in order for these inflows to be regarded as positive, 
they must be reliable sources of income).  
Physical 
Comprises the basic infrastructure (changes to the physical environment that help 
people to meet their basic needs and become more productive) and producer goods 
(tools and equipment used to function productively) needed to support livelihoods. 
Essential components include affordable transport, secure shelter and buildings, 
adequate water supply and sanitation, clean, affordable energy and access to 
information and communications.  
Social 
The social resources upon which people draw in pursuit of their livelihood objectives. 
These are developed through: 
Networks and connections: either vertical (patron/client) or horizontal (between 
people with shared interests) that increase people’s trust and ability to work together 
and expand their access to wider institutions; 
Membership of more formalized groups: which often entails adherence to mutually-
agreed or commonly accepted rules, norms and sanctions; 
Relationships of trust, reciprocity and exchanges that facilitate cooperation, reduce 
transaction costs and may provide the basis for informal safety nets.  
Source: (DFID, 1999, pp. 7-16) 
While these five capitals form the basis of the DFID-SLF framework, there has been increasing 
recognition of the need to acknowledge other forms of capital. Political capital represents a form of 
power that goes beyond social capital: political capital “refers to the legitimate distribution of 
rights and power, and how illicit operations of power can frustrate efforts of the poor to access and 
defend entitlements” (CARE, 2002, p. iv). As political processes and ideologies have been 
identified as one of the root causes of vulnerability, incorporating a political capital approach 
explicitly acknowledges the role of access to power and effectively links to vulnerability 
conceptualizations (Blaikie, et al., 1994; Hewitt, 1997; Pelling, 2003; Wisner, et al., 2004). 
Through the inclusion of political capital, there is an explicit recognition of rights based 
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approaches to development and emphasis on identifying root causes of vulnerability (CARE, 
2002). In the context of disasters, political capital examines the “ability to influence policy and the 
processes of government...[and] is important in determining the ability of households and 
individuals to claim rights to assistance after a disaster” (FAO & ILO, 2009, p. 11). This is 
indicative of the importance of including political capital in the sustainable livelihoods 
conceptualization used for the resilient disaster recovery framework.  
The DFID-SLF has also been critiqued for excluding cultural capital, regarded as an important 
element for understanding individual decision-making processes as well as livelihood strategies 
and outcomes (Snider, 2011; Daskon, 2010). Cultural capital is defined as a “set of attitudes, 
practices and beliefs that are fundamental to the functioning of different societies” (Throsby, 1999, 
p. 6) whereby “wealth is created through celebrating and investing in cultural histories, heritage, 
values, knowledge, traditions, rituals and ideologies of communities” (Daskon, 2010, p. 18). 
Cultural processes may also have an impact on perceptions of risk and understandings of disaster 
events: overall this can impact responses and processes of recovery following disaster events (Falk, 
2010; Reale, 2010; Schlehe, 1996; White, 2009). As an important factor driving local perceptions 
of disaster events and appropriate recovery responses, the sustainable livelihoods conceptualization 
used in this research incorporates cultural capital components. Figure 2.8 provides a revised 
depiction of the asset heptagon used to conceptualize sustainable livelihoods for the purposes of 
this research.  




The ‘Transforming Structures and Processes’ component of the SLF examines the small- to large-
scale institutions, organizations (both public and private), policies, legislations, customs and power 
relations that shape livelihoods. These structures and processes impact levels of access, terms of 
exchange and returns on investment strategies (DFID, 1999). Together, these structures help to 
shape processes of inclusion and marginalization. DFID (1999, p. 19) notes that current problems 
with development work revolve around the structures and processes component, arguing that these 
“do not work to the benefit of the poor. This can be a deliberate outcome driven by the failure of 
prevailing - elite controlled – governance arrangements to recognize the legitimate interests of the 
poor…or it can be more accidental, the result of an evolutionary process in which the poor have 
played little part”. It is through the transforming structures component of the model that the root 
causes of poverty and deficient livelihood strategies can be examined, whereas the asset pentagon 
represents the visible manifestations of these root causes.  
The ‘Livelihood Strategies’ component of the model examines the variety of activities that 
individuals and households engage in to meet their livelihood objectives: “it is a dynamic process 
in which they combine activities to meet their various needs at different times” (DFID, 1999, p. 
23). The vulnerability context, access to assets and structures and processes context will influence 
the choice of livelihood activities available to each individual and household. Due to the complex, 
dynamic and mobile nature of livelihood activities, these should be viewed within the wider 
temporal, social and scalar context. ‘Livelihood Outcomes’ represent the achievements or outputs 
of the ‘Livelihood Strategies’ section (DFID, 1999, p. 23). These outcomes can be further divided 
into five categories, including increased income levels, increased well-being, reduced 
vulnerability, improved food security and more sustainable use of the natural resource base. These 
outcomes may not be mutually compatible and conflict can arise when deciding on the importance 
of one over the other (i.e. strategies may increase income levels but at the expense of the 
environment) (DFID, 1999).  
While the sustainable livelihoods framework has been implemented in a variety of contexts, 
particularly through humanitarian organizations, there have been some critiques of the approach. 
As noted above, DFID’s SL framework does not sufficiently incorporate political and cultural 
processes (Snider, 2011). This issue has been addressed through the explicit incorporation of 
political and cultural capitals in the asset heptagon. This allowed for a deeper understanding of the 
ways in which rights and power, as well as history and culture impact livelihood strategies and 
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outcomes (Foresti, Ludi & Griffiths, 2007), Criticisms have also been raised over the lack of 
connection to social and economic theories, whereby the SL approach assumes “the current 
situation as a given, rather than identifying the events or forces that led to the existing social 
institutions (Small, 2007, p. 32). This leads to a microeconomic orientation that ignores social 
differentiation and how social and economic hierarchies contribute to various livelihood strategies 
and outcomes (Foresti, Ludi & Griffiths, 2007). In order to address this concern, the research 
incorporated sustainable livelihoods concepts in conjunction with a vulnerability framework that 
specifically examines root causes and structural processes contributing to reduced access to assets 
and power.   
A further critique revolves around the quantification and economization of the various capital 
assets. The use of the term ‘capital’ to describe the various sustainable livelihoods assets may 
imply a household economics approach, whereby assets are described in terms of economic 
benefits, as opposed to recognizing value in non-financial means (Morse, McNamara & Acholo, 
2009). As Scoones (2009, p. 180) notes, the capital approach does not “really deal with the 
complex intersections of the structural bases of power – in political interests, competing discourses 
and embedded practices – diminishing such complexity to a lowest common denominator metric”. 
While the research continues to use the word ‘capital’ to refer to access to the seven assets, it is 
noted that this interpretation is not necessarily meant to infer an economic value on each asset. 
Particularly, the research acknowledges that access to certain assets may hold value in non-
monetary ways, such as improved spirit, relationships and psychological wellness, as will be noted 
in Chapter Six.  
Although the above criticisms have been noted, DFID’s sustainable livelihoods framework was 
selected as the conceptualization of SL processes because it provides a holistic approach to 
development and livelihoods that explores key issues within the context of exposure to various 
hazards. The SLF offers a conceptualization of sustainable livelihoods that effectively relates back 
to the definition outlined by Chambers and Conway (1992) and recognizes the importance of 
incorporating the physical and natural environment. The approach merges particularly well with 
the conceptual framework of vulnerability outlined by Blaikie, et al.’s (1994) PAR model and 
Wisner, et al.’s (2004) Access Model. The DFID approach is also inherently dynamic through the 
recognition of the continually changing nature of livelihoods and the institutions that shape and 
influence them. By understanding the impact of external shocks and stressors, as well as the 
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internal processes that impact ability to respond and cope, the sustainable livelihoods framework 
developed by DFID “calls for ongoing investigation and an effort to uncover the nature of 
complex, two-way cause and effect relationships and interactive chains of events” (DFID, 1999, p. 
6). Furthermore, the asset pentagon (revised to the asset heptagon) provides an opportunity to 
organize, as well as visually summarize the results of the research (as noted in Chapter Six).    
2.2.3.2 Development, Sustainable Livelihoods and Disaster Recovery 
Many scholars, NGO’s and governments have recognized the need for longer-term programs to 
recover from and mitigate against future disaster events (Anderson & Woodrow, 1998; Cannon, 
Twigg, & Rowell, 2003; McEntire, 1998; Mileti, 1999; Rubin, Saperstein, & Barbee, 1985; 
Wisner, et al., 2004). Unfortunately, in the face of trying to fulfill immediate basic needs under a 
critical timeline during and immediately following disaster events, many NGOs are forced to 
abandon their development goals and the systematic planning and analysis phases found in many 
development programs are ignored (Anderson & Woodrow, 1998). Through the recognition that 
the most successful disaster mitigation interventions require long-term commitments and the 
strategic planning characteristics of development programs, many have argued for the merging of 
development programs with disaster recovery, preparedness and mitigation initiatives (Anderson & 
Woodrow, 1998; Cannon, Twigg, & Rowell, 2003).  
Incorporating a sustainable livelihoods perspective provides a direct connection between disaster 
recovery and longer-term development programs (Arnold, 2006; DFID, 1999). In order for 
development to be sustainable, there is a need to continually address hazards and vulnerability 
issues. This implies that disaster preparation, mitigation and capacity increasing activities and 
development programs should be viewed as an interrelated process (Arnold, 2006; Cannon, 2000; 
Cannon, Twigg, & Rowell, 2003). Through the incorporation of a sustainable livelihoods approach 
into disaster recovery initiatives, the linkages between these processes are explicitly acknowledged 
and recognized.     
Although SL approaches have been increasingly incorporated into disaster recovery programs, 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of business and economic activities has been ad hoc in nature and 
there is a lack of theories and conceptual models guiding reconstruction efforts in this sector 
(Regnier, et al., 2008). Régnier et al. (2008) also note that experience in livelihood recovery 
projects has been somewhat limited and successful efforts are highly localized in nature. In the 
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context of achieving resilient disaster recovery, the lack of conceptual and theoretical guidance in 
planning reconstruction activities, particularly in relation to livelihood strategies and building 
resilience, presents a challenge. Incorporating an SL framework with vulnerability and resilience 
concepts provides an opportunity to build conceptual and theoretical guidance for livelihood 
reconstruction initiatives. The linkages and connections between these three concepts will be 
discussed further in the conceptual framework outlined in chapter three. 
2.3 Summary and Conclusion  
As explored in the more recent recovery literature, vulnerability reduction forms a central 
component of effective reconstruction and rehabilitation from disaster events as vulnerable groups 
may be more susceptible to losses and experience more difficulty during recovery (Brown, et al., 
2008; Wisner, et al., 2004). From the understanding of vulnerability presented in the previous 
section, the hazard is viewed as the triggering event, but disasters are created when pre-existing 
vulnerabilities interact with the hazard.  Thus, any resilient disaster recovery and reconstruction 
efforts need to focus on reducing pre-existing vulnerabilities.  
Improving upon the pre-disaster conditions of affected communities should also focus on 
improving resiliencies and adaptive capacities of individuals and communities. Particularly in 
contexts where disaster recovery is organized and implemented by international humanitarian 
organizations, a focus on resilience can help to ensure that both newly established and pre-existing 
local governance capacities, as well as local customs and capitals, are perpetuated and enhanced 
(Ride & Bretherton, 2011). This approach focuses on maintaining sustainability of recovery 
operations, particularly after humanitarian organizations have suspended their recovery activities.  
Furthermore, incorporating a sustainable livelihoods approach helps to incorporate a longer-term 
perspective on disaster recovery and focuses on achieving enduring social and economic 
sustainability of development interventions. In this sense, the goal is to effectively use livelihood 
interventions in order to achieve vulnerability reduction and resilience building activities. Thus, 
sustainable livelihoods approaches provide an effective triangulation between concepts of 
vulnerability, resilience and long-term development in order to achieve improvements of the 
everyday living conditions of impacted populations.   
In conclusion, chapter two has summarized how concepts of vulnerability, resilience and 
sustainable livelihoods can be incorporated into a resilient disaster recovery framework useful for 
53 
 
assessing long-term disaster recovery and contribute to further understanding of recovery 
processes. In order to provide a more explicit understanding of how these concepts will be 
integrated as a conceptual framework for achieving the goals of this research, the following chapter 
outlines the research framework and the methodology for conducting the research. Further 
discussion of how each of these concepts formed an integral part of the assessment framework will 




3.0 RESEARCH METHODS  
The research integrated the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods in 
order to conceptualize resilient disaster recovery as well as develop a framework for assessing 
long-term recovery initiatives. Chapter three provides an overview of the initial research 
framework, outlining the conceptual approach used throughout the research process. The chapter 
also highlights how data were collected and analyzed, as well as providing an overview of the 
challenges and limitations of the research.   
3.1 Research Framework 
Researchers and aid organizations alike have identified the need for a systematic, independent and 
replicable framework and approach for monitoring, evaluating and measuring the longer-term 
relief and recovery operations of major disaster events (Brown, et al., 2008). As vulnerability, 
resilience, and sustainable livelihoods have been increasingly incorporated into disaster recovery 
theory and planning, an evaluation approach which integrates all three concepts will provide a 
unique opportunity to critically analyze post-disaster recovery operations. The following sections 
outline the conceptual framework as well as the methodological approaches typically used to guide 
assessments of these concepts.  
3.1.1 Resilient Disaster Recovery Assessment Framework 
The initial version of the Resilient Disaster Recovery Assessment Framework (RDR-AF) shown in 
Figure 3.1 depicts the conceptual model used to guide the evaluative process, which will be further 
refined and modified based on the research results. Through the use of a conceptual framework 
that incorporates the key issues addressed in the vulnerability, resilience and sustainable 
livelihoods literature, there is an opportunity to implement a transdisciplinary approach. The 
transdisciplinary approach is useful for research designed to explore the complexity of real-world 
problems that transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries (Benjamin, 2009; Pohl & Hirsch 
Hadorn, 2009). Through the integration of concepts from a variety of disciplinary paradigms (e.g. 
development, hazards, social-ecological resilience), the research expands outside of traditional 
discipline boundaries in order to: “grasp the complexity of the problems, to take into account the 
diversity of scientific and societal views of the problems, to link abstract and case specific 
knowledge, and to constitute knowledge with a focus on problem-solving for what is perceived to 
be the common good” (Hadorn et al., 2008, p. 19). This approach is particularly useful in the 
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context of long-term disaster recovery, whereby there is a variety of actors, stakeholders and 
programming implemented from a variety of sectors and perspectives.   
The RDR-AF provided a method for holistically evaluating whether the recovery effort has 
achieved resilient disaster recovery, increased capacity to cope with future events, and addressed 
some of the underlying root causes of vulnerability. The RDR-AF explicitly implies that in order 
for recovery efforts to be defined as successful, there is a need to address all three concepts. As 
well, the holistic nature of these three concepts will help to determine how the recovery process 
impacted local conditions and potentially reduced the risk of future disasters. The model presents a 
multi-scalar approach to conceptualizing and evaluating disaster recovery: the various scales of 
vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods processes are recognized through the 
understanding of each concept, as discussed in chapter two.  
Figure 3.1: Resilient Disaster Recovery Assessment Framework 
  
In the resilient disaster recovery framework, the three bodies of literature discussed in chapter two 
































conceptualized along the three dimensions discussed in chapter two, including resistance, 
recuperation and creativity. Using this three-pronged approach provided a holistic understanding of 
the different components that make households and communities resilient and provides a linkage 
between different definitions of resilience, as well as concepts of coping capacity and adaptive 
capacity. This understanding of resilience also integrates a temporal and dynamic approach, 
focusing on both pre- and post-disaster conditions, as well as long term changes. This effectively 
links to longer-term development initiatives and ties into the idea ‘building back better’ through a 
focus on change, transformation and learning. The relationship between resilience and 
vulnerability is captured by the X-Y axis model depicted in Figure 2.6 and outlined in the literature 
review. Vulnerability is conceptualized through the Pressure-and-Release (PAR) model developed 
by Blaikie, et al. (1994) and Wisner, et al. (2004). The PAR model examines vulnerability using a 
political ecology approach that explores how larger-scale social, political and economic decisions 
and processes interact with the environmental processes linked to hazardous events. Political 
ecology approaches operate under three main assumptions: 
1. The costs and benefits associated with environmental processes are for the most part 
distributed among actors unequally;  
2. An unequal distribution of environmental costs and benefits works to either reinforce or 
reduce existing social and economic inequalities. This emphasizes that environmental and 
developmental processes are inherently linked, and; 
3. The differentiated social and economic impact of environmental processes has political 
implications in terms of the altered power of actors in relation to other actors. 
Consequently, environmental changes may result in wealth creation for some and 
impoverishment for others, and also alters the ability of actors to control or resist other 
actors (Bryant & Bailey, 1997, pp. 27-28).  
The PAR model effectively links to the ‘Access’ model, focusing on the role of livelihoods and 
how livelihoods are influenced by both structure and agency. The PAR and Access models were 
chosen as the conceptual framework for understanding vulnerability due to the explicit focus on 
place and exploring root causes of vulnerability, the acknowledgement of the role of recovery and 
reconstruction processes in perpetuating or reducing vulnerability and the incorporation of both 
structure and agency. The PAR and Access models also provide a multi-scalar bridge across large 
and small scales of focus, with the PAR focusing on the larger scale social, economic and political 
structural processes and the Access model focusing on more localized, individual decision-making 
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processes. Using the PAR and Access models as a framework for exploring disaster recovery 
efforts provides a conceptual link between vulnerability and sustainable livelihoods (SL) theories 
and models. While early work on sustainable livelihoods acknowledged the importance of security 
in the face of shocks and stresses, more recent work has recognized the value of explicitly linking 
vulnerability and sustainable livelihoods concepts (see the work of Birkmann & Fernando, 2008; 
Cannon, Twigg, & Rowell, 2003; Lautze & Raven-Roberts, 2006; Pomeroy, Ratner, Hall, 
Pimoljinda, & Vivekanandan, 2006; Regnier, et al., 2008).   
Sustainable livelihoods is conceptualized through the Department for International Development’s 
(DFID) Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF), specifically through the asset pentagon, with 
the addition of political and cultural capital. The SLF was selected due to the explicit recognition 
of the interactions between vulnerability, various capitals that people may have access to and the 
structures and processes that impact livelihood strategies and outcomes (DFID, 1999). The asset 
heptagon, representing social, natural, physical, human, financial, political and cultural capitals, 
provides a conceptualization of the inter-relationships between the various forms of capital within 
the vulnerability context. The asset heptagon also provides a method for structuring and organizing 
the research results in Chapter Six. Unfortunately, in the current state, the SLF, PAR and Access 
models do not effectively conceptualize resilience or coping/adaptive capacities and there is 
limited information on the relationship between these processes, particularly resilience and 
sustainable livelihoods. This research will attempt to fill a gap in the literature through the 
synthesizing of these models and furthering knowledge on the relationships between these 
concepts, particularly in the context of disaster recovery.  
The RDR-AF offers a unique approach for evaluating long-term disaster recovery operations that 
differs from the type of approaches outlined in the humanitarian impact literature. Humanitarian 
assistance evaluation tools have generally been developed to assess the impacts of specific 
programs (Hofmann, 2004), emphasize evaluation in conjunction with program objectives (Beck, 
2009), focus on net changes in outcomes (3ie, 2008), identify measurable outputs (ALNAP, 2006), 
and compare those receiving assistance to a control group that did not receive assistance4 
(Buttenheim, 2010). From this perspective, any net positive change or differences would then be 
used to define the effectiveness of recovery interventions. On the other hand, the RDR-AF 
                                                   
4
 The challenges of identifying a non-biased counterfactual have been identified, including the ethical 
considerations of withholding assistance to form a control group, the spillover effects of assistance may expose 




approach begins the assessment by conceptualizing resilient disaster recovery, thereby defining 
what successful recovery looks like, through the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and 
sustainable livelihoods. In this sense, the RDR-AF approach compares those receiving assistance 
to an idealized conceptualization of what post-disaster interventions could achieve5. Although both 
approaches seek to compare post-recovery conditions to baseline data established prior to the 
earthquake, the RDR-AF approach goes further to provide a holistic assessment of recovery 
efforts, as opposed to specific programs, and seeks to identify ongoing vulnerability conditions and 
livelihood issues, while still maintaining a focus on resiliencies and capacities. Thus, the RDR-AF 
provides a conceptual approach to assessing recovery programming; the effectiveness of this type 
of approach will be further discussed in chapter seven.  
3.1.2 Methodological Approaches    
While the RDR-AF provides a conceptualization of effective disaster recovery, the approaches 
used for data collection should also be outlined. As long-term, holistic disaster recovery 
assessments have been relatively rare, the following section draws on vulnerability, resilience and 
sustainable livelihoods assessment methods outlined in each respective literature. Within the 
vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods literature, there are an abundance of tools that 
can be used to assess these concepts: these tools provide direction regarding the criteria that should 
be examined, methods for collecting data, as well as systems for organizing and displaying data. 
The variety of approaches highlights the different ways that various organizations have assessed 
vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods, and are a reflection of the different 
conceptualizations discussed in chapter two.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a detailed overview of vulnerability, 
resilience and sustainable livelihoods methodologies, a summary of guidelines for data collection 
was derived from a review of selected tools developed by a variety of agencies. Appendix 7 
provides an overview of selected vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods tools. From 
this review, several important elements were identified to guide the data collection methods of this 
research. These contributions include:  
                                                   
5
 This conceptual approach is based on a three key assumptions, the first assumption is that the budget would exist 
in order to implement long-term programming. The second assumption is that governments, NGOs and impacted 
communities have an unlimited timeframe in which to make adjustments. Finally, the approach assumes that 
impacted communities are willing and interested in change.  
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1. Incorporating qualitative and participatory research methods that acknowledge the value of 
local knowledge and strategies; 
2. Placing vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods issues within the context of 
development initiatives occurring in the area; 
3. Developing an approach which is broad in nature and flexible enough to recognize the 
unique characteristics of each place, while at the same time providing information on 
indicators/guidelines for assessment, and; 
4. Examining vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods at a variety of scales to 
incorporate a review of both localized and larger-scale processes. 
In order to assess long-term recovery initiatives, the selection of variables used to explore concepts 
of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods needs to be grounded within a conceptual 
framework (Birkmann, 2007), in this case the RDR-AF model. In order to guide the research 
process and survey/questionnaire instrument, a review of the literature garnered some of the key 
elements/factors/attributes that should be analyzed for each of the three concepts. Table 3.1 
outlines how the various factors affecting vulnerability and resilience were explored under a 
sustainable livelihoods framework. Merging concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable 
livelihoods creates a matrix, whereby vulnerability and resilience concepts are explored under the 
asset heptagon derived from DFID’s SL framework. The matrix depicted in Table 3.1 was used as 
a guideline to develop the survey/questionnaire instruments as well as organizing the data results in 
chapter six. The research explored these factors from a process approach, focusing on how issues 
associated with each attribute changed over time, particularly emphasizing changes that were a 
result of post-disaster recovery programming.  
Table 3.1: Attributes Influencing Sustainable Livelihoods, Resilience and Vulnerability 
Sustainable Livelihoods Vulnerability Resilience 
Human Capital 
Access to and levels of education 
Household structure (age, gender) 
Quality/access to health services 
Disability 
Language skills 
Attitudes/perception towards hazards 
Experience/knowledge of hazards 
Health levels – ability to labour 
Variety of livelihood options 




Networks outside community 
Social isolation/marginalization 
Use of networks during recovery 
Ability to access external help 
Physical Capital 
Shelter (rent/own/quality) 
Access to infrastructure and lifelines 
Rural/urban environments 
Population density 
Access to tools for livelihoods 
Access to transportation/mobility 





Level of savings (cash/assets) 
Unemployment 
Access to loans/credit 
Security of income 
Local economy strength 
Diversity of livelihoods/economy 
Risk dispersion 
Natural Capital 
Physical landscape features 
Geographical exposure to hazards 
Climate change issues 






Strength of social programming 
Corruption 
Lack of cooperation 
Political ideologies  
Levels of awareness/preparedness 
Education/training opportunities 
Reaction times 
Quality/strength of local leadership 





Cultural beliefs limiting disaster 
preparedness 
Beliefs/customs enhancing resilience 
(Gotong Royong) 
Sense of community 
Individual/community values/attitudes 
Sources: (Adger, 2006; Adger, Brooks, Bentham, Agnew, & Eriksen, 2004; Birkmann, 2007; Birkmann & 
Wisner, 2006; Blaikie, et al., 1994; Brooks, Adger, & Kelly, 2005; Buckle, 1998; Buckle, 2001/2002; Buckle, 
Mars, & Smale, 2000; DFID, 1999; Fuchs, 2009; King, 2001; King & MacGregor, 2000; Paton, Millar, & 
Johnston, 2001; Pelling, 2003; Rygel, O'Sullivan, & Yarnal, 2006; Turvey, 2007; Wisner, et al., 2004; Yan & Xu, 
2010; Yohe & Tol, 2002) 
For certain attributes, there was difficulty distinguishing an attribute as only a vulnerability or 
resilience characteristic. In some cases, attributes could be expressed as both a characteristic of 
vulnerability and resilience. In other cases, attributes had the potential to act as a vulnerability in 
certain contexts and a resilient characteristic in other contexts. This presented difficulties in 
classifying attributes in either the vulnerability or resilience column. As both concepts were 
explored in this research, the matrix is intended to demonstrate the range of issues to be considered 
and not necessarily to depict a clear delineation of vulnerability and resilience factors nor to 
suggest cause and effect relationship among the concepts. The complexity of the inter-relationship 
between vulnerability and resilience is discussed further in chapter seven. 
3.2 Data Collection 
As noted in chapter one, the objectives of the research were to develop a refined conceptualization 
of resilient disaster recovery, empirically test the RDR-AF approach as an evaluative framework in 
a post-disaster setting, and provide empirical evidence regarding one long-term recovery effort. In 
order to achieve these goals, the research made use of a variety of data collection and analysis 
methods: the following section provides an overview of these methods. In order to apply the RDR-
AF, a case study approach was employed. The 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake and subsequent 
recovery effort served as the overall ‘case’ used to examine and evaluate the disaster recovery 
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process, and a series of embedded cases (i.e. multiple impacted villages) were used to draw out the 
depth and breadth of the post-disaster experience. A total of five villages were selected for 
inclusion in the research: an overview of the case study site and selected villages is provided in 
chapters four and five, respectively.  
The case study approach was selected as it “contributes uniquely to our knowledge of individual, 
organization, social, and political phenomena” (Yin, 2003, p. 2). This provides an ideal opportunity 
to explore the interactions between various small- and large-scale social, economic, political and 
environmental processes that create disaster events and influence disaster recovery. The case study 
method is a place-based approach that provides an inherently geographic focus: assessment focuses 
on “discrete ecosystems, groups, or places where the risks are better understood, and can be more 
easily traced to pertinent processes” and the “coupled social-ecological interactions…produce 
more meaningful, detailed, and policy-relevant insights” (Barnett, Lambert, & Fry, 2008, p. 105; 
115). As a consequence, local vulnerabilities, resiliencies and livelihood strategies can be placed 
within the context of larger-scale social, economic, political and institutional processes (Fuchs, 
2009). Case study approaches are also useful for developing new theories and conceptual 
frameworks, particularly in areas where the phenomenon is underexplored and under-theorized 
(Baxter, 2010). This is particularly relevant in the context of long-term disaster recovery, where in-
depth research and the development of theory has been limited (Barton, 1969; Lloyd-Jones, 2006; 
Rubin, Saperstein, & Barbee, 1985; Schwab, 1998).  
As one of the main objectives of the research was to explore long-term resilient disaster recovery 
as a process, the principal tools for collecting data were qualitative in nature. Qualitative research 
focuses on understanding “the social world through an examination of the interpretation of that 
world by its participants” (Bryman, 2001, p. 264). In this manner, qualitative approaches attempt to 
“make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2005, p. 3). Qualitative approaches allow the researcher to examine both the structures 
that impact individual and group behavior, as well as individuals’ experiences of places and events 
(Winchester & Rofe, 2010). Thus qualitative approaches are uniquely suited to examine the 
structural and agency processes highlighted in the research framework previously described.    
A variety of qualitative approaches were used during the research process, including household 
interviews (n=128), focus group discussions (n=5), interviews with government officials, NGO 
practitioners and academics (n=17), and ethnographic observation and secondary data collection. 
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The following sections provide an overview of each of these methods, the process of participant 
selection, and data collection methods. This is followed by a brief discussion of the use of research 
assistants who facilitated the research process.  
3.2.1 Household Interviews  
The interview is the one of the most common research methods used in qualitative research 
(Warren & Karner, 2010). Interviews can take a range of forms: structured - where the interview 
process is question-focused and all participants are asked the same questions in the same order; 
semi-structured - where interview questions are used as a guide and follow-up questions are 
content-focused and deal with issues judged to be relevant to the research questions; or 
unstructured - where the interview is interviewee-focused, and highlights personal perceptions and 
histories (Hay, 2010, pp. 109 - 111). In-depth interviews offer an opportunity to go beyond 
aggregated data and acquire a deeper understanding of complex behaviors, motivations and 
decisions of the individuals and communities under study (Dunn, 2010). Interviews are also an 
appropriate method for providing information about events, opinions and experiences and how 
these may vary among different groups (Dunn, 2010). Particularly in the context of post-disaster 
recovery, the interview method allows the impacted population to share their thoughts and 
opinions on the recovery process and the programs implemented by both domestic and foreign 
organizations. This makes interviews, and more specifically household interviews, an appropriate 
method for examining the in-depth experiences of households and communities impacted by the 
earthquake event and the subsequent recovery effort.   
Between 24 and 27 semi-structured household interviews were conducted in each village (ranges 
varied due to interviews that had to be discarded due to validity issues, as well as extra interviews 
that were conducted in some villages), focusing on individuals and households that were directly 
impacted by the earthquake event. Household interviews occurred over a five-month period (from 
mid-January 2011 until mid-June 2011), approximately five years following the earthquake 
disaster. Although the household interviews took place over a five-month period, the researcher 
was involved in community meetings and visits with leaders and households in each village for a 
seven-month period from early December 2010 until the beginning of July 2011. Each interview 
was approximately one hour in length, although this ranged from 20 minutes to over two hours, 
depending on the responses of the interviewee.  
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The purpose of these interviews was to provide demographic information (i.e. household size, 
economic activities, income levels, etc.) as well as information on their recovery experience, daily 
living conditions and ongoing characteristics of vulnerability and resilience. These semi-structured 
interviews followed a standard question format focusing on recovery, livelihood, vulnerability and 
resilience issues derived from Figure 3.1. Follow-up questions were designed to provide a flexible 
structure that allowed the interviewer to probe or prompt for further details or to further discussion 
on relevant topics (Dunn, 2010; Warren & Karner, 2010). Appendix 2 provides an overview of the 
interview guide used for the household interviews.  
In most cases, interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesian language, although some 
interviews were conducted in Javanese. Issues associated with the use of language are further 
discussed in section 3.4. Interview responses were either translated to the researcher during the 
interview and notes were taken in English, or were translated by the research assistants at a later 
date (in this case the research assistants made notes in both English and Indonesian). Interviews 
that were translated at a later date were then reviewed together with the researcher and any 
clarifications or additional information was added in. Throughout this dissertation, household 
interview citations are referred to with the ‘HI’ prefix. Please see Appendix 1 for a complete list of 
interview dates, language used and associated interview numbering collected in each village.    
Individuals and households were selected to complete interviews based on purposive, non-random 
sampling techniques, whereby pre-identified individuals and groups of individuals were targeted 
based on discussions from the vulnerability, sustainable livelihoods and disaster recovery literature 
(i.e. including various actors and strata of the community, such as wealthier, more politically 
powerful members of the community, community leaders, as well as the more vulnerable groups, 
such as those with low income, those living in high-risk locations, female-headed households, 
those with lower levels of education etc). Table 3.2 highlights the variety of households that were 
targeted in each village.  
In all villages, discussions were held with the head of the village regarding the requirements for 
research participants, and the researcher was provided a list of community leaders and potential 
households to be interviewed. A representative from the village was hired to accompany the 
researcher and assistants to the various households, as well as to introduce the research team on 
behalf of the village government. Additional participants not on the original lists were solicited by 
the researcher and research assistants by walking through the village and highlighting households 
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that fit into the desired categories (i.e. wealthier homes, poorer households, female respondents, 
households that were marginalized in some aspect). Fortunately, the response rate for the 
household interviews was 100%, with no households declining to participate in the study. Most 
households seemed eager to participate and welcome the researcher into their homes, almost 
always providing tea and refreshments, as well as providing tours of their homes and pointing out 
features of the buildings and land that were impacted by the earthquake and subsequent recovery 
efforts.   
Table 3.2: Household Interview Matrix 
Village: Puton Kategan Wonokromo Ngandong Sengon Total 
N = 25 24 27 25 27 128 
GENDER:       
Male 15 12 14 15 11 67 
Female 10 12 13 10 16 61 
AGE:       
20 - 29 1 0 2 1 3 7 
30 - 39 5 5 7 5 5 27 
40 - 49 7 11 7 10 8 43 
50 - 59 9 6 4 6 3 28 
60+ 3 1 6 3 5 18 
EDUCATION:       
Never attended 2 1 0 5 0 8 
Elementary 11 13 2 5 1 32 
Junior High 4 6 6 8 13 37 
High School 5 4 6 6 12 33 
Diploma 1 0 5 0 1 7 
University 0 0 5 1 0 6 
 
In lieu of providing compensation or gifts to households that participated in the research, the 
decision was made (based on recommendations from Indonesian academic partners as well as 
community leaders) to provide an overall donation to each community. Examples of community 
donations are highlighted in Figure 3.2. 
The use of one large community donation ensured that all community members would be able to 
‘participate in’ or ‘use’ the donated goods in order to reduce the potential for conflicts over 
participating in the research. In-kind donations or events were provided to each community based 
on the wants and needs of each particular village. In one village, the researcher funded and 
attended a community dancing event, with Jetilan dancers performing for the community, whereas 
another village received a playground set for their pre-school program. Other donations included 
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books for the public elementary schools in the village, funds to purchase chili plants for all 
households, and t-shirts for all government employees to be worn during exercise and gotong 
royong activities (refer to Figure 3.2). Each village donation cost approximately $200 CAD, 
resulting in a total donation cost of $1,000 CAD.  
Figure 3.2: Examples of Community Donations 
 
Interview data was collected in order to respond to the research questions outlined in the first 
chapter. The interviews were used to: provide information on local stakeholder perceptions of the 
recovery effort; provide insight into the relationship between vulnerability, resilience and 
sustainable livelihoods during the recovery period; providing a basis for assessing the overall 




3.2.2 Focus Groups 
Focus group discussions involve engaging a small group of participants (usually in the range of 4 - 
10 people) in a semi-structured dialogue focused around a particular topic (Bryman, 2001; 
Wilkinson, 2004). Focus groups can be useful for providing in-depth information on collective 
responses to events that go beyond what can be provided by individual interviews (Warren & 
Karner, 2010). Cameron (2010, p. 156) notes that focus group discussions can be particularly 
useful for “investigating not just what people think and do but why people think and behave as they 
do...[thereby providing an] understanding of people’s beliefs and practices”. While the focus group 
is intended to provide further information to supplement and interpret the ideas and opinions 
expressed by the household interview respondents, it also provides an opportunity for “people to 
explore different points of view and to formulate and reconsider their own ideas and 
understandings” (Cameron, 2010, p. 154). Focus group discussions may provide the opportunity 
for respondents to share their thoughts and opinions in a more naturalistic environment, engaging 
in dialogue and communication processes with friends and community members that may include 
informal components such as storytelling, joking, teasing, and disagreement (Wilkinson, 2004). 
This indicates that focus groups are particularly well-suited for exploring some of the underlying 
components of the overall community response and recovery effort in the post-disaster context.   
One focus group discussion was held in each village site, resulting in a total of five focus groups. 
Focus group discussions were held at the completion of the household interviews in order to ensure 
that the researcher had enough information regarding the overall recovery experience of each 
particular village. Questions focused on issues of vulnerability in the community, as well as 
resiliencies and livelihood strategies that could be employed to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Thus, 
although a focus group guideline was provided for the focus group discussions (refer to Appendix 
3) it was necessary to slightly revise the questions for each village in order to ensure relevancy of 
the questions asked. The focus group discussions were conducted in Bahasa Indonesian, and two 
research assistants were employed for the discussion. One female assistant was responsible for 
conducting the discussion in a culturally appropriate manner, as well as one male assistant who 
took notes and translated the discussion for the researcher. This allowed the researcher to directly 
ask questions during the discussion based on comments and responses from the participants. The 
researcher took notes in English during the focus group discussions based on the translations 
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provided, and follow-up discussions with both research assistants provided further insights into the 
comments and responses made by the participants.  
The focus group participants were selected based on recommendations from the village leader, as 
well as recommendations from the research assistants based on the responses in the household 
interviews. In the context of Indonesian village structure, different types of village leaders were 
selected for inclusion, including neighbourhood leaders, as well as leaders of social and religious 
organizations. In order to reduce social conflict and ‘loss of face’, in many cases it was necessary 
to invite a large number of participants, although not all invitees were able to attend. Thus, the 
focus groups ranged in size, with one village having seven participants, one village having eleven 
participants, and the remaining three villages each having nine participants. Throughout this 
dissertation, focus group discussions are referred to with the ‘FG’ prefix. Please see Appendix 1 
for a list of focus group participant numbers, dates and locations.    
The data obtained from these focus groups was used in conjunction with the household interview 
data to understand the overall recovery effort within the context of each village. While the 
household interviews provided valuable information about the recovery experiences of the 
individual household, the focus group discussions focused on aspects of vulnerability, resilience 
and sustainable livelihoods from a community perspective. The larger-scale perspective 
contributed to the multi-scalar approach set forth in the evaluation framework, and allowed for a 
more holistic understanding of the issues and recovery processes in each village. This provided 
further information to support the assessment of the recovery effort as well as inform the 
conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery.   
3.2.3 Expert Interviews 
In-depth semi-structured interviews (n = 17, see Table 3.3) were also conducted with various 
stakeholders and representatives from government, academic and humanitarian organizations in 
order to more fully understand the recovery and reconstruction process (refer to Appendix 4 for the 
expert interview guideline). Government and humanitarian interviews were able to provide specific 
information on decisions that were made during the recovery process, as well as how external 
factors (such as government bureaucracy, funding constraints, donor requirements, etc.) played a 
role in the decision-making process. Particularly for the academic and humanitarian interviews, 
respondents were able to place the Yogyakarta recovery effort within the wider context of 
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development and humanitarian aid, both in Indonesia as well as globally. As a result, the expert 
interviews provided valuable information regarding some of the larger scale processes that could 
be linked to the experiences and current conditions in each village.  
Expert interviews targeted government officials at multiple levels within Yogyakarta and Central 
Java province, academic institutions in Yogyakarta, as well as aid organizations and humanitarian 
practitioners still located in the region. Expert interviews included representatives from various 
humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations, the Java Reconstruction Fund, Oxfam, 
Cordaid, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB). 
Due to the confidential nature of the interviews, further subdivision or discussion of responses in 
relation to specific organizations is not provided. Expert interviews are referred to throughout this 
dissertation with an ‘E’ prefix and a full listing of expert interviewees is provided in Appendix 1.   
Table 3.3: Expert Interviewee Matrix 




Academic Institutions 5 
Government Officials 5 
Almost all of the expert interviews were conducted by the researcher in English, although one of 
the government official interviews was conducted in Bahasa Indonesian and required the use of a 
translator. Potential interviewees were selected through personal contacts at Gadjah Mada 
University and the Islamic University of Indonesia, as well as humanitarian organizations. These 
interviewees then provided recommendations and contact information for further expert interview 
participants in the study, a process known as ‘snowball sampling’. Almost all the interviews were 
conducted in person, although two interviews were conducted over the telephone due to the fact 
that the interviewees were now working in other locations (although they were involved in the 
recovery effort in Yogyakarta). All expert interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim 
(excluding the interview conducted in Bahasa Indonesian). In some of the interviews, particularly 
with the government officials, there was more than one representative attending the interview, and 
at times, sharing information. This would still be highlighted as one interview, as there was always 
a key person who responded to the majority of the questions.  
As noted above, the expert interviews provided ‘higher-order’ information on the recovery effort, 
highlighting the larger-scale processes that impacted the overall recovery effort. This provided 
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important information to assess the overall recovery effort, as well as to contribute to the 
conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery.  
3.2.4 Other Data Collection Methods 
While the household interviews, focus group discussions and expert interviews represent the 
majority of data collected to conduct the research, ethnographic observations and collection of 
secondary data sources also contributed information regarding the overall recovery effort. Direct 
ethnographic observation was used as an ongoing research method to “provide a rounded account 
of the lives of particular people” and to contribute to an overall understanding of the people and 
culture of Yogyakarta, as well as the recovery experience after the earthquake (Angrosino, 2005, p. 
741). The researcher spent extended periods of time in the selected villages, attending social events 
(such as soccer matches, gotong royong and posyandu6 activities, visits with villagers etc.), 
academic and government events, as well as multiple tours and walkabouts through each village. 
These observations and informal discussions provided a deeper understanding of the daily living 
conditions and cultural context of village life in the region, as well as a deeper appreciation of the 
issues and recovery processes that occurred after the earthquake event. These observations were 
recorded through field notes, journal entries and photos. In conjunction with direct observations, 
informal discussions were held with villagers, community leaders, research assistants, academics, 
as well as various individuals throughout Yogyakarta. Information obtained from these informal 
discussions is referred to with a ‘CM’ prefix in this dissertation. All together, these informal 
discussions provided valuable sources of information for the researcher.   
Finally, secondary data collection was used to provide further information on the specifics of the 
recovery effort, as well as outline any previous research that had been conducted in the region. 
During each expert interview, respondents were asked whether they had access to any documents, 
reports or evaluations that might be valuable to the research. Many of the humanitarian 
organizations provided copies of their annual reports and internal assessments. Academics at 
Gadjah Mada University provided access to their resources and facilities, allowing the researcher 
access to a variety of materials and documents to support the study. These documents were useful 
for placing the recovery experiences of each of the village sites within the context of the larger-
                                                   
6
 Gotong royong refers to collective activities conducted at the village level. Posyandu refers to community health 




scale recovery effort, as well as providing quantitative information on reconstruction and recovery 
programs.   
3.2.5 Research Assistants  
Employing research assistants throughout the data collection process was a necessity: the 
researcher did not have the Indonesian or Javanese language skills to conduct the interviews, nor a 
firm understanding of the cultural and linguistic subtleties that might underlie participant 
responses. The importance of employing competent and skilled research assistants to conduct and 
translate the household interviews and focus groups cannot be overemphasized: research has 
indicated that language has an influence on how people see and think about various phenomena, 
resulting in significant impacts on worldviews and understandings of particular events (Boroditsky, 
2010; Sapir, 1951; Whorf, 1956). Language is the primary means of reflecting social and cultural 
practices, and as such, the research assistant plays the role of a cultural mediator between the 
researcher and the research participants (Steger, 2004). Language also plays a significant role in 
terms of how meaning is constructed, and how specific phenomena or events are interpreted and 
expressed (Howitt & Stevens, 2010). As a consequence, effective research assistants act not only 
as a translator of language, but of meaning, social customs, and cultural perspectives.    
Research assistants were hired through recommendations from Yogyakarta-based academic 
partners at both Gadjah Mada University and the Islamic University of Indonesia (UII). In the 
initial phase, two research assistants were hired (one male and one female) in order to facilitate the 
selection of village sites, pilot test the interview and focus group questions, as well as begin the 
process of household interviewing. The experience and connections of the female research 
assistant led to her taking on a role which was primarily to connect to potential village sites, 
arrange meetings with community leaders following appropriate cultural protocols and to make the 
logistical arrangements for conducting the research. The male research assistant’s role differed due 
to his superior English, Javanese and Bahasa language skills, which allowed him to conduct and 
translate the interviews and focus group discussions. Although extensive training was provided to 
this research assistant (e.g. in ethical matters, types of questions and follow-up questions asked) 
due to translation and validity issues with some of the results, it was necessary to re-interview and 
conduct new interviews towards the end of the data collection period. Of the original 118 
interviews conducted, 36 were discarded completely, 18 were never translated, and 64 were 
selected for re-interview to confirm the data and ensure consistency between the first and second 
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interview periods. Of the 64 selected for re-interview, only 52 were included in the final data set 
due to difficulty finding some of the previous interview participants, and mismatching data. Two 
new research assistants, both female, were hired to conduct the re-interviews along with 78 new 
interviews. In the second phase of interviewing, follow-up and new interviews were recorded in 
order to provide quality control and support the translation of interviews. Due to time constraints, 
the interview question guideline in Appendix 2 was used in a more structured nature to provide 
further guidance to the research assistants as they conducted their interviews. This will be further 
discussed during the challenges and limitations section. One of these new research assistants had 
been heavily involved in previous research regarding the earthquake and subsequent recovery 
efforts, and was able to provide detailed information and context for the responses of many of the 
interviewees. Throughout the entire research period, all four research assistants provided 
substantial information regarding the context of Javanese social and cultural traditions, as well as 
understandings of their experiences conducting the research and how they interpreted different 
responses.  
3.2.6 Research Ethics  
In order to conduct the research, there was a series of ethical and research permit procedures that 
were completed in order to obtain approval to begin the research process. First, the research 
methods were reviewed by the Office of Research Ethics (ORE) at the University of Waterloo. 
This involved completing the required forms, including outlining the research proposal, details of 
the study, research methods and identifying potential risks to the participants in the study. 
Furthermore, the informed consent process was outlined and methods for maintaining anonymity 
of participants and confidentiality of data during the research process as well the dissemination of 
research results were outlined. Recruitment scripts and interview guidelines were reviewed by the 
ORE and a few minor recommendations were made to improve the quality and procedures 
involved with recruiting participants and obtaining consent. All research methods complied with 
the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (2nd Edition).  
In order to conduct the research in Indonesia, it was necessary to apply for a research permit 
through the State Ministry of Research and Technology (RISTEK). This required partnering with a 
local scientist from an Indonesian university or research institute, in this case, the Tsunami 
Disaster and Mitigation Research Centre (TDMRC) connected with Syiah Kuala University in 
Banda Aceh. The application required submission of the research proposal, letters of 
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recommendation, letter of support from the TDMRC, health certificates, and personal supporting 
documentation (e.g. copy of passport, photographs etc.). Once the research permit application was 
approved, the researcher was granted a visa to enter the country for research purposes. On arrival 
in Jakarta, the researcher reported to the RISTEK office to obtain the research permit card and 
letters to submit to other related government agencies at both the central and provincial levels (e.g. 
Police Headquarters, Home Affairs Department, Immigration Office etc.). Through this process, 
the researcher was granted the Traveling Permit (Surat Keterangan Jalan) and a Limited Stay 
Permit Card (KITAS). These permits were required at the local level to indicate to the local 
community governments that the research had been reviewed by the Central government and 
appropriate permissions had been obtained. This facilitated entry into the research communities in 
order to begin the data collection process.      
3.3 Data Analysis 
Although case study research suggests that results are based on the “investigator’s own style of 
rigorous thinking, along with the sufficient presentation of evidence and careful consideration of 
alternative interpretations” (Yin, 2003, p. 110), an approach to manage, organize and critically 
analyze the data is still required. In order to effectively evaluate the various data sources, a series 
of separate data analysis techniques were conducted. The analysis helped to reduce the large 
amount of data collected in order to arrange the comments along common themes, as well as 
explore the data set in order to generate theory on the disaster recovery process (Cope, 2010). The 
following section outlines the process of how each type of data was organized and analyzed.  
3.3.1 Household Interviews 
The household interviews were analyzed using two main processes. The first was to statistically 
compare and describe different responses and relationships, whereas the second was to 
qualitatively assess themes from the interviews themselves. In order to initiate both the statistical 
and qualitative approaches, the data were entered into an excel spreadsheet and responses were 
categorized under key themes, called descriptive or topic codes (Cope, 2010). The descriptive 
coding process organized the data and allowed for description, categorization and reflection 
(Morse & Richards, 2002). These descriptive codes were a manifestation of the types of questions 
asked to household interviewees and included such themes as ‘livelihood strategies’ or ‘hazard 
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mitigation strategies’. Demographic information was included in this spreadsheet in order to 
compare variations in household responses to demographic variables.  
For some of the identified research themes, the data allowed for statistical descriptions of the 
results. In these cases, the data were numerically coded based on defining responses into set 
categories. The coding technique allowed for multiple responses, for example, in the occupation 
category, respondents may be engaged in more than one income generating activity, so the coding 
process made provisions for those circumstances. For some themes and categories, it was fairly 
clear how to code the data, although the qualitative nature of the data collection limited this 
technique for other themes. For themes where coding and statistical descriptions did not suit the 
data, coding and statistical descriptions were not completed in order to maintain the integrity of the 
data and analysis. In other cases, the nature of interview responses limited the reliability of using 
statistical methods. This was due to the type of follow-up questions asked (i.e. not all interviewees 
were asked the same questions) as well as the comments provided by respondents. In these cases, 
qualitative methods provided a more appropriate analysis strategy.  
In terms of the qualitative analysis, the data were analyzed using both the categorized data in the 
spreadsheet (i.e. examining themes within the data subset of hazard mitigation strategies) as well 
as exploring themes through analysis of the entirety of each interview. Although the interviews 
were not translated and transcribed verbatim, the translated interview documents provided a 
detailed summary of interviewee comments, allowing for detailed qualitative analysis. These 
interviews were coded using open coding: open coding is an inductive process whereby data and 
concepts in the interviews are linked and labelled based on previously identified theoretical 
constructs, as well as emerging patterns and trends (Morse & Richards, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). This type of analytic description involved the “identification of recurrent patterns or themes 
and attempting to construct a cohesive representation of the data” (Warren & Karner, 2010, p. 
218). These recurrent themes were then linked back to identified issues in the research literature in 
order to develop interpretations of the phenomena occurring in the case study.  
3.3.2 Focus Group Discussions  
The focus group discussions were analyzed similarly to the household interviews. The focus group 
responses were analyzed using the same open coding and analytical description process described 
above. The discussions were organized along a series of themes and were used to clarify or 
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corroborate information provided in the household interviewee responses, as well as to provide 
new insight and information on village conditions and the overall recovery experience from a 
larger-scale perspective.   
3.3.3 Expert Interviews  
Almost all the expert interviews were conducted in English, allowing for a slightly different 
method of organization and analysis compared to the household interviews. Expert interviews were 
conducted by the researcher and recorded and transcribed verbatim. Consequently, the analysis of 
the comments and word choices of the interviewees as compared to the household interviews was 
more detailed. While the expert interviews provided important information on the overall 
characteristics and decision-making processes involved in the Yogyakarta earthquake recovery 
effort, the responses also provided an opportunity to link back to higher-order initiatives in the 
development and humanitarian aid industry.  
3.3.4 Data Triangulation  
An important aspect of the data analysis process was triangulating the various data sources in order 
to ensure rigour and validity of the research process (Bradshaw & Stratford, 2010). As a research 
strategy, triangulation “involves using several methods to reveal multiple aspects of a single 
empirical reality...a discovery process designed to get at an objective truth that may be 
systematized as a formal theory of social structure and process” (Miller & Fox, 2004, pp. 35-36). 
Triangulation is also an approach that allows multiple and diverse viewpoints to contribute and 
cast light on the same topic or phenomena under study (Olsen, 2004). As a result, triangulation 
provided an opportunity to explore the different perceptions and experiences of disaster recovery 
within the context of the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake.  
In order to contribute to the process of triangulation, responses in interviews and focus group 
discussions held at the village scale were compared and contrasted to each other as well as to 
secondary data sources, including government and NGO reports, previous research publications, as 
well as academic and newspaper articles. Comparisons and corroborations were also made between 
responses at the village level to interviews conducted with government and humanitarian 
practitioners in order to obtain a more holistic understanding of how and why decisions were made 
and the impacts this had on the villages under study. The first-hand observations by the researcher 
also helped to corroborate or question comments made by all the respondents in the research. 
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3.3.5 Reporting Data Results 
In the results and discussion chapters, the research outcomes are discussed using relative terms, as 
opposed to absolute terms. While some descriptive statistical results are provided, the overall 
research aims were not intending to provide definitive statistical measurements of the number of 
responses falling into specific categories. Instead, the research approach aimed to highlight the 
degree of experiences and conditions associated with vulnerability, resilience and sustainable 
livelihoods in the recovery process following the earthquake disaster. In order to provide some 
guidelines as to the terminology used to frame the research results, the following section provides 
an overview of specific terms used throughout the remainder of the dissertation.  
Small number: Refers to the smallest number of responses, with generally anywhere from 
one to five (a small percentage) interviewees mentioning a particular issue.    
Few:  Refers to a small percentage of respondents, although slightly more than a 
small number.    
Some:  Refers to instances where there are an unknown number of respondents 
(e.g. one respondent may have mentioned as an issue affecting several 
households although only a small number of respondents raised the issue). 
This term also refers to anywhere from 10 - 20 interviewees providing 
similar responses related to a particular issue. In certain cases, the term 
‘some’ is representative of a similar proportion of a smaller group of 
respondents (e.g. refers to a relative proportion of households engaged in 
farming activities).    
Number:   Similar to the term ‘some’, the term is used to express an unknown number 
of respondents whereby household interviews indicated the issue affected a 
larger proportion of villagers although precise estimates are unknown.  
Several:  Refers to approximately 20 - 30% of respondents. This term is also used in 
proportion to the specific group referred to.  
Many:  Refers to issues/areas where a substantial number of respondents provided 
similar comments. The use of ‘many’ implies that the proportion of 
responses is approaching a majority.  
Majority:   Refers to instances where over half of the proportion of respondents 
indicated the same or similar responses.    
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3.4 Challenges and Limitations  
As with any research, a variety of challenges and limitations were encountered. As the case study 
site was located in Indonesia, this presented a variety of ethical, methodological and logistical 
issues in terms of completing the data collection process. Household interviews, focus group 
discussions, expert interviews and many secondary data sources were conducted in a language not 
readily spoken by the researcher. The researcher was visibly a foreigner working in the context of a 
hierarchal society whereby class, income, religion, education and ethnicity play a role in everyday 
social interactions and power relationships. In some cases this may have worked to the advantage 
of the researcher as participants were eager to participate and share their opinions and ideas, 
although there were obvious disadvantages in terms of misunderstandings, lack of trust, 
expectations of donations etc. Researchers have noted that these differences between researcher 
and research participants (termed social distances) can impact the overall research process: 
“interviewees may not trust us, they may not understand our questions, or they may purposely 
mislead us in their responses” (Miller & Glassner, 2004, p. 128). Although in some instances this 
may have been the case, during the research, the author took the time to seek local support and 
consent for the research, participated in local events with villagers and attempted to ensure the 
cultural appropriateness of data collection methods. Due to the culturally sensitive approach used, 
it was found that the majority of participants appreciated the significance of the research, were 
interested in participating and sharing their ideas and perceptions, and viewed the researcher as a 
useful advocate for expressing the needs of the village (Howitt & Stevens, 2010). While the 
positive response from villagers contributed to a productive research environment, there were still 
some issues and challenges that arose during the data collection period. The following sections 
provide an overview of the challenges of conducting the research, the limitations of the data 
collected, as well as the mitigation strategies employed to circumvent these challenges and 
limitations.    
3.4.1 Research Challenges  
In terms of language difficulties, several challenges were presented when conducting the research. 
Language limitations may present a challenge in obtaining accurate understandings of local 
survivors’ opinions, attitudes and perceptions (Steger, 2004). While the use of skilled translators 
and research assistants were employed, the chance of misinterpretation remains (Hutchings, 2004). 
The perceptions of the participants experienced a double interpretation as their ideas and words 
77 
 
were both translated in language, as well as filtered through an intermediary. In many cases, the 
research assistants provided a summary translation of the statements made by interviewees, as 
opposed to word for word translations. This may have led to misinterpretations, misperceptions 
and/or translation errors although every effort was made to clarify and repeat statements back to 
interviewees to ensure accuracy.  
There were also issues associated with the use of Bahasa Indonesian language to conduct the 
interviews. While the male research assistant was able to conduct interviews in Javanese when 
deemed necessary, the two follow-up research assistants had limited to no Javanese language 
skills. In the context of Javanese hierarchal culture, this meant that respondents speaking Bahasa 
Indonesian were speaking ‘up’ to the research assistants due to the latter’s higher education and 
use of a formally-taught language. Thus, the hierarchal nature of the cultural context as well as the 
limited Javanese language skills of the research assistants may have hindered the ability to obtain a 
more accurate and fuller understanding of the interviewees’ thoughts and opinions on the recovery 
effort. The final impact that language had on the research was through the collection of secondary 
data sources. Multiple Indonesian universities in the area had conducted research on the earthquake 
event and the subsequent recovery programs, although many of these documents were published 
only in Bahasa Indonesian. The time and cost constraints associated with translating these 
documents word-for-word meant that many of these reports were skimmed for the analysis.   
The culture and societal structure of the study region also had an impact on interviewee responses 
at both the household and expert levels. Javanese culture has a multitude of hierarchal and societal 
structures associated with use of language, negotiated social landscapes and prescribed gender 
roles (Lamoureux, 2003). Particularly with the poorer, more marginalized villagers, there were 
difficulties associated with respondents feeling comfortable in stating their thoughts and opinions. 
Many respondents from these groups noted that they were not in a position to critique the response 
and recovery efforts of the government and humanitarian organizations, and refrained from 
providing responses. Furthermore, Javanese culture values order, peace and harmony, with 
individuals rarely disagreeing with others face-to-face, criticisms generally being stated in a polite 
manner, mistakes being seldom acknowledged in order to save face, and deference being given to 
those in higher social, political and economic positions (Forshee, 2006). This may have limited 
interactions within the focus group discussions, with participants rarely contradicting the 
statements of other participants.     
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As would be expected in any research, on occasion there were also issues associated with the 
research assistants themselves. In some cases, research assistants did not ask, or did not follow-up 
with all interview questions, resulting in a fairly significant (approximately 20%) lack of data for 
some questions. In some instances, research assistants may have asked interview questions in a 
leading manner, particularly if interviewees had difficulty responding to a particular question. 
Furthermore, misunderstandings and miscommunications resulted in interviews that had to be 
removed from the final data due to validity issues. This resulted in two sets of data that were 
collected: the initial set of 52 interviews conducted with one research assistant, and another phase 
of interviewing conducted with two new research assistants. Although it is recognized that there 
may be some consistency issues in terms of how research assistants asked the interview questions, 
the researcher made every attempt to maintain linearity between the two interview phases. 
Questions were standardized in the second phase, and interviews were conducted together in the 
initial training phase (i.e. both research assistants, along with the researcher, were together with the 
interviewee for the first village follow-up and new interviews). The second phase interviewees 
were also asked to restate their opinions on some questions in order to ensure consistency of their 
responses. All translated interviews were reviewed together with the researcher and both research 
assistants in order to discuss any issues arising each day, and ensure some level of uniformity. 
While the author has highlighted the issues in terms of organizing and maintaining consistent 
standards among a research team of five individuals (the researcher and four research assistants), 
overall, the research assistants greatly improved the research and data collection process as well as 
provided valuable connections, information, knowledge and insight into Javanese culture and 
village life, the overall recovery effort as well as appropriate procedures and conduct in a variety of 
contexts.  
3.4.2 Mitigation Strategies for Research Challenges  
Two main strategies were used throughout the research in order to mitigate the issues associated 
with conducting research in a culturally, linguistically and socially different context. The first was 
to employ the use of local research assistants to conduct the interviews in at least one of the two 
local languages; the second was to pilot test the interview and focus group questions with 
community leaders and research participants in order to allow input and influence over the data 
collection process.  
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As noted above, four research assistants were used throughout the research process to facilitate the 
collection of data. Training and daily discussions on interpretation and language issues helped to 
ensure that the assistants were understanding the needs and requirements of the project, as well as 
to ascertain any of the issues they may have had with the interview questions or conducting the 
household interviews. The researcher accompanied and attended all household interviews and 
focus group discussions, which allowed the research assistants to translate directly in the field (on 
some occasions) and discuss where further clarifications were required. Along with these research 
assistants, connections with village leaders, the use of community representatives while conducting 
the household interviews, as well as the careful selection of households that would be included in 
the research, all contributed to mitigating some of the challenges of conducting research in a 
foreign language and culture.  
The second mitigation method that was used during the interviews was to establish rapport and 
support the opinions and ideas of community leaders and research participants (Warren & Karner, 
2010). Community leaders and research participants were given the opportunity to reflect on the 
questions asked and methods for improving responses (Miller & Glassner, 2004). For example, in 
the pilot testing phase, respondents noted the difficulty in answer the questions regarding the 
‘success’ of the recovery effort. They felt the term ‘success’ implied the recovery was finished and 
therefore, made it difficult to respond to the question. Instead, the questions were revised slightly 
in order to obtain information about what respondents felt was done well, what could be improved 
and what their opinions were on what would define a ‘finished’ recovery effort. While this did not 
result in a significant change in the actual questions asked, it demonstrates that community 
members felt comfortable sharing their thoughts and making recommendations regarding the 
research process. Community leaders were able to provide feedback on the appropriateness of 
certain questions and methods for facilitating dialogue with interviewees. Engaging in a process of 
discussion with community leaders allowed the leaders some input and influence in the research 
process and increased their willingness to participate and facilitate participation from community 
members.  
3.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The methodology chapter has highlighted the preliminary conceptual framework for the research, 
focusing on how resilient disaster recovery can be understood through the concepts of 
vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods. This framework was used as the basis for the 
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evaluative approach for assessing long-term recovery after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, 
providing an idealized conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery to which the research results 
could be compared. Furthermore, the conceptual framework provided the preliminary foundation 
for understanding resilient disaster recovery which will be further refined in chapter seven.   
An overview of the research methods was provided, focusing on how the qualitative research 
methods were instrumental in providing an in-depth understanding of the recovery process as well 
as local perceptions of the recovery program. Research methods consisted of a variety of 
approaches, including semi-structured household interviews, focus group discussions, expert 
interviews with academic, government officials and NGO practitioners, as well as participation 
observation and analysis of secondary sources. This created a multi-scalar approach whereby 
household interviews focused on the individual/household/community level, focus group 
discussions emphasized a community-level understanding of the recovery effort, and the expert 
interviews provided larger-scale (provincial, national and international) perspectives on issues of 
vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods. Data analysis methods highlighted how the 
multiple methods were brought together to provide a holistic understanding of the recovery effort 
from multiple perspectives and angles.  
Finally, some of the challenges and limitations of the data set were discussed, including language 
and cultural barriers, although the strategies used to mitigate these issues demonstrates how the 
local villages were included and facilitated the research process. While chapter three has 
summarized the research framework and data collection methods, the following chapter provides 
an overview of the case study site in order to provide sufficient background information to support 




4.0 INDONESIA AND THE 2006 YOGYAKARTA EARTHQUAKE  
The case study site selected as the basis for this research is the 2006 Yogyakarta, Indonesia 
earthquake event. As one of the most hazard-prone countries in the world, Indonesia has 
experienced a long and storied history with disaster events. Catastrophic events such as the 
eruption of Krakatoa in 1883, as well as the more recent 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that 
devastated the province of Aceh and resulted in over 220,000 deaths, have been well-publicized 
and well-studied (Clarke, Fanany, & Kenny, 2010). Smaller disaster events, such as floods, and 
landslides, although not as widely publicized internationally, occur on a regular basis throughout 
the country (IRIN, 2010). Arising from this frequent exposure to hazards and disasters is an 
increasing recognition of the need to incorporate a holistic approach to disaster management and 
risk reduction measures.  
It is within this context of shifting disaster management paradigms that the Yogyakarta earthquake 
occurred on May 27, 2006. As a consequence of the earthquake event, there were considerable 
damages to buildings and livelihoods in the region, leading to a significant long-term recovery 
program. The long-term recovery program provided the basis for the case study analysis in order to 
achieve the three objectives set forth at the beginning of the dissertation. These include refining the 
conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery, empirically testing the RDR-AF as an evaluative 
framework that incorporates the intersections of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable 
livelihoods in the post-disaster context, as well as providing empirical evidence of one long-term 
disaster assessment.     
In order to provide sufficient background information to support the results and discussion 
sections, this chapter provides a brief history of Indonesia, as well as Indonesia’s experience with 
hazards and associated policy approaches. Such information is useful for understanding the 
historical, political and legal context in which the earthquake event occurred. This is followed by 
an overview of the selected case study, the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, including the damages 
and losses, the recovery program and early assessments of the recovery as examined by the various 
NGOs involved in the reconstruction effort.   
4.1 Indonesia 
The islands of Indonesia are located in Southeast Asia, as shown in Figure 4.1, and have a 
population of just over 240 million, making it the fourth most populated country in the world 
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(World Bank, 2011). With over 17,500 islands, 1,000 of which are permanently settled, this vast 
archipelago has a high degree of diversity, with over 200 major cultural and linguistic groups 
(Vickers, 2005). Home to the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia is actually a 
secular nation with a history of attempting to build religious tolerance, specifically under the 
national ideology of pancasila7 (Ricklefs, 2008). Although it is difficult to provide a summary of 
such diversity in traditions, cultures and history, the following sections provide a brief overview of 
the history of Indonesia, in order to provide context for its experiences with natural disasters and 
how this has contributed to the current disaster mitigation policy context.  
Figure 4.1: The Islands of Indonesia 
 
Source: (CIA, 2012) 
4.1.1 Brief History of Indonesia 
While the various islands of Indonesia have each enjoyed a long and rich history, the formation of 
the modern territory can be traced back to the beginning of Dutch colonial rule, with the 
establishment of the United East Indies Company in Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1619 (Vickers, 
2005). Over the next 200 years, the Dutch expanded their control over the islands of Java, parts of 
Sumatra, Sulawesi, Timor and Maluku. As the Dutch expanded their empire into Kalimantan, New 
Guinea, Bali and Lombok during the late 19th century, some areas engaged in negotiations with the 
colonial power, whereas others engaged in conflicts, particularly in Aceh and Bali (Ricklefs, 
                                                   
7
 Pancasila refers to the Indonesian national ideology first espoused by Sukarno in 1945. The five principles are: 
the principle of one lordship, humanitarianism, nationalism/national unity, democracy, and social justice 
(Darmaputera, 1988; Vickers, 2005).  
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2008). By the 1920s, the Dutch East Indies territory had expanded to include the many islands that 
make up the current country of Indonesia today. It was during this period, in the beginning decades 
of the 20th century, that the nationalist movement in Indonesia began to develop; previous to this 
period there had been limited nationalist spirit as the colony had only recently been united as ‘the 
Indies’ by the Dutch (Bertrand, 2004; Emmerson, 2005; Vickers, 2005).  
During World War II, Dutch control over the Indies colony collapsed and the islands of Indonesia 
were occupied by the Japanese from 1942 – 1945. Under the Japanese occupation, sentiments of 
Indonesian nationalism and anti-Western campaigns grew, and in some cases, were actively 
encouraged and mobilized by the Japanese (Lamoureux, 2003; Ricklefs, 2008). After the Japanese 
defeat at the end of the Second World War in 1945, Indonesia, under the leadership of Sukarno, 
declared independence, although four years of hostilities, negotiations and UN intervention were 
required until the Dutch relinquished their authority in 1949 (Lane, 2008). Sukarno had the 
difficult task of trying to unite a culturally and linguistically diverse nation that had been through 
years of brutal hardship, suffering, violence and dislocation, as well as an economy that had been 
depressed through Japanese occupation and a colonial system designed to extract natural resources 
and send profits overseas (Vickers, 2005). During his time in power, under the slogan of ‘guided 
democracy’, President Sukarno viewed the primary role of the state as a means to improve the 
living standards and welfare of the people and focused on improving access to education, health 
and basic necessities. Sukarno’s socialist approach alienated the United States and Britain, and 
Sukarno increasingly turned to communist Russia and China for foreign aid and assistance (Lane, 
2008; Vickers, 2005). Throughout this period, large-scale development initiatives focused on 
perpetuating and maintaining Indonesian nationalistic sentiments through grandiose buildings and 
monuments, and hostility towards Western democratic and capitalist systems led to an internal 
economic approach (Lamoureux, 2003).  
During the 1960s, economic problems in Indonesia were exacerbated by increasing foreign 
indebtedness, falling exports and increasing inflation rates (Ricklefs, 2008). In 1965, divisions 
within the military came to a head as factions (namely members from the air force and Sukarno’s 
praetorian guard) supporting Sukarno killed several of the country’s generals (Lane, 2008). This 
action was heavily suppressed by other factions of the military, under the leadership of Major-
General Suharto. Major-General Suharto was able to gain control of the capital, Jakarta, and 
denounced the uprising as a coup enacted by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) (Vickers, 
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2005). Suharto’s coup set into action a period of intense violence whereby civilians were 
encouraged, with the support of the army, to violently attack alleged communists. The communist 
party was banned and it is estimated that between 500,000 - 1,000,000 Indonesians were killed and 
several hundred thousand more were imprisoned during this period of violence (Lane, 2008; 
Vickers, 2005). In 1966, the politically weakened Sukarno transferred much of his power over to 
General Suharto, and by 1968, Suharto was declared ‘Acting President’ (Ricklefs, 2008; Vickers, 
2005).  
With the Suharto, or New Order, government, sweeping economic reforms were introduced, 
including emphasis on foreign direct investment, deregulation and liberalization of capital 
movement (Iqbal & Rashid, 2002). International support for this transition by Western countries, 
particularly the United States, allowed Indonesia to re-engage with international economic 
institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Significant 
levels of foreign aid and loans, as well as debt restructuring provided massive amounts of funding 
for economic development and industrialization efforts (Lamoureux, 2003; Ricklefs, 2008). Many 
of the economic development policies during this period focused on the extraction and exportation 
of natural resources, although President Suharto struggled to balance external demands from the 
US, World Bank and IMF for deregulation and internal desires for national protectionism (Potter, 
Binns, Elliott, & Smith, 2004; Vickers, 2005). 
President Suharto’s regime was supported through a series of violent campaigns that instilled terror 
and fear among the population and suppressed many forms of opposition to his leadership (Hefner, 
2005; Lane, 2008). The violent suppression of political and student groups, independence 
movements (particularly in Aceh, East Timor, Papua and Irian Jaya), as well as Islamic 
organizations all contributed to the centralization of power within Suharto’s government and 
military elite (McVey, 2003). Propaganda, strict central control over media and newspapers, as 
well as censorship were all components of a state-run terror program designed to maintain control 
and order over a large population (Vickers, 2005). The regime was also supported through the 
sharing of benefits among an elite group that helped maintain Suharto’s power and control over the 
economy. Massive corruption of foreign aid, the establishment and building of alliances of wealthy 
conglomerates and monopolies, the forcible acquisition of successful businesses, and the fleecing 
of revenue through state controlled institutions (such as banks and Ministries) led to the 
establishment of an ultra-wealthy elite group of Indonesians (Clear, 2005). Connections to these 
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ultra-elite provided ample economic benefits and helped contribute to the rise of the upper-middle 
class in Indonesia (Ricklefs, 2008; Vickers, 2005).  
Although foreign aid and state revenue was heavily corrupted by the governing bodies, remaining 
amounts were used to provide programs and development projects to help the poor. Major 
improvements in basic infrastructure, such as road and transportation systems, as well as water and 
sanitation projects, the provision of primary education for all, improvements in the provision of 
health services, increases in rice production, and the rapid expansion of employment in basic 
manufacturing all led to increases in basic welfare and measures of standard of living (Ricklefs, 
2008).     
During the late 1980s and 1990s, a series of domestic and international events lead to rapid 
changes within Indonesia and the government system. The end of the Cold War coincided with US 
efforts to push forth a neo-liberal, free-market agenda. Controlling and corrupt dictators, such as 
Suharto, were seen as obstacles in the way of promoting economic development through free-
market policies (Vickers, 2005). Organizations, such as the World Bank, began shifting funding 
away from corrupt governments, particularly in Indonesia where corruption levels reached almost 
30% (Ricklefs, 2008). The memory of the still popular Sukarno and the 50th anniversary of 
Independence in 1995, the death of President Suharto’s wife in 1996, and the Bre-X gold scandal8 
involving Suharto’s children and friends all contributed to growing resentment against the Suharto 
regime (Lane, 2008; Vickers, 2005). The final straw was the Asian financial crisis of 1997. In 
Indonesia, the Asian crisis led to the collapse of numerous industries and a severe plunge in value 
of the Rupiah (Clear, 2005). This coincided with a severe drought event, as well as large forest 
fires in Kalimantan that served to further harm the international reputation of Suharto (Stolle & 
Tomich, 1999). Calls for reform were heard from all aspects of society and attempts to violently 
suppress protests were met with outrage and further violence (Lane, 2008; Ricklefs, 2008; Vickers, 
2005). Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998, promoting B.J. Habibie, the former Vice-President, to 
become Indonesia’s third president. Although Habibie was never able to distance himself from his 
relationship with Suharto, he achieved significant reforms during his short presidency (Lamoureux, 
2003). He reduced the power of the military, lifted censorship bans on the media, decentralized the 
                                                   
8
 After it was reported that large gold deposits had been found in Kalimantan, several firms, including Bre-X, 
were involved in a bidding war for the rights to these deposits. After initial investments and numerous offers to 
the Suharto children and friends, it was discovered that no gold deposits actually existed in Kalimantan and the 
geological reports had been fraudulent. The loss of millions on this fraudulent report severely harmed Indonesia’s 
international reputation and led to reluctance of foreign investment in the country.  
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government system and restructured the economic system under the mandate set forth by the IMF 
(Clear, 2005). Although these actions helped to decrease the amount of control maintained by 
Suharto affiliates, it also contributed to significant reductions of the middle class, reduced the real 
value of wages by 40% and increased poverty rates by 100% (Vickers, 2005).  
Habibie’s short presidency was followed by the first elected president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, leader of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Muslim religious organization. Wahid’s inconsistent 
and informal style made him an unpopular leader, and his reconciliatory approach offended both 
the military and his own political party (Vickers, 2005). After a series of crises, Wahid was 
impeached in July 2001 and replaced with Megawati Sukarnoputri, the former President Sukarno’s 
daughter. Megawati’s lack of experience and inability to engage in meaningful reforms, and in 
fact, engaging in corrupt and oligarchic behaviour, demonstrated the difficulty of shifting from a 
government system entrenched in corruption and New Order-style thinking (McVey, 2003; 
Vickers, 2005). The period from Suharto’s ousting in 1998 until the end of Megawati’s presidency 
was marred by violence, conflict and attempts to destabilize the new democratic government 
system. The rise of ethnic violence, fundamentalist Islamic terrorism, violence between military, 
police, political groups and other organizations attempting to assert power, as well as continuing 
independence movements in Aceh, Papua and East Timor all contributed to a feeling of instability 
and uncertainty (Ricklefs, 2008). During this period of continued crisis, Indonesia was on the brink 
of social, political and economic collapse (Bresnan, 2005; Rondonuwu, 2009).  
The second direct presidential elections held in Indonesia in 2004 saw the rise of a relatively 
unknown political figure, General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, known colloquially as SBY. 
Despite carrying a reputation as a mediator, peace-maker and reformer, SBY was part of the New 
Order power structure during Suharto’s reign (Vickers, 2005). Winning a second five year term in 
2009 strengthened SBY’s position as a reformer who has brought social, economic and political 
stability to Indonesia and the country is once again viewed as on the verge of an economic take-
off, recently joining the Group of 20 and showing strong economic progress (Rondonuwu, 2009). 
While issues of corruption and poverty still plague many parts of the country, a shift towards 
reform among some civil servants has provided optimism in the democratic system and the future 
of Indonesia, although this has been tempered by continued allegations of serious corruption and 
political bribery evident in national politics and economic activities. Scandals involving the once 
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highly respected Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) have 
tempered the initial optimism in SBY’s will and ability to eradicate corruption (Kimura, 2011).       
During the same period, beginning in 2001, the process of decentralization was enacted, with 
power quickly devolved from the central government to the district-level governments who were 
often unprepared for their new responsibilities (Fanany, 2003). Notwithstanding matters of foreign 
policy, defence, security, judiciary, religious, monetary and fiscal matters, the responsibility to 
administer the provision of public services, including education, health and infrastructure, was 
passed down to local government entities (Parikesit, 2009). With limited experience in governing 
at this level, many local government entities turned to corruption and bribery, following the only 
style of governing they were aware of. The centralized corruption and nepotism that existed under 
the Suharto regime was transferred down to the local level, creating new taxes and bureaucratic 
systems that have increased the complexity and difficulty of conducting business in Indonesia 
(Vickers, 2005).  
It is within this context of historical mistrust of government institutions, a longstanding culture of 
corruption amongst government officials, increasing living standards, although a widening gap 
between rich and poor, a changing process of decentralization, and a continuing process of driving 
Indonesia’s development forward, that the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake disaster and recovery 
effort occurred. The historical and political context plays an important role in examining how the 
long-term recovery process was implemented, as well as some of the ongoing issues and concerns 
related to effectively achieving risk reduction initiatives.  
4.1.2 Indonesia as a ‘Disaster Supermarket’ 
While the above section focused on Indonesia’s political history, the following section focuses on 
the geophysical characteristics of the country and how this has contributed to a landscape shaped 
by hazards. Situated at the convergence of three large crustal plates, namely the Eurasian plate, the 
Australian plate, and the Pacific Ocean plate, Indonesia experiences a high degree of seismic and 
volcanic activity, along with other hazards such as floods, landslides, droughts and forest fires 
(WHO, 2007). With approximately 40% of the population at risk of mortality from multiple 
hazards, Indonesia ranks as one of the highest risk countries in the world (GFDRR, 2009). The 
following sections provide an overview of the key hazards facing the Indonesian population, 
demonstrating the need for a multi-hazard approach in all disaster risk reduction initiatives.  
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Indonesia experiences a high degree of risk for major disaster events caused by earthquakes and 
tsunamis (James, 2008). From 2000 until 2010, Indonesia experienced 49 earthquake events with 
magnitude 6.0 and higher, including three events with magnitude 8.0 and over. These earthquake 
events resulted in the deaths of more than 237,000 people, including more than 220,000 from the 
2004 earthquake and tsunami event that devastated coastal areas of Aceh (USGS, 2010). These 
earthquake events have also resulted in the evacuation of more than 2.5 million people, heavy 
damage to more than 875,000 houses, 16,468 schools, 1,230 health facilities, 342 places of 
worship, 60 bridges and 45km of roads, resulting in approximately US$151.5 million in damage 
(UN/OCHA, 2010). More recent events, such as the 2010 Mentawai, West Sumatra earthquake and 
tsunami have highlighted the high vulnerability Indonesia experiences to earthquake and tsunami 
events (O'Loughlin, Booth, & Weaver, 2010).  
Volcanic eruptions, and the associated secondary hazards such as flooding and lahars, are another 
major risk for the densely populated Indonesian islands. An estimated 128 active volcanoes 
(representing 15% of active volcanoes in the world) are dispersed throughout the islands, 
particularly in Sulawesi as well as along the Sunda arc which extends from Sumatra to the Banda 
Sea (James, 2008; WHO, 2007). Recognized as the most volcanically active country in the world, 
Indonesia has 70 volcanoes classified as “very active” (BAPPENAS, Provincial and Local 
Governments of D.I. Yogyakarta, Provincial and Local Governments of Central Java, & 
International Partners, 2006). During the period from 2000 - 2010, volcanic eruptions killed 12 
people, injured 1,273, resulted in the evacuation of over 173,000 and damaged 364 houses with 
approximately US$2.37 million in damage (UN/OCHA, 2010). These statistics exclude the more 
recent eruption of Mt. Merapi in late 2010 that resulted in 341 deaths, the destruction of over 2,000 
homes, the evacuation of nearly 350,000 people and financial losses estimated at 781 million USD 
(Sumaryono, 2011). This recent event highlights the significant impacts on life, property, 
livelihoods, and tourism that major eruption events can have, as well as the secondary impacts of 
ongoing flooding and lahar flows. On the other hand, volcanoes also bring prosperity as the ash 
from eruptions provides rich nutrients for soil and agricultural activities in surrounding areas 
(Lamoureux, 2003).  
Flooding is another hazard that poses substantial risk to Indonesians located in proximity to an 
estimated 5,000 river systems (James, 2008). Of these 5,000 rivers, approximately 30% flow 
through urban areas, including densely populated centres such as Jakarta, Medan and Bandung 
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(GFDRR, 2009; WHO, 2007). The tropical climate results in heavy rainfall, the effects of which 
are exacerbated by poor urban planning, deforestation and shallow river systems (WHO, 2007). 
Over 11 million people have been affected by flood disasters between 2000 and 2010, resulting in 
US $705.7 million in damages (UN/OCHA, 2010). Significant damages to housing, buildings and 
infrastructure have been reported during this same period, with almost 675,000 houses, 3,235 
schools, 1,489 health facilities and 189 places of worship experiencing heavy damage (UN/OCHA, 
2010). Flooding can have significant impacts on livelihood activities through damages to rice 
fields, forests, fish ponds and irrigation systems.   
Other hazards impacting Indonesia’s 17,500 islands include disease and epidemics, such as avian 
flu, dengue fever, measles, malaria and tuberculosis, as well as tropical storms, drought, and fires, 
including the major forest fires in Kalimantan in 1997/1998 (Dennis & Colfer, 2006; James, 2008; 
WHO, 2007). Human-induced events, such as political disturbances and violent conflict have 
occurred in multiple locations, including Aceh, Maluku, Poso, Sambas and West Timor (James, 
2008). Transportation accidents, particularly air and boating accidents have occurred on multiple 
occasions during the past ten years, resulting in hundreds of deaths (Cutler, 2011).  
While geological, hydrological and meteorological conditions lead to high risk of multiple hazards, 
the social and political conditions in Indonesia also contribute to the risk of experiencing a disaster 
event. Population increase and rapid urbanization have contributed to the high percentage of the 
population at risk of experiencing multiple hazardous events. With over 50% of the population 
residing in urban areas, and urban growth rates that are rapidly outpacing national growth rates, the 
capacity of government systems to develop adequate housing and infrastructure in urban areas has 
been outpaced. This has led to poor planning, limited enforcement of land use zoning and increases 
in informal settlements (GFDRR, 2009). High population densities, particularly in hazard prone 
areas, have increased the number of people at risk of suffering death, injury and damages due to 
hazardous events (WHO, 2007). Environmental degradation and poor resource management 
strategies have not only contributed to increased risk, but has also been attributed to creating new 
hazards (WHO, 2007).  
Due to the range and frequency of various disaster events, Indonesia has been termed the 
“supermarket of disasters” (James, 2008, p. 424). This ongoing and frequent exposure to hazardous 
events has led to increased focus by local, provincial and central governments regarding reducing 
vulnerability and risk to hazardous events and implementing disaster risk reduction initiatives.   
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4.1.3 Indonesia’s Disaster Management Law 2007 
During the period from 2001 - 2007, Indonesia experienced more than 4,000 disaster events, 
including three major disaster events: the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the 2005 Nias earthquake 
and the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake (BAPPENAS et al., 2006; GFDRR, 2009). These major 
events have resulted in a shift in the government approach to prepare and respond to disaster 
events in Indonesia (Parikesit, 2009). Until that time, the government approach to disasters could 
be described as reactive and ‘ad hoc’ in nature (James, 2008). As government officials increasingly 
recognized the social, economic and political costs of responding to and recovering from an 
increasing number of disaster events, there has been a push towards implementing a more holistic 
disaster management approach.  
This shift in the Indonesian approach occurred in conjunction with international efforts to 
mainstream disaster risk reduction initiatives and incorporate elements of preparedness and 
mitigation to try to reduce the impacts of disaster events globally. The international paradigm shift 
started in the 1990s when the United Nations General Assembly declared 1990-1999 the 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) and through the creation of the 
Yokohoma Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World conceived at the World Conference on 
Natural Disaster Reduction in Yokohoma in 1994 (UNISDR, 2004). This was followed by the 
creation of the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction in December of 1999, 
and the development of the first internationally accepted framework for disaster risk reduction set 
out in the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005 - 2015) (UNISDR, 2005). Consequently, a stronger 
international push towards mainstreaming disaster risk reduction contributed to the implementation 
of disaster management framework in Indonesia.  
While nationally coordinated disaster management organizations have existed in Indonesia since 
1966, no formalized legal framework existed for governing the activities of these organizations 
until 2007 (PLANAS PRB & Forum PT, 2009). Buoyed by the devastation of the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami and the outpouring of international support and funding to promote an integrated 
disaster management program, the Indonesian government began the process of establishing a legal 
framework for implementing a more holistic approach to disaster management activities. The 
beginning of the disaster management bill was drafted and discussed throughout 2005 and was 
enacted as the Disaster Management Law (Law No. 24/2007) on March 29th, 2007 (PDRSEA, 
2008). The law outlined the principles of the national disaster management system, as well as the 
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division of labour, organization and the role of international organizations (GFDRR, 2009). The 
Disaster Management Law highlights three major paradigm shifts in the government approach to 
disaster events: firstly, there was a shift from response to a holistic approach that recognized the 
role of preparedness, education and mitigation activities in preventing disaster events; secondly, 
that protection from disaster events is seen as a basic right of the people and the responsibility for 
providing this protection should be a key role of the government (WHO, 2007), and; thirdly, that 
while the responsibility for protecting the people is held by the government, disaster management 
initiatives should be shared among all people and communities in order to effectively integrate 
disaster management into the public domain (PDRSEA, 2008).  
In order to implement the Disaster Management Law, a National Agency for Disaster Management 
was established (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana - BNPB), replacing the previous 
cumbersome system organized under the National Disaster Management Coordination Agency 
(BAKORNAS) (PLANAS PRB & Forum PT, 2009; WHO, 2007). This was to be followed by the 
establishment of provincial and district level (where needed/applicable) disaster management 
agencies, although the implementation of these institutions has been slower. The structure of 
government institutions responsible for disaster management, like many other governmental 
structures in the country, is based on a top-down hierarchal structure, as depicted in Figure 4.2 
(Mei & Lavigne, 2012). In this respect, policies and major decision-making for disaster 
management are set forth by the central government and other national agencies, although 
activities and programs are administered through the local level government programs at the 
community level.  
In concurrence with the implementation of the disaster management law, the central government 
also initiated its National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (NAP-DRR) for 2006 - 2009 in 
accordance with the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005 (WHO, 2007). The action plan aimed to 
integrate and mainstream disaster risk reduction initiatives into all development planning at various 
administrative levels (PDRSEA, 2008). This was followed by the University Forum (Forum PT) (a 
consortium of over 20 tertiary and research institutions) that provided a research and knowledge-
based support system to support the development of effective planning and disaster management 
institutions (PLANAS PRB & Forum PT, 2009). The intellectual forum provided the domestic 
leadership and expertise that allowed the development of the National Platform for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (PLANAS PRB), officially launched on April 26, 2009. The platform represents the 
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coalescence of DRR stakeholders in Indonesia, including international organizations, civil society, 
professional associations, tertiary and research institutions (Forum PT), government (BNPB), 
media and the private sector (PLANAS PRB & Forum PT, 2009).    
Figure 4.2: Disaster Management Organizational Structure in Indonesia 
 
Source: Adapted from (Mei & Lavigne, 2012) 
In summary, James (2008) reviews how the disaster model used in Indonesia has been shifting 
from a reactionary approach to a more comprehensive effort designed for mitigation, preparedness 
and building capacity under a comprehensive set of elements that include: 
1) Establishing and revising disaster management laws to incorporate contemporary ideas in 
disaster management as well as providing additional funding and prioritizing disaster 
mitigation.  
2) Increasing government capacity at local, provincial and national levels through increased 
funding as well as additional access to information and technologies. As a result of this 
increased emphasis on disaster preparedness, the first-ever Disaster Awareness Week was 
held in Jakarta in September 2006 with the goal of providing education and “creating a 
culture of preparedness” (James, 2008, p. 427).  
3) Funding and technical support on behalf of the international community, including the 
UNDP, AusAID, JICA, USAID and the World Bank, has helped the government to 


















4) Throughout Indonesia there has been a strong emphasis on supporting community-based 
disaster reduction initiatives and collaboration among NGO’s and other organizations 
involved in disaster management (PDRSEA, 2008). 
5) Public awareness and involvement is the final important aspect as Indonesia transitions 
from a centralized to decentralized government system. As various communities, 
government bodies and organizations adjust to this transition, there is some difficulty in 
maintaining collaboration and organization amongst the various programs (James, 2008).  
Shifting approaches to managing disasters are also evident throughout Indonesian society, with 
increasing recognition that disaster events are not only a natural phenomenon, but also impacted by 
human factors such as lack of preparedness, lack of knowledge, land-use planning, resource 
management and maintenance of infrastructure (Yansen, 2012). It is within this shifting 
institutional context and approach to managing disaster risks that the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake 
and subsequent recovery effort occurred.  
4.2 Yogyakarta Earthquake Event 
On Saturday, May 27, 2006 at 5:56am local time, Yogyakarta and Central Java Provinces were 
struck by a 6.3 magnitude earthquake, with the epicenter located south of Yogyakarta city – see 
Figure 4.3 (Elnashai, Kim, Yun, & Sidarta, 2007; Resosudarmo, Sugiyanto, & Kuncoro, 2008). 
The earthquake affected all districts in Yogyakarta, as well as nearby districts of Boyolali, Klaten, 
Magelang, Purworejo, Sukoharjo, and Wonogiri in Central Java province (BAPPENAS et al, 
2006). Due to the shallow depth of the earthquake, intense ground shaking was felt for almost one 
minute, resulting in severe damages to the densely populated area, particularly in the districts of 
Bantul in Yogyakarta province and Klaten in Central Java province (BAPPENAS et al., 2006). 
With an estimated death toll of over 5,700, between 40,000 – 60,000 injuries, the total destruction 
of over 150,000 buildings and more than 200,000 more suffering varying degrees of damage, the 
Yogyakarta earthquake was the most devastating global disaster of 2006 (BAPPENAS et al., 2006; 
Elnashai, et al., 2007; Munich Re, 2007; Resosudarmo, Sugiyanto, & Kuncoro, 2008). This event 
also represents one of the worst disasters in recorded history in terms of the degree of building 
damage (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). The following sections provide an overview of the geo-
physical aspects of the earthquake, the physical and infrastructural damages, as well as the social 
and financial losses and impacts.  
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4.2.1 Geo-Physical Aspects of the Earthquake 
The tectonics of the Yogyakarta area is dominated by the subduction of the Australian plate under 
the Sunda micro plate, although these processes are also influenced by the movement of the Pacific 
plate (Walter, et al., 2008). Subduction occurs at a rate of approximately 5-6cm/year and the 
impacted area of Java is subjected to regularly occurring earthquakes, although these vary in 
origin, depth and magnitude (Elnashai, et al., 2007; Munich Re, 2007). While these deeper 
subduction processes can cause major earthquake events, the shallow depth of the May 27th, 2006 
earthquake indicates it originated from local faults on the Sunda plate that are stressed due to the 
deeper, underlying processes of subduction between the Indo-Australian and Eurasian plates 
(Tsuji, et al., 2009). The left-lateral strike-slip movement resulted in an estimated fault rupture 
length and width of 20km and 10km, respectively (Elnashai, et al., 2007; Tsuji, et al., 2009). 
Although there is some discrepancy on the location of the epicentre, the approximate location was 
25 km South/South-East of Yogyakarta city with a depth of 10km resulting in intense ground 
shaking across an area of approximately 200km2 (Elnashai, et al., 2007; Tsuji, et al., 2009).  
Originally thought to have originated from the Opak River fault, located along the line of heaviest 
damage, seismic evidence suggests the 2006 earthquake rupture occurred 10km east of the Opak 
River along a previously unidentified fault running through the mountainous region of Gunung 
Kidul (Tsuji, et al., 2009; Walter, et al., 2008). Within the areas impacted by ground shaking, the 
intensity of shaking was influenced by local ground conditions. The impacted areas are located in 
close proximity to the active Mt. Merapi volcano, situated approximately 25km north of 
Yogyakarta city. Significant volcanic sediment deposits, caused by post-eruption lahars, occur on a 
regular basis in this region (Lavigne & Thouret, 2003). Areas with thicker layers of volcanic 
sediments experienced greater shaking motions as the characteristics of these soils have a tendency 
to amplify ground shaking motions as well as extend the length of time of shaking (Elnashai, et al., 
2007; Munich Re, 2007). The highest levels of damage were not necessarily experienced in the 
epicentral areas, but along the eastern edge of the graben/valley running from Yogyakarta to the 
coastal areas where volcanic sediments were thickest as demonstrated in Figure 4.3 (Munich Re, 
2007; Walter, et al., 2008).  
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The earthquake caused a series of secondary disasters, including slope instability, rock falls, soil 
failure, ground fissures, impacts on the water table level and water quality, as well as increased 
volcanic activity in nearby Mt. Merapi (which was already experiencing elevated levels of activity 
previous to the earthquake event) (Munich Re, 2007; Elnashai, et al., 2007; Walter, et al., 2008). 
While there were rumours immediately following the earthquake of an impending tsunami, and 
many locals believe that a tsunami warning was issued, no tsunami warning was ever issued for the 
area following the earthquake (CM-04).  
While the scientific data provides an overview of the mechanisms and processes of the earthquake, 
discussions with local residents who experienced the event also provided insight into the 
earthquake itself. Informal discussions with taxi drivers, restaurant owners, friends and villagers all 
indicated the earthquake started with horizontal movements and then shifted to vertical 
movements. Many respondents indicated that it wasn’t until the vertical seismic waves occurred 
that buildings started to collapse (HI 01-019; 02-004; 05-027). Other phenomena were also 
discussed, including strange animal behaviour, water receding in the Opak River immediately prior 
to the earthquake, and increased water turbidity.   
4.2.2 Physical and Infrastructural Damages 
Due to the location of the hypocentre, soil conditions and quality of construction, there was a high 
degree of damage to buildings in the affected areas. Unfortunately, many commercial, institutional 
and residential buildings did not adhere to current buildings standards for the area, with damages 
and structural failures resulting from low quality building materials, lack of reinforcement 
structures, and heavy roofs, which caused the collapse of walls during the lateral shaking motions 
(BAPPENAS et al., 2006; Elnashai, et al., 2007). Private homes in the area were generally 
constructed with unreinforced brick and mortar, with the mortar having a high sand content 
(Sarwidi, 2007). Connections to foundations and the roof structure (generally made from timber 
and slate tiles) tended to be inadequate, particularly for the vertical shaking motions, resulting in 
the collapse of many roof and wall structures (see Figure 4.4) (Munich Re, 2007). Not only were 
connections and reinforcements inadequate in many buildings, but the foundations of many 
buildings were also of poor quality. Sarwidi (2007) found that many foundations were built on 




An estimated 157,000 houses were totally destroyed, with another 202,000 suffering varying 
degrees of damage, leaving approximately 600,000 - 1,000,000 people homeless and 4.1 million 
cubic metres of debris (BAPPENAS et al., 2006). The largest damages were concentrated in 
housing and private sector buildings, with housing accounting for 52% of total losses and damages 
in the earthquake. Rural areas were particularly hard hit with the districts of Bantul and Klaten 
comprising 72% of the total housing stock destroyed in the earthquake (BAPPENAS et al., 2006).  
Figure 4.4: Structural Failure of Walls and Roofing in Private Dwellings 
 
The education and health sectors were also severely impacted, with high levels of damage to 
school and health facilities. In Yogyakarta province, 2,155 educational buildings were destroyed or 
damaged, with over 90% of educational facilities in Bantul experiencing damage or destruction. In 
Klaten, 38% of educational buildings were destroyed or damaged. In addition, the loss of 
educational equipment and the death of 36 teachers contributed to the damages to the sector. In the 
health sector, the majority of health services are provided by private clinics and practitioners and 
private facilities represented 65% of the losses. In Yogyakarta city, 17 private hospitals were 
damaged or destroyed, along with one public hospital in Klaten district. In Yogyakarta province, 
41 private health clinics, 1,631 private home practices, and 150 health posts experienced some 
level of damage. In addition, 45 public health centres (PUSKESMAS) were destroyed 
(representing 38% of all health centres) and another 22 were severely damaged. Damages to health 
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facilities were significantly less severe in Central Java districts impacted by the earthquake 
(BAPPENAS et al., 2006). The number of injuries sustained in the earthquake also placed 
significant strain on the health sector.   
In contrast, the impact on non-housing infrastructure was relatively minimal compared to the scale 
of damage in the housing/building sector. The most significant impacts were in the electricity and 
water supply sectors. There were damages to the electricity substations that provide electrical 
power for all affected areas, although electrical links were repaired quickly and electrical networks 
re-established within a few days in most areas. In terms of water supply, as only a small proportion 
of the population (less than 10% in the heaviest affected areas) has piped water supplied by the 
government owned water system (Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum, PDAM), the heaviest damages 
were associated with private, shallow wells which required cleaning or repair. Relatively minor 
damages occurred to road and rail networks, although no major disruptions to transportation 
networks were experienced. The main airport in Yogyakarta (Adi Sucipto airport) experienced 
damage to the runway and collapse of one of the terminals, although the airport was able to reopen 
with regular service within two days. There was very limited damage to post and 
telecommunications infrastructure in the area (BAPPENAS et al., 2006). Table 4.1 provides a 
summary of the damages sustained in Central Java, Yogyakarta province and Bantul district during 
the earthquake.  
Table 4.1: Summary of Estimated Damages in the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake 
 Central Java Province 
Yogyakarta Province 
(incl. Bantul district) 
Bantul District 
Human 
1,100 death toll, 18,500 
injuries 
4,600 death toll, 19,400 
injuries 
4,100 death toll, 12,000 
injuries 
Housing 
68,414 houses destroyed, 
103,689 damaged 
88,249 houses destroyed, 
98,342 damaged 
43,753 houses destroyed, 
33,137 damaged 
Education 
725 school buildings 
destroyed 
2,200 school buildings 
destroyed (1,900 primary 
schools) 
949 school buildings 
destroyed 
Health 
1 hospital, 16 health centres, 
56 health posts damaged or 
destroyed 
17 hospitals, 117 health 
centres, 324 health posts 
damaged or destroyed 
26 health centres and 67 
health posts damaged or 
destroyed 
Transportation relatively minor damage relatively minor damage relatively minor damage 
Communication minor disruption minor disruption minor disruption 
Electricity few days disruption few days disruption few days disruption 
Water Supply 
minor disruption and few 
leaks 
minor disruption and few 
leaks 






12 social facilities affected, 
827 religious facilities 
damaged 
67 social facilities affected, 
2,200 religious buildings 






21,760 SMEs affected, 6 
major hotels damaged 
75% of total enterprises 




10 traditional markets 
damaged 
85 traditional markets 
damaged 
17 traditional markets 
damaged 
Source: (BAPPENAS et al., 2006) 
Total damages and losses sustained in the Yogyakarta earthquake are estimated at $3.1 billion (US) 
(Munich Re, 2007). While the majority of heavy damage occurred in the semi-rural areas to the 
south-east of Yogyakarta city, there was some damage to buildings within the city, although the 
intensity of ground shaking in this area was lower. Several large buildings that were purportedly 
built according to building code standards experienced high levels of damage, including Malioboro 
Shopping Mall, the Ibis hotel, Saphir Square mall and the collapse of the Sheridan hotel foyer 
(Munich Re, 2007). Much of this damage was a result of either pounding, lateral movement of 
floors in multi-story buildings or large sections of infill walling falling out of a number of 
buildings (Munich Re, 2007). The level of damages associated with the magnitude of shaking 
indicates a high risk of damage in the event of a future earthquake event, particularly within the 
city of Yogyakarta itself.   
4.2.3 Human and Social Damages 
As noted in Table 4.1, the earthquake event resulted in the deaths of over 5,700 and estimated 
40,000 - 60,000 injuries (BAPPENAS et al., 2006). Destruction and damage of health facilities 
also exacerbated the difficulty of providing medical care. There were significant disruptions in the 
provision of education, although the government provided temporary tarpaulins to assist in 
establishing temporary schools as soon as possible. There was substantial damage to religious 
centres in both Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces due to the earthquake. Participation in 
religious activities in the affected areas is high, with a large majority of the population practicing 
Islam. Over 3,000 places of worship were damaged or destroyed, representing over 20% of all 
religious facilities in Yogyakarta province. An estimated 1,345 communities (approximately 
100,000 families) lost their places of worship. Many of these religious facilities are privately 
owned and maintained by the community, although the costs of rebuilding would create a 
                                                   
9
 SME = Small and medium enterprises  
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significant toll on villagers. As these religious facilities can also serve as centres for community 
activity and village governance, they play a significant social role in the community (BAPPENAS 
et al., 2006).     
4.2.4 Financial and Economic Damages  
Communities in Yogyakarta and Central Java have a high number of small, home-based 
enterprises, including furniture, ceramics, handicrafts, and food production (BAPPENAS et al., 
2006). The majority of these businesses involve self-employment or employ up to three employees 
(although not necessarily on a full time basis). Approximately one fifth of these businesses are 
classified as ‘poor’ with earnings of less than US$1 per day (Callander, 2007). A series of surveys 
conducted at various times in the post-disaster context revealed the impact the earthquake event 
had on economic activities in the impacted areas.  
The first preliminary damage and loss assessment report was conducted immediately following the 
earthquake event through the collaboration of the Central government’s National Development 
Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), the provincial and local governments of both Yogyakarta and 
Central Java provinces, as well as international NGOs and partners. The assessment estimated that 
the earthquake destroyed 17,300 formal businesses as well as 12,320 smaller, informal and 
household-based businesses. Impacted productive sectors employed over 650,000 workers who 
were directly affected by the earthquake event (BAPPENAS et al., 2006). Business owners 
suffered losses not only through the destruction of their productive assets (tools, kilns, sewing 
machines, furniture etc.) but also through the reduced productivity which further impacted income 
levels (Callander, 2007). In Bantul, close to 75% of businesses were affected (14,600 out of 
21,300), whereas in Klaten, 30% of the businesses were damaged (7,900 out of 25,000) 
(BAPPENAS et al., 2006). A significant number of market facilities were also destroyed in the 
earthquake. While the largest market in the area was unaffected, a number of traditional markets 
were damaged and losses were estimated to be around US$245 million (Callander, 2007).  
Follow-up livelihoods surveys conducted in April 2007 determined that up to 80% of entrepreneurs 
had recommenced their livelihood activities in some form, although almost all were producing at a 
reduced capacity. Almost half of buildings and assets associated with business activities had not 
been replaced. Conversely, the draw of competitive wages for both skilled and unskilled labourers 
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in the reconstruction sector resulted in underemployment in other sectors, including agriculture, 
garment and textile industries and other manufacturing sectors (Callander, 2007).   
The tourism sector was also heavily impacted by the earthquake. As the affected areas are home to 
important cultural and historical features, these sites provide a significant source of both domestic 
and international tourism revenues. Affected tourism sites included Prambanan temple (a 9th 
century World Heritage site) and the old King’s Graves in Bantul. Major hotels were also damaged 
in both Yogyakarta and Central Java province, closing over 700 high-quality rooms, with 
reconstruction phases lasting anywhere from 3 months to one year. Early estimates immediately 
following the earthquake indicated RP 36 billion in damages as well as expected losses of income 
of approximately RP 18 billion (equivalent to $3.7 million USD and $1.9 million USD 
respectively)  (BAPPENAS et al., 2006).  
Impacts on land used for agricultural cultivation was limited, although damages to irrigation 
systems, warehouses, processing facilities etc., had significant impacts on the production and 
distribution of food stuffs. In Yogyakarta province, 14 irrigation systems were damaged, covering 
63,124 ha of land and producing 393,800 tonnes/year of rice and 153,700 tonnes/year of parawija 
(other crops such as maize, cassava etc.). 65% of cultivated land dependent on irrigation systems in 
Yogyakarta province was affected by the earthquake (BAPPENAS et al., 2006). One of the 
secondary or ‘invisible’ impacts of the earthquake event involved the agricultural sector, which 
had been presumed to have fairly low impacts. The UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization’s 
(FAO) damage assessment conducted in 2007 found that many farmers had sold their livestock at 
deeply discounted prices in order to raise funds for reconstruction and other daily living expenses. 
This left little to no additional capital to purchase farm inputs, leading to significant secondary 
losses in food and vegetable crops over the long term (Callander, 2007).  
The destruction of such a large number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) was estimated to 
have resulted in the loss of approximately 130,000 jobs, leading to a 4% increase in unemployment 
rates in affected areas (from 7% to 11%). Hardest hit sectors included the service industry (workers 
in the trade sector), industry (construction, manufacturing, utilities and mining) and the agricultural 
sector (BAPPENAS et al., 2006). Although there were negative impacts on employment, the surge 
in government and humanitarian funding for reconstruction projects provided a significant source 
of employment opportunities, although long-term impacts on livelihoods and income levels has yet 
to be determined (Callander, 2007).  
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4.3 Yogyakarta Recovery Effort  
Shortly after the earthquake, there was tremendous response from various sources, including the 
Indonesian government, the United Nations, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, international donors, as well as various other NGOs and individual/private 
donations. In the days immediately following the earthquake, the emergency response effort was 
largely funded through individual and private donations from family members, friends and 
strangers, as well as local businesses and corporations. These donations included tents, tarpaulins, 
food, clothing, cash and various other resources (MacRae, 2008). This was followed by donations 
from various aid organizations and government sources. Aid organizations provided donations of 
tarpaulins, food, water, cooking resources and cash to the community, thereby providing 
community governments the role of distributing the goods internally among the villagers (UN-
HABITAT, 2008). The national and provincial disaster response agencies (still under the operation 
of BAKORNAS as BNPB had not yet been established) also provided emergency relief through 
one-time cash grants of RP 90 thousand per person (approximately $10 USD), 10kg of rice per 
person, as well as contributing to the temporary shelter distribution and provision of free medical 
services (JRF, 2007a; Resosudarmo, Sugiyanto, & Kuncoro, 2008).   
The Indonesian government established a coordination team for the two affected provinces along 
with two provincial implementation teams to facilitate the relief and recovery effort (JRF, 2008; 
JRF, 2007a). The response from local, national and international donors provided further funds for 
transitional housing, emergency and relief supplies, as well as longer-term reconstruction and 
recovery programs. In terms of financial involvement, the largest contributor was the Indonesian 
government which provided approximately 570 million (USD) for reconstruction activities, 
followed by the cluster agencies of the UN response which provided approximately 175 million 
(USD) and the multi-lateral reconstruction fund (Java Reconstruction Fund (JRF)) created through 
80 million (USD) in donations from the European Commission, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Finland, and Denmark (Asrianti, 2011; JRF, 2007a; Manfield, 2007). The 
multi-donor fund was then administered through the World Bank and funding was implemented 
through the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Community Housing Foundation 
(CHF), and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011; E-03).  
In terms of the contributions of various coordinated international humanitarian organizations, the 
Yogyakarta earthquake response was organized using the newly adopted UN cluster system. The 
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UN cluster approach was implemented in 2005 after a comprehensive review of the global 
humanitarian system highlighted a number of issues and problems within the international 
humanitarian response system (IHRS) (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). Particularly, a lack of 
coordination between various agencies and response gaps in the provision of relief and recovery 
services resulted in a lowered quality of provision of humanitarian services (IASC, 2006). The 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee  (IASC) first adopted the cluster approach in 2005 as part of a 
wider reformation process occurring in the IHRS with the purpose of improving the effectiveness 
of humanitarian activities, strengthening partnerships and coordination between various 
humanitarian agencies, and ensuring greater accountability among these organizations (IASC, 
2006). The system is organized around a series of sectors or ‘clusters’, each of which is led by a 
global agency and an individual leader who acts independently of his/her own organization 
(MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). The eleven global clusters and their lead agencies are listed in Table 
4.2. This system was first implemented during the Pakistan earthquake response in 2005 and was 
used for the second time during the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake response in order to coordinate 
and manage the large international humanitarian response (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011).  
Table 4.2: UN Global Clusters and Leading Agencies 





IFRC (acts as a convener during disaster situations) 
Camp Management and Coordination 
UNDRC (for IDPs from conflict 
IOM (for disaster situations) 
Health WHO 
Protection 
UNHCR (global cluster lead, field-level lead in 
conflict) 
UNHCR, OHCHR, UNICEF (decide on leadership for 
field level in disasters) 
Agriculture FAO 
Emergency Telecommunications 
OCHA (process owner) 
WFP (security telecoms) 
UNICEF (data telecoms) 
Early Recovery UNDP 
Education 
UNICEF 
Save the Children 
Alliance 
Sanitation, Water and Hygiene UNICEF 
Source: (Manfield, 2007) 
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The funds from the UN Cluster System were primarily used during the initial emergency and relief 
stages in order to provide for the immediate needs of the affected communities. Table 4.3 provides 
an overview of the evolution of funding provided for each cluster over the 12-month period 
following the earthquake event. The majority of funding for permanent reconstruction and longer-
term livelihood and development initiatives was provided by the Indonesian government and JRF. 
Although there were smaller concerns related to water, sanitation and health, shelter was 
designated the primary concern due to the high degree of structural damage and the upcoming 
rainy season (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). The recovery effort initially focused on housing and 
building reconstruction, followed shortly thereafter with livelihoods rehabilitation and disaster risk 
reduction initiatives (Manfield, 2007). Each of these sectors is discussed briefly below.  
Table 4.3: Evolution of Cluster Funding (in USD) 
Cluster June 2006 September 2006 January 2007 
% of Total 
Funding 
Agriculture 700,000 0 895,543 0.5 
Coordination 1,500,000 0 8,939,329 5.1 
Disaster Risk Reduction 0 0 16,941,829 9.7 
Education 320,000 1,650,000 18,520,084 10.6 
Emergency Shelter 10,520,497 12,930,355 24,556,285 14.1 
Livelihoods 0 400,000 5,687,290 3.3 
Health 3,657,265 3,770,909 24,752,817 14.2 
Permanent Housing 0 0 14,742,499 8.4 
Protection 60,000 1,429,674 3,789,230 2.2 
Public Outreach 0 0 2,005,060 1.1 
Water and Sanitation 2,776,326 5,759,866 15,608,005 8.9 
Training 0 0 419,322 0.2 
Shelter and 
Reconstruction 
1,922,410 4,690,814 37,797,012 21.6 
TOTALS 21,456,498 30,631,618 174,654,303 --- 
Source: (Manfield, 2007) 
4.3.1 Shelter and Building Reconstruction 
As the majority of damages were to private houses and other buildings, shelter and building 
reconstruction formed the majority of the reconstruction and recovery effort (Manfield, 2007; UN-
HABITAT, 2008). The beginning phase of the relief and recovery operation focused on providing 
emergency and temporary shelter to the impacted households, particularly to accommodate for the 
upcoming rainy season (generally starting around September/October) (MacRae & Hodgkin, 
2011). In the initial stages of the reconstruction effort, there was some uncertainty over whether the 
government would implement a one-step or two-step approach to permanent housing (UN-
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HABITAT, 2008). The one-step approach would provide funding for households to immediately 
begin reconstruction of permanent housing while living in temporary housing such as tents. The 
two-step approach would provide funding for transitional housing whereby local materials would 
be used to build temporary bamboo housing with reusable materials. The transitional housing step 
would then be followed by the reconstruction of permanent housing, thereby allowing more time 
for planning and development activities (E-02).  
In the end, the government decided to provide funding for the one-step shelter approach whereas 
the shelter cluster (involving more than 60 member organizations) decided to take the two-step 
sheltering approach (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011; UN-HABITAT, 2008). The government position 
was that it had a limited supply of funds and wanted to ensure that the funding went to permanent 
housing solutions. The government also believed that the emergency shelters provided were 
sufficient in terms of temporary housing and that no further funding needed to be allocated to 
transitional housing. There were also cases of homeowners constructing transitional housing using 
rubble and other materials. This decision was also influenced by the Aceh experience, whereby the 
government was on the receiving end of negative criticism related to the amount of time many 
families spent in transitional housing following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (E-01; E-02).  
On the other hand, the international organizations involved in the recovery believed the two-step 
housing solution was required in order to provide sufficient emergency shelter that met the 
international standards set forth in the Sphere handbook, as well as provide communities the time 
to plan and rebuild housing according to earthquake resistant guidelines. In addition, the upcoming 
rainy season indicated a need for improved shelter beyond emergency tarpaulins (UN-HABITAT, 
2008). The majority of the UN cluster funding used within the shelter cluster was used to provide 
emergency and transitional shelter to impacted households, including 350,000 tarpaulins, 45,000 
clean-up toolkits and 80,000 transitional bamboo shelters (Manfield, 2007). Figure 4.5 depicts 
typical transitional housing structures in Yogyakarta. 
Under the recommendation of various local experts, including the Sultan of Yogyakarta, the 
transitional shelters were built using local techniques and materials, including bamboo frames and 
woven walls, as well as tiled roofs (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). In some cases, the transitional 
shelters are still in use over five years after the earthquake, having been repurposed as kitchens, 
sheds, small shops, workshops, storehouses and small animal enclosures, although the use of 
untreated bamboo wood has limited the lifespan of the structures (approx. 2 years compared to 25 
106 
 
years for treated bamboo) (UN-HABITAT, 2008). Interestingly, the costs associated with building 
the transitional shelters in Yogyakarta were approximately $100 - $200 USD compared to the 
delivered costs of providing tents which was over $300 USD (Manfield, 2007). This provides some 
financial evidence to support an emergency to transitional shelter approach as opposed to the 
provision of longer-term transitional tents.  
Figure 4.5: Transitional Bamboo Housing in Yogyakarta 
Source: (UN-HABITAT, 2008) 
In terms of permanent housing, the reconstruction effort took a multi-actor approach. As 
previously mentioned, the majority of the permanent housing reconstruction effort was funded by 
the Indonesian government which allowed the construction of 258,000 houses. Initial government 
announcements in the media indicated that each affected household would receive 30,000,000 IDR 
(approx. $3,200 USD) to rebuild their houses, although once the extent of the damage became 
clearer, the amount was reduced to 15,000,000 IDR (approx. $1,600 USD). Due to issues with the 
government system for defining and registering affected households, some households did not 
receive funding to rebuild their permanent houses (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). The non-
governmental sector took a “fill-in-the-gap” approach to provide funding for the construction of 
housing for families who did not receive government funding (Parikesit, 2009). The JRF funded 
the reconstruction of a further 23,500 houses, whereas a variety of other NGOs provided funding 
for a small number of additional houses in selected villages (Manfield, 2007).  
Over 280,000 homes were rebuilt using a community-driven approach: community consultation 
and accountability led the government and other organizations to distribute reconstruction funds 
based on the “community spirit of gotong royong, a local tradition whereby families jointly take 
decisions and build together” (JRF, 2007a, p. 29). Local government leaders were responsible for 
organizing lists of impacted households who should receive reconstruction funding as well as 
administering and distributing funding. While the assessment of housing was conducted at the 
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dusun and desa government levels, the distribution of funding for permanent housing 
reconstruction was organized under the community structure of POKMAS in Yogyakarta 
(Kelompok Masyarakat - Community Groups) and KSMP in Central Java. These neighbourhood 
community groups consisted of 10 - 12 families whose houses were damaged during the 
earthquake and were responsible for administering the funding for reconstruction (UGM & IRP, 
2009). As much of the building damage was linked to poor quality construction and lack of 
adherence to building standards, the reconstruction effort attempted to build back with a focus on 
higher standards of safety and sustainability (JRF, 2008).  
4.3.2 Livelihoods Recovery 
Although the majority of funding was allocated for housing reconstruction, there was also an effort 
to rebuild livelihoods and economic activities in the area, although these activities generally 
commenced later in the recovery program. Livelihoods rehabilitation focused on the small-scale 
business activities and assets located within the household (i.e. the home-based enterprises) that are 
typical of the region. As the majority of these small businesses were low-capital, home-based 
activities, the household reconstruction efforts also provided some assistance in re-establishing 
these entrepreneurial operations (JRF, 2007a). The most impacted industries included ceramics and 
pottery, as well as the garment and textile industries.  
In order to provide some longer-term assistance to rebuild and re-establish these livelihood 
activities, a variety of government and NGO programs were initiated in the months following the 
earthquake. These include the FAO which provided agricultural support to the hardest hit rural 
communities; the GTZ which provided micro-financing and technical support programs to 
impacted SMEs, and; AusAID’s training program for improving construction skills. The second 
phase of JRF funding provided support for livelihood programming beginning in June 2008 and 
was administered through the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and GTZ (JRF, 
2008). The focus of these projects was to provide technical and asset-replacement assistance for 
micro and small enterprises; build capacity through training and expanding market access; enhance 
access to funding and micro-credit institutions, and; provide loan renegotiation strategies for 
defaulting lenders (JRF, 2008). In many cases, large INGOs partnered with local NGOs to 
implement these livelihood programs at the local level (UNDP & BAPPENAS, 2006). Figure 4.6 
provides an overview of the various institutions and livelihood programs implemented after the 
earthquake.   
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Figure 4.6: Livelihood Recovery Programs 
Program Institution Involved Notes 
Policy/Regulation on Credit 
Restructuration 
(No. 8/10/PBI/2006) 
Bank of Indonesia 
17,712 debentures were restructured, 
for a total credit market of RP 375 
billion  
Support program for BPR 
(Community Credit Bank) 
GTZ and local governments 
40 BPR in Yogyakarta and 13 BPR in 
Central Java; total support EUR 
500,000/ USD 9.85 million in the form 
of credit and partnership programs; 
capacity building program in the form 
of trainings 
Reconstruction program for 
economic facilities and 
infrastructure 
Central and local government 
Traditional market reconstruction, 
irrigation systems, road improvements  
Small and medium-sized 
enterprises recovery program 
Central and local government 
RP 105,60 billion in 2006; RP 332,911 
billion in 2007 and 2008 
Financial and technical assistance 
for SMEs 
International Organization for 
Migration  
 
Recovery program directed to 
improve market networks 
Office for Industry and Trade 
Assistance for micro-enterprises to 
maintain their networks with buyers 
Direct advocacy and 
empowerment programs for 
micro-enterprises 
Universities and NGOs 
Multiple villages received support for 
livelihood improvements, including 
Kasongan, Kotagede and Imogiri 
Source: (Setiawan, 2009, p. 37) 
A review of the different livelihood programs offered by various government institutions, as well 
as local and international humanitarian organizations, revealed that the livelihood recovery 
program focused on the following key initiatives (see IOM, 2011; IOM, 2010; JRF, 2007a; JRF, 
2008): 
- Capacity building and training activities to develop new skills, particularly in relation to 
construction and food production 
- Provision and establishment of micro-financing institutions to provide support to re-
establish damaged business activities 
- Provision of assets to support entrepreneurial activities, including kitchen tools, sewing 
machines, construction tools etc.  
- Agricultural support through seeds, fertilizers as well as provision of livestock to support 
animal breeding programs.   
Although one- and two-year post-disaster assessments indicated that up to 95% of small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) had recommenced their operations in some form, most sectors 
experienced a decline in production and sales, with the exception of industries that supported 
reconstruction efforts (i.e. the furniture sector) (JRF, 2008; JRF, 2007a; UGM & IRP, 2009). Two 
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years after the earthquake, over half of affected enterprises were struggling to reach pre-earthquake 
production and income levels (JRF, 2008). This slower pace of livelihoods recovery has been 
attributed to the emphasis on building reconstruction, funding gaps for livelihoods rehabilitation 
and delays in implementing livelihoods programs, as well as lower working capital among 
households in the region (JRF, 2008).  
4.3.3 Disaster Risk Reduction Efforts  
The earthquake provided the impetus to implement disaster risk reduction programming during the 
recovery effort, as well as analyze and plan for the numerous other hazards in the area. Arguably, 
the largest danger is posed from the nearby Mt. Merapi volcano which threatens the immediate 
area during eruptions and also large surrounding areas through ash fall and lahar flows. Some 
communities in the earthquake-affected zone are also prone to flooding, landslides, localized 
storms, and extreme weather events from El-Nino Southern Oscillations (UNDP & BAPPENAS, 
2006). Disaster risk reduction (DRR) initiatives were, therefore, implemented as part of the post-
earthquake response to focus on the multitude of hazards facing impacted communities in order to 
promote a more holistic approach to disaster recovery.  
The largest component of the DRR initiatives focused on building codes and enforcement of 
construction standards, including construction skills training, implementing a building permit 
system in relation to shelter and reconstruction activities, and public education for construction 
standards (Manfield, 2007). The community-based approach to construction provided individual 
home owners with increased control and sense of ownership over the construction of their homes, 
and the major funding agencies (the government and JRF) provided strict controls to ensure the 
enforcement of building standards in housing construction (JRF, 2008). Major education and 
training programs, along with public education campaigns, were implemented to teach seismic 
construction standards and techniques, such as the proper mixtures for cement and sand ratios 
(UN-HABITAT, 2008). Figure 4.7 depicts an example of the type of educational materials that 
were distributed during the reconstruction phase.  
Other DRR activities included supporting local governments and communities in planning and 
development strategies to mitigate against future disasters, including earthquakes, flooding and 
disease, as well as capacity training for local government institutions and disaster management 
organizations (Manfield, 2007). Particularly, the JRF promoted DRR activities through support of 
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Community Settlement Plans that focused on the incorporation of hazard and risk assessments into 
spatial planning initiatives and development strategies to promote safety and improve awareness 
(JRF, 2008).  
Figure 4.7: Example of Construction Training Materials 
 
Source: (UN-HABITAT, 2008) 
Public education was also carried out during the recovery period, including newspaper 
advertisements, radio and television campaigns, and promotion of the inclusion of disaster 
education in curriculum standards (Manfield, 2007). Long-term capacity building in selected 
villages was carried out under the IOM’s DRR initiative funded by the JRF. These initiatives have 
established community-based Village Disaster Response Teams, funded the construction of risk 
mitigating infrastructure and several disaster response simulations to enhance community 
preparedness and provided an opportunity to engage key stakeholders in the area (IOM, 2011).  
Overall, the disaster risk reduction programs implemented during the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake 
recovery indicate a promising shift in incorporating a holistic approach to disaster recovery and 
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DRR activities. The 2010 Mt. Merapi eruption was a reminder of the necessity of strong local 
institutions for mitigating and responding to various hazardous events, although further time and 
analysis is required in order to effectively examine the impact of these programs on reducing risk 
in the area.  
4.4 Preliminary Assessment of the Recovery Effort  
The 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake recovery is generally considered one of the best reconstruction 
efforts completed by the humanitarian response system (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). Although 
there has been limited research conducted on the outcomes of the recovery effort, a number of 
humanitarian organizations have provided reviews and assessments of the post-earthquake 
recovery programs. The following sections highlight key points from these assessments, 
particularly focusing on the pre-existing conditions in the region that contributed to a rapid 
recovery.  
Due to the close proximity and time period between the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2006 
Yogyakarta earthquake, as well as the fact that many of the aid organizations, individual aid 
workers and Central government officials were involved in both recovery efforts, there have been 
many comparisons made between the speed and effectiveness of both programs. Organizations and 
government officials were aware of the perceived failures of the tsunami recovery in Aceh and 
proceeded cautiously in Yogyakarta (MacRae, 2008). Many of the lessons learnt from the 
Acehnese experience were implemented in the Yogyakarta recovery effort, including the one-step 
housing solution by the government, the implementation of the multi-donor fund, and a community 
driven approach to recovery (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011; Parikesit, 2009). Although there are 
several lessons learned that were implemented in Yogyakarta, it would also be prudent to 
remember the differences in damages to infrastructure, the degree of human losses, social 
structure, social capital and government capacity, as well as the differing international responses to 
each event.  
The initial relief and early recovery phase of the response effort after the 2006 Yogyakarta 
earthquake was relatively quick to transition into long-term recovery and reconstruction activities. 
There are several reasons for this fast transition and recovery rate, specifically due to levels of 
damage, deaths and displacement, as well as strength of government and social institutions in the 
affected area. Although there was high damage to houses and buildings, there was limited damage 
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to road and communications infrastructure, easing the planning, assessment and delivery of aid and 
assistance (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). The numbers of deaths and injuries were also 
comparatively low (compared to the extent of damage and also compared to the losses in Aceh 
after the 2004 tsunami) resulting in lower levels of trauma and increased availability of human 
resources for reconstruction (Manfield, 2007).  
The semi-rural location of many of the impacted communities allowed many households to remain 
in their villages, limiting the need for IDP camps (UN-HABITAT, 2008). The impacted 
populations also tended to shelter in place, either on their land beside destroyed houses or within 
neighbourhood and village tents. This led to reduced conflicts over land tenure and allowed for 
community-based response mechanisms to begin functioning almost immediately following the 
earthquake (Manfield, 2007).  
Local and provincial government institutions in both Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces were 
largely unaffected by the earthquake event, allowing for a strong government response in impacted 
areas (Manfield, 2007). Although both areas have strong governments within the context of 
Indonesia, compared to Central Java province, Yogyakarta province has a stronger and more 
credible government system. This resulted in lower levels of corruption compared to Central Java, 
which overall experienced a slower and less effective recovery (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). The 
fact that many Yogyakarta government officials lived in the impacted areas and had their houses 
destroyed may have also helped to development a commitment to effective recovery.  
Due to the relatively low number of deaths, the social institutions in the impacted regions were 
largely unaffected by the disaster. The community spirit of gotong royong as well as a self-help 
culture with limited aid dependency in the area resulted in strong household, village and 
community involvement in the recovery process (Manfield, 2007; UN-HABITAT, 2008). High 
levels of participation in community and village organizations, including women and youth groups, 
helped provide systems for mutual aid and collective recovery (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). The 
impacted areas also comprise part of the Java construction industry, primarily centred in 
Yogyakarta city. A larger proportion of the affected population was employed by the construction 
industry, contributing to easy access to human and material resources required for the 
reconstruction effort (Manfield, 2007; UN-HABITAT, 2008). 
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The geographical location of affected areas also impacted the speed of recovery. Heavily damaged 
areas were located in close proximity to the city of Yogyakarta (which was only slightly affected), 
facilitating the process of aid delivery (MacRae, 2008; Manfield, 2007). As well, Yogyakarta city 
is a centre of higher education, with over 90 Universities, resulting in both a high response from 
student volunteers as well as large degree of expertise in technical, cultural and management 
issues. Yogyakarta is also considered the cultural capital of Indonesia, resulting in an increased 
interest and commitment at the national level in terms of response and recovery (MacRae & 
Hodgkin, 2011).   
Another factor that impacted the initial response effort was that many aid organizations were 
already positioned and prepared to work in the area. The April/May 2006 threat of an imminent 
eruption from nearby Mt. Merapi had led humanitarian organizations to stockpile resources and 
supplies in the area, including over 10,000 tarpaulins and several fully functioning offices (UN-
HABITAT, 2008). Many of the organizations and humanitarian practitioners involved in the 
Yogyakarta earthquake response had experience working in both the Acehnese tsunami recovery 
as well as the Pakistan response using the UN cluster system, perhaps resulting in greater 
coordination and knowledge of the local conditions (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011).   
Some authors suggest that the conditions that existed just prior to the Yogyakarta earthquake 
provided an opportunity for quick and effective disaster recovery, conditions which are generally 
not present in most post-earthquake disaster response environments (Manfield, 2007). Positive 
assessments of the disaster response after the earthquake focused on the speed and cost of 
recovery, particularly in comparison with the recovery effort in Aceh. Most of the permanent 
housing reconstruction effort was finished within two years and initial delivery rates of emergency 
and temporary shelters was much faster compared to other disaster events (MacRae & Hodgkin, 
2011). The reconstruction effort in Yogyakarta was able to rebuild almost 300,000 permanent 
houses with approximately 800 million USD in funding, compared to the Aceh recovery effort 
which was supported by USD 6 billion (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). The provision of shelter is 
generally considered more culturally appropriate and funding was implemented using a community 
based approach, whereby local villagers were involved in the process of distributing funding and 
organizing the reconstruction effort (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). 
While there is a predominantly positive portrayal in publications assessing the recovery effort after 
the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, several criticisms that do appear in articles and reports generally 
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focus on the behaviour of NGOs and how the aid effort was organized and implemented. 
Criticisms include: the lack of coordination between the different cluster sectors; lack of 
participation by some agencies in the cluster system; the inconsistent use of language and 
translation during meetings that impacted the level of involvement of local NGOs and 
organizations; the complexity of Indonesian government levels and changing policy approaches, 
and; levels of flexibility within the framework of the UN cluster system (MacRae & Hodgkin, 
2011; MacRae, 2008; UN/OCHA, 2007). Other criticisms suggest there was a late and lowered 
focus on livelihood rehabilitation initiatives (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011; Manfield, 2007).     
4.5 Summary and Conclusion 
Chapter four has provided an overview of the historical, political and legal framework in which the 
2006 Yogyakarta earthquake event occurred. The chapter summarized the political history of 
Indonesia, particularly highlighting the Suharto era dictatorship to demonstrate how a culture of 
corruption has been transferred down to local government levels during the decentralization 
process. Furthermore, an overview of the legal framework that is currently in development in 
Indonesia for responding to disaster events was covered: this legal framework was required in 
order to respond to the large number of hazards the country faces in conjunction with high levels of 
social vulnerability. This information is important to understand the context in which the 2006 
Yogyakarta earthquake recovery occurred as well as the decisions and responses from local 
villagers.  
This chapter also provided an overview of the damages and losses associated with the 2006 
Yogyakarta earthquake event along with a summary of the corresponding recovery effort. High 
levels of damages, particularly building damage, were rebuilt within a short period of time using a 
community-based and owner-driven process of reconstruction using cultural capacities such as 
gotong royong. A summary of some of the pre-existing conditions highlighted several reasons why 
the recovery effort was successfully able to reconstruct a large number of permanent dwellings in a 
short period of time, including low levels of infrastructural damage, pre-existing governance and 
response capacities in the region, high levels of participation among skilled construction labourers 
in the area and experience of humanitarian practitioners who were involved in the reconstruction 
effort in Aceh after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.   
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While the reports and assessments conducted by the various government and international 
organizations provide a predominantly positive portrayal of the recovery effort after the 2006 
Yogyakarta earthquake, a more in-depth, holistic assessment of the recovery effort is required in 
order to ascertain whether the recovery effort has successfully implemented a resilient disaster 
recovery approach that has improved the overall conditions of the community and led to reduced 




5.0 CASE STUDY SITES  
The 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake provides an opportunity to explore long-term disaster recovery 
and refine the conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery. This case study site has been 
selected for three main reasons. First, the earthquake had a tremendous impact on livelihoods and 
during the recovery effort there was a partial focus on post-disaster livelihood rehabilitation 
(BAPPENAS et al., 2006; Callander, 2007; JRF, 2008). This provided an important opportunity to 
explore the intersections between the three concepts used as the basis for defining resilient disaster 
recovery.  
The Yogyakarta earthquake also provides an opportunity to explore long-term recovery in the 
context of a shifting approach to mitigating disasters in Indonesia. The disaster occurred shortly 
after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which attracted unprecedented international coverage and 
assistance and also highlighted the importance of effective long-term disaster recovery. The 
Yogyakarta earthquake recovery effort also occurred in the shadow of some of the well-publicized 
failures of the Aceh recovery (MacRae, 2008; Parikesit, 2009). A large number of recovery 
practitioners from government and humanitarian organizations were involved in both the Aceh and 
Yogyakarta recovery efforts, allowing a second chance for practitioners to implement the lessons 
learned from the Aceh experience (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). The recovery effort was also an 
opportunity for UN cluster organizations to further refine and implement the cluster system for 
recovery. With many of the same practitioners involved in the 2005 Pakistan earthquake recovery 
(the first time the cluster system was used), the Yogyakarta relief and recovery operation provided 
a further opportunity to implement lessons learned (Manfield, 2007). As well, the disaster occurred 
within the context of increasing recognition from Indonesian government officials of the need to 
implement a legal framework for disaster management, as well as implement disaster risk 
reduction initiatives, as opposed to simply rebuilding communities to their previous form (James, 
2008). All in all, the Yogyakarta earthquake provides an important case study site to explore and 
analyze resilient disaster recovery occurring within a context of learning and change with the 
hopes of increasing the effectiveness of recovery and risk reduction initiatives.  
Finally, the timing of the earthquake and subsequent research is important: the earthquake occurred 
in 2006 and the timeline for field research was 2010 – 2011, allowing for 4 – 5 years of post-
disaster reconstruction efforts to unfold before research commenced. Many scholars have noted the 
long-term nature of post-disaster rebuilding and having at least 4 – 5 years between the disaster 
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event and the research is thought to be ideal: the majority of reconstruction projects have been 
completed and many organizations have left the area or are phasing their work into longer-term 
development initiatives (Edgington, 2010). Consequently, the Yogyakarta earthquake case study 
provided an appropriate timeline to assess the long-term effectiveness of these reconstruction 
efforts and to indicate where improvements might be possible, based on the preliminary 
conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery.  
While the previous chapter provided an overview of Indonesia’s political history and the legal 
framework for disaster response, chapter five highlights the smaller scale conditions and 
characteristics of the impacted regions in order to provide contextual information on the 
demographic, cultural and political characteristics of the region. This is followed by an overview 
of the selected village sites, including a summary of how these villages were selected for inclusion 
in the research.        
5.1 Yogyakarta and Central Java Provinces  
Java Island is divided into six administrative units, including four provinces (Banten, West Java, 
Central Java and East Java), one special region (Yogyakarta Special District (DIY)), and one 
special capital district (Jakarta). The 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake affected the provinces of 
Yogyakarta and Central Java, including all five districts in Yogyakarta province (Bantul, Sleman, 
Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta and Kulonprogo) as well as six of thirty-six districts in Central Java 
province (Klaten, Magelang, Boyolali, Sukoharjo, Wonogiri, and Purworejo). Of these eleven 
districts, six experienced heavy impacts, including all five districts in Yogyakarta province and 
Klaten district in Central Java province (BAPPENAS et al., 2006; Resosudarmo, Sugiyanto, & 
Kuncoro, 2008).  
At the time of the earthquake, the combined population of the six districts heavily impacted by the 
earthquake was 4.5 million, with an average population density of approximately 1,000 people per 
km2 (Resosudarmo, Sugiyanto, & Kuncoro, 2008). Yogyakarta province has a population of more 
than 3.2 million, and is one of the most densely populated provinces in Indonesia, with an average 
density of 1,047 people per km2 (Resosudarmo, Sugiyanto, & Kuncoro, 2008). Central Java 
province comprises a much larger area, representing approximately one quarter of the area of Java 
Island, although only a small area of the province was impacted by the earthquake. While the 
province had a population of almost 32 million in 2005, the population in Klaten, the district 
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suffering the most severe impacts from the earthquake, had a population of just over 1 million 
people (Marfai, et al., 2008). The two hardest hit districts, Bantul and Klaten, have population 
densities of 1,620 and 1,736 respectively: this ranks both districts in the top ten for population 
density across all of Indonesia (for so-called ‘non-urban areas’) (BAPPENAS et al., 2006).   
Across the areas impacted by the earthquake, 880,000 of the 4.5 million residents (approximately 
20%) have been classified as poor (BAPPENAS et al., 2006; Resosudarmo, Sugiyanto, & 
Kuncoro, 2008). While the poverty rates in Bantul are slightly lower, at 18.5%, Klaten has higher 
poverty rates with 23.3% of the population classified as poor. Average GDP levels in Bantul and 
Klaten are less than 50% of national averages, with Klaten ranked among the poorer districts in 
Indonesia (BAPPENAS et al., 2006).  
5.1.1 Rural-Urban Community Structure  
Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces can be characterized as exhibiting many features of what 
McGee (1991) referred to as the ‘desakota’ (i.e. village-town) phenomenon. In Java, as in many 
parts of Asia, the division between urban and rural has become blurred, with rural villages 
becoming progressively more interconnected and interlinked with urban areas, economically, 
technologically and culturally (Moench & Gyawali, 2008). Within the context of Asia, many of 
these urbanizing rural areas are located in the peri-urban regions of urban centres, but instead of 
rural migration to the urban core, these rural villages are experiencing a shift in social and 
economic activities, with an intense mix of both agricultural and non-agriculture livelihoods (Xie, 
Batty, & Zhao, 2005). These urbanizing rural villages exhibit traits of both urban and rural 
environments and have become increasingly linked to national and international economies, 
resulting in significant transformations within the village sites themselves. This urban/rural 
phenomenon was termed ‘desakota’ by McGee (1991) who used the Bahasa Indonesian words for 
village (desa) and town (kota). McGee (1991, p. 4) defines the desakota phenomena as:  
Distinctive areas of agricultural and non-agricultural activity [which] are 
emerging adjacent to and between urban cores, which are a direct response to 
pre-existing conditions, time-space collapse, economic change, technological 
developments, and labour force change occurring in a different manner and mix 
from the operation of these factors in the Western industrialized countries in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
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Some of the key features of desakota systems include increased physical, electronic and cultural 
connectivity; increased penetration of the cash economy with declining remnants of reciprocity 
mechanisms; mixed livelihoods drawing upon local and non-local service and manufacturing 
opportunities; increased diffusion of modern production and resource extractive technologies; and 
tensions between formal and informal and traditional institutions for resource management 
(Desakota Study Team, 2008, pp. 12-14). The desakota characteristic of Yogyakarta and Central 
Java is thought to have had a tremendous impact on the overall recovery of impacted villages due 
to increased economic and social connections with Yogyakarta city, changing livelihood strategies, 
and the nature and availability of social and human capital used in the reconstruction process.   
5.1.2 Government Structure 
In Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces, along with the majority of Indonesia, communities are 
divided into a series of administrative units within which various government roles and activities 
are funded and implemented. As mentioned in the case study chapter, a process of decentralization 
of government services has been in place in Indonesia since 2001 (Vickers, 2005): the roles and 
responsibilities that once belonged to the Central and provincial governments had been shifted 
down to local government levels (Parikesit, 2009). In terms of government structure, Table 5.1 
highlights the administrative divisions in Indonesia, noting that for some levels there is a difference 
in terminology for urban and rural administrative units.  
Table 5.1: Administrative Divisions in Indonesia 
Government Level Leader title English equivalent 
Central Government Presiden Nation  
Propinsi  Gubernur  Province 
Kabupaten (rural) / Kota (urban) Bupati / Walikota District/Regency 
Kecamatan Camat Sub-District 
Desa (rural) / Kelurahan (urban) Lurah Municipality 
Dusun Dukuh Village 
Rukun Tetangga (RT) Kepala RT (Bapak RT) Neighbourhood 
Kepala Keluarga (KK) n/a Household  
 
The four official levels of government administration are the province, district, sub-district and 
municipality, although the dusun and RT units are heavily involved in the implementation and 
administration of government funding and programming (Mei & Lavigne, 2012). Although these 
levels of government are used throughout Indonesia, there is a slight difference in the 
implementation of governance structures at the municipal level between Yogyakarta and Central 
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Java provinces. While similar municipal departments exist in both provinces, the scale at which 
programs are administered and the responsibilities of leaders in the villages are different. In 
Yogyakarta province, the lowest level of government administration is at the level of the dusun: 
this is the scale at which most government programs are implemented by the local village leaders. 
Each village has an elected dukuh who is responsible for administering programs within the 
village, working in cooperation with the RT leaders (CM-01; CM-02; CM-04). The local 
government hierarchy is highlighted in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1: Municipality Hierarchy Structure in Yogyakarta 
 
Source: (CM-01) 
In rural administrative units in Central Java province however, the scale at which programs are 
implemented is at the municipal level, rather than the village level as is the case in Yogyakarta 
province. In Central Java, municipalities are organized around a minimal hierarchy structure: there 
is one leader of the municipality (desa) who works alongside the three departments highlighted in 
Figure 5.2 (the general department, the governance department and the development department). 
There are only two 2 dukuhs who each have responsibility over multiple dusuns, although this 
position is more symbolic in nature (these leaders are also referred to as kadus) (CM-05). The 
neighbourhood RT leaders work in conjunction with the lurah and municipal government 
departments to implement programs and disseminate information. Thus, the lurah has direct 
contact with the RT leaders as opposed to the dukuhs, although the dukuhs are involved in official 
























Governance structures played a role in the recovery effort in terms of how government and NGO 
funding was organized and the roles of various governance institutions in implementing the 
recovery programs. This also played a role in terms of implementing the research, as different 
scales of analysis were used in each province (to be discussed in further detail below).  
Figure 5.2: Municipality Hierarchy Structure in Central Java Province 
 
Source: (CM-03, CM-05) 
5.1.3 Culture and gotong royong   
As a cultural centre for traditional Javanese arts and the site of the ancient temples of Borobudur 
and Prambanan, Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces are an important historical heritage area in 
Indonesia. Yogyakarta province is one of five special provinces in Indonesia as it is still ruled by a 
sultanate whose lineage dates back to the 16th century (BAPPENAS et al., 2006). Traditional 
Javanese beliefs and customs are still commonly practiced, although in more recent times, 
particularly in urban areas, there is evidence of some intermixing of individualistic, Westernized 
cultural trends (Forshee, 2006).   
One of the key cultural components that has relevance for the earthquake recovery effort is the 
traditional Javanese concept of gotong royong. Gotong royong is one of the core tenets of 
Indonesian society and can be defined as the spirit of mutual assistance among neighbours, 
particularly operating at the scale of the village in rural areas (Lamoureux, 2003). While gotong 
royong has been described as engagement in community activities for mutual benefit, others argue 















Gotong royong in the strict sense can be rendered as collective social activities. 
But the deepest meaning of gotong royong can be explained as a philosophy of 
life that takes the collective life as the most important (Bowen, 1986, p. 546).  
Within Indonesia, the spirit and principles of gotong royong have been adopted and 
institutionalized, particularly at the local level. Economic cooperatives and monthly kerjabakti 
activities (cleaning of neighbourhood and improvement of environmental quality) have been 
organized under the spirit of gotong royong. Public health activities administered by the Health 
Department are administered through gotong royong: posyandu are run by the women in the 
community to provide public health services for pregnant women, as well as infants and children 
under 5 years of age. Community governance structures have also incorporated the spirit of gotong 
royong through neighbourhood associations (RT/RW), youth organizations (karang taruna), the 
community board of trustees (Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat (BKM)), as well as neighbourhood 
security systems (siskamling) where community members engage in nightly patrols (Asian Disaster 
Reduction Center and International Recovery Platform, 2011).   
The spirit of mutual support facilitated both the initial relief effort as well as the longer term 
reconstruction process through the provision of labour to clear rubble and debris, construct 
temporary and permanent housing, as well as facilitated the consultation process and community 
involvement in the planning and decision making process (Asian Disaster Reduction Center and 
International Recovery Platform, 2011). Due to the nature of the earthquake, with low human 
casualties compared to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and the ability of villagers to shelter-in-
place, there was minimal break-down of communal social structures. Villagers, governments and 
NGOs were able to take advantage of the strong spirit of gotong royong found in the impacted 
areas (Manfield, 2007; MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011).   
In terms of religion, the people of Yogyakarta and Central Java are almost exclusively Muslim, 
with over 95% of the population practicing Islam (Lamoureux, 2003). Although the majority 
identify as Muslim, Javanese culture maintains a mix of animistic and Hinduistic beliefs: 
traditional Javanese myths and mysticism pervade the culture in Central Java and particularly 
Yogyakarta. Due to the geological conditions of the region, the Javanese have developed and 
maintained an “intense relationship with volcanoes and hazards” (Donovan, 2010, p. 118). Disaster 
events are frequently viewed as some type of test or punishment by God; this punishment is 
usually related to various activities such as littering, deforestation, bad character, angering the 
spirits, poor treatment of the earth etc. In many cases, disaster events are viewed as pre-destined 
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events, with villagers believing there is either a) little that can be done to mitigate the disaster, or 
b) the disaster can be mitigated through spiritual activities (Schlehe, 1996). Thus, these 
cultural/traditional beliefs can be seen, in some cases, to contribute to overall vulnerability levels 
through the refusal of communities to accept the official, scientific warnings or to attempt to take 
steps to reduce disaster risks. In other cases, the experiences with reoccurring disaster events has 
led to cultural beliefs and traditions that may provide protections, and reinforce the dangers 
associated with particular hazardous events (Donovan, 2010). This is explored in further detail in 
the cultural capital section in chapter six.  
5.2 Selecting Village Sites  
In order to conduct the research, it was necessary to select several village sites that would provide 
useful data regarding livelihoods, vulnerability and resilience in the post-disaster recovery period. 
A range of experiences in the post-disaster period was desired, with the hope of collecting data that 
spanned a continuum from a) villages that felt the recovery was successful, where attempts were 
made to improve overall conditions; versus b) villages where recovery was not as successful and 
there were limited or even negative changes. Thus, villages were selected among a range of 
following criteria:  
1. High degree of damage (over 90% of houses were damaged or destroyed); 
2. Preliminary assessment of the village indicating some form of resilience and adaptive 
transformation or continued levels of vulnerability, or a range between the two options; 
3. Villages exhibiting characteristics or experiences that would provide data on the role of 
identified vulnerability and resilience factors, such as internal/external social networks, 
role and strength of village institutions, leadership qualities, education levels, income 
levels/type of income source etc.; 
4. Villages that experienced livelihood intervention and long-term development programming 
compared to villages that experienced limited to no livelihood initiatives during the post-
disaster recovery period;  
5. Willingness of the village to participate and provide support throughout the research 
process.  
Due to the high degree of damages in Bantul and Klaten, the decision was made to focus on these 
two districts for data collection. A total of twelve villages were visited for initial assessments and 
pilot meetings and discussions were held with local village leaders as well as villagers, before 
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selecting suitable village sites. The precise method for selecting initial village sites was slightly 
different in Bantul and Klaten. In Bantul, initial desas were targeted based on the assessment of 
damages conducted in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. As one of the main criteria for 
selecting villages was a high degree of experienced vulnerability, desas were selected based on 
levels of housing and building damage and areas with over 90% of buildings and houses destroyed 
were targeted. Once desas had been selected, dusuns were selected for initial site visits based on 
village connections with research assistants and Gadjah Mada University, as well as through 
discussions with village leaders and villagers about other potential village sites. In Bantul, a total 
of eight dusuns were visited during the initial selection period. Four of these were chosen due to 
connections with one of the research assistants and the university, two were chosen due to 
recommendations by villagers, and two were chosen due to recommendations from village leaders. 
Of these eight villages, three were selected for the final research as they met the selection criteria 
outlined above.  
In Klaten, an initial meeting was held with a government officer responsible for organizing relief 
and recovery activities in the district. The government officer recommended three possible desa 
locations based on the criteria outlined above. These desa were then contacted and initial meetings 
and tours were completed. One additional desa was recommended by the lurah in one of the initial 
desas visited. Of these four desa, two were selected for participation in the final research.   
Due to the aforementioned differences in government structure and program implementation at the 
desa and dusun structure in Klaten and Bantul, the decision was made to collect data at the desa 
level in Klaten as opposed to the dusun level in Bantul. The preliminary method for choosing the 
scale of analysis was to target self-defined ‘communities’. While communities can be defined 
through the borders of government administrative units, or some form of spatial unit, they can also 
be defined through broader categories in which people feel a sense of belonging (Buckle, 1998). In 
this research, a community or village is defined as an area that local residents feel a sense of 
belonging, as well as through the government structure and methods for implementing projects. 
Stated simply, in order to target ‘communities’, it was necessary to conduct analysis at a slightly 
different scale in Bantul and Klaten. It is also important to note that these were the key individuals 
and government structures that were involved in implementing relief and recovery activities in the 
post-disaster period. Therefore, attempting to impose a rigid scale of analysis and focusing solely 
on the dusun level in both provinces would have excluded the government structures and 
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institutions responsible for implementing local level recovery and development initiatives in 
Klaten. The difference in the scale of data collection in Bantul and Klaten did not appear to have 
any significant impacts on the results of the research.   
For the data collection in Klaten, as the desas were much larger, there was greater difficulty in 
terms of selecting households for village interviews. In one desa, the lurah indicated that all eight 
dusuns and RTs were fairly similar in terms of levels of education, types of employment, levels of 
damage and recovery experiences. There was also less geographical distinction between the 
different dusuns and most programs were initiated at the RT level. Thus, three RTs were chosen for 
data collection - these were selected based on the number of households (KKs) in each RT, in that 
the larger RTs were selected (some RTs were quite small with less than 10 KKs). In the second 
desa in Klaten, the dusuns were fairly distinct and separate geographical locations and local 
government officials indicated that two of these dusuns experienced a much higher degree of 
damages. As one of the dusuns had a smaller number of households (approximately 40), the 
decision was made to conduct household interviews in both dusuns.     
5.3 Selected Village Sites  
Overall, data were collected in five villages10, three in Bantul district and two in Klaten district. 
Two of the villages (one in Bantul and one in Klaten) were selected due to their initial assessment 
as exhibiting high vulnerability and a lack of transformation and resilience features following the 
earthquake. Two villages (one in Bantul and one in Klaten) were selected due to their attempts to 
transform and improve livelihoods and standards of living following the earthquake. These two 
villages also had strong leaders who each attempted to implement changes following different 
trajectories. The final village (in Bantul) was selected due to its semi-urban characteristics, a 
higher standard of living and education levels, as well as a faster recovery time. This village also 
had a unique set of institutions within the village, which are discussed in further detail below. 
Table 5.2 provides an overview of the five selected village sites, including the number of 
households and population levels, as well as an overview of the impacts from the earthquake 
disaster (data from interviews with government leaders in each village).  
 
                                                   
10
 The term village will be used throughout the remainder of the paper to describe the different sites where 
research was conducted. Although this term does not accurately reflect the different scale of analysis between 

















Size of Village 
70 hectares 
total 
12 hectares for 
housing/gardens 
16 hectares for 
rice paddies 
n/d n/d n/d 
Number of 
Households 
350 216 325 900 220 
Total 
Population 
1228 678 900 n/d 900 
Total Males 602 328 n/d n/d n/d 
Total Females 626 350 n/d n/d n/d 
Total Children 
107 children 




153 children aged 
0 - 15 
115 children 
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factories 
Majority are 
























% of Houses 
Destroyed in 
EQ 
98% 100% Over 90%  Over 99% n/d 
Deaths  26 18 7 26 n/d 
Injuries 100 
90% injured (60% 
seriously) 
n/d n/d n/d 
The following sections provide an overview of each of the villages selected for study in this 
research. The purpose of these sections is to provide sufficient background information on each 
village in order for the reader to have an understanding of the similarities and differences between 
each village, as well as the recovery experiences of each village after the 2006 earthquake. Another 
purpose of these sections is to share the information about the village that leaders and community 
members felt was important to share about their villages. This provides an opportunity for both 
leaders and villagers to disseminate information they felt was important about the characteristics, 
history and conditions of their villages. Figure 5.3 outlines the geographical location of each of the 
village sites in Bantul and Klaten districts.  
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 The denotation “n/d” refers to “no data”  
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Figure 5.3: Map of Village Sites in Bantul and Klaten Districts  
 
5.3.1 Puton12 
Puton dusun is located in Trimulyo desa, Jetis kecamatan in Bantul. Located on the banks of the 
Opak River, the village is at risk from earthquakes, flooding and small-scale storms. With a 
population of approximately 1200 people, Puton is one of the largest villages selected for this 
research. The predominant occupation in the village is farming and construction, with the majority 
of villagers engaged in one or both of these livelihood activities. Construction labour positions are 
almost exclusively male income activities, whereas farming and agricultural occupations are held 
by both males and females. Puton is one of the poorer villages in the district, although recent 
projects conducted with Gadjah Mada University as well as universities in Japan and South Korea 
have resulted in positive development impacts for the village. Average education levels are fairly 
low although the younger generations tend to complete high school. Unemployment in the village 
is quite high, with many of the male construction labourers indicating that there is scarcity of jobs 
in the post-earthquake reconstruction period. As with most villages, the majority of houses are 
                                                   
12
 Information in this section is derived from household interviews #01-001 to 01-025, FG-01, CM-01 
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located in close proximity to each other, creating a core residential area that is surrounded by 
agricultural land. Figure 5.4 includes photographs of the village and surrounding areas.   
Figure 5.4:  Photographs of Puton Village 
 
During the earthquake, there were 26 deaths, including the dusun leader, the dukuh. Many of the 
injured and killed were elderly or small children. After the disaster there was no electricity and 
over 90% of the houses were totally destroyed (only 5 houses remained standing). For one week 
the people were living in community tents although there was little food, heavy rain and the area 
was inundated with snakes. Due to the death of the village dukuh, there was a lack of leadership in 
the aftermath of the earthquake, although one of the villagers (Ibu X) took the role of the village 
leader and facilitated the distribution of aid and reconstruction funding. For the following three 
years there was no village dukuh, although the role was assumed by Ibu X. Although the 
community invited Ibu X to become the village dukuh, she declined the position as she was already 
employed by the Central government. Instead, the community requested that her husband take the 
role of Pak dukuh, which he accepted, and he fulfills the administrative component of the village 
leaders’ position. Ibu X maintains a community leadership role and is heavily involved in 
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development programming in the village. For Puton village, when reference is made to the village 
leader, this is referencing Ibu X as opposed to Pak dukuh due to the nature of her involvement and 
leadership role in the community.  
During the first two to three weeks of the initial emergency period (i.e. the initial relief and early 
recovery operations) in Puton village, there was limited assistance provided to the village. 
Villagers received small donations and personal assistance from other communities and 
friends/family from other areas (while some personal donations were kept for the individual 
family, many families shared personal donations with their neighbours and fellow villagers). After 
a short period of time, there was assistance in terms of larger food donations and health services 
from the government and large organizations such as USAID, although there was limited 
coordination in terms of how this assistance and aid was to be distributed. After approximately 
three months, the villagers received shelter assistance in the form of transitional bamboo shelters 
from foreign aid organizations. The majority of these bamboo houses were constructed using 
gotong royong to share labour resources.  Approximately six months after the earthquake, the 
villagers received funding from higher level government sources in order to begin the 
reconstruction of permanent housing. Each household considered in the heavy damage category 
received 15 million Rupiah (RP) (approximately $1,600 USD) to rebuild their houses. As the RP 
15 million was insufficient to build a house, some community members used gotong royong, 
although many households chose to pay labourers from outside Puton due to labour shortages (HI 
01-020). By the end of 2007, all the houses in Puton village had been rebuilt.  
As with all villages studied, there was a donor-driven focus on building earthquake resistant 
housing in order to reduce vulnerability to future earthquakes.  While some village members would 
have preferred to use wood/teak to reconstruct their houses in the traditional Javanese kampung 
style, the requirement from donors was that they must use cement and iron in order to maintain 
earthquake resistance standards (CM-01). In Puton, there was also a push to reduce the impact of 
flooding hazards. Houses located close to the river were relocated to higher ground and the low-
lying areas were then used as agricultural fields as well as the location of aquaculture and animal 
breeding stalls. Unfortunately, this approach has not led to a total elimination of damage from 
natural hazards. The 2010 Merapi volcanic eruption increased sediments in the river basins leading 
to more frequent flooding in Puton that has damaged aquaculture ponds (De Bélizal, 2011).  
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As mentioned above, Ibu X, a woman employed by the Central government in the Forestry 
Ministry, took control to manage the relief and reconstruction activities after the death of the 
village dukuh. Due to her English speaking skills, her education (Master’s degree obtained in the 
Netherlands) and numerous external contacts with organizations in Indonesia and abroad, Puton 
village was able to attract a series of recovery and reconstruction projects aimed at facilitating an 
increase in living standards. Considering herself a ‘community volunteer’, Ibu X has focused on 
improving the range of livelihood opportunities available to villagers in Puton. Although Ibu X and 
her family are not native to Puton village, and at the time of the earthquake she had only just begun 
to reside in the village, her ability to manage and attract aid and programs to Puton village has 
earned her the respect of male and female villagers in Puton. During the household interviews, 
several villagers noted the respect and admiration they held for Ibu X, noting that after the 
earthquake, although she had her own family and was pregnant, she took responsibility for all the 
villagers and tried to help their families (HI 01-021). One of the neighbourhood leaders noted that 
if Ibu X had not been in the village after the earthquake, the relief and recovery would have been 
very different. He noted that there were difficulties in providing assistance to some villages due to 
their remote location. Trucks would be stopped along the roadside and other villages would claim 
the aid for their own. He stated that if Ibu X called for the aid, the aid would always make it to 
Puton and other villages would not be able to stop it (HI 01-019). Another example of the role of 
Ibu X in the recovery period is through her negotiations with international NGOs that provided 
assistance in the community. One particular organization, Cordaid, was willing to provide 
transitional shelters to the community, although it was almost one year after the earthquake before 
they were able to operationalize this donation. The community felt that the shelters were 
unnecessary as many households had either already received transitional shelters or were in the 
process of building their permanent homes (CM-01). Instead, Ibu X negotiated for a new project: 
the provision of septic tank facilities for all households (HI 01-024). Previous to the earthquake, 
many families used the nearby river to dispose of their waste; due to Ibu X, the donation from 
Cordaid was used to provide bathroom and sanitation facilities for all households in Puton (HI 01-
005; 01-011; 01-016; 01-022).   
In terms of the long-term development programs initiated by Ibu X, there has been an emphasis on 
livelihood opportunities. Many villagers were reliant on seasonal employment and dependent on 
weather conditions. Through the implementation of a series of economic development programs, 
Ibu X has attempted to diminish the dependence on seasonal income and increase the security of 
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income sources. Connections with both Gadjah Mada University and Hanseo University in Korea 
have led to the recent implementation of a 5-year development plan to transform Puton into an eco-
village. As a pilot project, some villagers are using biomass and compost to produce gas and 
electricity for adjacent households. Projects have also been implemented to reduce the use of 
fertilizers, establish animal husbandry and aquaculture activities, planting of Durian trees for all 
households, as well as establishing local tourism initiatives, including home-stays, local restaurants 
(warungs) and paths and activities for tourists to explore the village (HI 01-002; 01-011; CM-01). 
The success of some of these initiatives has been noted in the poverty statistics for Puton village. 
Before the earthquake, over 50 families were categorized as very poor, by 2011, approximately 20 
– 30 families were classified as very poor (CM-01). This 50 percent reduction in the number of 
‘very poor’ families occurred over a two to three year time period and is indicative of the rapid 
transformations that have occurred in Puton village in the post-disaster period.  
Although there are some positive transformations occurring in the village, there is one large 
problem that has limited the ability of the village government to implement their development 
programs. The relationship between Puton village and the lurah (desa leader) has been strained 
since the lurah was elected into power in 2005. Villagers indicated that during the election period, 
one of the lurah’s rivals was from Puton village and many of the villagers supported the rival. 
After the lurah was elected, he refused to provide any government funding to Puton village and all 
funding and programs have been diverted to other dusuns in the desa. Thus, any funding 
designated for village development that is channeled through the local desa office is diverted to 
other sources and Puton has received no funding through official government sources (HI 01-024; 
01-007). Ibu X has been forced to search for other funding sources, particularly through university 
partnerships and humanitarian organizations.  
Puton village was selected for inclusion in the research as the village provides an opportunity to 
explore the impacts of strong leadership and the transformations that were attempted after the 
earthquake and during the recovery period. There has been an emphasis on long-term development 
initiatives to raise the standard of living of the people as well as improve the resilience of the 




Kategan dusun is located in Patalan desa, Jetis kecamatan, one of the hardest hit districts in Bantul 
during the earthquake. Similar to Puton, the village has a residential core area surrounded by 
agricultural fields (see Figure 5.5). The village is at high risk for earthquake and strong storms, as 
well as small flooding risk in some areas. The majority of villagers are engaged in farming labour 
activities, particularly the women, although other income activities include pedi-cab drivers, 
factory workers and construction labourers. Many households, particularly the older generations, 
are dependent on remittance payments from their children who are either working in Hong Kong, 
Singapore or Malaysia, as well as larger cities in Indonesia (HI 02-001; 02-003; 02-004; 02-017; 
02-021). There are high levels of unemployment in the village, particularly for construction 
labourers and the younger population (HI 02-001; 02-012; 02-015). Overall, education levels are 
low with very few residents attending university or even high school (although high school 
education is more common in the younger generation). Without high school education or skills, 
many of the younger population are unemployed and are either leaving to go to larger cities in 
search of work, or are remaining in the village unemployed (HI 02-004; 02-004).   
During the earthquake, 13 people were killed with 5 more individuals passing away due to their 
injuries in the following days. Almost 90% of the population of Kategan experienced some injury, 
with 60% suffering serious injuries. All the houses in the village were damaged or destroyed in the 
earthquake. Infrastructure was also damaged, including the irrigation systems which made it 
difficult to recommence farming activities. The village dukuh had passed away shortly before the 
earthquake, and so there was a lack of leadership within the village in terms of obtaining, 
organizing and distributing aid. For two years following the earthquake there was no village leader 
until the new dukuh was elected in 2008 (CM-02). In order to facilitate the distribution of the 
emergency aid, the youth organization in the village took control and distributed the relief 
throughout the village. The youth organization (comprised mainly of older children in the village 
aged 16 - 25) also facilitated the rebuilding of houses through purchasing the materials and 
providing the materials to each household in the village (HI 02-007). In Kategan village, the 
decision was made to register all households in the heaviest category of damage so that all families 
would receive the full RP 15 million funding (HI 02-001). The villagers were provided the 
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 Information in this section is derived from household interviews #02-001 to 02-025, FG-02, CM-02 
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materials to rebuild their houses and villagers used gotong royong in order to save on labour 
expenses.  
Figure 5.5: Photographs of Kategan Village 
 
In terms of long-term livelihood and development programming, Kategan has received limited 
assistance. While there was a program during the recovery period that focused on training villagers 
to process and sell coconut, there was no provision of capital to start businesses as well as a lack of 
training in establishing networks and markets for selling the products. Currently, there are no 
coconut producers in the village. There were also difficulties in implementing the government-run 
sewing program as there was conflict over whether the sewing machines should be distributed to 
individuals or to establish a communal sewing area where multiple people could use the sewing 
machines when necessary. At the time of the research, the sewing machines are not being used 
(CM-02). Other than these two programs, there has been very limited assistance provided to the 




The lurah’s house was located in Kategan village. The lurah’s wife currently resides at the house 
in Kategan village although the lurah spends most of his time at his second home in Yogyakarta 
city where he is engaged with his businesses activities (CM-02). The lurah’s house in the village is 
a traditional joglo style house that has been in the family for generations (see Figure 5.5). The 
lurah is a man of noble ancestry, considered part of the aristocracy of the Sultanate in Yogyakarta. 
Because of this, he has received formal education and is considered a wise man who can solve 
difficult problems in the village. If there is a problem that the villagers cannot solve, or if they 
consider it a difficult problem, they will contact the lurah and he will provide assistance and 
solutions that are supported by the villagers (HI 02-005; 02-007). He is well respected among the 
villagers although due to his business activities and responsibility for 20 dusuns in the desa, he is 
not able to attend to the issues in Kategan regularly.  
The current standards of living in Kategan village are the lowest of the five villages selected for 
inclusion in the research. Most of the houses remain unfinished following the earthquake, with 
many lacking flooring and finished walls (see Figure 5.5). Although water and sanitation facilities 
were built following the earthquake, these were not provided to all individual houses and many 
households share bathrooms and wells with other families, as well as those who continue to use the 
nearby river to dispose of their waste (HI 02-003; 02-013; 02-022). The biggest concern for many 
of the villagers is ensuring they have enough food and money to meet their needs on a daily basis. 
In fact, harvest failure and hunger was cited as a primary hazard for many villagers (HI 02-002).  
Kategan village was selected for inclusion in the research due to preliminary impressions that the 
village exhibited a lack of resilience and adaptive capacity in the aftermath of the earthquake 
disaster. Although the lurah is a strong leader, he is responsible for multiple villages and there is a 
lack of strong leadership at the village level, as well as overall low levels of education, knowledge 
on development and social programming, and low income levels. Overall, the village gave the 
impression of passivity; while villagers would like to see positive changes, most villagers indicated 
they didn’t know how to accomplish this and were waiting on external organizations to come in 
and help them.  
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5.3.3 Wonokromo I14 
Wonokromo I (hereafter referred to simply as Wonokromo) village is located in Wonokromo desa, 
in Pleret kecamatan. Located at the confluence of two large rivers (the Opak and Gadjah Wong 
Rivers) as well as a third tributary river (the Belik River) running through the village, the area has 
a risk of flooding as well as risks from earthquakes, strong wind storms and fire due to the density 
of housing. Currently, there are 325 households in the village, with a total population of 900 people 
although at the time of the 2006 earthquake there were 300 households and 875 people. The 
majority of villagers have achieved high levels of education, with approximately 80% of the 
villagers engaged in formal employment, mainly working as government officers or teachers (CM-
04). The village can be described as semi-urban, with higher population densities than the other 
selected villages, as well as exhibiting unique features, such as a Judo training centre. The majority 
of the village land is developed so there are a limited number of farmers, although some villagers 
still work as farm labourers. Remaining villagers are engaged in entrepreneurial activities such as 
tailors, shop owners and food/product producers (HI 04-004). Located to the immediate south of 
Yogyakarta city, Wonokromo village sits immediately adjacent to a main road, resulting in easy 
access to the city and transportation infrastructure. The village also sits immediately beside 
Wonokromo II; the villages used to be one large village, although the large size meant the village 
was split administratively into two smaller villages in 1974 (CM-04).  
Wonokromo village has important historical connections to the sultanate and religious institutions. 
The village was built on independent land given to Abdullah Fakih by one of the first Sultans of 
Yogyakarta province. Abdullah Fakih built the village of Wonokromo on the land: as a gift from 
the Sultan, the land was considered independent and therefore, the residents were not required to 
pay any taxes until the Republic of Indonesia was created in 1945. As part of this religious 
heritage, there is a large mosque that was built in the village, and a Sultanate representative has 
been appointed as caretaker of the mosque (HI 04-001). Along with the mosque, there are 
numerous religious boarding schools in the village that are a reflection of the strong religious 
heritage and strength of religious institutions in Wonokromo. Students from all over Indonesia 
have attended these religious schools, which positively impacted the recovery experience 
following the earthquake (HI 04-008). Figure 5.6 depicts Wonokromo and some of the features 
found in the village.  
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 Information in this section is derived from household interviews #04-001 to 04-025, FG-04, CM-04 
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Figure 5.6: Photographs of Wonokromo Village 
 
Wonokromo is located along the Opak river fault; during the earthquake, large cracks appeared in 
the ground in the village. Seven people were killed in Wonokromo I, along with 15 others in 
Wonokromo II. Four people from outside the village, who happened to be in Wonokromo at the 
time of the earthquake, were also killed; these four persons would not be included in the official 
statistics for the village (CM-04). Immediately following the earthquake, many of the villagers 
made their way to the mosque to pray, although others started to head north due to a false tsunami 
warning (HI 04-008; 04-006). In the evening, the leaders from the village held a meeting to discuss 
how they could provide immediate shelter and food to the affected villagers. Wonokromo I and 
Wonokromo II established one office to organize and coordinate the emergency aid, although this 
was disbanded after three days. Coordination and communication between the two villages 
remained strong throughout the relief and recovery period (CM-04).  
Due to the close proximity to Yogyakarta city, as well as the strong external connections 
maintained by many villagers, there was a large amount of in-kind and monetary donations: in the 
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first day following the earthquake, the village received RP 4 million (approximately $425 USD) to 
help facilitate emergency aid. Villagers also have connections to Central government and military 
officers, and on the second day following the earthquake, approximately 60 soldiers from the 
marine army were deployed to the village to provide emergency assistance. The military provided 
two military tents and kitchen tools (CM-04; HI 04-001; 04-008; 04-011). The villagers themselves 
began the process of cleaning debris and reconstructing their houses almost immediately following 
the earthquake (HI 04-003; 04-004). The mosque in the village had a generator, so villagers were 
able to use the mosque area for temporary shelter and communal cooking. The electricity also 
allowed the village to maintain radio communications outside the area, which also helped facilitate 
requests for immediate assistance (CM-04).  
In terms of the shelter relief and recovery programs, very few families in Wonokromo accepted 
transitional bamboo housing as they were afraid that acceptance would limit the amount of funds 
they would receive for their permanent houses (HI 04-005). Many families were able to begin the 
process of rebuilding almost immediately as they had the stable income levels and savings in order 
to rebuild on their own. As the majority of residents were engaged in formal employment, they 
also did not suffer reduced income levels that were common in other villages (HI 04-010). In terms 
of permanent housing reconstruction, as the majority of villagers worked in formal employment, 
there was a lack of skilled construction labourers in the village. This limited the ability to use 
gotong royong to rebuild each other’s houses, and therefore, most families in Wonokromo had to 
pay for outside labourers to reconstruct their houses. There was an abundance of labourers who 
came to the region to assist in the recovery effort, although not all of these labourers were skilled 
in construction. There were instances of shoddy construction and in some cases, the rebuilt houses 
had to be torn down and reconstructed in order to meet the earthquake resistant guidelines 
established by the government and JRF funding sources (HI 04-005; 04-011). Regardless of these 
issues, the villagers were still able to completely rebuild all houses and buildings within two years 
following the earthquake.   
During meetings with village leaders, several reasons were highlighted as to why Wonokromo 
village was able to recover at a quicker pace than other villages15. The geographical location of the 
city provided easy access for donations and direct access to immediate relief and emergency aid. 
There is also a high degree of external social networks in the village, not just among village 
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 Information in this section is derived from CM-04, FG-04; HI 04-005; 04-011; 04-013)  
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leaders, but in many households. As many of the villagers have achieved high levels of education 
(university degrees), villagers have connections through their employment as well as personal 
family and friends. Many villagers who have left the village and were working in Jakarta and other 
large cities still felt strong connections to their families and the village itself. The village has strong 
silaturahmi – an Arabic term for keeping connections between each other. The village connection 
with the Sultanate has led to strong feelings regarding the noble history of the area, and villagers 
maintain that connection even when they leave. There are formalized organizations outside the 
village where former villagers living in other cities get together for social activities. Another aspect 
that has helped build the strong external connections is the number of religious boarding schools in 
the village. Students from across Indonesia have spent time in Wonokromo village and many still 
maintain strong connections: this led to a high level of donations from people all across Indonesia 
who sent money and aid to help support the recovery effort of the villagers. The strength of the 
religious faith of villagers was another highlighted aspect that impacted recovery rates. Villagers 
have high levels of respect and faith in religious leaders, and the leaders were able to provide 
inspiration and spirit for people to begin their recovery. Believing the earthquake was their destiny 
from God, they used their religious faith to help rise up from the devastation. Other factors 
highlighted by village leaders include the characterization of the people as hard working, diligent 
and innovative, as well as the strength of religious activities and institutions in the village.  
While the above paragraphs have highlighted the positives aspects of Wonokromo, there are also 
issues, particularly in regards to social relations in the village. As the village can be described as 
semi-urban, there has been a shift towards individualistic behavior and increased social conflict 
(HI 04-009). One of the research assistants noted that problems in Wonokromo are social in nature, 
as opposed to economic, and that almost all household interviewees commented on the social 
conflict in the village. Some villagers do not participate in gotong royong activities, with wealthier 
individuals paying out of participation. There is increased competition between families in terms of 
standards of living, style of housing, what private schools their children attend, levels of education 
etc. There is also conflict between the different types of leaders in the village (HI 04-003; 04-006). 
The strong religious institutions have led to a number of religious leaders in the community who 
are well-respected by the villagers. At times there are conflicts between the religious and 
government leaders. There are also conflicts between various government leaders in the village. At 
the time of the earthquake, the dukuh had held his position for three years. There were three other 
rivals in the community running against the dukuh for election; there are still individuals in the 
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community who follow the rivals. This has led to somewhat fractured relationships within the 
village, with different households supporting different community leaders and their agendas (CM-
04; HI 04-006; 04-009). Consequently, there have been difficulties implementing some 
government programs as well as a lack of trust between different households.  
Wonokromo village was selected for the research due to the number of religious and historical 
institutions that have contributed to strong social capital. As well, due to the semi-urban nature of 
the village, the higher levels of income and education, and strong external networks, Wonokromo 
represented a unique village that exhibited resiliencies not found in the other villages. On the other 
hand, the village provided an opportunity to explore some of the downsides of these resiliencies, 
particularly through the weaker social connections within the village and the conflict between 
various leaders in the community.  
5.3.4 Ngandong16 
Ngandong desa is located in Gantiworno kecamatan in Klaten regency in Central Java province. 
The village is comprised of eight dusuns and 28 RTs. The village is located in the southern part of 
Klaten, and is fairly isolated from the main roads and economic activities in the larger urban areas. 
The village is at risk for earthquakes, as well as small storms, landslides in some areas and ongoing 
issues of flooded agricultural lands (HI 03-001; 03-003; 03-005). The majority of villagers are 
working as construction or farming labourers, although there are a few villagers that have been 
successful with entrepreneurial activities. The majority of construction labourers are employed in 
Yogyakarta city. There has been an emphasis placed on the role of education in the village, and 
many villagers have saved to send their children to university. Similar to Kategan and Puton, 
Ngandong village is arranged in a series of residential areas (although not necessarily individual 
dusuns) surrounded by agricultural fields.  
The earthquake disaster resulted in the complete collapse of all but five houses in Ngandong. The 
five houses that remained standing had substantial damages to the cement portions and only the 
sections of the house constructed from bamboo remained standing. During the earthquake, 17 
people were killed, and a further 10 died in the days following the disaster. Ngandong village 
received ample emergency assistance immediately following the earthquake, particularly from 
strangers, family members from unaffected villages as well as private companies that provided 
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 Information in this section is derived from household interviews #03-001 to 03-025, FG-03, CM-03 
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donations (HI 03-001). One of the most important organizations that provided assistance was the 
government of Wonogiri kabupaten; Ngandong village is located in close proximity to Wonogiri 
and because the government of Klaten was busy with all the affected villages, the government of 
Wonogiri provided food and temporary shelter assistance to Ngandong and other villages along its 
border. Furthermore, transitional housing was provided to many villagers in Ngandong by the Red 
Cross. In the initial stages of the relief effort, there was an offer of government assistance (Proyek 
Penanggulangan Kemiskinan di Perkotaan (P2KP) - Urban Poverty Alleviation Program) which 
was willing to provide funding to build 20 houses before the official government funding was 
implemented. The government of Ngandong decided to turn down these 20 houses as they felt it 
would be difficult to choose which families would have their houses built first and would create 
social conflict within the village. Hence, the program was delayed until after the official 
government housing program was finished: at that point the P2KP was administered and helped 
provide housing to those families that did not receive the official government funding (HI 03-001; 
CM-03).   
During the reconstruction effort in Ngandong, the government established groups of approximately 
15 households in order to manage the distribution of materials and rebuilding effort. Through these 
groups of 15 households, the houses were built step-by-step using the government funding (CM-
03). Funding was provided by both the Central government and JRF (who provided 18 units in 
Ngandong). Every household received aid from one source although there was no funding for 
people who did not have houses before the earthquake. The houses in Ngandong are more varied in 
shape in style and some have retained, to a certain degree, the traditional Javanese housing style 
that was common in villages before the earthquake (see Figure 5.7). 
In terms of livelihood recovery, there has been funding in Ngandong to develop the economy. In 
2008, USAID provided 150.000.000 IDR (approximately $16,000 USD) for economic 
development; this was in addition to a private donation of 4.000.000 (approximately $425 USD) 
and 30.000.000 (approximately $3,200 USD) provided by the Klaten government. With a budget 
of 184,000,000 IDR (approximately $19,600 USD) for village development and livelihood 
recovery activities, the government established a village bank for the villagers to have access to 
low-interest credit  (the village bank interest level is 1.8% compared to 2.5% - 3% bank rates) for 
establishing entrepreneurial activities. Currently the bank has been successful in maintaining a 
consistent cash flow as the villagers have been diligent about repaying the loans on-time: the 
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current default rate is 5% (CM-03). Although the purpose of the village bank is to provide 
assistance with establishing business activities, many of the villagers are taking loans in order to 
pay for daily living expenses as opposed to starting new businesses (HI 03-001; 03-007; 03-025). 
There is also a limited cash flow of the bank so there is difficulty in providing larger loans due to 
the risk involved. The above-mentioned funds also provided assistance for other programs, 
including the programs run by the PKK (women’s organization in the village), including posyandu 
and the provision of loans specifically for women, as well as an animal breeding program that 
provided goats and chickens to the poorest villagers. A cow stall was also built by a humanitarian 
organization in 2009, although currently the stalls are empty as there was no provision of capital to 
supply the cows (CM-03).   
Figure 5.7: Housing Styles in Ngandong 
 
In the aftermath of the earthquake disaster, there were problems with a lack of data as well as 
incorrect data. The desa office did not have the correct information regarding the number of houses 
and public facilities and it was difficult for the seven staff members to collect the data in the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake as they were also trying to respond to the needs of their 
own families, many of whom had injuries. Thus, the funding levels they received were incomplete 
and did not allow the government to fully implement recovery programs in the village: the village 
lurah argued that the response was hindered by a lack of data (CM-03; HI 03-001; 03-006). 
Ngandong village was recommended for the research by the government officer in Klaten due to 
its strong leader, the lurah. The lurah has been a vocal opponent of corruption at various levels, 
fighting to ensure that his village receives the funding it has been allocated by the Central 
government. The lurah told a story of how he would look through all the budget materials at 
142 
 
budget meetings at the kabupaten and kecamatan level so that he would know exactly how much 
money his village was supposed to receive. Typically, 20% of the funding allocated by the Central 
government would be levied as an informal administration fee by the government in Klaten. The 
lurah would consistently complain at budget meetings and to various government officers in order 
to find out what was happening to the 20% cut: currently his village is receiving almost 100% of 
the funds that have been allocated by the Central government (CM-03).   
While Ngandong village has strong leadership and lower unemployment levels than villages in 
Bantul, there are ongoing environmental issues with their agricultural lands. In 1975, in order to 
facilitate the agricultural development of marshland located to the west of the village, the district 
government built a drainage channel. However, since this drainage channel was built, there have 
been flooding issues on Ngandong agricultural lands that have limited the productivity of the land. 
Drainage problems have intensified since 1975, with many farmers losing their crops throughout 
this period (HI 03-001). Thus, in 2010, JRF provided funds to build new channels in Ngandong in 
order to drain the flooded agricultural lands. Unfortunately, the newly built drainage channels did 
not work properly: instead of draining the fields, the channels continued to drain water into the 
fields, resulting in further flooding (see Figure 5.8) (HI 03-003). This is the most important issue 
currently facing Ngandong village as multiple villagers have lost entire crops, some for as long as 
seven years (HI 03-008; 03-009; 03-012; 03-013; 03-014; 03-015; 03-019; 03-022; 03-025).  
Figure 5.8: Permanent flooding of agricultural fields in Ngandong 
 
Ngandong was selected for inclusion in this research due to the strong leadership displayed by the 
village government, although leadership styles were different compared to Puton village. The 
village has exhibited resilience throughout the recovery process through strong community 
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cooperation and implementation of livelihood programming. As well, although the majority of 
villagers are working in low-income labourer positions, there has been a strong emphasis on 
education in the village that has resulted in numerous low-income families sending their children 
to university. Unfortunately the ongoing environmental issues and problems implementing some of 
the longer-term development programs have hindered the ability of the village to dramatically 
change the living conditions of the village. Hence, Ngandong village offers an opportunity to 
explore the impacts of the adaptive capacity features of the village in conjunction with ongoing 
vulnerability and livelihood issues.    
5.3.5 Sengon17 
Sengon desa is located in Prambanan kecamatan in Klaten regency. Located in the southern part of 
Prambanan, the village is close to the hills separating Klaten from Wonogiri. The village is located 
quite a distance from the main roads in Klaten, leading to isolation and lack of connections with 
market facilities and business opportunities (HI 05-012). Although Sengon village has multiple 
dusuns, data were collected in the two dusuns that experienced high levels of damage in the 
earthquake: Sumberejo and Cabakan. From this point forward, when discussing Sengon village, 
this is referencing Sumberejo and Cabakan only (unless otherwise stated). Within these two 
dusuns, there are 220 households and approximately 900 - 950 people. The majority of the 
population are employed as construction and farming labourers, although the economic conditions 
in Cabakan are slightly better than in Sumberejo (CM-05). There is a small minority of 
government workers, and the housing style and standards of living between government workers 
and labourers is quite distinct and visible (HI 05-004). Education levels are higher in some areas of 
the village: there appeared to be a spatial component to educational levels as certain 
neighbourhoods emphasized education whereas others did not (HI 05-007; 05-025). The village 
has a high risk for earthquakes, and landslides in some areas. There is also risk from heavy storms, 
as evidenced by the destruction of the village office in November 2010 due to a small-scale wind 
storm (referred to as local tornadoes - angin puting beliung - in the Indonesian context) (HI 05-
013). Interestingly, the village office was not damaged in the earthquake.  
Within Sengon village, Cabakan suffered the highest level of damages due to the density of 
building structures. People were able to escape their houses, but because of the density of 
buildings, there was little open space to escape the falling debris - many people in Cabakan died 
                                                   
17
 Information in this section is derived from households interviews 05-001 to 05-028, CM-05, FG-05.  
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from falling debris as opposed to inside their houses (HI 05-001; 05-007; 05-019). In the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake, Sengon received support and donations from multiple 
sources, including the government and private donations. A private Indonesian bank provided the 
village with 30,000,000 IDR in order to facilitate emergency tents and the daily living needs of 
villagers. The youth community worked together with the government leaders in order to provide 
emergency shelter for coordination posts as well as for the community. There was difficulty 
distributing aid throughout the village as many of the roads were blocked with debris. While 
volunteers attempted to remove some of the debris by hand, it was not until two months later that 
the debris was cleared. Heavy equipment was brought in by the Central government in order to 
clear the roads in conjunction with an announced visit from the President. During this visit, 
President SBY announced that they would be building an earthquake memorial in the area, as 
depicted in Figure 5.9 (HI 05-001).  
Figure 5.9: Earthquake Memorial in Sengon village, erected on the one year anniversary of the 
earthquake 
 
During the housing reconstruction, the villagers of Sengon strictly followed the government 
deadlines for each step of the funding process. The government provided funding on a step-by-step 
basis and declared a series of deadlines for which construction for each step should be completed. 
While some of the other villages ignored these deadlines, the residents of Sengon followed them 
although there were difficulties finding the necessary labourers (HI 05-026). Many households 
hired labourers from outside the village to help rebuild each step of their house in order to meet the 
government-set deadlines (HI 05-002; 05-006; 05-012; 05-024). Although gotong royong was used 
in some cases, the strict adherence to the government deadlines limited the ability of many 
households to rebuild using gotong royong. Housing funds was provided from three sources: the 
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government, the JRF (funding for 59 houses) and World Vision (funding for 40 houses) (HI 05-
028). There was some discrepancy in terms of how the different funding sources worked, as World 
Vision provided the labour for the house construction, and it was understood that JRF had strict 
rules regarding the re-use of building materials and the layout design of the house (HI 05-028).   
In regards to livelihood assistance, there were a limited number of programs in Sengon. A small 
amount of funding was provided to initiate a village bank, although the level of funds in the 
program remains low (CM-05). Although many villagers have access to this micro-credit program, 
the majority have not been able to take advantage of assistance for business development, instead 
taking loans for housing reconstruction and everyday living needs (HI 05-001; 05-008; 05-011).  
Some animal breeding programs were also implemented, particularly the provision of goats for the 
poorest households. The PNPM program through the social ministry also implemented a sewing 
training program in the village, although there was some social conflict in terms of how 
participants were selected for inclusion (HI 05-003; 05-020; 05-025).  
The villagers noted three key aspects that have improved since the earthquake. First, housing has 
been rebuilt with iron reinforcements according to earthquake resistant standards. Second, social 
conditions and gotong royong spirit have improved since the earthquake. Villagers have regular 
meetings to maintain their feelings of togetherness and continue to use gotong royong to build and 
maintain public facilities such as the small bridges and drainage channels.  Third, after the 
irrigation channels were damaged they were rebuilt with a new design, improving the overall water 
circulation in the agricultural fields (HI 05-003; 05-006; 05-010; 05-015; 05-021; 05-024). 
Unfortunately the villagers have been unable to experience the benefits of these improved 
irrigation channels due to unpredictable weather and bug infestations. While the bugs, called 
wereng hijau (green leafhopper), are typical for the area, they thrive in wet conditions and 
normally die-off during the dry season. Due to unpredictable weather conditions and the lack of 
dry weather, the bugs have continued to propagate and have infested the agricultural lands 
throughout Sengon and surrounding areas (HI 05-007; 05-010; 05-014). Although the villagers 
have attempted to use pesticides, this has not led to any significant decreases in the infestation.  
Sengon village was chosen for inclusion in the research due to the ongoing problems facing 
households in terms of their livelihood activities. There was a significant lack of social 
programming following the earthquake, particularly in comparison to the other villages. This 
resulted in limited support and adaptive transformations in terms of the social conditions for the 
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people in Sengon. Sengon is also struggling from the ongoing bug infestation conditions that have 
severely reduced crop yields, resulting in ongoing crisis conditions for the poorest families. Thus, 
Sengon provides an opportunity to compare the experience of those villages that were able to 
implement positive changes versus those that were not as successful.  
5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The above chapter provided a brief discussion of Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces in order 
to provide sufficient context for the issues and concepts discussed in the following chapters. This 
included an overview of the concepts of desakota and gotong royong and how these impact 
approaches to hazards and disasters. The primary purpose of the chapter was to focus on outlining 
the selection of village sites, detailing the requirements for including villages in the case study. 
This was followed by an overview of each of the villages, including the characteristics, the overall 
recovery experience as well as ongoing issues and concerns facing the villagers. The purpose of 
these village overviews was two-fold: the first was to provide sufficient background information 
on the context of each village in order to support the interpretations and discussions included in the 
following chapters; and the second was to share the information about each village provided by 




6.0 RESULTS  
In order to achieve the objectives set forth in the introductory chapter, the Resilient Disaster 
Recovery Assessment Framework (RDR-AF), described in chapter three, was developed as the 
conceptual tool to inform a holistic evaluation of one long-term disaster recovery effort. Using the 
case study approach, the assessment of the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake recovery programming is 
used to provide empirical evidence to test and support the use of this framework, as well as 
providing further information on the process of long-term disaster recovery. Furthermore, in 
chapter seven the empirical evidence is used to further refine the conceptualization of resilient 
disaster recovery. The following summary of results will be used to support the overall assessment 
of the 2006 Yogyakarta recovery effort summarized in the discussion chapter.  
Before moving on to an analysis of vulnerability, resilience and livelihood conditions, it is 
interesting to note whether villagers believe they have recovered from the disaster or not. While 
government and NGO recovery programming has been completed, in some cases for up to three 
years, villager responses indicated over half of interviewed households believed they had yet to 
recover from the disaster. Several reasons were highlighted as evidence to support their opinions, 
as depicted in Figure 6.1. Rationales for defining whether recovery had finished or not particularly 
focused on the housing reconstruction effort, with many villagers noting that their houses remain 
incomplete18. Economic conditions and psychological trauma were also cited as evidence to 
support opinions that the recovery effort was either finished or not finished (HI 01-022; 02-006; 
02-017; 03-014; 03-015; 03-016; 03-017; 03-018; 03-021; 04-004; 04-006; 04-008; 04-009; 04-
017; 05-021; 05-025). In most cases, interviewees provided their responses focusing almost 
exclusively on their own recovery. Thus, if they believed that they had recovered from the 
earthquake, they would indicate that the entire recovery effort was complete. In some cases, 
villagers highlighted that they believed their own recovery was finished although they pointed to 
other villagers around them who had not sufficiently recovered yet (HI 01-016; 02-025; 03-006). 
While the evidence suggests an incomplete recovery effort, a more in-depth assessment is provided 
through the RDR-AF approach. This overall understanding of villager perceptions of recovery will 
be used to frame the results section, highlighting the overall opinion that although the majority of 
recovery projects had long ceased, the majority of villagers do not believe they have recovered.   
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 54% of respondents indicated that their house was not yet complete 
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Figure 6.1: Point of Recovery after 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake 
 
*n = 93, total responses = 137 
In order to organize the results under the RDR-AF, the various vulnerabilities and resiliencies for 
the five villages under each of the seven sustainable livelihood capitals are summarized below. The 
vulnerabilities and resiliencies of each of these capitals are explored in relation to the earthquake 
and subsequent recovery experience, as well as current conditions within each village. This 
approach is used to assess whether increased and/or decreased levels of vulnerability and resilience 
trends are specifically a result of the earthquake and subsequent recovery effort. This will provide 
the basis for exploring whether the recovery effort successfully contributed to vulnerability 
reduction, resilience building and sustainable livelihood initiatives, as outlined in the resilient 
disaster recovery assessment framework. 
6.1 Human Capital 
As noted in section 2.2.3.1, human capital represents the “skills, knowledge, ability to labour and 
good health that together enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve their 
livelihood objectives” (DFID, 1999, p. 7). Within the context of vulnerability and resilience for 
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facing disaster events, this also includes hazards knowledge and preparedness activities. Table 6.1 
provides an overview of the various human capital vulnerabilities and resiliencies of each village, 
followed by a discussion focusing on three human capital themes: education and skills; health, and; 
hazards preparedness/knowledge. Note in the human capital summary table, as well as the 
summary tables for the remaining six capitals, some elements are listed simultaneously as both 
vulnerabilities and resiliencies. This seeming contradiction is a result of the nature of disaster 
recovery as well as a reflection of the relationship and interactions between vulnerability and 
resilience. Further discussion on the relationship between these two concepts is included in chapter 
seven.    
Table 6.1: Summary of Human Capitals 
Village Vulnerabilities Resiliencies 
Puton 
Lack of education; 
Large supply of unskilled labourers; 
Psychological trauma from earthquake 
remains; 
Lack of hazards knowledge and 
awareness; 
Some poor have a lack of desire to 
improve + learn + change 
Increased awareness of environmental 
sustainability and importance of education; 
Large supply of labourers; 
Government provides support for health and 
education services for poorest; 
Creation of disaster risk reduction organizations 
Kategan 
Lack of hazards knowledge and 
awareness; 
Very low levels of education; 
Psychological trauma from earthquake 
remains for some; 
Passive mental state - low levels of desire 
for change; 
Many youth are leaving village to look for 
work, leaving the older members 
Increased awareness of hazards, with many 
villagers taking hazards courses and participating 
in simulations; 
Access to some government programs for 
education and health services; 
Large supply of labourers; 
Some training programs, particularly for youth 
Wonokromo 
High levels of psychological trauma from 
earthquake remain; 
Lack of construction labourers meant 
people meant hiring for housing 
reconstruction 
Good hazards knowledge; 
Hazard mitigation measures and preparedness 
organizations; 
High levels of education and strong emphasis on 
education throughout village; 
Increased skill and knowledge of construction 
standards after earthquake 
Ngandong 
High cost prevents some from attending 
higher education; 
Many do not feel prepared to deal with 
another disaster and still have 
psychological trauma; 
Large supply of unskilled labourers 
Strong emphasis on education throughout village; 
Higher levels of hazards awareness and 
preparedness initiatives compared to other 
villages; 
Established disaster management plans and 
preparedness organizations; 
Access to some government programs for 
education and health services; 
Large supply of labourers 
Sengon 
Lack of hazards knowledge among some 
villagers; 
Psychological trauma from earthquake 
Strong emphasis on education throughout village 





Many construction labourers are unskilled, 
leading to lower wages and unstable 
income; 
Lack of knowledge about marketing 
products and businesses 
Good hazards knowledge and experience 
6.1.1 Education, skills and knowledge  
There were significant differences in terms of household member levels of education among each 
of the five villages, as demonstrated by Figure 6.2. From the education analysis, Kategan had the 
lowest mean levels of education, followed by Ngandong, Puton, Sengon, and Wonokromo, 
although the two Klaten villages each had a substantial percentage (23% - 33%) of university 
educated individuals among the 18-29 and 30-39 age cohorts. The differences in educational levels 
among the five villages were found to be statistically significant at the 0.001 significance level, 
with the educational attainments levels in Wonokromo being significantly different in comparison 
to the other four villages19. Figure 6.2 also indicates an increase in education levels over the past 
half-century: compared to the number of villagers in the 50+ age cohort who did not attend formal 
schooling, the percentage of individuals not attending school has decreased to zero among all 
villages in the 30-39 and 18-29 age cohorts. The regression analysis indicated a statistically 
significant relationship at the 0.001 level, with an r-value of 0.461, highlighting a strong 
relationship between age and education levels. Furthermore, the results indicate that a majority of 
18-29 year olds are achieving high school education.  
Based on villager comments, these shifts in educational achievement levels can be attributed to two 
major factors: income levels and familial emphasis on education. Although public education up to 
the high school level is technically free in Indonesia, in reality, there are a variety of registration, 
uniform and supply fees that lead to substantial education costs for the poorest families. These 
educational barriers contribute to increased vulnerabilities related to lack of education: poor 
families noted the strain that educational costs put on the household, including stressing finances, 
requiring credit to pay tuition costs, and depleting savings (HI 01-011; 02-002; 02-011; 02-0014). 
In the context of university education costs, many families sold assets, such as land and cattle, in 
order to afford the tuition fees. This was regarded as a positive investment due to the likelihood  
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that university education would afford a significantly higher standard of living for their children. 
University education could also provide support for other family members, including contributing 
to household living expenses of the parents, and education costs for younger siblings (HI 01-008; 
02-004; 03-004; 03-006; 05-002; 05-026). This contributes to resilience both within households 
and among family networks, providing a social safety net among family units. Unfortunately, for 
the poorest families, the level of assets required to pay university tuition fees is almost 
unattainable, further contributing to their overall vulnerability (HI 02-016; 02-019; 02-020; 03-
001).  
Perceptions of formal education differed across villages, particularly in relation to achieving a 
post-secondary diploma or bachelor’s degree. In communities and neighbourhoods where 
education was viewed as very important (particularly in Wonokromo, Ngandong and sections of 
Sengon), parents were supporting their children, both male and female, to attend higher education 
institutions regardless of economic conditions (i.e. labourers were saving and finding funding 
sources to send their children to university) (HI 04-003; 04-009; 04-025; 05-002; 05-013). Families 
encouraged children to work hard and attempt to win scholarships, and accumulated savings in 
land and cattle that could be sold to pay tuition expenses (HI 05-011). 
The varying degrees of emphasis on achieving higher levels of education can be attributed, in part, 
to spatial relationships: those who obtain university education and achieve higher standards of 
living influence surrounding households. Surrounding households see the higher standards of 
living that can be obtained through university education and want to achieve the same for their 
own children and families (HI 05-026). On the other hand, the poorest communities and 
households (particularly in Kategan and sections of Puton), held less positive views towards 
education (HI 01-007). In these instances, while households expressed a desire to see their children 
attend high school or university, they were not planning for that experience, they preferred their 
children to work to provide money for the household, or they held laissez-faire attitudes towards 
education and allowed their young children to decide what they wanted to do (HI 01-005; 01-007; 
01-016; 02-021; 02-002; 02-022; 03-013; 05-001). Thus, education-related vulnerabilities were not 
always acknowledged in villages demonstrating the lowest levels of education.  
Formal education at the university or diploma level was thought by many villagers to lead to a 
reliable and stable occupation, which could be seen as increasing resilience levels. For villagers 
who achieved elementary to high school education, the difference in livelihood success appeared to 
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have a higher correlation with skill development and the strength of social networks as opposed to 
levels of education (HI 05-005). Certain villagers had achieved secure and stable livelihoods with 
only elementary or junior high school education while others with high school lacked reliable 
employment and business opportunities. Those with the skills to develop an idea, the knowledge to 
maintain and enhance the business and the networks to market their product generally achieved 
success in their livelihoods initiatives (HI 01-005; 01-010; 03-010; 05-012). In the case of 
construction labourers, those with the highest skill generally have higher pay, more stable income 
and little to no unemployment periods (HI 05-026). On the other hand, those with lower skills, 
including construction assistants and farming labourers, faced high competition for employment, 
low payment and unreliable contractual positions (HI 01-021; 03-010; 05-010). In this sense, the 
issue for those who have not gone on to post-secondary education is not necessarily about attaining 
higher education levels, but having a skill that contributes to steady and stable employment that is 
not seasonally dependent (HI 02-021).  
The relationship between education and skills/networks highlights the complexity of education as a 
vulnerability and resilience indicator. A certain degree of formal education contributed to reduced 
vulnerability due to reading and writing abilities, although the relationship between education and 
vulnerability was not necessarily consistent. While university education contributed to increased 
resilience in terms of stable income and the possibility of increased networks, the role of other 
levels of education in decreasing vulnerability was less clear. As a majority of 18 – 29 year olds 
have completed high school education, the role of skills and networks appeared to play a larger 
role in vulnerability reduction compared to educational attainment alone.  
6.1.2 Healthcare services  
Similar to education, the cost of healthcare and health programs in Indonesia can create substantial 
vulnerabilities, particularly for the poorest members of society. Fortunately, there are a number of 
government subsidized healthcare programs, at both community and national levels, based on a 
four-tiered system (VIP, 1st class, 2nd class, and 3rd class), that contribute to increased levels of 
resilience. The primary method for subsidizing healthcare for the poor is through the central 
government’s 3rd class health insurance program called JAMKESMAS (Jaminan Kesehatan 
Masyarakat - Community Health Insurance). Of the 125 household interviews conducted, 40 
households (32%) qualified for health insurance through the JAMKESMAS program. Qualification 
levels are based on a variety of factors, including income, housing, assets, and each village is 
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provided a strict quota for the number of poor families that can be registered for this program (CM-
03, CM-05). There are also a number of other 1st, 2nd and 3rd class health insurance programs, 
including JAMKESOS (Jaminan Kesehatan Sosial - Social Health Insurance), JAMKESDA 
(Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah - Regional Health Insurance - regional program to target poor who 
are not covered by JAMKESMAS), JAMSOSTEK (Jaminan Sosial Teneya Kerja - Social Security 
Health Insurance - state-owned, private employer health insurance), and ASKES (Asuransi 
Kesehatan - Health Insurance - provides health insurance for public sector employees). These 
health insurance programs provided coverage for a further 22 households, indicating that almost 
50% of the households surveyed had some form of government provided health insurance 
program. For these households, approximately 85% of community healthcare service and generic 
drug costs are covered by the government (HI 02-005; 03-005). While there were a small number 
of complaints regarding the quality and speed of service (HI 01-003; 04-007), the impact of these 
health insurance programs for the poorest is noted by villagers who stated that “if I didn’t have 
JAMKESMAS it’s difficult to pay medical care” (HI 02-020); and “healthcare is expensive, 
especially for the poor people. It’s impossible for them to pay hospital bill” (HI 02-023). Thus, 
these health insurance programs contribute to increased resiliencies in relation to health aspects of 
human capital. 
For the remaining 50% of households who did not qualify for government-sponsored health 
insurance, healthcare costs were absorbed by the household. While the wealthier households can 
afford these costs (HI 01-010; 04-015), the cost is prohibitive for poorer households, and 
contributes to increased vulnerability. In the case of more severe health issues that require 
hospitalization or surgery, households have had to take credit (HI 01-004; 02-021; 05-008), borrow 
money from family or friends (HI 03-024; 04-001; 05-011; 05-017), or take money from savings 
(HI 01-005). In one instance, a villager had to use funding earmarked for housing reconstruction to 
pay for surgery to have his appendix removed. Due to this, he was unable to rebuild his permanent 
house and continues to live in the transitional shelter provided after the earthquake (HI 05-005). 
The impact of not having government health insurance is summarized by one villager who noted:  
If you didn’t have money to pay, some people will just stay home with no care, 
or they will try to find the money somewhere – loans, go to family, selling stuff 
etc. They won’t think about how to pay back the loan just think about saving 
their life – that is the most important (HI 03-001).  
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Due, in part, to the government health insurance system, it is interesting to note that those that are 
most vulnerable medically are not necessarily the poorest. It is those households that are poor, yet 
not poor enough to be considered for the JAMKESMAS, that struggle the most with healthcare 
expenses. Particularly with regards to more serious medical concerns, such as those requiring in-
patient care or surgery, households may have to opt for no care due to financial constraints. This 
may lead to decreases in human capital levels, and increased vulnerability overall.  
While the government insurance programs provide a source of resilience for some households in 
the face of health issues, government funded community health programs also contribute to 
significant health resilience. PUKESMAS (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat - Centre for Public 
Health) centres contribute to affordable health services for villagers with and without government 
insurance coverage (HI 03-022; 4-013). Rates for services at PUSKESMAS range from RP 2,000 
to RP 5,500 ($0.20 - $0.60 USD) for registration and medical fees (HI 03-006; 04-009; 05-003). 
Another component of health services is provided through POSYANDU activities organized by the 
women’s organization (PKK). POSYANDU is a “community based vehicle to improve the health 
status of women and children that involves increased coverage of health care and intersectoral 
collaboration” (Leimena, 1989, p. 264). These activities focus on healthcare for young children and 
the elderly through the provision of nutritional education and health monitoring, as depicted in 
Figure 6.3.  




The implementation of the POSYANDU health programs in the late 1980s has contributed to the 
strengthening of women’s organizations at the village in conjunction with improving availability 
and accessibility of health services. This contributes to resilience through increasing the health 
capital of villagers, as well as strengthening community organizational capacity.   
6.1.3 Hazard knowledge and preparedness 
At the desa level, there has been an increase in volunteer based organizations created to increase 
hazards awareness and implement DRR programming at the local level (HI 01-015). These SIBAT 
(Siaga Bencana Berbasis Masyarakat - Community-Based Disaster Preparedness) teams provide 
training to local villagers regarding hazards in the community, conduct earthquake simulations to 
increase capacity to respond, and help create disaster response plans at the community level (HI 
01-015; 03-002; 03-022; 04-007). This has occurred in conjunction with recent efforts by the 
central government to implement national and provincial disaster management organizations as 
discussed in chapter 4. These improvements in disaster management organizations, in combination 
with increased awareness, provide evidence to support the position that the recovery effort 
contributed to increased risk awareness and disaster preparedness initiatives, thereby contributing 
to reduced vulnerability.  
Despite the gains in hazard preparedness, many villagers commented on the ongoing need for 
further hazards knowledge and training. While some villagers attended courses on hazards and 
earthquake simulations, many household respondents were unaware of the physical processes that 
create natural hazards, the risk of hazards for their community, or how to reduce risk associated 
with those hazards (HI 01-003; 01-005; 01-007; 02-011; 03-012; 05-025). Many villagers noted 
that earthquakes and disasters are destiny from God, and that there is little that can be done to 
prepare; this point will be further discussed in the cultural capital section 6.7.   
6.1.4 Human capital and disaster recovery 
During the post-disaster period, the data indicate20 that human capital levels in all five villages had 
a significant impact on recovery itself. As noted in chapter four, one of the more successful aspects 
of the recovery effort was the implementation of a community-based housing reconstruction 
program. The success of this community-based reconstruction program was particularly attributed 
                                                   
20
 These results were inferred from the post-recovery household interviews, community discussions and focus 
groups, as well as the expert interviews. The research did not measure pre-disaster human capital levels.  
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to construction skills among the villagers: villagers were able to rebuild their houses using their 
own construction skills and labour. In the case of Wonokromo, the most educated village where the 
majority of villagers worked as government officers and the number of construction labourers was 
quite low, many households had to hire external labourers. The majority of these labourers came 
from unaffected regions in Central Java province, including Magelang and Temanggung regencies 
(HI 04-003; 04-004; 04-007; 04-017; 04-024). Not only did lack of construction skills contribute to 
higher rebuilding expenses through the limited use of gotong royong, but in a few cases, this also 
created issues in terms of quality of building construction. Some of the hired labourers falsely 
advertised themselves as skilled construction labourers, although their quality of labour/skill was 
quite low. For a small number of households in Wonokromo, the lack of construction skill among 
hired labourers resulted in housing that did not meet the construction guidelines set forth by both 
the Indonesian government as well as JRF. These houses had to be torn down and rebuilt at the 
owner’s expense in order to receive the next phase of funding (HI 04-005; 04-011). In other 
villages, the skill of construction labourers meant that households could construct their own 
houses, monitor labourers to ensure high quality building standards, and help neighbours rebuild 
their houses. The recovery effort also contributed to increased skill in construction as some 
villagers were able to receive construction training and skills through courses offered by the 
government and NGOs to increase awareness of earthquake resistant building standards (HI 01-
024; 04-005). Thus, although some construction labourers may have had higher vulnerability levels 
in the pre-disaster context (due to unstable unemployment and lower income levels), construction 
skills contributed to increased resilience following the earthquake. This indicates there is a 
dynamic and temporal component to vulnerability and resilience levels: further discussion on the 
dynamic nature of resilience is provided in chapter seven.     
While health facilities may have been over-extended in the period immediately following the 
earthquake, emergency medical services were provided free of charge for those impacted by the 
disaster through government health centres (Resosudarmo, Sugiyanto, & Kuncoro, 2008). Injured 
villagers were able to receive quality medical care without additional expenses and debts incurred 
on impacted households (HI 01-001; 02-006; 02-009; 03-019). Medical services were also 
provided free-of-charge from humanitarian organizations who established mobile field healthcare 
facilities in the aftermath of the disaster. These mobile health centres provided services for injuries 
and general health for any villagers who required assistance, regardless of whether they were 
impacted by the earthquake or not (HI 03-001). This was a positive aspect of the relief operation; 
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particularly for those families who did not have government sponsored insurance and may have 
suffered from ongoing medical issues but lacked the income to pay for quality healthcare services. 
While these free health services reduced vulnerability, and provided support and assistance in the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the operational period was limited to the relief stage and 
has had limited long-term impact on the resilience of those households lacking funds to afford 
healthcare services.  
The earthquake also contributed to psychological trauma that exacerbated vulnerability levels. 
Initial reports indicated that trauma levels were high in areas with heaviest impacts: children 
showed stress reactions, including sleeping problems, behavior issues (such as crying and anxiety) 
and fevers, whereas adults experienced flu-like symptoms and fear of beginning the rebuilding 
process and returning to work in agricultural fields (UGM & IRP, 2009). Although counselling 
services were provided in some villages for children (HI 03-015), some interviewees indicated that 
their children still suffered psychological trauma from the earthquake, including sleeping issues, 
(HI 01-003; 02-005). A number of adults also complained about ongoing trauma associated with 
the earthquake disaster (HI 01-017; 01-021; 01-022; 02-005; 2-010; 02-016; 02-017; 03-014; 03-
015; 03-016; 03-017; 03-018; 03-020; 04-006; 04-007; 04-013; 04-019; 04-025; 05-021; 05-022; 
05-023; 05-025; 05-027). In all villages, it was local community members who removed the 
injured and dead from the earthquake debris (HI 03-001; 04-008; 05-002). These experiences, 
along with the loss of family members, housing, and personal belongings contributed to long-term 
psychological trauma associated with the 2006 earthquake, and future earthquake or disaster 
events. This indicates that further attention on the long-term emotional and psychological aspects 
associated with disasters is required in order to effectively address different forms of recovery.  
To summarize, within the context of human capital, the recovery effort contributed to both 
increased resilience as well as increased vulnerabilities. Recovery programming following the 
earthquake disaster did not have an impact on access to formal education levels, and in a small 
number of cases the disaster and ensuing costs of recovery reduced household capacity to pay 
education expenses, contributing to further vulnerability (HI 01-015; 03-023). In terms of skill 
levels, the recovery effort contributed to skill development for construction labourers who 
participated in training courses on earthquake resistant housing standards. Although free healthcare 
was provided for injuries sustained during the earthquake (HI 05-001), poor households that did 
not qualify for government healthcare insurance programs have continued to struggle with 
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healthcare costs, particularly for severe health issues. The recovery effort did contribute to reduced 
vulnerability through increased knowledge and awareness regarding earthquake resistant housing 
construction, although further follow-up is needed in terms of providing villagers with a strong 
hazards knowledge and preparedness base.  
6.2 Social Capital 
Social capital examines the different formal and informal social connections (both internal and 
external to the community) of households and communities as well as feelings of reciprocity, trust 
and exchange that provide the basis for social and economic interaction and activities (DFID, 
1999). Table 6.2 provides an overview of the various social capital vulnerabilities and resiliencies 
for each village. This is followed by a comparison and discussion of the internal and external social 
assets of households and villages.  
Table 6.2: Summary of Social Capitals 
Village Vulnerabilities Resiliencies 
Puton 
Low levels of external networks, many 
have family in same area and were 
impacted by the earthquake; 
Lack of networks for employment 
purposes; 
Social jealousies from aid distribution; 
Lack of affordability of social 
organizations for poorest 
Fair distribution of aid and sharing with 
neighbours; 
Strong external linkages of leader; 
Strong familial connections; 
Spirit of community togetherness (gotong royong); 
Strong community organization, particularly for 
women 
Kategan 
Low levels of external familial networks 
outside village; 
Lack of networks for employment 
purposes; 
Lack of affordability of social 
organizations for poorest; 
May have been an issue with corruption 
of aid 
Fair distribution of aid and sharing with 
neighbours; 
Strong youth organization mobilized the 
distribution of aid; 
Strong familial connections; 
Improved spirit of community togetherness 
(gotong royong); 
Farmer’s community organization at the desa level 
supports farmers; 
Community organizations (i.e. dasa wisma, arisan) 
Wonokromo 
High levels of social conflict and social 
jealousies; 
Competing religious and government 
leaders leads to social fragmentation; 
Lower levels of community solidarity due 
to individualistic attitudes 
Strong familial connections provided support for 
recovery; 
High levels of external linkages to military, 
religious organizations and private institutions; 
Strong community organizations and structures, 
particularly religious organizations; 
Strong community heritage and shared ancestry 
Ngandong 
Lack of affordability of social 
organizations for poorest; 
Strong government and community organizations; 
Strong familial connections; 
Improved spirit of community solidarity  (gotong 
royong); 
Stronger networks for employment purposes 




Lack of external networks for 
employment leads to high unemployment 
levels; 
Some levels of social conflict from aid 
distribution 
Strong familial connections provide support during 
recovery and economic hardship; 
Strong spirit of community solidarity; 
Strong community organizations 
6.2.1 Internal Social Capital 
Family and kinship networks have been identified as a critical social mechanism for increasing 
resilience to disasters, particularly during the post-disaster period as a resource to provide material 
and non-material support (Kirschenbaum, 2006). Evidence from the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake 
supports this premise, as all surveyed villagers noted that they received assistance from family 
members in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. Assistance took a variety of forms, including 
food and material goods for emergency support (HI 01-003; 02-008; 03-018; 04-006; 04-011; 04-
022; 05-019), labour assistance for reconstruction of temporary and permanent shelter (HI 03-011; 
03-022; 05-004), financial support for rebuilding housing (HI 01-004; 02-001; 03-002), and 
sheltering family members during the immediate aftermath period (HI 003-005; 4-001; 04-007; 05-
013; 05-014). Among many of the poorest households, villagers noted that their family members 
lived in the same village, so it was difficult to provide financial and material support as they were 
also impacted by the earthquake, thereby increasing their vulnerability (HI 01-010; 02-012; 05-
001; 05-003). In these cases, family members did provide emotional and psychological support for 
recovery. In fact, when asked what gave them strength to recover from the disaster, 51%21 noted 
family as an important support mechanism.  
While familial support was unequivocally recognized as a resilience factor for recovery after the 
earthquake, the impact of informal community support and networks was more complex and 
differed by village. In Puton, Kategan and Ngandong, the majority of villagers felt that aid was 
distributed fairly and there were limited conflicts during the immediate response and recovery 
periods. On the other hand, Wonokromo experienced a high degree of social conflict, as did 
Sengon where there was no desa level leader and numerous cases of corruption (HI 01-006; 02-
003; 03-006; 04-003; 04-006; 04-021; 04-024; 05-016; 05-010). Supportive aspects of community 
networks are evidenced through villager comments highlighting households sharing aid and 
assistance with their neighbours. In regards to the immediate response and relief assistance 
                                                   
21
 Of the 114 interviewees who responded to this question, 58 highlighted their family as a source of support. 
Respondents were allowed multiple responses - in total, 146 responses were provided, with 68 (or 47%) 
highlighting family as a support mechanism for recovery after the earthquake.  
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provided, almost all respondents felt that they received adequate short-term emergency relief 
supplies. Although there were some minor complaints, these usually revolved around requests for 
specific conditions, including milk for infants, and medicine for high blood pressure (HI 01-008; 
01-018; 04-020; 04-022; 04-024; 05-008; 05-016). In a small number of cases, villagers 
complained that neighbours around them received assistance that they themselves did not receive. 
This was particularly evident for a cooking tools program organized by the regency level 
governments in Bantul and Klaten (HI 02-013; 03-018; 03-019; 05-025). As the relief assistance 
was generally organized at the village level, individual villages may have had different experiences 
with organization and distribution depending on the capacity of local governance and community 
structures.  
Private donations from friends, family members and private companies provided a number of 
households with more than enough assistance. In these instances, the aid was shared with 
neighbours and others within the community (HI 01-007; 01-023; 02-002; 02-007; 02-012; 03-003; 
03-007; 04-005; 04-008; 04-011; 05-028). This spirit of giving and support contributed to feelings 
of togetherness within the village that several households highlighted as an important support 
mechanism after the earthquake (23% of interviewees highlighted community solidarity as a factor 
providing strength for recovery). In one instance, an interviewee described how the villagers had 
run to the hills after the earthquake due to the false tsunami warning. One of the villagers had run 
to the hills without clothing and needed assistance to cover her body. The interviewee gave her the 
sarong she was wearing and used pieces of her husband’s clothing to cover herself as well. She 
highlighted this story as a positive experience that made her grateful that she was still able to share 
something with her neighbours even in a difficult situation (HI 01-018). This highlights the role of 
internal social capital networks as a contributing factor in resilience levels.  
To varying degrees within all villages, conflicts over aid distribution and levels of assistance 
created social jealousies and conflict, highlighting vulnerabilities related to social capital (HI 01-
001; 01-005; 02-015; 04-003; 04-007; 04-009; 05-016). Both Wonokromo and Sengon had issues 
with corruption of aid, as well as increased levels of conflict and dissatisfaction with aid 
distribution (HI 04-003; 04-004; 04-005; 04-012; 05-002; 05-010; 05-016). In particular, 
Wonokromo has had ongoing issues with social conflict between villagers supporting different 
government and religious leaders - this issue will be discussed further in the political capital 
section as well as the cultural capital section. In Puton, Kategan and Ngandong, a small minority of 
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villagers noted that they felt they did not receive some aid items that other villagers did (HI 01-
005; 02-015; 03-018). In these instances it was difficult to determine whether these comments were 
a reflection of unfair aid distribution, or, as indicated by other villagers, could be attributed to some 
villagers receiving more through familial and personal network donations (HI 01-017; 02-023). 
Generally, families who received extra aid through personal assistance shared among neighbours 
and friends. A small number of villagers felt that these personal donations should have been 
reported to the kepala dusun in order to be distributed equally throughout the village (HI 04-012; 
04-024). These examples highlight a drawback of the tight social structures found in each village: 
the higher degree of community togetherness and involvement may increase the likelihood for 
dissatisfaction and conflict. This raises important questions about how official relief and recovery 
assistance can be distributed alongside personal assistance in a fair manner that is culturally 
appropriate and reduces social conflict within villages.  
A variety of community structures, including government and community organizations were used 
during the recovery effort in order to assist in the distribution of aid and recovery programs, 
accentuating social capital resiliencies. These include the neighbourhood RT leaders who collected 
data and distributed aid among the neighbourhood, as well as the village women’s organization 
(Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK) - Family Welfare Movement) and the youth 
groups. These strong organizational structures at the desa and dusun level provided the decision-
making structures as well as the support and capacity to implement a community-based recovery 
program that distributed aid throughout the villages (HI 02-003; 02-006; 02-001; 03-003; 03-006). 
A variety of pre-existing community organizations also contributed to conditions of resilience in 
the villages, such as the PKK, Arisan, as well as post-disaster farmer’s organizations established by 
the PNPM Mandiri government program. The PKK helps to organize the POSYANDU health 
activities for children and the elderly as discussed above, as well as promoting family development 
activities, such as the newly implemented preschool playgroups in all villages (HI 04-007; 05-006). 
One villager noted that her involvement in the PKK and POSYANDU activities “makes me feel 
confident even though I’m not high educated. It makes me respected by other people” (HI 01-008). 
This demonstrates the effectiveness of these social organizations to both provide services to 
community members, as well as increase organizational capacity and resilience at the village level.  
The Arisan program is a community-based social group that also provides credit and savings 
services. The program is organized at either the RT or dusun level. Members meet on a weekly or 
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monthly basis and contribute a small fee (approximately RP 5,000 or $0.50 USD) which is then 
allotted to a member on a rotating or lottery basis. The system provides a method for saving and 
credit, as well as a social gathering to discuss and solve issues and problems (HI 01-006; 02-022; 
03-025). Although the arisan program provides important resiliencies for many households, these 
benefits do not seem to extend to the poorest households as they do not have the financial capital to 
be able to contribute to the savings program on a weekly or monthly basis (HI 01-009; 02-014; 02-
020; 03-024). Thus, for some of the poorest households, a lack of ability to participate in certain 
social capital structures further increases their vulnerability, as they are excluded from the 
resilience these organizations provide.  
Part of the post-disaster recovery process included the creation of new community organizations 
designed to increase resilience levels, particularly among poorer agriculturalists. A farmer’s 
organization was established by the PNPM Mandiri program (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan 
Maskarakat - National Program for Community Empowerment) after the earthquake and 
implemented at the desa level to provide a support mechanism for farmers. The purpose of the 
program is to increase farmer knowledge on coordinating schedules for planting and growing rice 
cultivating patterns and rotating crop cycles to fit the seasons, and providing training for using 
fertilizers and pesticides (HI 02-009; 03-005). Farmers involved noted the program’s contributions 
to increasing knowledge and skill in farming techniques and positive impacts on crop yields (HI 
02-009; 02-023). A further contribution related to improvements in social networks, and allowed 
one member to start a small brick factory through newly established partnerships (HI 02-023). This 
is indicative of the ability of local community organizations to contribute to resilience 
improvements through increases in welfare, networks and ongoing livelihood initiatives.  
6.2.2 External Social Capital 
During the recovery effort, linkages between villagers and external networks, termed bridging 
capital, was a key resource for attracting aid and recovery programming: this demonstrated 
resilience to cope with the disaster. Villages with leaders and members with strong external 
connections were able to obtain a greater amount of goods and materials during the immediate 
response phase and to increase funding for house reconstruction and social programming to 
improve overall community conditions. Particularly in Puton village, Ibu X was able to attract a 
variety of NGO and university partnerships for recovery and development programs, suggesting a 
higher degree of resilience (CM-01). Unfortunately, the majority of this bridging capital was held 
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by Ibu X, so it is unclear whether this capital would be carried over to other villagers. Another 
example is Wonokromo village, where a number of villagers and leaders had external connections, 
particularly through religious organizations and schools, as well as connections to high-ranking 
government officials (CM-04; HI 04-001; 04-008; 04-011). In other villages, particularly the 
poorer communities of Kategan and Sengon, which are comprised mainly of construction and 
farming labourers, external networks were limited. The lack of external linkages negatively 
impacted the amount of aid and recovery initiatives that were implemented in these villages, 
thereby reducing resilience levels (HI 02-012; 05-002).  
While external networks to organizations provided immediate assistance for recovery from the 
earthquake, many respondents noted that external networks were also a key resource for obtaining 
stable employment and promoting entrepreneurial activities (HI 02-004; 03-006). This was 
particularly true for the construction industry, which employed a majority of the male villagers in 
the case study sites, although not always on a stable basis (construction labour positions were held 
almost exclusively by men, although anecdotal evidence suggests a small number of women work 
as construction assistants although their pay is lower than their male counterparts). In Ngandong, 
many of the villagers noted that there was steady employment through their networks for 
employment in Yogyakarta city, highlighting their resilience (HI 03-003; 03-004; 03-0006; 03-
010; 03-025). In other villages, namely Sengon, Kategan and Puton, high unemployment levels for 
labourers were attributed to a lack of networks which would allow for employment in construction 
projects, indicating increased vulnerability (HI 02-020; 05-006; 05-012). For construction 
labourers from Puton and Kategan, this unemployment was exacerbated by project managers’ 
preference for hiring construction labourers from Klaten due to their perceived willingness to work 
for longer hours and lower pay (HI 01-021; 03-003). In terms of entrepreneurial activities, external 
networks were required in order to market products made at the village level, such as food, 
clothing and handicrafts. While the earthquake recovery effort provided training for the production 
of these products, the lack of established external networks limited the effectiveness of these 
programs and rarely contributed to significant changes in livelihood activities (HI 01-004; 01-008; 
01-016; 02-008; 03-003; 03-007; 05-024; 05-027). Overall livelihoods programming will be 
further discussed in chapter seven.    
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6.2.3 Social Capital and Disaster Recovery  
To summarize the impact of social capital on the recovery effort, strong social capital resources, at 
both internal and external levels (i.e. bridging and bonding capital), demonstrated resilience and 
increased the capacity of households and villages to obtain materials goods and funding, as well as 
non-material support for reconstruction and recovery programs. Villagers received support through 
horizontal and vertical linkages, including family, friends, private companies, and strangers, as 
well as government and NGO sources (HI 01-005; 01-007; 01-008; 01-022; 02-024; 03-001; 03-
023; 05-001; 05-014). In many cases, higher levels of bridging capital contributed to increased 
resilience through assistance and recovery programming, as evidenced by the recovery experiences 
in Puton and Wonokromo. While the earthquake disaster and subsequent distribution of aid 
increased social conflict to some degree, many of villagers believed the earthquake and recovery 
experience brought their community closer together and actually increased the spirit of community 
togetherness, thereby reducing overall vulnerability (HI 01-003; 02-013; 02-024; 03-008; 03-012; 
03-018; 04-017; 04-025; 05-007; 05-015; 05-027).   
Recovery programming also had positive impacts on vulnerability levels. Through the 
implementation of a community-based reconstruction effort, the recovery effort continued to 
support the capacity of local village institutions to respond to the disaster in their communities, and 
strengthened the spirit of community solidarity through working together to recover their 
households and villages. Establishment of new community organizations, such as the farming 
cooperatives and the community-based disaster preparedness organizations further supports 
community capacity and the development of social capital networks.  
While there were some positive impacts on resilience levels attributed to the recovery effort, the 
research revealed that recovery programming had limited impacts on social capital networks for 
livelihood opportunities. The recovery program did little to improve economic networks, limiting 
the effectiveness of training and livelihood programming due to lack of marketing skills. In order 
to increase the effectiveness of livelihood interventions, social network development and 
marketing training is required in order to provide villagers with the capacity to effectively promote 
and sell their products. This will be discussed further in the livelihoods section in chapter seven.  
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6.3 Physical Capital 
Physical capital comprises the infrastructure and production tools that contribute to livelihoods and 
reduce vulnerability to disasters (DFID, 1999). In the context of Yogyakarta, as there was limited 
damage to the relatively well-developed transportation and communication networks, the focus of 
this section will be on the provision of transitional shelter following the earthquake, building 
standards for permanent housing reconstruction; water, sanitation and electrical infrastructure; as 
well as production tools. Figure 6.3 outlines the various vulnerabilities and resiliencies associated 
with physical capital.  
Table 6.3: Summary of Physical Capitals 
Village Vulnerabilities Resiliencies 
Puton 
Although improved, building standards 
remain low and ongoing monitoring of 
building code remains non-existent; 
Lack of electrical infrastructure for poorest 
households 
Improved housing construction; 
Improved sanitation, water, and electrical 
infrastructure after earthquake; 
Some improvement of livelihood tools after 
earthquake (sewing machines, construction tools 
etc.) 
Kategan 
Although improved, building standards 
remain low and ongoing monitoring of 
building code remains non-existent; 
Lack of electrical infrastructure for poorest 
households; 
Loss of livelihood tools after earthquake led 
to business closures and losses 
Improved housing construction and condition; 
Improved sanitation, water, and electrical 
infrastructure after earthquake; 
Improved irrigation structures led to increased 
crop yields 
Wonokromo 
Loss of business infrastructure and 
livelihood tools after earthquake led to 
business closures and losses 
Improved housing construction and condition, 
particularly for poorest; 
Improved sanitation facilities for poorest 
Ngandong 
Irrigation systems are not working properly, 
impacting crop yields; 
Improved housing construction and condition; 
Improved sanitation (toilet and septic tank 
facilities) 
Sengon 
Density of residential buildings; 
Reduced water quality since the earthquake 
Improved housing construction and condition; 
Improved toilet facilities following earthquake 
6.3.1 Transitional Shelter  
In the months following the earthquake, the relief effort continued to support impacted villages 
through the provision of basic needs and temporary bamboo shelters (Manfield, 2007; UN-
HABITAT, 2008). The transitional or ‘two-step’ shelter effort was exclusively funded by the 
humanitarian sector through the provision of bamboo housing that was constructed using the 
community spirit of gotong royong (JRF, 2008; Manfield, 2007).  
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Of the 110 interviewed households providing responses, a total of 84 households, or 76%, received 
transitional housing. Figure 6.4 provides an overview of the length of time the households who 
received temporary bamboo housing used this form of assistance as their primary shelter facility. 
Focusing on those households who received transitional housing, over half used the bamboo 
shelter for a period of less than one year. In fact, of the 48 households living in transitional shelters 
for less than one year, 87% resided in these shelters for less than six months. Using the bamboo 
shelters for such a short time period suggests that the cost-effectiveness of temporary sheltering 
may have been limited in the context of the 2006 Yogyakarta recovery effort. These numbers, in 
conjunction with villager comments regarding hiring labourers to rebuild their permanent homes as 
quickly as possible, also provides evidence to support the Central government position regarding 
the one-step housing solution. On the other hand, of those households receiving transitional 
shelters, almost 40% resided in their shelters for one year or more, with a small number of 
households using bamboo housing for over two years. In fact, the interviewees who noted they 
lived in transitional bamboo housing for over two years were still using the bamboo shelters as 
their primary shelter facility during the research period (approximately five years following the 
earthquake). 
Figure 6.4: Length of Time Transitional Housing (TH) Used for Living* 
 
 



























While the results may support the one-step housing policy, there is evidence to suggest that the 
responses provided by some villagers may be inaccurate. For example, an interviewee would note 
that they lived in an emergency tent for one month following the earthquake, and then two months 
in the bamboo shelter before returning to their reconstructed permanent house. During the same 
interview, the villager indicated that they waited until they received government funding to begin 
the reconstruction of their housing – the distribution of which didn’t begin for six to eight months 
following the earthquake. These villagers would have lived in some form of temporary housing for 
at least six to eight months, although their responses stated they only lived in temporary housing 
for three months. As a result, it is difficult to provide conclusive evidence regarding the length of 
time villagers were residing in their temporary housing structures as there is reason to suggest 
some of the evidence may be erroneous.  
While the length of time villagers resided in bamboo shelters may be inconclusive, the research 
suggests the implementation of the transitional housing effort contributed to increased community 
solidarity and mutual cooperation. The transitional shelter program was designed to incorporate 
local techniques, knowledge and cultural systems (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). As will be 
discussed in section 6.7.2, villagers used the community spirit of gotong royong to support the 
construction of temporary housing. Villagers also identified the community spirit of togetherness 
as an important aspect in providing strength and motivation to recover after the disaster. Thus, the 
humanitarian response effort effectively integrated various forms of capital resiliencies available in 
the region in order to implement a temporary housing solution that appropriately made use of local 
resources, knowledge and labour.  
6.3.2 Permanent reconstruction and building standards  
As noted in section 4.2.2, the earthquake resulted in substantial damages to buildings due to poor 
construction standards and low quality building materials (BAPPENAS et al., 2006; Elnashai, et 
al., 2007; Sarwidi, 2007). Thus, the recovery effort focused on building reconstruction and the 
majority of government and JRF recovery funding was used to finance the reconstruction effort 
(MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). To a lesser extent, various humanitarian aid organizations provided 
support for housing reconstruction in some villages (Manfield, 2007). As noted in section 4.3.1, the 
reconstruction of buildings focused on increasing resilience levels by rebuilding to earthquake 
resistant standards (JRF, 2008).  
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Structural damage to housing was classified in three categories: complete destruction, medium 
damage, and low damage (HI 01-019). In Bantul, villagers in the ‘total damage’ category were 
given RP 15 million (approx. $1,600 USD) to rebuild their houses, whereas villagers with total 
damage in Klaten were provided with RP 20 million (approx. $2,100 USD)22. This difference can 
be attributed to additional funds that were provided by the Central Java government to assist 
households to rebuild their houses (CM-03, CM-05). Villagers in both Bantul and Klaten noted the 
funding was insufficient to rebuild a house, and only allowed for reconstruction of the foundation, 
walls and roof (HI 01-008; 01-014; 02-003; 02-004; 02-007; 02-020; 03-002; 03-004; 03-005; 03-
024; 04-012; 05-001; 05-002; 05-012; 05-022). Any additional reconstruction costs were absorbed 
by the household through savings, selling of assets, financial assistance from family members, as 
well as through credit (HI 01-002; 04-014; 01-025; 02-002; 02-014; 02-025; 03-001; 03-011; 03-
020; 04-013; 05-001). This has created a vulnerability for a number of households in the ‘total 
damage’ category, as they have been unable to replace their savings and assets used to fund 
reconstruction after the earthquake disaster (HI 01-002; 01-014; 01-025; 02-002; 02-020; 03-011; 
03-005; 04-013; 05-004; 05-017). Households with medium levels of damage received RP 4 
million (approx. $420 USD), and low damage households received RP 1 million (approx. $110 
USD): these amounts were also considered insufficient for fixing damages and retrograding 
existing structures (HI 01-019). Conversely, a small number of villagers thought that the 
government funding was sufficient as they were grateful for the assistance that was provided and 
the provision of too much assistance would lead villagers to be dependent on government aid (HI 
01-007; 01-024; 02-013; 03-014). This raises complex questions for government and humanitarian 
response agencies regarding how to provide appropriate levels of assistance without contributing to 
aid dependency.  
The data regarding house completion supports the assertion that there was a lack of funding for 
housing reconstruction. Figure 6.5 outlines villager responses to a question of whether they believe 
their house is finished or not. The graph suggests that approximately one third of interviewed 
respondents have completed housing reconstruction, whereas over half have not. These responses 
highlight ongoing reconstruction issues, three years after all funding for housing reconstruction had 
been dispersed and the Indonesian government officially declared the reconstruction effort finished 
                                                   
22
 Although respondents in the case study sites in Klaten indicated they received 20 million RP, other data and 
expert interview comments suggest that funding distribution was not as well done in Klaten as compared to 
Yogyakarta province (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). In some cases, data suggests that households in Klaten 
received an average of just 5 - 7 million RP for house reconstruction (E-02).  
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(HI 04-021). While all households have at least basic shelter, with cement foundations, brick walls 
and tiled roofs, many considered the level of finishing incomplete, and in some cases, unsuitable 
(HI 01-008; 01-016; 02-003; 02-025; 03-007; 04-012; 05-001; 05-012). Difficulties completing the 
reconstruction of housing were almost exclusively related to lack of funds to complete finishing 
touches, such as flooring, windows and doors, as well as cementing and painting walls (HI 01-001; 
02-022; 03-006; 05-002; 05-003; 05-015). As households struggle to continue funding the ongoing 
housing reconstruction, this may contribute to increased vulnerability through a lack of funds for 
other expenses (e.g. human capital expenses such as health and education), as well as limited 
ability to save (i.e. impacting financial capital levels).   
Figure 6.5: Housing Reconstruction after the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake* 
 
*n = 110 
While respondents highlighted shortfalls in funding, the reconstruction of housing using 
earthquake resistant standards and associated public education programs appeared to have 
significantly contributed to increases in earthquake resistant housing and awareness of building 
standards. Eighty-eight percent of household respondents believed that their house was earthquake 
resistant due to construction methods which followed government guidelines. A further 8.5% 
believed that their house is resistant enough to allow time for residents to escape in the event of a 
future earthquake, although they do believe the house could still be damaged or destroyed. Only 
3% of household respondents believed their house was not earthquake resistant due to the fact that 
they did not follow the construction guidelines, in most cases because they rebuilt their houses 
using their own funds or because they spent the house funding on other expenses (HI 03-023; 05-





















of reconstructed houses followed the construction guidelines (E-17). Although the vast majority of 
households followed the construction guidelines, this was not done on a purely voluntary basis: 
during the reconstruction period there was monitoring by government and JRF employees and 
funding was tied to following construction standards. To determine whether these guidelines had 
been internalized by earthquake survivors, interviewees were asked whether they would use the 
earthquake standards when constructing additions to their houses (or if they had already made 
additions, whether they followed the guidelines). Figure 6.6 summarizes the household responses. 
Figure 6.6: Earthquake Resistant Guidelines for Housing Additions*  
 
        *n = 104 
From Figure 6.6, 68% of the interviewees who had already made or were planning to make 
additions to their houses declared that they either did, or would, follow construction guidelines. A 
further 10% indicated that they did not use the guidelines only because the addition was not 
considered an important room for the house (such as a terrace, dirty kitchen or external bathroom 
facility). This relatively strong support for the guidelines suggests a shift in thinking towards 
construction and earthquake resistant standards, highlighting the connections between physical and 
human capital. Furthermore, Figure 6.6 provides a strong indication that the recovery program has 
contributed to reduced vulnerability through stronger housing construction, as well as increased 
resilience through awareness and desire to increase construction standards.  
Perceptions of the quality of reconstructed permanent housing also reflected a shift from pre-
disaster housing. Particularly for the poorest villagers, housing reconstruction programs provided 
































more modern and higher class compared to bamboo houses (HI 2-013; 02-020; 02-025; 03-002; 
03-009; 03-012; 03-020; 04-001; 04-009; 04-011; 05-008; 05-019; 05-023). Alternatively, for the 
wealthier households, the reconstruction effort generally resulted in smaller houses, some of which 
have not been completed over four years after the earthquake (HI 02-017; 03-016; 03-020; 05-001; 
05-021). This is summarized by one interviewee who noted: 
For the middle income and poor people, POKMAS has many advantages 
because before the earthquake they cannot have proper house but now they have 
a better house. Yet for the rich people, POKMAS has a negative effect because 
they have to follow the guidelines so for them 15 million is not enough and they 
have to use their own money to fix the house (HI 04-005).    
A significant change linked to the recovery effort was the provision of housing to multi-
generational families that were previously living in one house. In traditional Javanese households, 
it is typical for multiple generations of families to live in one house (CM-01). Due to the limited 
funding provided by government sources, many families resorted to building smaller houses after 
the earthquake, which made it more difficult for multiple families to live in the same structure. 
Thus, JRF provided fill-the-gap funding, particularly for households where multiple families were 
residing. This allowed the construction of separate housing for each family: households who 
received secondary housing were grateful to have their own house and live separately from other 
families (HI 01-004; 01-010; 03-007; 03-021; 03-022; 04-009; 04-024).   
One aspect of quality of housing reconstruction that should be noted is the extent to which 
earthquake resistant guidelines were followed. In some cases, households may indicate that they 
have followed guidelines, although the quality of construction may remain lower. For example, 
households may have improved awareness regarding the requirement of reinforcement iron bars, 
although they did not use the standard thickness (i.e. 10mm), instead using a smaller size (i.e. 8mm 
or 6mm) in order to save costs (E-06). In the majority of cases, the walls of housing have been 
filled from floor to ceiling with brick and mortar, increasing the likelihood of injury due to 
collapsing walls23 (E-02). While the household surveys in this research did not specifically assess 
housing construction, expert interviews and observation of housing indicated there are ongoing 
issues with quality of housing construction in the region. Furthermore, many of the procedures 
implemented during the reconstruction program, including permit, monitoring and retrofitting 
                                                   
23
 Construction standards highlighted a housing model whereby the upper portion of walling would be built with a 
lighter building material, usually bamboo, in order to reduce the risk of injury from collapsed walls in future 
earthquakes (E-02).  
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initiatives, have reverted back to pre-disaster form following the completion of the recovery 
funding (E-17). This suggests that although the housing reconstruction program contributed to 
resilience through increased awareness and improvements in earthquake resistance of buildings, 
the need for ongoing education and emphasis on quality construction remains.    
6.3.3 Water, sanitation and electrical standards 
Many interviewees reported improvements in access to water, sanitation and electricity 
connections in the research villages, particularly for the poorest households. In Puton village, 
negotiations with the NGO Cordaid led to the provision of septic tanks to be shared between two 
households, and the provision of toilets for each household. Consequently, the sanitation 
conditions for several households improved as they had previously used the nearby Opak River for 
these purposes (HI 01-005; 01-011; 01-016; 01-022). While certain households noted 
improvements in electrical access (HI 01-001; 01-006; 01-009), other households noted the high 
cost associated with purchasing the electrical meter and wiring the house (approximately RP 2 
million or $210 USD) compared to the amount of funding available for reconstruction (HI 01-011; 
01-014). Similar situations were found in the remaining four villages: households either had access 
to electricity, wells, septic tanks and toilets prior to the earthquake, or access improved after the 
earthquake (HI 02-002; 02-013; 02-014; 02-022; 03-003; 03-005; 03-009; 03-012; 03-014; 04-007; 
04-014; 04-021; 05-013; 05-019; 05-022). In Sengon, the earthquake contributed to significant 
issues with water turbidity and poor water quality in household wells. Although the Indonesian 
Red Cross (Pelang Merah Indonesia - PMI) implemented a clean-up initiative, households 
reported having to use a pump and filter to clean the water (HI 05-001; 05-003; 05-004; 05-022). 
Although the data suggested ongoing issues with water quality in Sengon, the vast majority of 
households noted access to water, sanitation and electricity facilities either remained the same 
following the earthquake, or improved, particularly for the poorest households. Hence, there was 
an overall reduction in vulnerability related to infrastructural physical capital. Furthermore, the 
connections between water and sanitation facilities and overall health could also contribute to 
vulnerability reduction related to human capitals.   
6.3.4 Production tools  
For many households in all villages, the earthquake resulted in destroyed home businesses and 
associated production tools, further increasing overall vulnerability levels. Construction labourers 
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lost tools, fish breeding pools were destroyed, tailors lost their sewing machines, chicken and quail 
pens were destroyed along with livestock, machines for recycling and garment businesses were 
destroyed, and food producers lost cooking utensils (HI 01-007; 02-009; 03-001; 03-006; 04-001; 
04-007; 04-010; 05-006). The recovery programming included some assistance to support 
livelihood activities and the replacement of production tools, particularly through improved access 
to credit programs, replacement of building tools for the reconstruction program, and the PNPM 
Mandiri sewing program that provided training and sewing machines (HI 01-024; 03-016; 04-014; 
05-018). Unfortunately, many households did not receive assistance to support the re-establishment 
of their businesses, and some small businesses and entrepreneurial activities were discontinued.  
Livelihood support varied across the research villages, with some communities receiving more 
assistance than others. As noted in Puton, there were a number of programs to help households 
establish or re-establish entrepreneurial activities, including animal husbandry, fish breeding, food 
production, and fruit trees (CM-01). On the other hand, there was limited assistance in Kategan in 
terms of production tools and livelihoods initiatives, in conjunction with very low external social 
capital resources as discussed above. As a result, there have been limited livelihood improvements 
in Kategan, resulting in a further perpetuation of vulnerability levels (HI 02-002; 02-008; 02-011). 
In Wonokromo, many households were employed in public sector positions and the need for 
livelihoods interventions was lower, although there were negative impacts on some small 
businesses. In two instances, the damages to garment and recycling machinery led to the closure of 
successful businesses, and the business owners began working in seasonal employment as 
construction labourers (HI 04-007; 04-013). Economic conditions for these households were 
significantly reduced, leading to overall increases in vulnerability. In Ngandong, a large number of 
households had stable incomes through involvement in breeding quail eggs prior to the earthquake 
(HI 03-001; 03-006; 03-007; 03-008; 03-009; 03-015). The majority of these businesses were 
suspended after the earthquake due to the death of the majority of quails, as well as the destruction 
of pens and stables. The devastation suffered by these businesses was further exacerbated in 2007 
when the Avian influenza outbreak mean that all surviving quails had to be destroyed (HI 03-008; 
03-009; 03-015). While certain households could use credit to re-establish their businesses, at the 
point of the research, the majority of networks for selling the eggs had been estranged and taken up 
by quail breeders in other areas (HI 03-007). Loss of sales arrangements following the earthquake 
was also noted by other business owners, such as warungs, tailors and garment industries (HI 04-
175 
 
016; 05-018). This provides some indication of the need for immediate livelihoods support in the 
post- disaster period in order to maintain business relations and marketing networks.  
In terms of agricultural production tools, there was some level of post-disaster assistance in order 
to replace or improve irrigation facilities. In Kategan, reconstruction and enhancement of irrigation 
structures and paddy field management through JRF funding and the PNPM Mandiri program have 
increased access to physical capital for livelihoods purposes (HI 02-002; 02-023). On the other 
hand, construction of irrigation and drainage structures designed to improve agricultural conditions 
in Ngandong through JRF funding had a negative impact: the newly constructed drainage channels 
have led to further unintended flooding of agricultural fields (HI 03-003; CM-03). This suggests 
mixed vulnerability reduction and resilience building in the agricultural sector due to ongoing, 
underlying issues associated with environmental change and degradation.  
6.3.5 Physical Capital and Disaster Recovery 
For the majority of households, the transitional and permanent housing reconstruction effort 
contributed to reduced vulnerability through improvements in the quality of building construction 
and a shift in attitudes towards safety and earthquake resistant construction guidelines. In 
particular, the permanent housing recovery effort improved conditions for the poorest, most 
vulnerable households, although due to the amount of funding provided, many houses remained 
incomplete four-to-five years following the earthquake.  
Recovery programming also contributed to resilience through improvements in access to water, 
sanitation and electrical infrastructure. This was predominantly evident for poorer households, with 
improvements particularly noticed in sanitation facilities. Despite these improvements, the costs 
associated with electricity hookups were prohibitive for a small number of households, resulting in 
sharing of electricity sources.  
The earthquake resulted in severe damages to livelihoods and entrepreneurial activities, 
particularly production tools and capital assets involved in livelihood initiatives. To a certain 
degree, livelihood assistance and productive tool replacement was implemented, although this has 
achieved little in terms of improving livelihood conditions in all villages, thereby resulting in 
stagnating or, in some cases, increased vulnerability levels. This is discussed further through an in-
depth analysis of the livelihood programming provided in chapter seven.    
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6.4 Financial Capital 
Financial capital denotes the financial resources that individuals and households use to achieve 
livelihood objectives and face external stresses and shocks (DFID, 1999). These type of resources 
can take many forms and include related issues, such as savings (in cash and liquid assets), access 
to credit, security of employment and stability of income, levels of poverty and equity, strength of 
local economies, and diversity of livelihood opportunities (from Table 3.1). In the context of 
recovery from the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, the following section will explore vulnerability 
and resiliencies related to access to financial resources under two key themes: employment and 
income levels; as well as savings and credit programs. Table 6.4 provides a summary of the 
vulnerabilities and resiliencies associated with financial capital in each village.    
Table 6.4: Summary of Financial Capitals 
Villages Vulnerabilities Resiliencies  
Puton 
Low income levels; 
Seasonal, unstable employment; 
High unemployment levels; 
Lack of access to credit and loans for 
poorest; 
Lack of savings; 
Lower asset levels after earthquake (assets 
sold to support recovery) 
Low-interest credit programs through koperasi 
and other micro-financing programs; 
Some level of savings/community savings plans 
(arisan); 
Access to informal credit and savings facilities; 
Increased diversity of employment opportunities; 
Community taxation plan for development 
activities 
Kategan 
Very low income levels; 
Very high unemployment levels; 
Seasonality of employment; 
Lack of savings; 
Lower asset levels after earthquake (assets 
and savings used to support recovery effort) 
Improved access to low-interest credit programs 
through koperasi, arisan, and other micro-
financing programs; 
Access to informal credit and savings facilities; 
Some level of savings; 
Some income diversity through chicken, goat and 
cow breeding 
Wonokromo 
Some unemployment and unstable/seasonal 
income, particularly for labourers; 
Lack of savings and assets for poorest 
members in village 
Low unemployment levels; 
Stable incomes for many households; 
Improved economic and business conditions 
following earthquake; 
Access to credit programs; 
Majority of villagers have some level of savings 
Ngandong 
Lack of savings and assets after earthquake 
(used for recovery purposes); 
Credit facilities mainly used to support 
daily living needs; 
Seasonal employment leads to unstable 
income; 
Lower income levels due to poor crop 
yields; 
Loss of turtle cattle and quail businesses 
after earthquake 
Access to low-interest credit programs through 
village bank (BGD) and LKD; 
Access to informal credit and savings facilities; 
Low levels of unemployment 
Sengon 
Credit facilities mainly used to support 
daily living needs; 
Improved access to low-interest credit programs; 
Access to informal credit and savings facilities; 
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High unemployment rates, among both 
farming and construction labourers; 
Seasonal employment leads to unstable 
income; 
Lack of savings 
Many villagers have some savings in jewelry, 
land or livestock 
6.4.1 Employment and income levels 
As noted in Chapter 5, unemployment levels in three of the villages, Puton, Kategan and Sengon, 
presented a serious vulnerability for several households in terms of maintaining a stable income 
and meeting their daily living needs. In Puton and Kategan, high unemployment levels among the 
male population were attributed to lack of construction labourer positions due to positions being 
replaced by workers from Klaten, as well as seasonality of agricultural activities (HI 01-007; 01-
021; 02-001; 02-012; 02-018). Kategan villagers also highlighted low education levels and lack of 
networks, as noted in above sections (HI 02-018; 02-023). One villager estimated the 
unemployment rate in Kategan to be approximately 50% (HI 02-028). In Puton and Kategan, 
women were the primary income earners (through farming labouring or home-based business 
activities) in many of the interviewed households. In Sengon, high unemployment was ascribed to 
poor agricultural conditions as well as lack of construction projects requiring labourers, thereby 
impacting both male and female labourers (HI 05-001; 05-002; 05-006; 05-017). By comparison, 
unemployment levels in Ngandong and Wonokromo were relatively low. In Wonokromo, many 
villagers worked as public sector employees, and therefore, had stable, reliable incomes, with 
several households noting that unemployment was not a problem (HI 04-001; 04-008; 04-010; 04-
011; 04-014; 04-025). For the small minority of villagers working as labourers, lack of 
employment and seasonality of job availability were similarly highlighted as vulnerability issues 
(HI 04-009; 04-023). Villagers in Ngandong noted improvements in employment following the 
earthquake, as networks increased during the reconstruction effort (HI 03-003; 03-004; 03-010). 
This has resulted in an improvement in living conditions and local economic conditions in 
Ngandong indicating a reduction in overall vulnerability (HI 03-004; 03-010; 03-024).  
Seasonality and instability of employment was highlighted as a vulnerability in terms of 
maintaining appropriate living standards. Income levels for general labourers was generally quite 
low: farming labourers (both male and female) typically received RP 20,000 per day (approx. 
$2.10 USD), although the landowner would usually provide a lunch meal. Unskilled male 
construction labourers were generally paid RP 30,000 - 35,000 per day (approx. $3.20 - $3.75 
USD), whereas a skilled male construction labourer may receive RP 40,000 - 45,000 per day 
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(approx. $4.25 - $4.80 USD) (HI 01-021; 01-024; 03-005). Although the wages are low, many 
households argued that they could cover education, health and daily living expenses if income and 
employment was stable and reliable (HI 01-021; 02-021; 02-025; 03-006; 03-019; 03-020; 03-024; 
03-025; 05-011). One villager noted that “people with steady activity never have a problem to 
build the permanent house and the same time spend money for daily expenses” (HI 02-021). Thus, 
the seasonality and instability of income is a key vulnerability issue facing labourer households.  
In order to reduce the vulnerability associated with unstable and unreliable income, a diversity of 
income sources is required. Particularly in Puton village, Ibu X has implemented a community 
development plan focused on increasing resilience through diversifying income sources. A number 
of villagers noted increases in household income due to the livelihood programming implemented 
in the post-disaster period, including fishing (lele) ponds, and tourism attractions (watu welak) (HI 
01-005; 01-011). Particularly for women, these livelihood programs have provided a secondary 
source of income: “before the earthquake, the housewives were just sitting around waiting for 
money from their husband. Now they make money from making keripik tempe (fried fermented 
soybean cake) and other small home industry” (HI 01-006). In Kategan and Sengon, chicken, goat 
and cow breeding programs implemented after the earthquake have also contributed to 
diversification of household income sources (HI 02-002; 02-003; 05-005). These alternative 
employment strategies provide secondary income to help support households through periods of 
seasonal unemployment, leading to a more stable income and increased resilience. Besides the 
animal breeding programs, livelihood strategies to reduce the dependency on seasonal and unstable 
employment were not implemented in villages such as Kategan and Sengon.  
6.4.2 Savings and credit programs 
Level of savings has been identified as an indicator of vulnerability for hazards; therefore, 
households with liquid assets and cash are seen as having higher levels of resilience to face 
external shocks and stresses than are households without such reserves (DFID, 1999). Among the 
five villages, the research revealed that, generally, households with stable income sources were 
able to accumulate savings in cash and assets, such as jewelry and cattle. The impact of stable 
employment is evidenced in Figure 6.7, where the percentage of interviewed households with 
savings is compared to households without savings. From Figure 6.7, it is clear that Wonokromo (a 
village where stable employment is the norm) had the highest number of interviewed households 
with savings. On the other hand, Kategan (where seasonal or unstable employment is the norm) 
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had the lowest level of households with savings, with less than one quarter of households having 
cash or liquid assets. Puton, Ngandong, and Sengon (villages which fall between the employment 
extremes seen in Wonokromo and Kategan) had similar savings levels, with approximately half of 
all households having some degree of savings. This finding suggests a strong link between 
employment stability and savings available during times of crisis, and hence, vulnerability in the 
face of hazards and disasters.  
Figure 6.7: Percentage of Households with Savings by Village 
 
While level of savings has been identified as an indicator of vulnerability, evidence from the 2006 
Yogyakarta recovery effort suggests a complex relationship between vulnerability and savings. A 
majority of households acknowledged selling assets (furniture, cows, goats, chickens) and savings 
(cash and jewelry) in order to support daily living expenses and rebuilding of housing after the 
earthquake. Many of these households had since been unable to re-accumulate any savings or 
assets, leaving them in a position of increased vulnerability to future shocks and stresses (HI 01-
002; 01-003; 01-014; 01-025; 02-001; 02-002; 02-007; 02-014; 02-018; 02-020; 02-022; 02-025; 
03-008; 03-020; 03-022; 04-013; 05-004; 05-016; 05-017; 05-020). Lack of savings and assets also 
limited the household’s ability to cover household expenses such as healthcare and education: as 
noted previously, a small number of households were unable to pay tuition for their children 
following the earthquake as they used their savings for housing reconstruction (HI 01-015; 03-
023). This increased the vulnerability of individuals and households in other forms of capital, 
particularly human capital. Accordingly, indicators of vulnerability that explore levels of savings 
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provide a more in-depth understanding of the vulnerability conditions of households. In this sense, 
a more accurate assessment would include a measure of how quickly lost assets can be replaced, as 
opposed to just current levels of savings.  
Credit availability has also been highlighted as a factor influencing vulnerability and resilience (see 
Table 3.1). A number of interviewees acknowledged that access to credit facilities improved 
following the earthquake disaster (HI 02-009; 02-013; 04-008). Banks and other credit institutions 
provided low-interest credit programs to support the reconstruction of housing (HI 05-001). As 
well, credit programs were established following the earthquake to support the recovery of 
livelihoods and allow households to establish new entrepreneurial activities (HI 02-005; 02-023; 
03-001; 04-008; 05-004; 05-016). Community organizations and cooperatives, particularly Arisan, 
also provided opportunities for savings and credit programs to support daily living expenses, 
entrepreneurial activities, as well as major expenses such as education, healthcare, weddings and 
funerals (HI 01-006; 01-008; 02-014; 02-024; 03-022; 05-008). Poorer households noted that they 
preferred to take credit from the community cooperatives due to lower risk and lower interest 
payments, as well as a relative lack of requirements for guarantee items compared to formal 
banking institutions (HI 01-006; 01-005; 01-011; 05-004; 05-006). For some households, these 
credit facilities have allowed for improved economic conditions due to the start-up of new 
entrepreneurial activities (01-008; 02-005; 02-023; 03-022).  
An issue identified by villagers regarding micro-credit and financing institutions was regarding the 
lack of variety of livelihood options available. Several families indicated that they would like to 
improve their income by opening a warung - a small shop selling convenience food items (HI 01-
005; 02-004; 02-013; 02-021; 03-002; 03-014; 03-017; 03-020; 03-021; 03-023; 04-003; 04-010; 
05-008; 05-015; 05-016; 05-023; 05-025). While some households were able to generate a suitable 
income through these shop services, the rural and relatively isolated location of most villages 
suggests that the market for these goods is limited to nearby villagers. The easy access to micro-
credit financing has allowed a number of families to open warungs, thereby increasing the 
competition for customers and diluting profit prospects. This has had the unintended consequence 
of reducing the income available for households who had warungs prior to the earthquake, as well 
as limiting the financial benefits of these types of new business opportunities (HI 01-005; 03-001; 
04-023). Similar experiences were noted by other business owners, including one villager who 
worked as a rice grinding labourer: “before the earthquake my business as a rice grinder was a 
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good job with reliable income. But now I can’t rely on the business anymore, because there are a 
lot of competitors. There are more competitors because when everyone gets success in their 
business then others follow the business” (HI 01-022). This issue is exacerbated by livelihood 
programming that targets one livelihood option in multiple villages, such as the sewing training 
program initiated by PNPM Mandiri. The resulting oversupply of tailoring labourers limited the 
profitability of these types of entrepreneurial activities.   
6.4.3 Financial capital and disaster recovery  
The recovery effort following the earthquake has had a significant impact on vulnerabilities and 
resiliencies related to livelihoods and aspects of financial capital. The reconstruction program 
provided an abundance of labour positions, although this period of high employment was relatively 
short-lived, and unemployment levels appear to be higher compared to the pre-disaster period, 
particularly for construction labourers in Bantul (HI 01-001; 01-021; 02-013; 02-022). 
Furthermore, one construction labourer noted that the reconstruction effort has contributed to 
increased unemployment as there is little need for new building projects, as the majority of 
buildings were rebuilt after the earthquake. Thus, there is little need for repairs or renovations (HI 
05-004). Other research conducted in the region supports this finding: following the completion of 
the reconstruction effort, the unemployment rate in Bantul had doubled compared to pre-disaster 
levels (from 5% to 10%) (UGM & IRP, 2009). This suggests an overall increase in vulnerability, 
particularly for those individuals and households engaged in construction labourer positions.   
In summary, the earthquake disaster and subsequent recovery has had the dual role of decreasing 
levels of savings and assets, yet increasing access to credit facilities. This is indicative of both 
increased vulnerability as well as increased resilience and has cascading effects for other levels of 
capital: education and healthcare costs have become prohibitive for some families and households 
have had to make greater use of social capital networks to fund the household recovery costs. 
Thus, the inter-relationships between the various capitals and vulnerabilities highlighted a 
cascading relationship, whereby increased vulnerability in one capital may increase vulnerability in 
other capitals.  
6.5 Natural Capital 
Natural capital explores the natural resource stocks that are available for livelihood opportunities, 
including resource services, intangible goods as well as divisible assets used for production 
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purposes (DFID, 1999). In the context of Bantul and Klaten, there are limited natural resources 
available for livelihood purposes and the majority of available land is used for low-intensity 
agricultural purposes (UGM & IRP, 2009). In the context of hazards, natural capital also includes 
geographical location and exposure to or protection from hazards, physical landscape features, and 
climate variability (see Table 3.1). The following discussion is organized according to these three 
themes, and a summary of the vulnerability and resilience issues associated with natural capital is 
highlighted in Table 6.5.  
Table 6.5: Summary of Natural Capitals 
Village Vulnerabilities Resiliencies 
Puton 
Climate variability impacts farming and 
transportation; 
Proximity to Merapi volcano and Opak River 
Productive and fertile agricultural lands; 
Access to rivers for fishing/irrigation services 
Kategan 
Climate variability impacts farming, health and 
working conditions for labourers 
Productive and fertile agricultural lands;  
Access to river for fishing 
Wonokromo 
Very little access to agricultural lands 
surrounding village; 
Climate variability impacts employment and 
health 
Village located at the junction of three river 
systems, increasing flooding risk 
Geographic location of village leads to high 
accessibility;  
Improved land title registration; 
Access to rivers for fishing 
Ngandong 
Ongoing issues with flooding of rice paddies 
reduces crop yields;  
Prolonged wet season has contributed to pest 
infestations that reduce crop yields;  
Pest infestations leads to increased use of 
fertilizers and poor quality crops that have 
sickened cattle;  
Village location reduces accessibility 
Some productive and fertile agricultural 
lands; 
Access to river for fishing/irrigation services; 
Access to forested areas for timber and non-
timber forest products; 
Sengon 
Ongoing issues with bug infestations has 
severely reduced crop yields, leading to 
unemployment and lack of food;  
Climate variability impacts farming and health 
conditions; 
Remote village location reduces accessibility 
and employment networks 
Productive and fertile agricultural lands 
(although crop yields limited due to 
infestations); 
Access to forested areas for firewood and 
forest products 
6.5.1 Exposure to hazards 
As noted in section 5.3, each of the five villages is exposed to a variety of hazards, including 
earthquakes, flooding, landslides, and strong wind storms. The recent 2010 Mt. Merapi eruption 
highlighted the complex interaction between hazards and livelihood opportunities: while there is 
low risk associated with the immediate dangers of eruptive events, the dispersion of ash through 
the atmosphere and hydrological system creates both a risk of flooding as well as fertile 
agricultural soil. This was highlighted in Puton where sediment-filled rivers contributed to two 
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flooding events in one year, damaging fish breeding ponds and agricultural fields, and highlighting 
ongoing vulnerabilities associated with hazard exposure (CM-01). Conversely, eruptive events also 
contribute to rich and fertile agricultural lands in volcanic regions. In both Bantul and Klaten, rich 
and productive agricultural lands contribute to livelihoods opportunities for farming, as well as a 
year-round food source, enhancing overall resilience.  
While Ngandong and Sengon should have productive agricultural land, issues associated with 
flooding and bug infestations have led to significant issues with productivity and low crop yields 
(HI 03-001; 03-004; 05-001). In Sengon, the impacts of the bug infestation have been severe, with 
low skill levels, high unemployment and low standards of living exacerbated by low crop yields 
(HI 05-001; 05-011; 05-028). Households have had to begin purchasing food, whereas they 
previously harvested it themselves (HI 05-013; 05-014; 05-017). The impacts of the infestation 
were highlighted by one villager who noted that in a normal harvest, one patok of land (2200m2) 
would yield 300 - 400kg of rice, but the most recent harvest yielded only 25kg (HI 05-014).  As the 
agricultural land typically produces three harvests per year, this represents a substantial loss for 
households in terms of income and food source, contributing to overall vulnerability. Several 
reasons were identified for the bug infestation, including: 
1) Different planting times and regulations among landlords: this results in a rotating 
cultivation scheme that allows the wereng hijau (green leafhopper) to flourish; 
2) Unpredictable weather and lack of a dry season: typically, during the dry season, the bugs 
die off, reducing the number of pests during the subsequent wet season. Due to climate 
variability and the lack of a dry season, humidity levels and increased discharge levels 
have overrun the irrigation systems, leading to standing water and prime conditions for the 
bugs to flourish; 
3) Lack of predators: Ongoing hunting of birds has reduced natural mechanisms for 
controlling pest infestation levels (HI 05-001; 05-004; 05-007).   
The bug infestation has also impacted animal husbandry and livestock activities. Villagers noted 
that the increased use of pesticides to control the pest population has tainted the straw and grasses 
used to feed livestock and poisoned the animals (HI 03-010; 03-012; 05-016). Secondary 
businesses associated with agricultural activities have also been impacted as one villager who rents 
a tractor to farming labourers noted decreases in activity and income (HI 03-011). Farming 
labourers have also been significantly impacted as farmers and landlords are not employing 
labourers to harvest the fields (HI 03-019; 03-025; 05-004; 05-015). Income levels and standards 
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of living in the village have dropped significantly, with an increase in the number of families 
receiving RASKIN (Beras untuk Rumah Tangga Miskin - Rice for Poor Families) (HI 03-011). 
This further highlights the cascading effects that vulnerabilities in one capital can have on other 
forms of capital.  
6.5.2 Geographic Location 
The geographic location of individual villages also contributed to levels of vulnerability and 
resilience in the post-disaster period. In terms of the physical landscape and geographic location, 
Wonokromo village lacks agricultural lands due to its urbanized form (HI 04-004; 04-012), 
although the close proximity to Yogyakarta city and location immediately adjacent to a main road 
contributes to ease of accessibility (HI 04-008). This had a positive impact on resilience in the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake as numerous donations arrived in the village from strangers 
and donators from Yogyakarta city (HI 04-025). In Kategan and Puton, villages are located farther 
from Yogyakarta city, although still along main routes and have good accessibility to the southern 
parts of the city. On the other hand, both Ngandong and Sengon are geographically isolated, 
located far from main roads and in the southern part of Klaten near the mountains (HI 03-002; 05-
012). In these instances, access to markets for certain types of entrepreneurial activities is limited 
(HI 03-002; 05-012). The geographic location of Ngandong and Sengon also contributed to lower 
amounts of aid received in the aftermath of the earthquake: geographic isolation and aid 
organizations focusing on Yogyakarta province decreased the focus on providing assistance to 
these villages (CM-03). Thus, the geographic location of two of the villages contributed to 
increased vulnerability, whereas the remaining three villages experienced higher resilience due to 
easier accessibility.  
6.5.3 Climate variability  
The impacts of climate variability and possibly global environmental change have had significant 
impacts on households in all five villages, particularly landowners, farmers, and farming labourers. 
Climate change projections for the region indicate expected changes in seasonality of wet and dry 
seasons, delays in annual monsoon periods, and shifts in precipitation patterns (Case, Ardiansyah, 
& Spector, 2008). Evidence has suggested that climate change has already occurred over the past 
three decades throughout Indonesia, with a trend towards increasing precipitation levels. While 
these precipitation levels are increasing, the trend suggests a pattern of increased rainfall during 
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wet seasons, and a more prolonged dry season with reduced rainfall, which may contribute to 
increased vulnerability due to climate extremes (Oktaviani, Amaliah, Ringler, Rosegrant, & Sulser, 
2011).  
These climate shifts have had an impact on agricultural activities in the villages of Puton, Kategan, 
Ngandong and Sengon. In previous years, farmers were able to accurately calculate the start and 
end of the dry season, thereby allowing the planting of appropriate crops (HI 01-019; 02-004; 03-
022). On average, agriculturalists can generate three harvests per year: two of these harvests are 
rice and occur during the rainy season, whereas the third crop cycle is palawija, referring to dry 
season crops such as corn, legumes, and cassava (HI 02-023; 05-004). A majority of farmers noted 
that they are now unable to predict the wet and dry season due to seasonal variability and shifts in 
precipitation trends (HI 01-001; 01-003; 01-012; 01-015; 02-004; 02-010; 02-014; 02-015; 03-001; 
03-015; 03-022; 05-002; 05-005; 05-012; 05-017; 05-024). Errors in planting timing and crop type 
can have significant impacts on the vulnerability of farming households, as rice quality and crop 
yields decrease, negatively impacting food stocks and income levels (HI 02-017; 02-018; 03-021; 
05-004). The impact of a lack of dry season in Ngandong and Sengon have already been noted 
above, as pest infestations have severely reduced crop yields.  
Shifts in seasonal precipitation can also impact other sectors, particularly the construction sector. 
During the wet season, increased precipitation levels causes difficulty for travelling to Yogyakarta 
city for employment24 (HI 01-005), as well as working outdoors in construction during heavy 
downpours (HI 04-019). During the dry season, hotter days make it difficult for construction 
labourers to work as the heat becomes unbearable (HI 02-009; 02-011; 04-005). On the other hand, 
two entrepreneurs noted the positive impacts of these climate shifts, as ice sellers will have 
increased business due to the heat (HI 04-025), as well as increased sales of propane gas instead of 
firewood during the rainy season (HI 01-006). This suggests issues related to environmental 
change may contribute to both vulnerability and resilience, depending on the livelihood strategies 
engaged in.  
                                                   
24
 Note that the majority of households are using motorbikes as the main method of transportation which causes 
difficulty when traveling during rainy periods, particularly heavy downpours. The majority of motorbikes will 
pull off the road during a rainfall event for safety reasons, thereby limiting transportation during these periods of 
heavy precipitation.  
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6.5.4 Natural capital and disaster recovery 
The recovery effort after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake tangentially impacted natural capital 
resources through the livelihood programming, particularly through the establishment of farming 
organizations, provision of support for new or rehabilitated irrigation systems, as well as some 
improvements on the diversity of livelihood options. This supports a move away from seasonally-
dependent income, towards a diversified livelihood portfolio at the household level, thereby 
improving resiliencies. These initiatives have been successful for some households, particularly 
those involved in the farming organizations in Kategan.  
In Ngandong and Sengon, vulnerability levels have been perpetuated, or even increased in the 
post-disaster period due to on-going struggles with agricultural productivity. While it is beyond the 
realm of the recovery effort to impact climate variability and global environmental change, 
livelihood and capacity building programs should help households to develop adaptive strategies 
and skills for improving their livelihood opportunities in the face of these issues. These strategies 
could include upgrading irrigation systems, farming cooperatives (as noted above), crop 
diversification strategies, secondary income through animal husbandry and value-adding industries 
(i.e. food and/or production). The ongoing struggles facing many households in Ngandong and 
Sengon suggest that the recovery effort did not effectively contribute to increased natural capital 
access: capacity to adapt and respond the various hazards remains low, household vulnerability 
levels continue to increase due to ongoing exposure to shocks and stresses, and economic 
conditions for many households, particularly in Sengon, have decreased significantly.    
6.6 Political Capital 
As noted in Chapter 2, political capital examines the “ability to influence policy and the processes 
of government...[and] is important in determining the ability of households and individuals to 
claim rights to assistance after a disaster” (FAO & ILO, 2009, p. 11). Aspects of political capital 
include the strength of local leadership and decision making structures, accountability of 
governance institutions, and issues of corruption, and are discussed in the following sections. Table 






Table 6.6: Summary of Political Capitals 
Village Vulnerabilities Resiliencies 
Puton 
Conflict with desa level government leads to 
lack of funding; 
Village leader killed during earthquake; 
Some villagers uncomfortable to critique 
government structures 
Freedom to discuss issues with community 
leaders (musyawarah); 
Close relationship with ex-Bupati; 
Strong local leadership 
Kategan 
Loss of dukuh before earthquake contributed to 
lack of leadership during response and 
recovery phases; 
Low levels of participation in political aspects;  
Reliance on desa leader for solving village 
issues 
Desa level leader is from village and provides 
strong leadership;  
Desa leader is part of aristocracy; 
Strong youth organization 
Wonokromo 
Multiple religious and government leaders 
leads to social and political fragmentation and 
lack of cooperation and support for government 
programs;  
Unequal distribution of secondary housing and 
social programming 
Freedom to discuss issues with community 
leaders (musyawarah);  
Strong government and religious leaders 
provide psychological support for recovery;  
Empowered to discuss political issues at 
multiple government levels 
Ngandong 
Some issues of unfair distribution of aid after 
earthquake;  
Some villagers are uncomfortable critiquing the 
local government 
Transparent and coordinated desa government 
with strong support from community;  
 Awareness of central government policy;  
Freedom to discuss and critique local and 
central government policy 
Sengon 
Lack of leadership during earthquake response 
due to recent retirement of lurah;  
Higher levels of aid corruption compared to 
other villages;  
Incapacity of government to respond to 
farming and employment issues 
Fair distribution of government rice program 
(raskin) for poor families;  
Freedom to discuss and critique local and 
central government policy 
6.6.1 Strength of local leadership 
In Puton, Kategan and Sengon, there were issues associated with lack of a village leader following 
the earthquake, due to death and retirement. Each of these villages had a different experience with 
the political vacuum in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, highlighting the importance of 
contextualizing vulnerability and resilience. In Puton, the village dukuh was killed during the 
earthquake, leading community volunteer Ibu X to take over leadership duties in the village. While 
this could have led to increased community vulnerability, the strength of her leadership contributed 
to significant improvements in the coordination and facilitation of aid and recovery programming 
in Puton village, as outlined in section 5.3.1, indicating strong resilience. This also contributed to 
growing levels of respect from villagers, allowing Ibu X to push forth a progressive development 
program focusing on a diversity of sustainable livelihood strategies. One villager noted: “I pride 
Ibu X and without her this village would still be a backwards civilization. But sometimes the 
villagers cannot follow the program because it is very progressive and developed - the program is 
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very good but rapid and maybe a bit different than the villager’s conditions” (HI 01-010). 
Households may not always understand or see the necessity of the development programming, 
although they will follow the program based on their respect for Ibu X. One villager noted that if 
Ibu X asked him to do something, there were only two responses that he could give: “yes and yes” 
(HI 01-021). Similarly, in Ngandong village, the lurah was highly respected for his role in 
struggling to obtain funding for his village as well as his efforts to contribute to transparency and 
fair distribution of the post-earthquake assistance (HI 03-002; 03-004; 03-005; 03-007; 03-014; 03-
016; 03-021). In both these cases, community leadership has contributed to a strengthening in the 
capacity of local government systems to push forth development programs, which have had 
positive results for resilience levels and increasing overall welfare in each village.  
In Kategan village, the dukuh passed away shortly before the earthquake, leading to a lack of 
leadership and increased vulnerability during the post-disaster period (HI 02-004). Fortunately, the 
youth group in the village took control of organizing and distributing aid, as well as trying to 
acquire further assistance by situating a stall for collecting aid on Jalan Parangtritis, one of the 
main roads in the southern part of Yogyakarta city (HI 02-007). Despite a new dukuh being elected 
approximately two years after the earthquake, there has been limited new programming or attempts 
to attract new funding. During the focus group discussions, the Kategan community leaders cited 
their limited knowledge in terms of what type of programs to implement as well as how to obtain 
funding for development initiatives (FG-02). One of the positive aspects of political leadership, 
and hence, political capital resilience, in Kategan was the lurah, who is from the village and was 
considered capable and wise in solving village issues (HI 02-005; 02-007). While the lurah 
provided a source of strong leadership for the village, his primary residence was in Yogyakarta city 
and he was responsible for a number of other villages, limiting his ability to effectively contribute 
to improving conditions in Kategan.    
In Sengon village, the retirement of the lurah shortly before the earthquake contributed to a 
leadership void and thus political capital vulnerability during the disaster recovery period. 
Although villagers attempted to organize and distribute aid using existing community structures, 
interviewees reported significant issues with corruption (HI 05-002; 05-010). Although a new 
lurah was elected, there were concerns regarding the ability of the desa government to contribute 
to post-disaster solutions for reducing poverty and unemployment, as well as offering 
programming to improve the productivity of agricultural lands (HI 05-006; 05-012; 05-013; 05-
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016; 05-019). Although there were concerns regarding the ability of the local government to 
initiate and implement livelihood and adaptation programs, the capacity of the local government to 
implement current programming was complimented. Certain RT leaders were commended for their 
fair distribution of aid in their neighbourhoods, as well as the distribution of the RASKIN rice 
program (HI 05-014; 05-017; 05-018; 05-019; 05-026; 05-027).  
In Wonokromo village, although there were a number of strong leaders, and therefore potentially 
strong political capital resiliencies, this diverse leadership has contributed to conflict within the 
community. In particular, there were issues between the dukuh and other leaders who ran in the 
leadership election (as outlined in section 5.3.3) as well as the strong religious leadership in the 
village. One villager noted: 
The big problem in this sub-village is the community leaders, the non-
government ones, who do not support programs that is made by the local 
government and Pak Dukuh. The community leader seems to ignore the 
government programs. They just concern about religion problems not in 
environment, or livelihood problems. (HI 04-004).   
Due to these conflicts, there have been difficulties implementing new programs within the village, 
and there are portions of the population who do not support government-run programming (HI 04-
001; 04-011; 04-012). While some villagers may not support the current dukuh, there were other 
households who commented on the good organization and fair distribution of disaster aid, efforts 
by the local government to maintain communication and transparency with the villagers, and the 
implementation of environmental and hazard mitigation initiatives (HI 04-006; 04-007; 04-011). 
The difficulty faced in trying to implement fair programming in the divisive village is indicated by 
one villager who commented: 
There was a problem after the earthquake because Pak Dukuh distributed aid to 
people who didn’t support him, and people who support him are upset because 
they feel those people didn’t support the dukuh so why should they get 
assistance (HI 04-006).    
Despite the presence of conflict, in Wonokromo, the strength of government and religious leaders 
provided strong support for community members following the earthquake disaster. The 
community leaders came together shortly after the earthquake to organize and launch shelter and 
food relief (HI 04-011). In particular, the religious leaders provided spiritual support to encourage 
villagers to rise up and recover from the disaster (HI 04-005; 04-006; 04-011). This suggests that 
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political leadership in Wonokromo contributed to both vulnerability and resilience (to be discussed 
further in the cultural capital section).  
To summarize, Puton and Ngandong exhibited strong, collective leadership, with local 
governments working together towards implementing livelihood programming to increase 
resilience through stability of income and improve living conditions in the village. While 
Wonokromo also had strong leaders, competition and conflicts between different factions in the 
village reduced the strength of individual leaders and increased the difficulty of implementing 
progressive and adaptive programming. The strength of leadership in the three aforementioned 
villages is highlighted by their refusal of assistance from some organizations due to perceived 
inappropriateness of the assistance (e.g. temporary shelters which were not needed, attempted 
provision of a small number of houses which would have resulted in conflicts, and assistance tied 
to religious demands) (CM-01; CM-03; HI 04-008). While Sengon and Kategan both had local 
governments capable of implementing programming, there was a lack of initiative and knowledge 
base to instigate adaptive and livelihood programming in the post-disaster period, contributing to 
political capital vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the strength of regional and provincial governments, 
particularly in Yogyakarta province was highlighted (E-02). In Yogyakarta, the sultanate provides 
an additional source of political leadership, with faith in this monarchal governance structure 
providing support and faith for recovery (E-14).  
6.6.2 Decision-making structures 
Decision-making structures in many parts of Indonesia tend to reflect Javanese culture and 
traditions, particularly the collective spirit of rural village life. The concept of musyawarah-
mufakat represents: 
An important manifestation of the gotong-royong ethos in most Indonesian 
village communities...the concept involves the processes that develop general 
agreement and consensus in village assemblies, which emerge as the unanimous 
decision or mufakat. This unanimous decision can be reached by a process in 
which the majority and minorities approach each other by making the necessary 
readjustments in their respective viewpoints, or by an integration of the 
contrasting standpoints into a new conceptual synthesis (Jaraninggrat, 1967, p. 
397). 
Accordingly, villagers meet together to discuss issues and develop solutions through consensus 
building and mutual agreement. The majority of discussion takes place “behind the scenes” as 
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opposed to during village meetings in order to avoid conflict and controversy in public. Thus, 
official village meetings where votes take place tend to be more ceremonial in nature, as opposed 
to a discussion and decision-making arena (Kawamura, 2011, p. 5). Several villagers commented 
on musyawarah as a positive component of decision-making processes in their respective villages 
and noted impacts on social harmony and reduced conflict, suggesting a form of resilience (HI 01-
001; 01-011; 01-021; 03-005; 03-007; 04-006; 04-025).  
In principle, the concept of musyawarah-mufakat offers an opportunity for all voices to be 
represented in decision-making structures, although this cultural tradition may contribute to limited 
expression of opposing opinions in the public sphere. This is particularly evident for poorer, more 
marginalized individuals who expressed a reluctance to discuss government issues or critique 
policy and programming. Many of the poorer and/or uneducated villagers felt that they had no 
right to comment and critique government policy (HI 01-009; 01-016; 02-002; 02-009; 02-010; 02-
014; 02-015; 02-020; 03-008; 04-010; 05-007; 05-008; 05-016; 05-017). Samples of villager 
comments highlight issues of political capital vulnerability, including:  
“I’m nothing more than an ordinary person and I don’t have the right to judge or 
comment on the government” (HI 02-002);  
“It’s not my business to complain about the government since I’m an 
uneducated person” (HI 02-014); 
“I have no right to comment on government policy because I’m a nobody in this 
village” (HI 05-017).  
While these types of comments were consistent from poorer households in Puton, Kategan and 
Sengon, villagers in Wonokromo and Ngandong expressed a higher degree of interest in 
government activities at all levels (local, regional, and national) and were more open to critiquing 
government policy (HI 03-001; 03-003; 03-016; 03-017; 03-022; 04-001; 04-005; 04-021; 04-024; 
04-025). Particularly in Ngandong, villagers expressed disappointment in Central government 
policy that they believed impacted local economic conditions, mainly focusing on importation 
policies of agricultural commodities that reduced rice and beef prices for local farmers (HI 03-001; 
03-003; 03-022). Although these villagers expressed opinions on government policy, many felt a 
lack of empowerment to influence government decision-making processes at levels outside the 
village, indicating ongoing vulnerability.    
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6.6.3 Accountability of government institutions 
Since the period of democratization beginning in 1998, there have been increases in government 
accountability compared to the Suharto regime. Efforts at curbing government corruption through 
the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) have resulted in increased attention and awareness 
of political and economic bribery, although local-level corruption appears to have increased as a 
result of processes of decentralization (see section 4.1.1) (Fanany, 2003; Kimura, 2011; 
Rondonuwu, 2009). While these increases in transparency represent a positive change for the 
Indonesian political system, there are a number of areas where the accountability of government 
institutions remains elusive, and this theme was probed in the research.  
The length of terms for government positions varies according to the type of leadership position, 
and this may contribute to political capital vulnerability. At the local government level, the term of 
an elected lurah lasts for eight years, whereas the dukuh is elected until retirement at age 60 (CM-
01). During the course of elected terms, there is little recourse for individuals and communities 
who may take issue with the administering of funding or programming, increasing vulnerability 
and reducing accountability of governance structures. In Puton village, conflict with the lurah has 
resulted in a complete loss of government funding for village programs. Village leaders 
commented that there was nothing that could be done except to wait two more years until the 
lurah’s term was finished (CM-01; HI 01-024). At the individual level, in Wonokromo, some 
residents recounted stories that demonstrated the lack of accountability structures that exist for 
complaints and appeals. One such story is highlighted in Box 1.  
Regarding central government policy, villagers reported general feelings of lack of empowerment 
and little control over decision-making structures, as discussed in section 6.6.2. As noted above, 
many of the poorer villagers felt they were not in a position to be able to critique government 
policy, either because they were poor or uneducated (HI 01-009; 01-016; 02-002; 02-009; 02-010; 
02-014; 02-015; 02-020; 03-008; 03-011; 04-010; 05-007; 05-008; 05-017). This perception may 
be traced back to Indonesia’s history of dictatorship and an educational system that was designed 
to imbue the message “that society should be a passive recipient of government wisdom” (Vickers, 
2005, p. 189). Where villagers were keen to critique government decisions and policies, they also 
felt a lack of political power to influence these decision-making structures. One villager noted: 
I’m a bit disappointed sometimes with the Central Government policy because it 
makes it harder for the people here. For me, I have access to send a letter to the 
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senate but the senators don’t care about the people below them so what can I do? 
Poor people can only feel mad but can’t do anything - they can complain but not 
do anything. They vote for people who say they will change things for the poor 
people but when they get into power they don’t do it - it’s just empty promises 
(HI 03-001).  
This feeling of political disempowerment suggests ongoing vulnerability and was prevalent 
throughout four of five research the villages: Puton, Kategan, Ngandong and Sengon. On the other 
hand, villagers in Wonokromo appeared to have a greater sense of empowerment, with individuals’ 
questioning decisions and following-up at government offices, as evidenced by Pak X’s story in 
Box 1. When individuals in other villages were questioned about decisions they did not agree with 
(i.e. distribution of aid, participation in programming, JAMKESMAS etc.), almost none had 
followed up with government officials, and did not make any attempts to rectify government 
decisions (HI 01-007; 02-002; 02-009; 02-014; 02-020; 03-020; 05-003; 05-025). Thus, issues of 
political empowerment and political capitals levels varied across the villages, resulting in varying 
levels of vulnerability and resilience.  
 
6.6.4 Corruption 
Concurrent with a lack of accountability of government institutions, the research revealed that 
vulnerability related to corruption of government funding sources was an ongoing issue for 
Box 1: A Tailor’s Story 
Pak X, a tailor, did not receive assistance after the earthquake from the Social Ministry’s PNPM 
sewing program. After he went to discuss the issue with the village dukuh, he was informed that 
his name had been included on the list of villagers who should receive a sewing machine. The 
list of names was then passed on to the desa government, who submitted a final list of names to 
the Social Ministry. When Pak X went to the lurah’s office to discuss why he had been 
excluded from the program, the office did not provide an explanation or make any changes. Pak 
X then went directly to the Social Ministry office to see if anything could be done, although he 
was informed that the office does not take any personal requests for assistance and that they 
distribute assistance based solely on the list provided by the local level government (HI 04-
009). Another tailor in the same village complained about the selection of villagers who 
received assistance from the sewing program, indicating that many of those who received the 
sewing machines were not tailors and eventually sold their machines (HI 04-010; 04-009). This 
story is indicative of the power of local government institutions to impact how funding and 
assistance is distributed, and how little recourse is provided to individuals and villagers who 




Indonesian political structures. During the post-disaster period, villagers in Sengon and 
Wonokromo indicated there were specific examples of individuals’ illegally diverting relief and 
recovery aid (HI 04-005; 04-013; 05-012; CM-04). On a positive note, instances of corruption in 
Sengon and Bantul (not one of the study villages) have been investigated and court proceedings 
have been brought against particular individuals (HI 04-004; 05-012; CM-04). Villagers in Klaten 
particularly highlighted the Regency and Provincial government misappropriating funding (CM-
03; HI-03-001). In Klaten, as funding is administered from the Central government down through 
to the local village level, approximately 10 - 20% of funding is siphoned off at the provincial and 
regency level, generally termed an administration fee (HI 05-002; CM-03). As noted in section 
5.3.4, the lurah in Ngandong has been particularly forceful in obtaining the full amount of funding 
for his village, demonstrating his resilience and capacity to act as a leader and intermediary to fight 
ongoing issues of corruption.     
While the research revealed significant and ongoing issues with corruption, at times, it was 
difficult to determine whether corruption had actually occurred or whether individuals were 
unaware of distribution procedures, unaware of the actual amount of aid that they should receive, 
or simply felt that they did not receive enough assistance (HI 01-005; 01-012; 01-022; 02-015; 02-
023; 03-020). In a few instances, households received larger personal donations from friends and 
family members outside their village, which may have given surrounding households the 
impression that these beneficiaries corrupted assistance (HI 01-017; 01-022; 04-005; 04-007).  
While corruption represents an ongoing issue in Indonesia, attitudes towards corruption reflect the 
difficulty in eradicating fraudulent behavior. In one village a local leader commented on observed 
corruption:  
There is a group of people who are deviant with the assistance. People in the 
government took the assistance for their own needs for themselves. I was against 
that and took my village portion and distributed it. I never told this problem to 
the higher government people because I don’t care. If people want to do 
something wrong that is their choice but I will just do it my way (HI 05-002).   
This viewpoint was consistent among other villagers who were in high-level roles during the 
recovery period and observed corruption: 
The leaders of the group of people who were organizing the assistance for 
housing and distributing the 15 million - sometimes they had deviant actions. He 
was taking some of the money and not giving the full 15 million but a small 
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administration fee. It’s not necessarily bad because we don’t care - if they want 
to be corrupt then be corrupt - but there will be social punishment. We don’t 
associate with that person anymore (HI 04-005).  
While these comments indicate that corruption may lead to some form of social punishment, in 
general, a laissez-faire attitude towards misappropriation of funds allowed corruption to continue 
unchecked in many instances. These attitudes towards corruption may be a reflection of the 
perception that there is a lack of accountability in the government system, as well as cultural values 
that encourage saving face and avoiding conflict (to be discussed in section 6.7.3).  
6.6.5 Political capital and disaster recovery 
Access to political capital in the form of strong leadership significantly impacted vulnerability and 
resilience levels as well as recovery and assistance received during the post-disaster period. Strong 
leadership in Puton and Ngandong during the recovery contributed to feelings of respect and 
support for local government institutions. This allowed leaders to implement new programming to 
increase the living standards of households in their villages during the post-disaster period. On the 
other hand, the recovery period in the remaining three villages highlighted current tensions and 
issues, including social conflict and lack of accountability of government institutions. In all 
villages, the recovery effort helped to build the capacity of local government institutions and 
community organizations to respond to disasters and contributed to learning on implementing large 
scale programs and knowledge on hazard mitigation measures. In this way, the recovery program 
potentially contributed to increased political capital resiliencies through the implementation of a 
community- and government-driven response.  
The recovery program, particularly from the humanitarian sector, also focused on issues of 
transparency and accountability. Public postings of aid funding and the objectives of the 
programming were visible in all case study villages during the research period. Monitoring of aid 
distribution and using local neighbourhood groups to distribute housing reconstruction funding 
also supported a transparent and accountable recovery program. Community-based distribution 
organizations were used to limit corruption as it was thought that responsible individuals would be 
less likely to divert assistance from neighbours, family and friends. This type of approach may 
have reduced vulnerability issues related to corruption, particularly in those villages with strong 
communal spirit, such as Kategan.  
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With the exception of local leadership, which was strengthened in two villages, overall, there 
appeared to be limited impacts and positive changes on political structures and political 
vulnerabilities and resiliencies during the recovery period. Access to political power and 
accountability of government structures has remained consistent in the pre- and post-disaster 
period. As well, issues of political empowerment and access to political power remained relatively 
unchanged following the disaster.  
6.7 Cultural Capital 
Cultural capital involves the set of attitudes, practices and beliefs that underpin the functioning of 
different societies and includes aspects such as shared histories, heritage, values, knowledge, 
traditions, rituals and ideologies (Daskon, 2010; Throsby, 1999). Within the context of Yogyakarta 
and Central Java provinces, there are cultural features that both inhibit and enhance disaster 
preparedness vulnerabilities and resiliencies. These include strong religious faith, spirit of 
community togetherness and cooperation, and cultural values and attitudes. Table 6.7 provides an 
overview of the various vulnerabilities and resiliencies which are thought to be associated with 
cultural capital in each village, followed by a discussion focusing on the three themes mentioned 
above. 
Table 6.7: Summary of Cultural Capitals 
Village Vulnerabilities Resiliencies 
Puton 
Religious fatalism leads to lack of 
preparedness initiatives 
Strong religious faith provides support for recovery; 
Spirit of gotong royong supports recovery and community 
development; 
Javanese philosophy of nrimo - accepting of 
circumstances and give thanks to God; 
Javanese cultural traditions promote familial support 
Kategan 
Religious fatalism leads to lack of 
preparedness initiatives; 
Adherence to construction 
timelines reduced the use of 
gotong royong for permanent 
housing construction 
Increased spirit of gotong royong supports recovery and 
community development;  
Religious faith provides hope and support for recovery; 
Javanese cultural traditions promote familial support 
Wonokromo 
Low use of gotong royong during 
the reconstruction period 
Strong religious organizations and activities provides 
strength and support for recovery and everyday living 
conditions as well as external linkages;  
Javanese cultural traditions promote strong familial 
support; 
Religious beliefs used to support strong recovery and 
improvements in living conditions in the post-disaster 
period 
Ngandong 
Religious fatalism leads to lack of 
preparedness initiatives 
Religious faith provides hope and support for recovery;  
Javanese cultural traditions promote familial support;  
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 Spirit of gotong royong supports recovery and community 
development 
Sengon 
Strict adherence to construction 
timelines reduce the use of gotong 
royong for permanent housing 
construction;  
Religious fatalism leads to lack of 
preparedness initiatives 
Religious faith provides hope and support for recovery;  
Javanese cultural traditions promote familial support;  
 Strong spirit of gotong royong supports recovery and 
community development 
 
6.7.1 Religious faith 
The strength of religious faith in all villages contributed to both vulnerability and resilience. The 
dominant faith in all five study villages, Javanese Islam, led to a tendency for villagers to assume a 
fatalistic attitude towards hazards and disasters. Several villagers expressed the opinion that 
disasters were acts of God and that there was no way to resist them (HI 01-002; 01-010; 02-001; 
02-009; 03-010; 03-017; 05-025; 05-027; 05-028). One villager noted: “just let it flow because 
what God wants, it will happen” (HI 01-001). Many villagers also commented that disasters were a 
destiny from God, which have already been written in the Lauful Mahfudz - the Book of Destiny 
(HI 02-003; 02-006; 02-012; 02-014; 02-017; 02-018; 03-004; 03-008; 03-011; 03-012; 03-013; 
03-016; 03-017; 03-019; 03-023; 03-025; 04-004; 04-006; 04-008; 05-005; 05-017; 05-018). Due 
to this belief in disasters as God’s destiny, some villagers expressed the conviction that there is 
nothing that can or should be done to prepare for disasters (HI 01-010; 02-001; 02-009; 02-010; 
05-005). Others believed that the best method for preparing for disasters was to pray, maintain 
closer relationships with God, and/or just accept God’s will (HI 02-005; 02-018; 03-013; 03-014; 
03-016; 03-023; 04-011; 04-012; 04-022; 05-011; 05-017; 05-027; 05-028). Fatalistic attitudes 
were particularly evident through one villager who noted: 
There is nothing that should be done to prepare for disasters. We give all things 
on earth to God. Everything on earth will go back to God so we just prepare 
mentally. The disaster comes from God and written in the Book of Destiny so 
you just have to accept it and try to survive it (HI 05-005).  
Thus, these religious beliefs lead villagers to assume that there is little to be done to mitigate 
against various types of hazards and little to be gained from engaging in preparedness activities, 
suggesting an increase in vulnerability.  
Conversely, religious faith also provided a strong resilience and support mechanism for recovery 
following the earthquake. Over 30 of the 128 interviewed villagers mentioned their religious faith 
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as a source of strength during the post-disaster period: this was the second only to the role of 
family as a support mechanism. Villagers’ belief in God’s role in their destiny allowed them to 
accept the destruction and loss, and move on to a new phase in their life (HI 02-002; 02-003; 02-
005; 03-022; 05-005; 05-018; 05-026; 05-027; 05-028). Support from religious leaders through 
sermons and discussions also provided the strength and support that some villagers needed to begin 
the recovery process (HI 01-004; 04-005). One villager commented: 
Each person has their own destiny and I accept mine and will try to rise up 
again. Why do we fall? Because God orders us to leap up! (HI 03-003) 
Particularly in Wonokromo, the village with the highest level of religious activities and a number 
of strong religious leaders, interviewees highlighted the role of religion during the recovery period. 
While villagers sustained their belief that disasters are a destiny from God, there were limited 
comments associated with religious fatalism: instead, villagers used their faith not only to support 
resilient recovery and rise up from the disaster, but also to improve their conditions and behavior. 
A sample of comments from Wonokromo includes: 
Earthquake is God’s destiny - it’s a cycle and notice for humankind to come 
back to God’s instruction and realize that God has higher power to rule the 
universe (HI 04-011) 
The earthquake is God’s notification for us to get closer to him. He tries to 
remind us that doing sins should not be done by humankind, especially now 
when humankind kills in the name of God (HI 04-012) 
This is the second chance God gave me to patch up my life quality (HI 04-024) 
The earthquake taught me to reconsider the role of God in this life. Natural 
disasters is something to learn to avoid: humans should live in balance and 
harmony with the environment they live in so that they can easily adapt and 
adjust the way they live (HI 04-021) 
These examples demonstrate how strong religious faith contributed to resilience through changing 
philosophies regarding improving quality of life and reducing the likelihood of future disasters. 
The difference in attitude generated by religious faith may be a result of the strength of religious 
leadership who promote faith as a means for personal strength. Thus, strong religious faith does not 
necessarily lead to vulnerability through fatalistic beliefs, but depends on the individual and, most 
likely, religious leadership in the community.   
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6.7.2 Spirit of community togetherness  
High levels of resilience were seen in most villages through the use of the cultural spirit of gotong 
royong (GR) to clear debris, and to build temporary and permanent shelters. In Puton, Kategan and 
Sengon, GR was used by most villagers to clear debris and build temporary bamboo housing, 
although many households paid labourers to rebuild their permanent houses (HI 01-011; 01-012; 
01-013; 02-017; 02-019; 02-022; 05-002; 05-005; 05-007; 05-010; 05-012; 05-023; 05-024). 
Reasons for hiring labourers included wanting to complete the reconstruction of their houses faster, 
and attempting to meet the strict government deadlines for completing each reconstruction phase 
(HI 05-006; 05-026). On the other hand, those who used GR to rebuild their permanent houses 
generally cited a lack of funds to be able to afford paying labourers, instead taking longer to build 
their houses and using their own family members as labourers (HI 01-013; 02-020; 02-023; 05-
022; 05-025). In Wonokromo, gotong royong was only used to clean debris as the majority of 
villagers did not accept temporary bamboo housing and almost all interviewed households hired 
labourers to reconstruct their permanent houses (HI 04-003; 04-004; 04-007; 04-009; 04-011; 04-
014; 04-015; 04-017; 04-018; 04-019; 04-021; 04-023; 04-024; 04-025). Lack of available 
labourers and low construction skills among villagers in Wonokromo also contributed to the need 
to hire labourers, thereby increasing the overall cost of housing reconstruction by approximately 
20% (HI 01-011; 04-005; 04-025). Similar to Puton, Kategan, and Sengon, villagers in 
Wonokromo also cited the strict government deadlines for each reconstruction phase, as well as a 
desire to reconstruct their homes as quickly as possible, as reasons for hiring labourers as opposed 
to using GR (HI 04-005; 04-025). In Ngandong, there was greater use of gotong royong to rebuild 
permanent housing, thereby eliminating labour costs for rebuilding. As the funding provided for 
housing reconstruction was considered low by almost all interviewees, the use of GR allowed the 
entire amount to be spent on building materials as opposed to also having to pay labour costs (HI 
03-001; 03-007; 03-009; 03-010; 03-011; 03-023).  
Villagers also identified the community spirit of togetherness as an important aspect of resilience 
through providing strength and motivation to recover after the disaster (HI 01-021; 01-022; 02-
007; 02-025; 03-002; 03-004; 03-008; 04-005; 04-006; 05-004; 05-013). One villager noted that 
after the earthquake:  
Everything in the community was together and the feeling of togetherness in the 
spirit of gotong royong. Together we talk to each other and encourage each other 
(HI 01-021).  
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Another villager highlighted the importance of gotong royong to support earthquake recovery: 
Gotong royong is better after the earthquake because based on the lessons from 
the disaster, they realized that togetherness is very important to help each other 
and socialize and live in this world. They couldn’t live in this world alone, by 
themselves - we need people and somebody and society. So to strengthen and 
make us stronger we should increase gotong royong (HI 05-013).   
Thus, the cultural spirit of gotong royong provided multi-faceted resilience support mechanism 
throughout the recovery effort, and continued to support village development, both economically 
and spiritually.  
6.7.3 Cultural values and attitudes  
Similar to religious beliefs and community spirit of gotong royong, general Javanese culture 
influenced vulnerability and resilience responses to the earthquake disaster. The Javanese 
philosophy of nrimo ing pandum, which promotes the principles of acceptance and gratefulness, 
was highlighted by a number of villagers (HI 01-001; 01-007; 01-011; 01-019; 02-002; 02-003; 02-
023; 03-005; 03-020; 05-005). Nrimo ing pandum guides Javanese behavior through acceptance of 
fate, and understanding all things as gifts from God (E-12). Many villagers expressed gratitude 
after the disaster, noting that they were “thankful to God for whatever you get because it could be 
worse” (HI 01-007). This cultural attitude also influenced perceptions of recovery assistance, with 
many villagers expressing gratitude for the supplies and food aid received in the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster (HI 01-010; 01-016; 02-012; 03-002; 03-009; 03-012; 05-012; 05-017; 05-
018; 05-028). When asked about their perception of the recovery effort, one villager responded:  
Yes, everything was okay especially the goods and food. We just accepted and 
leave it to the God almighty because we can do nothing. For us everything was 
fine, it was all because of God. And we are grateful because we still have a 
chance to live in this world (HI 01-016).     
Thus, the nrimo cultural attitude influenced responses and perceptions of the disaster and recovery 
experience and promoted an attitude of acceptance, thereby giving villagers resilience and strength 
to recovery and rehabilitate psychologically from the disaster. However, this cultural value could 
be interpreted through a more critical lens: nrimo ing pandum promotes acceptance and gratitude 
in the face of difficult circumstances, possibly limiting adaptive behavioral changes to events such 
as earthquakes, thereby increasing vulnerability levels (E-10).   
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Javanese traditions of strong familial and kinship networks also supported recovery after the 
earthquake disaster. As previously discussed in the social capital section (see section 6.2), strong 
loyalties and kinship networks within family and village systems contributed to high levels of 
resilience and self-support mechanisms during the recovery period. Families provided assistance in 
the form of food and material goods, emergency sheltering, as well as financial and labour support 
for the reconstruction of temporary and permanent housing (HI 01-003; 01-004; 02-001; 02-008; 
03-002; 03-005; 03-018; 03-022; 04-006; 04-011; 04-022; 05-004; 05-014; 05-019). In poorer 
households, where there was limited financial assistance available, familial and kinship systems 
provided emotional and psychological support for recovery (HI 02-008; 02-021; 03-025; 04-014; 
05-007). Cultural loyalty to hereditary villages also supported recovery, particularly in 
Wonokromo, where as strong sense of silaturahmi contributed to higher levels of assistance (CM-
04; HI 04-005; 04-011; 04-013).  
Other cultural traditions may have impacts on both vulnerabilities and resiliencies related to 
preparedness and response after disasters. For example, one interviewee noted that cultural 
traditions inhibit risk-sharing techniques: 
In terms of the social conditions, I think the insurance is not really effective with 
our trusts or beliefs because we believe in the God in the certain way. So when 
we prepared something for the bad things it is forbidden in the religion - it’s a 
taboo. So for example, I insure my car and in our traditional beliefs it means I 
believe my car will have an accident (E-09).  
This indicates the importance of understanding cultural traditions and beliefs when attempting to 
implement recovery programming and disaster risk reduction initiatives: programs and strategies 
should be in line with cultural beliefs in order to maintain an appropriate level of success and 
sustainability of programming.  
6.7.4 Cultural capital and disaster recovery 
Many of the cultural conditions in Yogyakarta and Central Java province contributed to resiliencies 
observed during the recovery period, particularly through strong religious spirit that provided 
strength and support for recovery. Conversely, in some villages and households, cultural and 
religious beliefs contributed to vulnerability through feelings of fatalism and promoted limited 
disaster preparedness initiatives. As noted in the human capital section, there appeared to be 
limited educational or psychological programming in these villages to contribute to increased 
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awareness of disaster risk reduction measures. In conjunction with religious fatalism, this reduced 
the likelihood that ongoing efforts to implement a disaster management system would be effective 
at the village level.  
Javanese cultural values and traditions also provided support for community recovery and 
indicated a strong resilience in the aftermath of the earthquake. This is particularly evident through 
the cultural spirit of gotong royong, whereby families and villagers worked together in mutual 
cooperation in order to clear debris, build temporary shelter, and in some cases, permanent 
housing. The strong community spirit and capacity within villages was supported through the 
administration of recovery funding, particularly the housing reconstruction funding. As the 
recovery effort considered the cultural capital that existed through the philosophy and spirit of GR, 
this contributed to an intensification of community feelings of togetherness and mutual support. 
Many villagers felt the spirit of GR improved after the earthquake, as the shared experience of 
suffering and rebuilding together provided support and strength for recovery (HI 02-013; 02-015; 
02-017; 02-024; 03-008; 03-009; 03-012; 03-014; 03-015; 03-018; 03-019; 03-023; 04-017; 04-
023; 04-025; 05-013; 05-022; 05-024).  
While the use of gotong royong is touted in the literature as a strength of the Yogyakarta 
earthquake recovery effort, the results indicate that the use of GR for permanent housing 
reconstruction was limited. While the distribution of funding supported community and village 
organizational capacity, the government deadlines for each phase of reconstruction limited the 
ability of households to use gotong royong. In two villages, a strict adherence to the government 
building deadlines meant the villagers were unable to use GR: it would have taken too long to take 
turns building each other’s houses and they would have missed the government deadline. In these 
cases, the government requirements reduced the effectiveness of this cultural strategy for mutual 
cooperation. In Wonokromo village, where the majority of villagers are employed as government 
officers, the use of GR was lower due to lack of construction skills among the villagers. Villagers 
hired labourers from outside the village to rebuild their houses for them. Thus, it is interesting to 
note that the strongest use of gotong royong was among the poorest households, whereas the 
wealthiest households and communities limited the use of GR. This provides an indication that the 
philosophy of gotong royong and the spirit of mutual cooperation may be more valued by poorer 
households, where the rewards of participating in community sharing of resources provide the 
most benefits.  
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6.8 Summary of Village Capitals  
To summarize, Figure 6.8 provides a heptagonal representation of the vulnerabilities and 
resiliencies associated with the seven sustainable livelihoods capitals for each village. The levels of 
current capitals available in each village were classified on a scale from low to high, ranked from 0 
to 5. These rankings were classified based on the household interviews and focus group 
discussions, as well as observations made by the researcher. Each capital was subdivided into five 
categories, representing the different forms each capital could take and each village was assigned a 
score from 0 to 1, based on a low, medium or high categorization. These scores were then tallied to 
provide an overall score out of five. This summary is not meant to reflect a precise measure of each 
capital; instead, the aim is to provide the reader with a visual representation of the different capital 
conditions in each village. For a more in-depth summary of how each village capital was ranked, 
refer to Appendix 5.   
From Figure 6.8, the different forms of capital available for both recovery after the earthquake, as 
well as everyday living conditions, are visible. Particularly, the low levels of capital found in 
Kategan and Sengon are emphasized, corresponding to ongoing difficulties in recovering from the 
disaster and maintaining adequate standards of living. Conversely, Wonokromo had high levels of 
capital available in almost all of the seven themes, many of which contributed to faster 
recuperation times and more complete recovery following the 2006 earthquake. While the score for 
natural capital reflects the lack of natural resources and agricultural lands available, most 
households in Wonokromo are not engaged in agricultural and natural resource extraction 
activities, thus the lack of access to this form of capital does not necessarily impact overall welfare 
conditions. This is contrary to the experience in Nangdong and Sengon, where issues associated 
with lack of natural capital had significant impacts on other capital levels for some households. 
This indicates that the importance of each type of capital may be dependent on place and the 
conditions of the local context. Puton and Ngandong villages fall in the middle, with improving 
levels of capital available for recovery, and ongoing implementations of adaptive capacity 
measures. The correlation between the various capital levels in each village and the quality of 
recovery experienced after the earthquake disaster supports the use of a framework that integrates 
concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihioods. This will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7. Moreover, Figure 6.8 demonstrates how post-disaster recovery is highly variable, and 
depends strongly on local contextual conditions and capacities.  
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Figure 6.8: Summary of Sustainable Livelihood Capitals 
 
 
6.9 Summary and Conclusion  
The results chapter outlined the various vulnerabilities and resiliencies of the five case study 
villages through a sustainable livelihoods lens, with a focus on seven capitals: human, social, 
physical, natural, financial, political and cultural. This framework for organizing and evaluating 
the recovery effort as well as ongoing conditions in each village provided valuable information to 
support a holistic assessment of the recovery effort after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake disaster. 
The results indicate that while certain capitals were improved, particularly the physical capital 
section through improved housing and access to water and sanitation facilities, overall, the 
recovery effort did little to increase local human and political capacities. For many households, 
financial assets have decreased as villagers sold off assets and used savings to contribute to their 
ongoing recovery. Thus, for many villagers, they are in a position of increased economic 
H = Human Capital, S = Social Capital, Ph = Physical Capital, F = Financial Capital 
N = Natural Capital, P = Political Capital, C = Cultural Capital 
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vulnerability to face future disaster events. A further assessment of the recovery programming is 
provided in chapter seven, along with a discussion of how the empirical evidence supports a 





Within the context of the research questions set forth at the beginning of the dissertation, this 
chapter emphasizes the three main contributions of the research, namely conceptual, 
methodological and empirical. Beginning with the empirical contributions, the first section 
holistically assesses the long-term recovery effort after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, explicitly 
linking the evidence in chapter six to the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable 
livelihoods outlined in chapter two. The second section summarizes the methodological 
contributions of using the resilient disaster recovery approach as a framework for assessing long-
term recovery efforts. This section emphasizes the positives, as well as the drawbacks associated 
with the conceptual framework for the research. Furthermore, the importance of including each of 
the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods are explored. In the final 
section focusing on conceptual contributions, the empirical evidence from the 2006 Yogyakarta 
recovery effort is examined within the context of the disaster recovery literature outlined in chapter 
two. This section examines how the research contributes further evidence to support previous 
research, as well as furthering understanding of recovery as a process. Finally, the section 
concludes by bringing the evidence and knowledge gained from the research together in order to 
refine and adjust the conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery outlined preliminarily in 
chapter three. This final conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery focuses on integrating the 
concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods through a process-oriented 
understanding of disaster recovery. 
7.1 The Empirical Evidence: Assessing the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake Recovery Effort  
Using the preliminary conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery, the assessment framework 
used for the research argues that disaster recovery initiatives must address the root causes of 
vulnerability, increase resilience to face future disasters, and improve livelihoods in order for 
recovery to be considered successful. While the sections in chapter six provided a summary of the 
vulnerabilities and resiliencies organized under the seven livelihood capitals, the following 
sections link the information back to the conceptualizations and models of vulnerability, resilience 
and livelihoods discussed in the literature review. This will form the basis of the empirical 




7.1.1 Vulnerability  
In section 2.2.1.1, the PAR and Access models of vulnerability were outlined as the 
conceptualization of vulnerability utilized for this research. In particular, the PAR model highlights 
the root causes and larger-scale processes that manifest themselves at the local level in order to 
effectively address vulnerability issues. Root causes of vulnerability can be linked back to levels of 
access to power, structures and resources, and are influenced by political and economic ideologies. 
On the other hand, the visible manifestations of vulnerability are represented by ‘unsafe 
conditions’ and are channeled through dynamic pressures. These include a lack of local 
institutional capacity, training and skills, ethical standards, as well as through dynamic changes, 
such as rapid population growth and urbanization, and environmental change (Blaikie, et al., 1994; 
Wisner, et al., 2004). The following discussion is organized under these three progressions of 
vulnerability (root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions): livelihood issues associated 
with the Access model will be further discussed in the livelihood section 7.1.3  
7.1.1.1 Unsafe conditions 
Fragile physical environments, including living and working in dangerous locations and poor 
quality infrastructure and building standards, are a particularly important component of unsafe 
conditions in the context of earthquake events. In Yogyakarta after the 2006 earthquake, some of 
the research villages implemented land use planning changes that contributed to reduced risk for 
future flooding and earthquake events. While access to transportation, communication, electrical, 
water and sanitation infrastructure was quite good before the earthquake, the recovery effort 
contributed to improved water and sanitation facilities in the five case study villages, 
predominantly for the poorest households. The physical reconstruction effort contributed to 
numerous improvements in order to reduce the risk for future earthquake and disaster events. For 
the most part, permanent housing reconstruction followed earthquake resistant construction 
standards and there were improvements in housing facilities for the poorest households. There also 
appeared to be an improvement in awareness of construction standards and a shift in thinking 
towards smaller but stronger housing. The improved physical housing standards are one of the 
most important contributions of the recovery effort.  
In terms of vulnerable society members, the strong capacity of local institutions and community 
organizations is indicative of strong resilience levels at the community level. Community capacity 
was supported during the recovery effort through a community-based reconstruction program. This 
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contributed to further capacity-building as organizations and local governments gained experience 
with implementing a large-scale recovery program. On the other hand, some of the poorest and 
most marginalized villagers were generally uninvolved in community organizations and many did 
not feel confident to express opinions or involve themselves in decision-making processes. This 
reflects an on-going lack of political and decision-making power for particularly vulnerable 
groups.   
Institutional levels of disaster preparedness have improved through the implementation of a legal 
framework and national government agency for disaster management (BNPM) as well as the 
implementation of provincial (BDPM) and local level institutions. This has been supported by the 
humanitarian sector, which was heavily involved in supporting and developing government 
response capacity (PDRSEA, 2008; PLANAS PRB & Forum PT, 2009). Shifting disaster 
management paradigms commenced following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, although the need 
for the process was buoyed by the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. It remained inconclusive whether 
informal levels of disaster preparedness have improved. While there have been some community-
level disaster preparedness initiatives, including community organizations and training/simulation 
programs, ongoing issues with religious fatalism to hazards appeared to limit the likelihood that 
individuals and households would engage in preparedness actions.   
7.1.1.2 Dynamic pressures 
According to the PAR model, dynamic pressures can be organized under two themes: lack of 
institutions, skills, economic strength, and ethical standards, and; macro-level forces such as 
population growth and urbanization, and environmental change. Regarding institutions and skills, 
both Yogyakarta and Central Java have a tradition of strong local governance capacity. As noted in 
the social capital section (6.1.2), there is also a variety of community level institutions that support 
village development. The humanitarian and national level government response supported the use 
of these governance institutions to implement a community-based reconstruction program and 
further engaged in capacity-building activities to strengthen responses to future disasters. 
Conversely, although skills training programs were implemented during livelihood programming, 
low skill levels in impacted villages continue to contribute to high levels of vulnerability.  
Although Javanese culture encourages strict moral behaviors, the historical context of colonialism 
and dictatorship (as discussed in chapter four) has contributed to high levels of corruption in public 
and government spheres. While the recovery effort promoted transparency and accountability 
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during the reconstruction program, issues of corruption continued to plague governance 
institutions. Attitudes towards corruption remained mixed, with those in positions of power 
remaining relatively unconcerned with holding corrupt individuals accountable. Although the push 
of humanitarian organizations towards accountability and transparency raised awareness of 
corruption issues, longer-term shifts in attitudes at all levels of government and civil society are 
required before changes could be realized. Furthermore, improvements to government pay scales 
are required to provide acceptable levels of compensation for full time work in order to reduce the 
necessity of secondary income sources for certain types of government employees, particularly at 
the local level. Longer term empowerment and accountability issues should also be addressed, by a 
variety of actors at various scales, in order to increase government accountability to voters and 
improve political empowerment of the poor. This suggests that changes are required both within 
the government system, as well as among Indonesian civil society itself.  
In terms of macro level forces, population growth and urbanization, as well as environmental 
change have contributed to increased vulnerabilities in impacted areas. The rural regions exhibit 
characteristics of the desakota phenomenon, whereby rural to urban migration has slowed and 
economic activities in rural villages have shifted and are becoming increasingly connected to urban 
centres (Moench & Gyawali, 2008). Although this reduces rural-to-urban migration patterns, 
increasing population densities have led to development in increasingly risky environments, 
including along rivers, coastal areas, up-slopes of volcanoes, and hillsides. There has been a shift 
away from traditional settlement areas and a loss of local knowledge and traditions regarding 
housing placement and style that contributed to risk reduction historically (E-09; E-10). There was 
limited emphasis during the recovery effort in terms of recognizing the role of traditional 
knowledge and transferring that knowledge to current conditions. Environmental change had 
particularly strong impacts on villagers who remained engaged in agriculture. Unpredictability of 
wet and dry season weather, changing precipitation patterns, decreased productivity and insect 
infestations have had negative impacts, particularly in Klaten. While the recovery effort attempted 
to improve conditions for agriculturalists through irrigation systems, collective farming 
organizations, seed and fertilizer training and programs, as well as increasing animal husbandry 




7.1.1.3 Root causes 
Root causes of vulnerability focus on limited access to power, structures and resources, as well as 
political and economic ideologies that contribute to ongoing marginalization. As noted in the 
political power section in chapter six, lack of accountability of Indonesian and Javanese 
government institutions and lack of ability to influence decision-making structures, particularly 
among the poorest, has contributed to limited access to power. In some cases, those in positions of 
power and influence have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, and work against 
community-based activities to increase knowledge, skills, and overall welfare (E-07; E-16). Thus, 
ideological thinking and a hierarchal social system has contributed to the perpetuation of low-
skilled, low-educated, and low-income households.  
Access to a variety of resources, including education, health, skills training, natural resources, 
livelihood production tools and agricultural land, is driven by a capitalist economic system 
whereby those individuals and households who can afford it are provided the best access. This 
limits the ability of the poorest households to gain access to these resources, although government 
welfare programs for education and health services have contributed to increasing levels of access. 
Interestingly, a key finding of the research suggests that in the study villages, current government 
health insurance programs and agricultural farming systems have concentrated vulnerability not 
among those who are the poorest, but among the social class just above the poorest. This finding 
was corroborated through the assessment of recovery programming which found that the poorest 
benefitted from improved housing although the households just above the lowest social class have 
struggled to replace lost assets and re-engage in livelihood activities. This suggests that 
vulnerability may not be concentrated among the poorest, most marginalized community members; 
instead, vulnerability conditions were most severe for poor households.   
In summary, the recovery effort after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake contributed to reductions in 
the visible manifestations of vulnerability, particularly in regards to earthquake resistant building 
standards. On the other hand, the recovery effort had limited contributions towards reducing the 
root causes of vulnerability and establishing a sustainable system for increasing access to a variety 
of assets for the poor. This limits the effectiveness of aid interventions, as lack of access to power 
and resources will continue to perpetuate systems of vulnerability and marginalization. All in all, 
the earthquake recovery program contributed little to improving access to power and resources, 
211 
 
although it must be acknowledged that these are long-term processes that delve into the realm of 
advocacy policy structures at national and international levels. 
7.1.2 Resilience 
The conceptualization of resilience for this research focused on three themes: resistance, 
recuperation and creativity. These themes focus on the ability of individuals, households and 
communities to absorb the impacts of hazardous events, recuperate quickly after experiencing a 
disaster, as well as the ability to learn, transform, mitigate and adapt to future stresses and shocks 
(Adger, 2000). The following section explores the extent to which the recovery effort contributed 
to increasing resilience in each of the three themes.  
7.1.2.1 Resistance 
The capacity to absorb and withstand external stresses and shocks is a fundamental component of 
resilience. In the case of the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, the primary method for increasing the 
capacity to absorb shocks was through the implementation of earthquake resistant building 
standards for reconstructed housing. Although it is difficult to test the capacity of housing to 
absorb or sustain only minor damage in the event of future earthquakes, the acknowledgement by 
the vast majority of villagers that they followed the construction guidelines indicated that there was 
an improvement in quality of construction. In contrast, the economic conditions required for 
building resistance to future hazards remains limited, particularly at the household level. The cost 
of education and health services remain prohibitive for many families, and ongoing livelihood 
difficulties further impacted the ability of households to rise out of poverty. Livelihood issues will 
be discussed in more detail in section 7.1.3.  
7.1.2.2 Recuperate 
One of the positive aspects of the recovery effort was that the international humanitarian complex 
recognized the capacities that existed in the earthquake affected region. Through the 
implementation of a community-driven recovery effort, the reconstruction program allowed local 
communities the opportunity to use their own capacity to support recovery. This represents an 
important shift in approaches to recovery: in previous recovery initiatives, impacted communities 
were generally seen as victims requiring support from external sources in order to recover. The 
community-driven approach worked to further enhance local capacities to mobilize, organize, and 
confront the problems and issues encountered for future hazards (Paton, 2006). Working in 
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conjunction with the humanitarian sector, the resilience of government organizations and villages 
was indicated through the rapid recovery observed in the region: within two years, almost all of the 
350,000 houses destroyed or damaged had been rebuilt (MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011).  
While NGO and government sources highlight the completion of the housing reconstruction effort, 
the research results emphasized the ongoing struggles a majority of households continue to face to 
finish the construction of housing, as well as rebuild economic and livelihood activities. In many 
households, the lack of capacity to replenish lost assets and savings suggests that these households 
have been left with lower levels of recuperation resilience to face future events. This suggests that 
further assistance is required to more fully support recuperation following major disaster events.     
An encouraging trend observed during the recovery effort was the support and capacity-building 
activities humanitarian organizations provided to government institutions. These capacity-building 
activities had the objective of developing policies and standards for disaster management plans and 
emergency response preparations. Those government agencies that obtained experience and 
training through the Yogyakarta recovery effort have even engaged in knowledge transfer and 
training to other government agencies: the regency government in Bantul has worked with 
governments in Sleman, Yogyakarta, in order to facilitate lessons learned into future events, 
including the nearby 2010 Mt. Merapi eruption recovery effort (E-13; E-15).  
While the government in Bantul has yet to be tested following the earthquake, the capacity of 
agencies in Sleman (who have received ongoing support from humanitarian agencies during the 
five year period of 2006-2011) to respond to disaster events outside the expected range does not 
appear to have greatly increased, as evidenced by the poor response to the 2010 eruption event. 
Government emergency response plans were developed based on 2006 eruption levels, and 
standard operating procedures were created in accordance with this expectation (E-17). In the 2010 
eruption, due to the larger scale of the event, a greater number of individuals and villages were 
impacted. During the 2010 eruption response, there was a lack of capacity to adapt to changing 
disaster conditions within the agencies responsible for organizing emergency relief. Particularly, 
there was a lack of coordination and response capacity was overwhelmed due to the scale of the 
disaster. This resulted in a response effort which was generally considered worse than the 2006 
response (E-07). This suggests that training and capacity-building activities need to continue in 
order to a promote a more flexible and adaptive culture, whereby organizations have the ability to 
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respond adaptively to present and current circumstances, as opposed to relying on plans and 
standard operating procedures developed from historical circumstances.  
7.1.2.3 Creativity 
As noted in the previous section, in some instances, government organizations displayed a limited 
capacity to adapt and increase level of functioning, particularly in high-stress situations. Lack of 
adaptability and transformational capacity was also found in several households in the case study 
villages. While the earthquake recovery effort provided some assistance, particularly for 
livelihoods, in the form of training and skills development, very few households were able to take 
advantage of supports due to a lack of skills, networks, and knowledge. This suggests that the 
livelihood interventions did not fully implement a program based on the skill levels and capacities 
of impacted villagers, leading to limited positive changes. In order for humanitarian assistance 
from aid organizations, universities or government institutions, to be successful, a holistic and fully 
integrative program is required. This will be discussed further in section 7.1.3.  
More positively, some villages were able to implement new programming, with support from 
humanitarian assistance. In particular, Puton village exhibited a remarkable capacity to adapt and 
transform during the post-disaster period. This can be attributed in large part to Ibu X’s passion as 
a community volunteer and local leader, her high levels of education and commitment to 
improving and sustaining welfare within the village, and her strong external networks to 
humanitarian and university organizations. The Puton example provides evidence to support the 
assertion that the disaster recovery period can provide a ‘window of opportunity’ to promote 
positive growth and transformation at the community level, with the right type of support and 
intervention strategies.  
7.1.3 Livelihoods  
DFID’s sustainable livelihoods framework provided the conceptualization of livelihoods utilized in 
this research, specifically through the asset heptagon, as a method for organizing vulnerability and 
resilience information. As the vulnerabilities, resiliencies, and access to the seven livelihood 
capitals was discussed previously in chapter six, the following section outlines a more complete 
understanding of the livelihood concerns of villagers. The evidence related to ongoing livelihood 
issues and interventions during the earthquake recovery period provided further evidence to 
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support the overall assessment of the 2006 Yogyakarta recovery effort, as well as support the 
linkages among vulnerability, resilience and livelihood issues, to be discussed in section 7.2.  
As noted in section 5.1, prior to the earthquake disaster, Bantul and Klaten had significant poverty 
levels, at 18.5% and 23.3% respectively (BAPPENAS et al., 2006). At the time of the earthquake, 
almost half of households (approx. 47%) in impacted areas were engaged in small-scale 
agricultural activities as a primary livelihood strategy: the majority of these households represent 
low-educated, low-skilled individuals, particularly women, older generations and the landless 
(Government of Indonesia, 2007). These agriculturalists tend to have small land plots, simple 
technological inputs, and low agricultural outputs (UGM & IRP, 2009). In four of the case study 
sites (excluding Wonokromo where employment is predominantly in the government sector), the 
majority of non-farming employment was comprised of construction labourers, small-scale home 
enterprises (such as warungs, food production of snacks, and other small businesses), and a small 
minority of government sector employees (CM-01; CM-02; CM-03; CM-05). Approximately 20% 
of these small-scale, home-based enterprises are considered ‘poor’, with less than $1 USD/day in 
earnings (Callander, 2007). This provides evidence to support the assertion by Setiawan (2009) 
that prior to the earthquake, impacted areas were “already facing the pressures of poverty” (p. 35) 
and experienced ongoing livelihood struggles.   
The earthquake disaster resulted in further negative impacts on economic and livelihood issues: the 
destruction of small- and medium-scale enterprises, damage to traditional market facilities, loss of 
productive assets, and loss of income (BAPPENAS et al., 2006). As a result, the recovery effort 
incorporated an economic and livelihoods focus, although these activities generally commenced in 
mid- to late-2007, over a year after the earthquake (Setiawan, 2009). Furthermore, livelihoods 
programming received significantly less funding compared to the shelter sector, and strategies for 
recovering livelihoods, particularly at the government level, were limited (E-14). As noted in 
section 4.3.2, these interventions generally took the form of capacity building and training 
activities, the provision of credit facilities, replacement of production tools, and agricultural 
supports (see IOM, 2011; IOM, 2010; JRF, 2007a; JRF, 2008). While certain villages in 
Yogyakarta and Central Java province received ongoing, in-depth support from major funding 
agencies, including the IOM and ASB, none of the villages selected for this research received long-
term livelihoods support.   
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Despite the fact that there was a focus on livelihoods rehabilitation following the 2006 earthquake, 
in the case study sites, many villagers whose entrepreneurial activities were destroyed by the 
earthquake noted that they did not receive assistance to replace production tools and restart their 
businesses. Examples of the variety of businesses that were destroyed in the earthquake and did not 
have matching livelihoods re-establishment programs include tofu selling (HI 01-007), electrician 
(HI 02-009), carpentry (HI 02-018), turtledove breeding (HI 03-001; 03-006), quail egg businesses 
(HI 03-007; 03-008; 03-015), steel welding (HI 03-016), chicken nursery (HI 04-001), clothing 
design and production (HI 04-007), tailoring (HI 04-010), paper recycling (HI 04-013), fish 
breeding (HI 05-006), warungs (HI 05-017), and food catering (HI 05-018). The variety of 
businesses is indicative of the diversity of entrepreneurial activities in the region, yet none of these 
households received support in order to re-establish their home-based business activities.  
While credit facilities were established for villagers to take loans to restart their livelihood 
activities, either the income generation from the enterprise was too small to support the cost 
associated with productive tool replacement, or the significant amounts of money required to 
replace lost assets was considered too risky by the household (HI 01-009; 01-010; 01-012; 02-006; 
02-009; 03-001; 03-002; 03-005; 03-007; 03-008; 04-010; 05-003; 05-004; 05-006; 05-016; 05-
017). It is also important to note that many villagers sold their household assets in order to support 
daily living needs and reconstruction of housing in the aftermath of the earthquake (see section 
6.4.2 on level of savings). Thus, many households were living in precarious financial positions, 
having difficulty maintaining adequate daily needs and fund the housing reconstruction effort. 
Taking loans to restart damaged entrepreneurial businesses was a further indebtedness that many 
households were unwilling to undertake. This indicated that provision of capital support, in the 
form of productive tool replacement or cash grants, is a support mechanism required in order to 
jumpstart the diversity of entrepreneurial activities in the post-disaster period.  
For those villagers who did not previously have small-scale businesses, the need for ongoing skills 
training was highlighted. Particularly, villagers with low skills and low levels of education were 
hoping for ongoing training and skill development. One villager argued that this would help 
improve the overall economic condition in the region, as well as contribute to more holistic 
recovery: 
I want the government to pay more attention to the people and provide more job 
opportunities and skill and training and work on improving the economy. The 
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government didn’t provide enough courses to give us skills to try a new life. 
Because everything is gone and destroyed after the earthquake and they should 
try to give support and jobs and spirituality. Not just material, but also 
immaterial support (HI 01-021).  
While the implementation of micro-credit facilities improved access to capital for diversifying and 
establishing new entrepreneurial activities, some villagers were skeptical of their ability to 
successful commence businesses without further support (HI 02-003; 02-015; 02-020): 
We only have junior high school education so even if we received loans or 
money for improving the life or income, we don’t know what to do with it: don’t 
know how to market the product. If there is a skill course, we will follow it. We 
are willing to improve our lives but we don’t have any skills to do this. So it’s 
not just about having money but we don’t have the skills to use the money 
effectively (HI 02-002).  
Thus, the vulnerability conditions of the villagers reduced their capacity to take advantage of the 
micro-credit programming implemented during the recovery period. This provides support for an 
approach whereby credit and capital facilities are provided in conjunction with training and skill 
development, as opposed to just increasing access to credit facilities.  
While the above villagers highlighted the need for further training, other villagers received 
livelihoods training, particularly for sewing training, food production (such as kripik tempe, kripik 
pisang, and cendol), and handicrafts (HI 01-004; 01-008; 01-016; 02-007; 02-008; 03-005; 03-007; 
05-018; 05-024; 05-027). Unfortunately, many of these households were unable to reap any 
benefits from training due to lack of marketing skills and networks to promote the products they 
had been trained to make (HI 01-004; 01-008; 01-012; 01-016; 01-018; 02-001; 02-007; 02-008; 
03-003; 03-005; 03-007; 05-018; 05-024; 05-027). As one villager noted “social programming in 
this village is such a wasting time (sic) because there’s no follow-up after the training” (HI 03-
007).  
A further aspect that limited the success of livelihood programming was the narrow focus of 
intervention activities. In all villages, the PNPM Mandiri sewing and small animal husbandry 
activities were mentioned as one of the main livelihood interventions, except for Puton where a 
range of strategies were deployed through funding from Hanseo and Gadjah Mada universities. 
Implementing a narrow range of livelihood strategies led to increased competition and over-
saturated the labour force for particular types of employment. While in theory, the provision of 
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credit facilities would allow for a diverse range of livelihood strategies to be implemented at the 
village level, in reality, many villagers lacked the skills and knowledge to be able to take 
advantage of unique livelihood opportunities (E-06). Of the villagers who expressed a desire to 
start a home-based business activity, almost all were interested in opening a small warung shop. If 
all these villagers opened a warung shop, this would have a negative impact on surrounding 
businesses, including a reduction in available markets, limiting the overall success of businesses 
through over-saturation and increased competition, ultimately leading to an overall reduction in 
income levels (HI 01-004; 03-001; 04-004; 04-023). In Puton, livelihood programming has 
achieved greater success due to the long-term support provided (through the 5-year funded 
development plan and community taxation program), and training to support a variety of livelihood 
interventions.  
The above results suggest that in order for livelihood programming to be successful, organizations 
need to take a four-pronged approach: 
1. Provision of capital and credit facilities to support the initial phases of starting a business; 
2. Provision of training to promote skills to make quality products; 
3. Marketing and networking support to promote the sale of products; 
4. Implementation of a diversity of feasible livelihood options. 
Without this holistic support, the money spent on livelihood interventions appears to be wasted, as 
few villagers are able to take advantage of the programming. The data from villagers indicated that 
the lack of a holistic approach resulted in limited changes in livelihoods and economic conditions 
in disaster-affected areas (E-06). This sentiment is summed up by one villager who noted: 
After the earthquake they said everything will be getting better or at least the 
same - but it’s not! The recovery must increase the welfare of the people, 
provide job opportunities and economic recovery because of the decrease in 
economics after the disaster. They need to focus more on economic aspects 
which is very important to the people (HI 01-024).   
While the above sections highlighted the unsuccessful aspects of livelihood recovery, it is 
important to note that some households benefited from livelihood programming. Villagers who 
received the PNPM Mandiri sewing program highlighted the positive impacts in terms of 
improving their skills and replacing sewing machines that were destroyed in the earthquake (HI 
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01-013; 01-015; 05-020; 05-025). The improved access to credit facilities also supported increased 
economic conditions for villagers who were able to use loans to support business growth (HI 04-
014). Accordingly, for a limited number of households, the livelihood programming was successful 
in terms of improving economic conditions and increasing the diversity of household income 
strategies.  
To summarize the assessment of the livelihood recovery effort, the majority of villagers believed 
livelihood recovery was either unsuccessful or that the economic conditions remained the same as 
before the earthquake. This is supported by data from other research which suggests that 
unemployment rates in Bantul have doubled since the earthquake (UGM & IRP, 2009). Therefore, 
the ‘window of opportunity’ for improving economic and livelihood conditions was not taken 
advantage of, and in some cases, households are living in more precarious and vulnerable 
conditions.  
Linking these responses back to the conceptualization of sustainable livelihoods provided in the 
literature review, including DFID’s SLF model, as well as the Access model, the findings 
demonstrate the interaction between vulnerability and livelihood strategies and outcomes. The 
availability of livelihood assets was influenced by social relations, structures of domination, and 
transforming processes, and have impacted the ability of households to engage in livelihood 
activities. This occurred in conjunction with individual decisions and agency processes, including; 
decisions to participate in training and skill development, risk choices to start new businesses, 
strategies for networking and marketing their products and skills, as well as investments of 
business capital. Focusing specifically on the interventions highlighted in the Access model (see 
Figure 2.5), the results from the 2006 Yogyakarta recovery programming suggest that there was 
little adaptation in livelihood strategies following the earthquake, and financial and asset 
accumulation has been limited, leading to increased vulnerability in facing future stresses and 
shocks.  
7.1.4 Summary of Empirical Assessment  
In conclusion, the empirical evidence suggests the recovery effort contributed to reductions in the 
visible manifestations of vulnerability through improvements in housing standards. On the other 
hand, little reduction in vulnerability was observed in connection with root causes and ongoing 
issues associated with other forms of vulnerability, such as financial and human capital. In terms of 
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resilience, impacted villagers had high levels of certain forms of resilience, including strong social 
and cultural coping mechanisms, prior to the disaster. The recovery also contributed to resilience 
through supporting a community-based recovery program that emphasized improvements in 
construction standards, made use of local capacities, and provided institutions with experience in 
responding to a large-scale disaster event. On the other hand, resilience at the household level 
either remained the same or was reduced due to ongoing struggles with recovery and lack of 
livelihood strategies. The recovery programming did not effectively integrate a holistic economic 
program to fully support individuals and households through all stages of livelihoods, from 
training, capital and marketing support. This suggests that the recovery effort superficially reduced 
some forms of vulnerability, although other forms of vulnerability were increased and the 
underlying issues and problems in villages were not sufficiently addressed.    
7.1.5 The Humanitarian-Response System - Failure of Design? 
The humanitarian response system, in conjunction with government agencies, has increasingly 
focused on issues of vulnerability and resilience during disaster recovery periods, particularly at 
the policy level. For example, the documents of many organizations highlighted the importance of 
addressing the root causes of vulnerability in order to implement long-term sustainable shifts in 
society. Yet the evidence uncovered in the research suggested that the recovery effort only engaged 
in cursory recovery, focusing on addressing unsafe conditions, as opposed to root causes.  
Although the recovery assessment suggests government and humanitarian organizations did not 
sufficiently address root causes, it does not appear that the humanitarian response system 
employed after the Yogyakarta earthquake is designed to engage in the programming and actions 
that would contribute to long-term vulnerability reduction. NGO practitioners highlighted the 
funding and accountability structures that limited the potential for humanitarian organizations to 
effectively utilize the long-term recovery period to address underlying conditions of vulnerability:  
People are measured according to how much money they can spend and how 
fast. Nobody in their job performance gets measured in terms of the impacts and 
changes they are making in the communities – that’s disappointing. So it means 
people are coming in for six months and spending the money and then they get 
promoted. If they come in for six months and say it’s going to take a lot more 
than six months to spend this money in a reasonable period – you are going to 
get fired (E-01).  
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Thus, the funding structures and internal culture of the humanitarian response agencies effectively 
limited the type of assistance that could be provided to support long-term vulnerability reduction 
and resilience building activities. The current system maintained an approach that focused on 
superficial recovery strategies, thereby limiting the sustainability and effectiveness of 
interventions. This type of approach was found throughout the recovery effort in Yogyakarta, 
where some organizations focused on outputs (i.e. number of houses built, number of construction 
workers trained, number of pamphlets distributed) as opposed to actual changes observed at the 
ground level (E-02; E-06).  
The accountability structure of humanitarian organizations also limited the ability to use the 
‘window of opportunity’ to implement sustainable programming initiatives. Accountability 
structures have a tendency towards donors and funding agencies, as opposed to the individuals and 
communities the aid is supposed to be helping. Particularly when donors and funders are not well-
versed in local customs, cultures and needs, humanitarian programming has a tendency towards 
easily identifiable and quantifiable outputs that can be achieved in short periods of time. In the 
eyes of donors, this may contribute to perceptions of improved accountability of the humanitarian 
agency, implying the organization is capable of implementing a program that achieves quick and 
effective results. Unfortunately, this type of approach limits the type of programming that can be 
implemented as well as the overall effectiveness of long-term objectives:  
It’s very hard to justify [responses to] an earthquake where after two years you 
don’t have your final project output – which from a livelihoods perspective 
could be well justifiable as you need that time to set something up and get it 
going. But then we’d all be up for criticism that ‘oh you haven’t gotten any 
results’. So the political pressure from donors, funders, taxpayers prevents that 
(E-06).  
Thus, the humanitarian response system does not appear to be designed to accommodate all aspects 
of the ‘window of opportunity’ provided by disaster events in order to effectively reduce 
vulnerability and build resilience to respond to future stresses and shocks. The structure of these 
agencies limited their ability to achieve the goals and objectives they themselves stated they were 
trying to achieve. A shift towards long-term programming, increasing awareness of donors, and 
adjusting the accountability focus to include impacted households and communities would improve 
the ability of these humanitarian organizations to meet their own objectives.  
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7.2 Methodological Issues: The RDR-AF Evaluation Tool 
The RDR-AF model was designed as an evaluation methodology to assess the impact of long term 
recovery efforts. Specifically, the model provided a preliminary conceptualization of what resilient 
disaster recovery should look like, creating an optimized model of successful recovery. This 
effectively linked recovery to key concepts in the hazards literature, including vulnerability, 
resilience and sustainable livelihoods. As the case study assessment in section 7.1 demonstrated, 
this approach allowed a comparison between the actual achievements of a specific recovery effort 
to an idealized conceptualization of what recovery could accomplish. The approach also provides a 
holistic model, focusing on a wide range of factors that impact overall recovery and reduce the risk 
of future disaster events.  
Although the RDR-AF approach presents an alternative method for assessing the impact of 
humanitarian assistance (outlined in chapter three), the constraints and difficulties associated with 
conducting such a holistic evaluation are similar to those identified in the humanitarian impact 
assessment literature. These include the difficulty is assigning causality and attribution, limited 
baseline data to make comparisons, lack of capacity to engage in evaluations of long-term impacts, 
timing and scale issues of assessment, selecting appropriate indicators, as well as implementation 
issues (ALNAP, 2006; Beck, 2009; Hofmann, 2004; Proudlock, Ramalingam, & Sandison, 2009). 
Although there has been increased focus on providing guidelines for assessing the impact of 
humanitarian assistance, there has rarely been any systematic analysis of the long-term impacts of 
overall recovery programs (Buttenheim, 2010; Edgington, 2010). The following sections outline 
the positive and negative aspects of the RDR-AF model in order to determine the effectiveness of 
using such an approach to assess long-term disaster recovery.  
7.2.1 Benefits of the RDR-AF Model 
The results of the research outlined in chapter six suggest that the RDR-AF was an effective 
conceptual and methodological framework for evaluating long-term recovery through a focus on 
root causes of vulnerability, resilience to face future disasters, and improving the sustainability of 
livelihood strategies. This evaluative tool allowed the assessment to move beyond the surface 
aspects of recovery, particularly the housing reconstruction (which by all aspects was relatively 
well done), and incorporate a holistic understanding of a variety of aspects influencing the welfare 
of households and communities. A comparison only to pre-disaster levels would provide limited 
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analysis of the ongoing conditions of vulnerability and livelihood struggles, and achieved little in 
identifying aspects for further resilience building. Thus, this approach provided a more in-depth 
assessment of ongoing conditions, particularly through understandings of lack of access to a 
variety of resources.  
Through the holistic approach provided by the RDR-AF model, the assessment of recovery 
focused not just on interventions, but also on missed opportunities. If the analysis focused 
exclusively on the effectiveness of programming interventions, areas or sectors where there was 
limited recovery programming might have been overlooked. For example, many households 
indicated they struggled with ongoing issues of psychological trauma and lack of hazards 
knowledge. A focus on systematic issues of vulnerability also highlighted continuing issues with 
lack of access to a variety of material and immaterial assets, including education and health 
resources, as well as decision-making power. The livelihood analysis identified the limited long-
term impact of economic interventions. Thus, through the RDR-AF approach, the need for further 
emphasis on programming and interventions in these sectors was identified.   
The timeline for data collection under the methods adopted for the research also suggested a 
benefit over traditional humanitarian impact evaluations. In cases where evaluations and program 
reports are completed, data collection is generally taken either during or at the ending point of the 
programming (Beck, 2009; Buttenheim, 2010). This suggests that evaluations would be conducted 
while beneficiaries continued to receive support. On the other hand, the RDR-AF takes a process-
oriented approach which explicitly recognizes the dynamic nature of recovery. In this research, the 
data were collected anywhere from one to three years after government and humanitarian 
organizations had completed their recovery activities allowing for an assessment of the longevity 
and sustainability of interventions. In the Yogyakarta case study, particularly for livelihoods 
programming, the data suggested that little has been done to contribute to long-term changes in 
livelihood strategies and outcomes. Thus, the RDR-AF approach provides a deeper understanding 
of how recovery programming may contribute to long-term transformations at the household and 
community level, both positive and negative.   
The importance of scale and the impact it has on understanding the concept of place was 
highlighted in the research through the RDR-AF. While an area can be defined as a ‘place’ based 
on the shared experience of a disaster event, this assumes that the area has some form of 
homogeneity. The different experiences and characteristics of each village (including livelihood 
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strategies, government structure, village history, levels of education etc.) and even differences 
within villages indicated that the concept of place is not necessarily applicable to the entire area 
impacted by one disaster event. Although some experiences were found to be similar across all 
villages (i.e. the use of gotong royong as a cultural strategy for recovery, the use of pre-existing 
organizations to effectively control and distribute aid), the livelihood activities and problems, 
political and geographic conditions, community experiences and long-term recovery efforts were 
different for each of the five villages. This implies that places exist within places; a true 
understanding of place may require a focus on various levels of scale, from the smaller-scale 
communities through to provincial and national levels. Although the majority of this research 
focused on the local scale, the RDR-AF approach provides an opportunity to highlight the 
experiences of various places through a multi-scalar approach, highlighting what occurred in 
individual villages, along with regional and provincial comparisons.  
A final benefit of the RDR-AF approach is through the use of participatory methods that 
incorporate the views and opinions of beneficiaries and impacted households. Using participatory 
approaches for humanitarian impact evaluations have been identified as just one of three 
approaches for conducting assessments: the remaining approaches focus on quantitative measures 
of impact, as well as deductive/inductive approaches (Hofmann, 2004). Of these three approaches, 
the participatory approach, focusing on the perceptions of impacted and affected households, has 
rarely been used in the humanitarian sector (Proudlock, Ramalingam, & Sandison, 2009). The 
RDR-AF approach focused specifically on identifying the views of beneficiaries, thereby explicitly 
acknowledging a focus on impacts and processes, as opposed to outputs, and accountability 
towards impacted populations.  
7.2.2 Challenges related to implementing the RDR-AF Model 
Similar to any assessment of humanitarian programming, there were challenges in implementing 
the RDR-AF approach to evaluate the overall recovery effort. The first issue is associated with lack 
of baseline data. In this case study, there was limited data to make comparisons between pre- and 
post-disaster conditions for individual households. Due to the lack of baseline data, information 
regarding pre-disaster conditions was derived from individual recall. This approach may result in 
erroneous data due to recall errors (Buttenheim, 2010). For example, there appeared to be errors in 
recollecting the length of time in temporary housing, as noted in section 6.3.1. On the other hand, 
when villagers were asked to compare current conditions to pre-disaster conditions, many 
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respondents were able to highlight specific factors that influenced their views, such as lower 
income levels, smaller housing, and loss of production tools, etc. They were also able to identify 
aspects of the recovery that they felt had improved, suggesting some level of accuracy in recall of 
prior conditions. Although memories of prior conditions may be accurate, the lack of baseline data 
and methods for ensuring the validity of statements represents an ongoing issue for the assessment.  
A second issue involved the linkages between current conditions and recovery programming. 
There was some difficulty establishing causality between the humanitarian intervention and 
changes in beneficiary conditions (Proudlock, Ramalingam, & Sandison, 2009). While one 
approach would be to assign a counterfactual, in other words, to compare groups who received 
interventions versus those who didn’t, ethical and methodological issues have been highlighted 
regarding this approach (Buttenheim, 2010). A second approach, utilized in the RDR-AF model, is 
to use theory-based methods to “examine a particular case in depth to explain how an intervention 
could be responsible for specific changes” (Proudlock, Ramalingam, & Sandison, 2009, p. 6). 
Causality linkages are inferred from contextual information provided by the research participants, 
including villagers, government officials, academics and NGO practitioners. This approach is 
required as the purpose of the case study approach is to examine the recovery effort in its entirety, 
as opposed to comparing beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries. Furthermore, the case study method 
seeks to understand the recovery effort holistically, as opposed to focusing on the specific 
outcomes of one particular program or intervention. Nevertheless, inferring comparisons does 
challenge the ability of the research results to make conclusive statements regarding the impact of 
specific humanitarian and government interventions.  
A further challenge with implementing the understanding of resilient disaster recovery in the 
assessment framework relates to approaching recovery as a process. The RDR-AF conceptual 
approach recognizes the dynamic nature of recovery and changing conditions of vulnerability, 
resilience and sustainable livelihoods. While the data collection phase spanned a period of almost 
eight months, in the long term, this may represent more of a snapshot of the long-term recovery as 
opposed to process. Viewing recovery as a long-term process implies using a longer-term 
evaluation methodology that explores causal relationships, although the time and cost issues 
associated with this suggests it is impractical. Thus, the results capture a snapshot of the recovery 
process over an eight month period, and it is recognized that conditions may have already changed 
in the study area.   
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A final challenge of the RDR-AF approach is in regards to the logistics of conducting the research. 
The framework suggests the need for an in-depth understanding of a variety of contextual and 
intervention programs at various scales. The wide breadth of information needed required a 
considerable amount of time and effort in terms of background information on the disaster, 
understanding of contextual information, including language, culture and customs, as well as 
opinions and perceptions from a variety of actors, at various scales. The multi-scalar approach was 
difficult to implement, and much of the results of the research focused on the community level. 
The amount of information required from research participants was time-consuming and can 
exceed reasonable expectations for assessment. As noted in chapter three, the amount of data 
collected was reduced, as the length of pilot household interviews was almost three hours. This 
suggests that a more standardized household survey approach for collecting information may be 
necessary for future implementations of the RDR-AF, in order to satisfy information needs within 
acceptable time commitments on the part of research participants.  
7.2.3 Integrating Vulnerability, Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods 
One of the important benefits of the RDR-AF model is the integration of vulnerability, resilience 
and sustainable livelihoods into an applied evaluation framework. Through this approach, a wide 
range of factors and processes that influenced the disaster experience (as discussed in chapter 2) 
were analyzed. The results of the research suggested the importance of incorporating all three 
concepts when holistically assessing long-term recovery and determining whether risk of future 
disasters has been reduced. Vulnerability was an important concept to understand the underlying 
processes impacting individual, household and community ability to access and effectively utilize a 
variety of material and immaterial assets. Underlying conditions of vulnerability were linked to the 
capacity of individuals, households and villages to take advantage of the resources provided during 
the recovery programming. Those with higher vulnerability were less successful in benefitting 
from the recovery programming, while those with less vulnerability were able to access a greater 
share of the resources available.  
The resilience perspective provided an understanding of the characteristics that contributed to 
capacities to absorb, recuperate quickly, and transform following the earthquake. The villages that 
have had the most success in terms of using the recovery effort to implement improvements and 
changes in living conditions, overall welfare and standards of living were Puton and Ngandong - 
the two villages that were highlighted for their adaptive capacity following the earthquake and the 
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strength of their political leadership. This supports the integration of a resilience framework that 
focuses not only on capacity to absorb and recuperate quickly from hazardous events, but also to 
take advantage of the resources and specific conditions available in the aftermath of a major 
disaster event.  
The importance of incorporating livelihood initiatives into vulnerability reduction and recovery 
efforts should be emphasized. In communities and households where livelihood recovery was 
successful and income sources were reliable and sustainable, overall perceptions of recovery were 
more positive and quality of life conditions either remained similar to pre-disaster conditions or 
had improved. In other cases, where livelihood conditions deteriorated, the perception of the 
recovery effort was not as positive and quality of life conditions were stagnating or had declined. 
This suggests that successful livelihood interventions should form an important component of 
recovery programming, and as such, should be included in any assessment of overall recovery 
programming.  
To summarize the methodological contributions, the results from the research reaffirm the 
usefulness of the RDR-AF model. The RDR-AF provides a unique perspective on evaluating 
recovery through a focus on holistic assessment that emphasized a comparison to an idealized 
conceptualization of disaster recovery. The importance of integrating the three concepts of 
vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods was highlighted. Integration allowed for an 
effective assessment of recovery programming and comprehensive understanding of the current 
conditions of impacted villages and households. Moreover, incorporating aspects of vulnerability, 
resilience and sustainable livelihoods was useful for providing a holistic analysis of the long-term 
recovery effort after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake.  
7.3 Conceptualizing Disaster Recovery  
While the above section highlighted the usefulness of the RDR-AF approach for evaluating 
recovery, the following section further refines the conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery 
as a process. In order to achieve this objective, the section begins by returning to the recovery 
literature outlined in chapter two. The evidence from the case study is used to either support or 
extend recovery knowledge, providing an indication of important concepts that should be included 
in the re-conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery. Subsequently, the contributions of the 
research for understanding the intersections and relationships between vulnerability, resilience and 
sustainable livelihoods are provided. This will provide further evidence to support the refinement 
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of the final resilient disaster recovery conceptual output. Finally, the revised conceptualization of 
resilient disaster recovery is outlined, focusing on key issues and processes identified throughout 
the research.  
7.3.1 Returning to Recovery Theory  
One of the objectives of the research involved contributing to disaster recovery knowledge and 
understanding resilient disaster recovery as a process. Thus, the following section returns to the 
recovery theory presented in chapter two and the results of the case study are used to provide 
support for previous recovery theory, as well as contributing to further understanding. The 
discussion will be organized under the five patterns of organizational behavior delineated by 
Barton (1969) in section 2.1.1. Furthermore, these sections are important for outlining important 
recovery concepts that should be incorporated into the revised conceptualization of resilient 
disaster recovery.   
7.3.1.1 Strength of local government institutions 
Barton (1969) suggested that major disaster events often overwhelm the capacity of local 
government institutions. These organizations may be unable to effectively cope and respond to the 
disaster event, requiring replacement by improvised government agencies. In the 2006 Yogyakarta 
recovery effort, the government did establish coordination agencies in both Yogyakarta and 
Central Java province in order to administer relief and recovery programming. Organizations for 
administering permanent house reconstruction funding were also established, including POKMAS 
in Yogyakarta province and RR in Central Java province. While this might suggest incapacity of 
the local government to respond, in fact the opposite is true. These agencies were established by 
the regional, provincial and national governments in order to effectively establish the needs of 
impacted populations, coordinate information and disseminate recovery programming, as well as 
monitor recovery activities. Hence, there was a strong government capacity to respond, and the 
utilization of local administrative and coordination organizations may result in improved 
capabilities to respond to future events (Lewis, 1999). Furthermore, this provides an example of 
how local governments can be empowered to manage recovery efforts, thereby leading to a 
strengthening of government recovery institutions (Clinton, 2006; McEntire, 2001).  
One of the reasons the recovery program in Yogyakarta was able to effectively use local 
government agencies was due to the nature of damages. Local and provincial government 
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institutions in both Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces were largely unaffected, and the lower 
number of deaths (compared to disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami) meant that social 
institutions remained intact (Manfield, 2007). Thus, in Yogyakarta, the recovery effort was able to 
effectively utilize local government resources, and newly established recovery and reconstruction 
agencies worked in coordination with government agencies, as opposed to replacing them. This is 
dissimilar to the experience in Aceh after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, whereby major 
reconstruction and rehabilitation agencies were established to supplant local government 
institutions that were themselves heavily impacted by the disaster (Fengler, Ishan, & Kaiser, 2008). 
This suggests that disaster events do not necessarily lead to incapacity of local government 
institutions to respond; while coordination and recovery agencies may be established in the post-
disaster period, the extent to which this involves the replacement of local government institutions 
may be largely dependent on the pre-existing capacities of the local government, the scale of the 
disaster and the damages to human capital in the region (E-01). In any case, if coordination and 
recovery agencies are established, they should be working in conjunction with local government 
institutions, regardless of capacity or impacts, in order to improve local government capabilities, 
contribute to the sustainability of recovery programming, and facilitate an approach that empowers 
impacted populations to be involved in the recovery process (E-06; E-12; E-16).     
7.3.1.2 Responsibility of relief organizations  
Historically, recovery programming after major disaster events has had a tendency to fall to the 
responsibility of humanitarian organizations, particularly in developing countries. According to 
Barton (1969), due to the variety of organizations involved in recovery efforts, there may be 
competition and breakdown in coordination. The Yogyakarta case study does not support this 
assertion. The leading funding agency was the Indonesian central government, and local 
government institutions played a major role in the reconstruction program, as discussed in chapter 
four (E-06). Furthermore, the behavior of relief and recovery humanitarian organizations was 
implemented through a ‘lessons learned’ approach whereby issues of competition and 
inefficiencies in the 2004 Aceh recovery effort were addressed during the 2006 recovery program 
in Yogyakarta (E-07).   
Under the UN cluster system, the humanitarian sector has moved towards a coordinated structure 
for improving the implementation of disaster aid and recovery programs. The relief and recovery 
programs triggered by the 2006 earthquake was the second time the UN cluster system was 
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utilized, and potentially allowed for improved coordination, decreased competition between 
organizations, increased quality in the provision of relief and recovery services, and ensured 
greater accountability25 (IASC, 2006; MacRae & Hodgkin, 2011). The push by humanitarian 
organizations for increased accountability and coordination suggests a shift towards improving the 
implementation of humanitarian assistance, as suggested by Clinton (2006). On the other hand, 
further evidence is required in order to determine whether this was unique to the Yogyakarta 
recovery effort, or whether learning and change has been applied in other major disaster events 
with large humanitarian response, such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake.  
Moreover, the role of humanitarian organizations has been increasingly recognized as more 
facilitatory in nature as compared to on-the-ground implementation of recovery programming. 
Humanitarian organizations should be used to provide local governments and communities with 
information on standards, technical assistance, and implementation strategies (E-03; E-14). 
Through governments and local communities sharing in the responsibility for implementation and 
the day-to-day running of recovery programming, sustainability of disaster risk reduction 
initiatives is promoted (E-06). Furthermore, development activities are based on the needs of the 
community as opposed to the needs of donors, funders, and organizations (E-16). This should also 
contribute to increased efficiency, as it limits the necessity of humanitarian organizations using 
funding to establish offices, housing, transportation, and communication facilities for NGO 
practitioners, which can take up significant portions of recovery budgets in some cases (E-01; E-
16). Hence, particularly in places where governance capacity is stronger, the role of humanitarian 
organizations should be to work in conjunction with governments, and facilitate optimal recovery, 
as opposed to replacing governance institutions and response mechanisms. This type of facilitatory 
approach also recognizes that households and communities should drive their own recovery, as 
highlighted in Clinton’s (2006) ten propositions for building back better.   
In the case of some large humanitarian organizations, there has been an increase in partnerships 
with local NGOs in order to facilitate understanding and awareness of the context and community 
needs. Unfortunately, in the context of a major disaster event, many local NGOs are established in 
the relief and reconstruction period in order to take advantage of funding and employment 
opportunities, and are dissolved once the funding from international donors is completed (E-16). 
                                                   
25
 While the research did not specifically evaluate the UN cluster system, improvements in coordination and 
provision of services compared to the 2004 response in Aceh after the Indian Ocean tsunami highlight the 
implementation of lessons learned, decreased competition and improved provision of services after the 2006 
Yogyakarta earthquake (MacRae, 2008; Manfield, 2007).   
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Not only does this limit the capacity to implement ongoing long-term programming, but there may 
be impacts on the effectiveness of capacity-building activities in the region: social networks 
developed throughout the recovery period are dissolved along with the local recovery 
organizations (E-01). In some cases, the newly established local NGOs have limited capacity to 
translate the program objectives and requirements of the international donor to the local 
community. This occurred during the implementation of the JRF housing reconstruction program, 
whereby the local monitors and trainers misunderstood the JRF reconstruction guidelines and 
disallowed the re-use of housing materials (E-16). While local facilitators indicated these 
guidelines to villagers, the JRF did not restrict the re-use of materials, indicating some level of 
misunderstanding of the reconstruction program requirements (E-04). This indicates a need for 
international NGOs to develop local partnerships and networks in the pre-disaster period with 
legitimate local NGOs that are engaged in long-term capacity and development activities in the 
impacted region. Moreover, this process could also be used to develop communication lines and 
facilitate local understanding of key program objectives.   
7.3.1.3 Public perception of recovery activities  
As noted by Barton (1969), public perceptions of recovery operations from both government and 
humanitarian sources are driven by rational assessment of achievements as well through symbolic 
gestures. The results from the research support this suggestion. Respondents provided rational 
assessments of the process and outcomes of the implementation of recovery programming, and 
noted appreciation for efforts, even in cases where the project failed to meet objectives (i.e. the 
JRF irrigation program in Ngandong which contributed to increased flooding of agricultural 
fields). Many villagers were able to recognize both the positive achievements of the recovery 
programming, such as the housing reconstruction offering some improvements in terms of safety 
and construction standards, as well as aspects of recovery that were not as successful, particularly 
the livelihood programming.  
In contrast, symbolic gestures, particularly by government agencies, can contribute to long-term 
perceptions of recovery programming. One of the main issues associated with recovery perceptions 
in Yogyakarta involved the declaration shortly after the earthquake by Vice-President Jusuf Kalla 
that impacted households would receive RP 30 million (approx. $3,200 USD). Once the extent of 
damage was realized, this number had to be lowered to RP 15 million (approx. $1,600 USD). 
While the majority of households had heard the initial announcement, many were unaware that the 
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amount would be reduced and the reasons for this reduction. This contributed to significant 
feelings of distrust and social conflict in villages, as some households still believe they were 
supposed to receive RP 30 million and that the funding was significantly corrupted (HI 01-014; 01-
022; 02-004; 05-016). Local government leaders were then responsible for explaining the funding 
conditions to villagers, which may have contributed to feelings of distrust and corruption, 
particularly in contexts where social conflicts were higher.  
7.3.1.4 Conflict during the recovery period  
Researchers have noted the changing nature of conflict during the post-disaster context. In the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster, collaboration, solidarity and mutual helping significantly 
reduces the number of conflicts, whereas the distribution of external aid and reconstruction 
assistance tends to greatly increase the number of conflicts (Barton, 1969). According to Geipel’s 
(1982) Conflict Model of Recovery (see Figure 2.1), levels of conflict are at a maximum during the 
reconstruction planning phase, whereas the number of conflicts decreases throughout the recovery 
period as individuals and households become accustomed to new living conditions. While the 
recovery experiences in each of the case study villages after the Yogyakarta earthquake generally 
follow Geipel’s model, there are some significant differences, as depicted in Figure 7.1. In this 
figure, the depiction of conflict curves was derived from a subjective interpretation of respondent 
comments as opposed to a quantitative assessment of number of conflicts.   
Figure 7.1: Model of Conflicts during the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake 
 































In the Yogyakarta recovery effort, levels of conflict were generally at a maximum during the relief 
phase, with villagers highlighting distribution of immediate assistance as a particular concern. This 
is contrary to the findings in Geipel’s model, whereby conflicts were generally lower during the 
relief period, hitting a maximum at the beginning of reconstruction phases, particularly during the 
planning phase. In Yogyakarta, the number of conflicts during the relief period was attributable to 
two sources: degree of pre-existing potential conflicts, and strength of local leadership. In 
Wonokromo, the number of potential conflicts was greater in the pre-disaster period compared to 
the other four villages. The higher degree of conflict contributed to a greater number of conflicts 
during the relief phase, as villagers experienced a lower degree of social cohesion and increased 
tension over the distribution of relief assistance. Conflict continued during the reconstruction 
phase, as there were issues with corruption of house funding. In Sengon, a high degree of conflicts 
was attributed to high levels of corruption of assistance due to lack of political leadership. In 
Puton, Kategan and Ngandong, the ability of government and youth organizations to work together 
and distribute relief and assistance in a transparent and socially cohesive manner reduced the 
number of conflicts in these villages.  
Differences between the temporal periods of maximum conflict in the Yogyakarta case study and 
Geipel’s (1982) study of the 1976 Friuli earthquake may be a reflection of the different 
characteristics of the region impacted, as well as the implementation of a community-based 
reconstruction program in the Yogyakarta case. In Yogyakarta, the semi-rural nature of the 
impacted region meant that the majority of households were able to shelter-in-place, with low 
levels of displacement. The community-based reconstruction program meant that households had a 
greater degree of control over the reconstruction of their houses, leading to reduced social conflict 
during the planning phases of reconstruction. This suggests that the nature of conflict may be at 
least partially dependent on pre-existing conditions in the region, such as pre-existing levels of 
conflict and development characteristics, as well as the characteristics of recovery programming.  
A final difference between the Conflict Model of Recovery highlighted in Figure 2.1 and the 
Yogyakarta experience highlighted in Figure 7.1 relates to the number of conflicts in Phase IV of 
recovery. In Geipel’s (1982) conflict model, the number of conflicts is thought to decrease as 
individuals and households become accustomed to their new circumstances, implying a reduction 
in conflicts due to residents resigning themselves to the new circumstances. In Yogyakarta, the 
experience in three villages, Puton, Kategan, and Ngandong, suggests an alternative explanation. In 
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these three villages, the disaster and subsequent recovery period contributed to increased solidarity 
and mutual cooperation among villagers. Interview respondents highlighted the improved gotong 
royong conditions and reduced social conflicts due to the shared experiences of recovering from 
the disaster. This suggests the disaster and recovery program actually contributed to reducing the 
number of conflicts in the village, as opposed to villagers’ first experiencing conflicts and then 
being resigned to their recovery conditions. This indicates that an effective recovery program, 
while acknowledging that some degree of conflict is inevitable, should contribute to a reduction in 
the number of conflicts and work to improve social solidarity.   
Furthermore, the variations in conflict across the places experiencing recovery programming 
highlight the distinct spatial and social outcomes following a disaster event. Edgington’s (2010) 
dual lenses of ‘geography of crisis’ and ‘geography of opportunity’ and evidence from the 
Yogyakarta recovery supports this notion. Recovery programming in Yogyakarta created spaces of 
ongoing crisis as well as spaces where the disaster acted as a catalyst for improving social 
conditions and overall community functioning. This supports McEntire’s (2001) observation that 
the interaction between both the community and external recovery actors can work to perpetuate 
and further entrench vulnerabilities and conflicts, or lead to a reduction of these issues.   
7.3.1.5 Major national programs  
Barton’s (1969) review of the recovery literature suggested that major national programs of 
recovery are required to supplant local responses and increase efficiency. In contrast, the 
Yogyakarta earthquake case study suggests that local governments were capable of implementing 
recovery programming, with the facilitation of NGO and national government support. This is 
similar to findings by Rubin, Saperstein, and Barbee (1985), who focused on political and 
government leadership capacity during the recovery (see Figure 2.2). The research results provide 
support for recognizing the role of other key actors, including local governments and communities 
themselves (as discussed above). 
Berke, Kartez, & Wenger (1993) highlighted the impact of vertical and horizontal relationships on 
disaster recovery: these relationships reflect the capacity to organize and access resources on a 
variety of scales. This is supported by evidence from the Yogyakarta earthquake recovery, which 
highlighted the importance of both vertical and horizontal linkages. Individuals, households and 
communities with strong internal cohesion were able to implement a recovery program with lower 
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levels of social conflict, improved equitable distribution of assistance, and decreased costs of 
reconstruction through the use of gotong royong. External linkages to government and 
humanitarian organizations, as well as civil society also impacted recovery: those villages with 
greater external networks were able to translate these relationships into increased assistance and 
programming. This evidence highlights the importance of networks in facilitating a strong recovery 
after major disaster events.  
The role of private and civil society elements represents a somewhat neglected area of 
humanitarian assistance. These linkages represented a strong component for recovery funding and 
support following the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, including cash and in-kind donations, 
fundraising, emotional and psychological support, and labouring assistance (E-06). Taking 
advantage of the strength of civil society to develop informal partnerships and coordination for 
responding to small- and large-scale hazardous events is an area that requires further exploration 
(E-07). Particularly in the context of developing countries where insurance programs remain 
largely non-existent, civil society partnerships represent an opportunity for risk-pooling and 
resource-sharing (E-01; E-09; E-15). A further component of civil society involves the sharing of 
knowledge, particularly between the educated who can work as community volunteers in order to 
facilitate improvements in welfare and standards of living. An example of this type of volunteer-
based community involvement is in Puton, whereby Ibu X works within a network of community 
volunteers in order to facilitate the development of one particular village (CM-01; FG-01). This 
type of informal community network and development program could be implemented on a larger 
scale through informal civil society networks in order to increase overall welfare and standards of 
living and contribute to increased resilience.      
7.3.1.6 Summary of recovery literature  
The data from the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake suggests a shift away from the traditional 
understandings of recovery and reconstruction following major disasters. Contrary to previous 
research on disaster recovery in developing countries, governance capacity in Indonesia reflected a 
relatively strong ability to implement programming using local government organizations and 
human resources, providing the government with the major role of reconstruction and recovery. In 
the Yogyakarta case study, local capacity was not overwhelmed after the disaster, and coordination 
agencies worked in conjunction with local governments. While humanitarian organizations were 
involved in the recovery effort, the role was secondary compared to the recovery efforts of the 
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government. The implementation of a coordinated humanitarian response under the UN cluster 
system led to decreases in competition and increasing efficiencies of aid distribution. Certain 
humanitarian organizations have also engaged in a shift towards a facilitation role, whereby the 
primary role is one of knowledge transfer and the responsibility for implementation is given to 
local organizations. Furthermore, the role of civil society and the private sector was highlighted, 
with suggestions for how this could contribute to improved development and implement unique 
strategies for spreading risk.  
The research also contributed to increased understanding of the nature of conflict in the post-
disaster period, with emphasis on the influence of pre-existing social conditions as well as the 
characteristics of recovery programming. The importance of understanding pre-existing conditions 
in the disaster-impacted region was highlighted: the capacity of governance systems to implement 
recovery programming will influence the role of humanitarian organizations and impact the 
characteristics of recovery programming. The nature of recovery is also highly dependent on the 
damages experienced, particularly human damages and social capital linkages. This suggests that 
even communities with strong governance and social structures could be overwhelmed with 
recovery due to heavy disaster impacts.  
These results also contradict the findings of Haas, Kates, and Bowden (1977) who argued that 
disaster recovery is “ordered, knowable and predictable” (p. xxvi). Although the statement 
references the distinct phases of recovery programming, the implication is that the speed and 
characteristics of physical, economic, social and cultural recovery is homogenous and consistent 
throughout impacted populations. The results from this case study indicate that recovery is not 
homogenous: recovery occurs at different rates depending on pre-existing capacities and 
conditions, and there are variations in the outcomes of recovery across different places. Similar to 
criticisms from Berke, Kartez, & Wenger (1993), Rubin, Saperstein, & Barbee (1985), and Schwab 
(1998), the four linear phases of recovery described by Haas, Kates, & Bowden (1977) were not 
necessarily clear or distinct in the Yogyakarta example. The distinction between the emergency 
and restoration period was rather blurred, with emergency and restoration activities occurring 
almost simultaneously. For many households, economic activities have yet to return to pre-disaster 
levels, although commemorative activities, such as the earthquake monument, have been 
completed. This implies that the four phases of recovery described in the disaster recovery model 
in section 2.1.1 are neither distinct, nor linear.       
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7.3.2 Vulnerability, Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Concepts   
While section 7.2 highlighted the importance of incorporating vulnerability, resilience and 
sustainable livelihoods concepts in recovery assessments, each of these concepts was expressed 
individually. In order to effectively integrate and understand the relationships between each of 
these concepts, further understanding of the interactions between them is required. While the 
literature review highlighted the interconnections between vulnerability and sustainable 
livelihoods, particularly highlighted through the Access model outlined in chapter two, the 
relationship between vulnerability and resilience, as well as resilience and livelihoods was less 
clear. The following section provides an overview of the contributions to further understanding of 
the relationships between these concepts, and how this can lead to a more complete integration of 
these concepts in the framing of resilient disaster recovery.  
7.3.2.1 Vulnerability and resilience  
The results demonstrated that the relationship between vulnerability and resilience is neither linear, 
nor simple: in fact, in this research the relationship was found to be more complex than originally 
anticipated. Various attributes of vulnerability had both positive and negative feedbacks on aspects 
of resilience. For example, while most villages had a strong belief in God and religious faith, in 
Wonokromo this translated into a higher degree of social connections and increased aid, as well as 
providing strength for recovery and working towards improving living conditions. In other 
villages, while strong religious faith provided strength for recovery, it also contributed to religious 
fatalism, and a lack of initiative to prepare for future disasters. This paradoxical relationship was 
seen in other areas, such as levels of experience and strength of government institutions. Table 7.1 
provides an overview of how some factors or indicators may contribute to both vulnerability and 
resilience.  
Table 7.1: Relationship between Vulnerability and Resilience Attributes 
Attributes Vulnerability Resilience 
Religion 
A strong belief in God and religious faith 
may contribute to vulnerability through the 
belief that disasters are God’s plan, God 
would take care of them, and thereby 
limiting the need for any preparedness 
actions to face hazards 
A strong belief in God and religious faith 
appeared to contribute to resilience through 
increased social awareness, attempts to aid 
others in the community, bringing the 
community together, providing strength for 
recovery 
Culture 
Cultural beliefs may limit need for disaster 
preparedness activities, and decision-
making structures that limit the capacity of 
Cultural beliefs may lead to acceptance and 
gratefulness, improving psychological 
capacity for recovery  
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Competing leaders can lead to increased 
social conflict among followers, and 
difficulty with program implementation 
Strong and respected leaders can push forth 
progressive programming to improve 
welfare and standards of living, as well as 
obtain further resources to support recovery  
Experience with 
disasters 
May lead to belief in capacity to respond to 
all future disasters (regardless of scale), 
limiting desire to engage in adaptive or 
preparedness activities 
Experience with disasters builds capacity to 




Strong government institutions may reduce 
response capacity at the individual, 
household or community level and 
contribute to dependency on external 
support 
Strong response and organizational capacity 
can support improved response and quicker 
recovery  
The above table indicates that the relationship between vulnerability and resilience is difficult to 
define and may be highly dependent on context. This supports the relationship framework set forth 
in chapter two, Figure 2.6, whereby resilience and vulnerability are conceptualized as distinct 
concepts represented along two continuums. While vulnerability and resilience are distinguished as 
separate concepts, the relationship is viewed as complex and highly interrelated. The X-Y 
conceptualization suggested that it is possible for individuals, households, and communities to 
have characteristics of high vulnerability as well as high resilience. Approaching the relationship 
as two separate concepts explicitly recognizes that even though affected populations may 
experience some forms of high vulnerability, they also have other forms of resilience to support 
recovery. 
The results from the case study research support the use of the hypothetical communities outlined 
in Figure 2.6. In the case of Puton village, households experienced high vulnerability through poor 
housing construction, low income levels and low levels of education, while recovery was 
facilitated through high levels of resilience. These resiliencies took the form of construction skills, 
community organizational capacity, and cultural capitals that contributed to sharing of resources 
and mutual cooperation. Puton also demonstrated adaptive capacity, learning and transformation 
through the use of social capital networks to support the implementation of a strategic five-year 
development plan. This suggests that appropriate and timely assistance can be used in conjunction 
with existing resiliencies in order to facilitate adaptation and transformation, resulting in 
improvements to overall welfare and living conditions. Thus, Puton represents an example of a 
village with high levels of both vulnerability and resilience. Conversely, the experience in Kategan 
represents villages with high vulnerability and low resilience. Vulnerability factors were similar to 
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Puton, although there was a lack of social capital networks and capacity to implement learning and 
transformations within the community. Accordingly, the relationship between vulnerability and 
resilience can be understood as highly contextual and dynamic, and varies significantly with the 
type of disaster and associated damages.  
7.3.2.2 Resilience and sustainable livelihoods  
In the RDR-AF conceptual model, the relationship between resilience and sustainable livelihoods 
remained undefined. This was consistent with the lack of consensus in the hazards literature in 
defining the relationship between these two concepts. In some cases, responses to hazards have 
made the assumption that hazard resilience and sustainability are mutually exclusive, particularly 
when focusing on building standards (Kijewski-Correa & Taflanidis, 2012). On the other hand, 
concepts of resilience may imply sustainability, as the ability to absorb, recover quickly and adapt 
to changing natural and human processes indicates a capacity to effectively respond to external 
stresses and shocks (Derissen, Quaas, & Baumgartner, 2009). This suggests that the concepts of 
resilience and sustainable livelihoods are mutually reinforcing; particularly, the research indicated 
that capacity to adapt to shocks and stresses has been useful for enhancing livelihood 
diversification and security (Motsholapheko, Kgathi, & Vanderpost, 2011). This contradicts the 
work of Common and Perrings (1992) and Levin, et al. (1998) who defined the relationship 
between resilience and sustainability as interchangeable, suggesting a high degree of similarity.  
In the context of hazards and disaster recovery, it is important to understand whether resilience 
contributes to sustainable livelihoods, and vice versa, at the individual, household and community 
level. The definition of sustainable livelihoods used for this research explicitly states that “a 
livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks” (DFID, 
1999, p. 1). This implies that a livelihood that is sustainable is also resilient: the livelihood strategy 
can absorb the impact and recover quickly from external pressures. From this understanding, the 
relationship between resilience and sustainable livelihoods is viewed as interactive and mutually 
reinforcing (Gwimbi, 2009).  
Applying this definition to the Yogyakarta case study indicates that this approach may not provide 
the whole story. Farming labourers in Yogyakarta province experienced limited impacts on their 
livelihoods due to small damages to irrigation and agricultural systems, and their livelihood 
activities were recommenced shortly after the earthquake. The low-input, low-output agricultural 
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system might suggest a high degree of sustainability and some resilience to highly damaging 
events such as earthquakes. Conversely, farming labourers represent one of the poorest groups in 
the case study villages, with limited human and financial capital assets, and low ability to 
recuperate, adapt and transform following the earthquake (indicative of low resilience). Low 
income levels also led to a poor capacity to rebuild housing without external assistance, and a 
decreased capacity to access of variety of resources, including health and education services. From 
a poverty and well-being perspective, farming labourers would not necessarily be classified as 
having ‘sustainable livelihoods’. This suggests there is more to the sustainable livelihoods concept 
than capacity to absorb the impact of stresses and shocks.   
In order to further explore the relationship between these two concepts, an example of three 
different population groups, divided by their livelihood activities, is provided. The first group 
(group 1) involves those individuals and households, both male and female, engaged in public 
sector employment, including government officials, teachers, as well as those involved in religious 
organizations. This particular group has a tendency towards higher income levels, increased 
standards of living and higher levels of well-being compared to the other two groups. The second 
group (group 2) includes those individuals and households involved in home-based economic 
activities, both male and female. This group includes a range of income levels, although overall 
standards of living and levels of well-being are quite good in the village context. The third group 
(group 3) examines the livelihoods and levels of resilience of farming labourers discussed above. 
This group is often comprised of women, although a number of men also work as farming 
labourers. As noted, these labourers typically represent the poorest, least educated villagers and 
have some of the lowest standards of living in the village. Assuming similar quality of construction 
of housing among the three groups, the post-disaster experience provides insight on the 
relationship between livelihoods and resilience, as depicted in Figure 7.2.  
Following the earthquake, all three groups experienced similar levels of damage to housing 
although the impact this had on livelihoods differed. Groups one and three were able to 
recommence their livelihood activities almost immediately, due to the continued need for the 
provision of their livelihood services26. On the other hand, group two had greater difficulty 
continuing their livelihood activities due to the destruction of the buildings in which production 
                                                   
26
 In some cases, farming labourers did not resume their livelihood activities for three to four months following 
the earthquake. This was due to the fact that the harvest had been reaped immediately prior to the earthquake, and 
many impacted households missed the seeding time due to their focus on building temporary and permanent 
shelters. Hence, many farming labourers began working during the following planting season.  
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took place as well as damages to production tools. Hence, group two most likely experienced 
greater livelihood impacts following the earthquake due to the loss of their shelter assets as well as 
their employment and productive assets.  
Figure 7.2: Sustainable Livelihoods and Resilience between Three Groups 
 
When examining resilience levels between the groups, all groups exhibited similarly low levels of 
resistance resilience: there was limited capacity to absorb the impacts of the earthquake due to poor 
quality of housing construction, although this impacted livelihood activities differently, as noted 
above. Examining recuperation resilience, group one was able to recuperate more rapidly due to 
higher income levels and stability of income. Group two’s capacity to recuperate quickly was 
reduced due to damages to income generating activities. Group three’s capacity to recuperate 
quickly was quite low, although this was specifically due to low income levels and lack of access 
to capital assets and savings, as opposed to damages to income generating sources.  
In terms of creativity, all groups experienced positive transformations in the form of earthquake 
resistant housing, although this was the result of external pressures and assistance from 
government and NGO sources. While group one had limited need for adaptation and increasing the 
functioning of their livelihood activities, some of the households in group two were able to 
improve and increase their business activities by taking advantage of the resources provided during 

















resilience then group one, indicating the importance of agency, although this was not consistent 
throughout the group. Group three was unable to take advantage of resources and programming 
during the recovery period due to low levels of capital access, thus exhibiting the lowest capacity 
to adapt and transform. This is indicative of the importance of access to sustainable livelihood 
assets in facilitating various forms of resilience.  
The group examples provide an indication of the complex and multi-faceted nature of the 
relationship between resilience and sustainable livelihoods. Although group one could be defined 
as having a sustainable livelihood due to the economic capacity to absorb the impact of external 
shocks, as well as overall livelihood contributions to well-being and increased access to assets, it 
would be difficult to classify this group as fully resilient due to the high degree of impacts 
experienced from the earthquake. Increased levels of access, assets and well-being did not 
necessarily translate into increased capacity to absorb the impacts of the earthquake: housing of 
both the poor and wealthier was destroyed, and productive tools and assets were lost. This would 
suggest that sustainability of livelihoods does not necessarily contribute directly to all forms of 
resilience: in fact, concentrating on sustaining the economic outputs associated with livelihood 
activities may actually contribute to decreased resilience through the elimination of redundancies 
and buffering components of the system (Dearden & Mitchell, 2012; Walker & Salt, 2006). While 
recuperation and creativity aspects of resilience were significantly impacted by sustainability of 
livelihood activities, perception of hazard risk and individual-decision making impacted the degree 
to which households used income and access to assets to improve their capacity to absorb impacts 
of hazards. This suggests that in order for sustainable livelihoods to contribute to increased 
resilience, particularly the capacity to resist, individuals, households and communities must engage 
in deliberate actions to use the financial benefits derived from successful livelihood strategies to 
reduce risk and build resilience to future disasters.  
Exploring the relationship between resilience and sustainable livelihoods using the same group 
examples, the mutually reinforcing nature of the interactions between the two concepts is slightly 
clearer. As noted above, resilience involves the capacity to absorb the impacts and recover quickly 
from disasters, as well the ability to adapt and transform. This holistic approach implies that these 
capacities would translate into a greater sustainability of livelihood activities. Evidence from the 
example provided above supports this assertion: if all groups had exhibited resistance resilience, 
the earthquake would have resulted in limited impacts on all livelihood activities, leading to 
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increased capacity to recover (due to lower damages), particularly for groups two and three. The 
mutually reinforcing nature of resilience and sustainable livelihoods is highlighted through the 
recuperation and creativity resilience: the capacity to recuperate quickly, adapt and transform was 
heavily influenced by higher capitals levels. This suggests that those persons who exhibited 
characteristics of resilience would also exhibit strong characteristics of sustainable livelihoods and 
vice versa.   
Overall, the relationship between resilience and sustainable livelihoods is summarized in Figure 
7.3. In the diagram, resilience is seen as a critical factor for livelihood sustainability, as is 
sustainable livelihoods for resilience (Osbahr, 2007). Yet the relationship linkages between these 
concepts are filtered through three key factors, including the hazard context (type of hazard, 
damages, etc.), quality of capital levels, as well as individual agency.  
Figure 7.3: Relationship between Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods 
 
Although access to capitals should be considered part of the sustainable livelihoods concept, in this 
case, the influence capital levels had on resilience was seen as significant, and hence, this is 
highlighted in the diagram. In this instance, sustainable livelihoods contribute to the various forms 
of resilience, although the nature of this contribution is dependent on the characteristics of the 
disaster and the nature of impacts experienced.  In certain cases, households must also engage in 
deliberate actions that contribute to risk reduction (i.e. investing in earthquake resistant housing 
construction, investing income in savings etc.) in order to contribute to resilience, which 
necessitates the inclusion of agency.  Thus, similar to the relationship between vulnerability and 
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resilience, the results from this research suggest a relationship complexity influenced by agency 
and context. Although the relationship is influenced and filtered through three key factors, the 
diagram suggests a variety of overlap, highlighting the intersections and mutually reinforcing 
nature of the relationship between resilience and sustainable livelihoods.   
7.3.3 Re-conceptualizing Resilient Disaster Recovery as a Process  
In order to integrate vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods concepts with the 
knowledge gained about disaster recovery from the research results, this section provides a revised 
conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery. The revised conceptualization particularly 
highlights how disaster recovery can be understood as an ongoing process. Beginning with an 
overview of how disaster recovery can be understood as a process, the section culminates with the 
revised conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery.  
The research results highlighted how the process of recovery involves not only physical 
reconstruction, but also intangible elements, such as the process of decision-making, governance 
capacity and infrastructure, psychological healing, and establishing new social connections 
(Kenny, et al., 2010; Mileti, 1999). The research also highlighted how the recovery process itself is 
heavily influenced by pre-disaster conditions, customs and policies of the impacted area, and as 
such, offers a complexity rarely found in the other three stages of disaster management 
(Schilderman, 2010). The complexity was emphasized through the diverse recovery experiences 
from the five case study villages. Recovery of impacted areas was rarely uniform and homogenous; 
there was a spatial component to patterns of recovery that were impacted by both pre-existing 
conditions as well as the politicized processes of providing assistance and reconstruction 
(Edgington, 2010). From this perspective, disaster recovery can be understood as a multi-
dimensional process occurring differently in different places and among different groups, and 
encompasses a wide-range of activities (Samuels, 2010).  
While many historical definitions of disaster recovery focus on returning individuals and 
communities to ‘normal’ conditions, the research indicated that communities rarely return to pre-
disaster form. The passing of time and the disaster experience results in changes and shifts in the 
community and even ways of thinking: 
Returning to a previous situation is never possible in any case, because it is 
important to consider the impact of time. The passing of time from the point of 
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origin to the point of reconstruction means that it is not possible to recreate the 
starting point. Rather than moving along a circle, the impact of time produces a 
result similar to that of a corkscrew...thus the reconstruction...has required the 
construction of new concepts of ‘normal’ (Kenny, et al., 2010, p. 14).  
Thus, it can be argued that there is difficulty differentiating between ‘normal’ conditions and the 
recovery process itself. As impacted communities begin reconstruction and rehabilitation activities, 
a new understanding and meaning of ‘normal’ is continuously remade and reworked throughout 
this process (Ride & Bretherton, 2011). This indicates that while the disaster event results in 
significant shifts and changes within the community, the process of recovering also has an impact 
on the community.  
Consequently, disaster recovery should be viewed not only as the process of reconstruction and 
rehabilitation, but also as process that can have significant impacts on the social landscape of 
impacted communities. Particularly in the housing sector, the reconstruction program resulted in 
social, cultural, and familial transformations. There was a shift away from traditional housing 
styles and separation of multi-generational family compounds. Although this was highlighted as a 
positive trend, this resulted in social and cultural changes within the community, both presently 
and perhaps in the future. The cement and iron construction materials were also regarded positively 
by villagers as these housing styles were generally seen as more modern and of a higher social 
standing than traditional bamboo housing. In this manner, the recovery program itself has resulted 
in cultural, political, economic and social shifts within disaster-impacted communities.  
There are a variety of stakeholders and actors involved in the recovery process; although previous 
recovery literature has focused on the role of humanitarian organizations, this understanding 
downplays the role of local communities who may be actively engaged in their own recovery (Ride 
& Bretherton, 2011). As these communities engaged with the recovery effort, there are further 
changes and shifts in organizational and capacity levels. Another important consideration is that 
the involvement of external organizations leads to the development of a new sense of ‘normal’ as 
assistance and aid permeates through affected communities. Once these government and 
humanitarian organizations complete their recovery activities, a new adjustment phase occurs as 
residents become accustomed to everyday living conditions without the assistance previously 
provided by external organizations. During this new adjustment period, affected communities 
develop another sense of ‘normal’ and become re-accustomed to everyday life without external 
assistance (Samuels, 2010). Although many definitions of long-term recovery focus exclusively on 
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the period in which external assistance is provided, the research findings suggest recovery 
continues even after humanitarian organizations have completed their reconstruction activities.  
In order to conceptualize resilient disaster recovery as a multi-dimensional and dynamic process, 
as well as integrate recovery knowledge and theory, Figure 7.4 depicts the refined understanding of 
resilient disaster recovery. The Resilient Disaster Recovery Model provides a conceptualization of 
what effective ‘resilient disaster recovery’ would look like. This approach synthesizes key 
information from the vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods literature, as well as the 
knowledge gained from the research regarding long-term disaster recovery. This conceptualization 
focuses on exploring the positive impacts on capital levels as they are transformed through the 
resilient disaster recovery process. As no scale for this conceptualization is identified, this model 
could be applicable at the household, community and regional levels.   
From this conceptualization of the process of resilient disaster recovery, the pre-existing conditions 
of resilience, vulnerability and sustainable livelihoods capital levels (including all seven capital 
levels noted in the RDR-AF) are impacted by the characteristics of the disaster and damages 
context. The process of recovery, both formal and informal, is influenced by three key recovery 
filters, including the variety of recovery actors involved, the impacts the disaster had on access to 
the seven livelihood capitals, as well as individual, household and community agency.  
Recovery programming is implemented through the partnerships and interactions between a variety 
of actors, including governments, humanitarian and religious organizations, impacted 
communities, as well as the private sector and civil society. The roles and responsibilities of each 
of these actors will vary depending on the pre-existing conditions and nature of the disaster event, 
as well as the characteristics and structure of recovery programming. Particularly, this highlights 
the role of local community involvement in the recovery process, with the majority of actors 
involved specific to the place of the disaster. Thus, the specific conditions and roles of the various 
actors will also be dependent on local conditions, and vary from place to place.   
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The disaster impacts on the seven capital levels will influence the recovery process as well. The 
new capital levels reflect the capacity of different actors to implement and take advantage of 
recovery strategies, thereby impacting the execution of formal and informal recovery programming 
and funding. This also emphasizes the dynamic nature of recovery; during the recovery period, the 
level of various capitals is in a constant state of flux, as the process of recovery is constantly 
shifting and specific recovery needs change. In this sense, the contributions of different capital 
levels will change across the different components and temporal periods of recovery. An example 
of this is with the changing levels of resilience and vulnerability levels of construction labourers 
within the Yogyakarta context. While constructions labourers were generally low-paid workers, 
with unstable and unreliable income, and thereby high levels of vulnerability, during the 
reconstruction period, the access to construction skills allowed for a community-based 
reconstruction program that enhanced recuperation resilience. Following the reconstruction effort, 
many of these construction labourers suffered from high unemployment levels, unstable income 
and resulting lack of access to a variety of assets. This demonstrates the dynamic nature of 
vulnerability and resilience during recovery periods, and highlights how capital levels can be more 
valuable in certain contexts than others.     
Furthermore, formal and informal recovery programming is influenced by individual, household 
and community agency. Decision-making processes, particularly regarding choices in relation to 
housing construction standards, livelihood choices, and participation in community organizational 
activities, impact the recovery process and capacity to implement adaptations and transformations 
during the recovery period. The conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery would hypothesize 
that individuals, households and communities would implement choices and strategies in order to 
reduce risk to future disasters, reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience, although it is 
recognized that this may not always be the case in the real-world.  
Throughout this period of formal recovery programming, the conceptualization of resilient disaster 
recovery highlights that vulnerability reduction should form a key component of recovery 
strategies. Furthermore, recuperation and creativity resilience occurs during this period, with the 
recovery programming acting as a catalyst for improvements in resilience levels. This results in a 
series of encouraging transformations and adaptations within the community, particularly 
highlighted through improvements in access to a variety of assets within the seven livelihood 
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capitals. These improvements in capital access should result in overall reductions in vulnerability, 
as well as increased capacity to absorb the impacts of future disaster events.    
Once the formal recovery effort is complete and the various organizations conclude their funding 
and recovery programs, impacted households and communities shift into a new state of capital 
levels, reflective of the successes of the recovery programming. While formal recovery 
programming is complete, ongoing informal recovery continues, with a series of adaptations and 
transformations continuing to occur within households and communities. This model of resilient 
disaster recovery explicitly recognizes that impacted areas do not return to pre-disaster form, 
instead transforming into a new state, although it is recognized that this is a dynamic process. 
Thus, it must be mentioned that the depiction of post-recovery capital levels is not meant to imply 
that capital levels return to a static level once recovery programming is completed. Rather, the 
model suggests that there has been a shift in the forms of vulnerabilities and resiliencies associated 
with each capital compared to pre-disaster conditions. Furthermore, the model explicitly 
recognizes that informal recovery and ongoing transformations occur following the completion of 
formal recovery activities, suggesting the long-term nature of recovery as a process.     
Through this refined conceptualization, resilient disaster recovery can be defined as:  
The ongoing period of short- and long-term recovery, both formal and informal, 
that contributes to the interrelated processes of vulnerability reduction, increased 
access to relevant livelihood capitals, and improved capacity to absorb, cope and 
learn from hazardous events.  
The resilient disaster recovery approach recognizes that the processes of vulnerability reduction 
and resilience building are highly interrelated, although complex, and thus, individuals and 
communities will have differing optimal zones between vulnerability reduction, resilience building 
and increased access to assets. Defining the recovery process specifically through a resilience lens 
acknowledges that people are inherently resilient, and that different forms of resilience can be 
found in all societies (Ride & Bretherton, 2011). The resilience approach also recognizes that “at 
the heart of resilience thinking is a very simple notion – things change – and to ignore or resist this 
change is to increase our vulnerability and forego emerging opportunities” (Walker & Salt, 2006, 
pp. 9-10). Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the empirical, methodological and conceptual contributions of the 
research. The empirical evidence under the RDR-AF model suggested that the recovery program 
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after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake contributed to reductions in the visible manifestations of 
some forms of vulnerability, although there was limited impact on dynamic pressures and root 
causes. An analysis of the humanitarian response system determined that many organizations are 
not designed or structured to implement the type of long-term programming required to effectively 
address underlying vulnerability issues. This meant that much of the programming, particularly 
livelihood programming, was relatively ineffective, and in the unique words of one villager: “a 
wasting time” (HI 03-007).    
The methodological contributions highlighted the RDR-AF model as an effective framework for 
evaluating post-disaster recovery operations. The framework allowed for a holistic analysis 
focusing on the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods. Using the RDR-
AF approach offered a new evaluative tool whereby recovery programming and outcomes were 
compared to an idealized conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery. This provided an 
opportunity to understand missed opportunities in recovery programming, as well as taking a 
multi-scalar and participatory approach to data collection. Challenges were also identified, many of 
which are common to all types of methodological approaches for evaluating recovery 
programming. A lack of baseline data to make comparisons to pre-disaster conditions as well as 
difficulty in establishing causal relationships between specific programs and community outcomes 
were identified as research challenges. Furthermore, the large of amount of data required to satisfy 
the information needs set forth by the model indicates a large time commitment on the part of 
researchers and participants. Thus, a standardized household interview strategy was recommended 
for longitudinal approaches to assessing recovery.   
The discussion chapter also summarized the conceptual contributions of the research. Beginning 
with a summary of how the research results contributed to further understanding of disaster 
recovery knowledge, including the role of governments, humanitarian organizations and civil 
society, and the nature of conflict in the post-disaster period. The relationship between concepts of 
vulnerability and resilience, as well as resilience and sustainable livelihoods was also reviewed. 
The results provided support for conceptualizing vulnerability and resilience as separate concepts, 
but highlighted the interconnections between the two concepts. The complex relationship between 
resilience and sustainable livelihoods was also discussed, although the mutually reinforcing nature 
of these concepts was emphasized.  
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Finally, the knowledge obtained from the research contributed to a revised and refined 
conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery. The revised conceptualization incorporated a more 
nuanced understanding of the integration between vulnerability, resilience and sustainable 
livelihoods concepts as well as disaster recovery processes. Resilient disaster recovery was 
conceptualized as a complex process with a variety of actors, although specific outcomes focused 
on reduced vulnerability, increased resilience, and improved access to sustainable livelihoods 
capitals. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods 
was highlighted, explicitly recognizing recovery as an ongoing process that leads to a shifts and 





8.0 CONCLUSION  
This research set out to conceptualize resilient disaster recovery and utilize the concept as a 
framework to evaluate and assess long-term disaster recovery. Through this process, the research 
provided data to enhance the conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery as a process, as well 
as contributing to empirical evidence of a long-term disaster recovery effort. The ensuing chapter 
highlights how the results responded to the research questions set forth in the introductory chapter. 
This is followed by a series of recommendations regarding the implementation of disaster recovery 
initiatives, as well as an overview of areas where further research is required.    
8.1 Responding to the Research Questions 
The following section highlights how the results and discussion chapters responded to the research 
questions set forth in the introduction of this dissertation. Within each of these sections, the 
findings for each question are summarized, followed by an overview of how these results 
contribute to the concept of resilient disaster recovery as well as the disaster recovery literature 
overall.   
8.1.1 Question One: Evaluating the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake Recovery 
The first research question related to the evaluation and assessment of one disaster recovery effort. 
As noted in chapters one and two, research on disaster recovery has been limited, and there has 
been a lack of empirical assessments focusing on holistic understanding of long-term recovery 
initiatives (Barton, 1969; Coppola, 2007; Edgington, 2010; Lloyd-Jones, 2006). Through a 
comprehensive assessment of the 2006 Yogyakarta recovery effort, this research contributed to 
further understanding of long-term recovery processes. Furthermore, much needed empirical 
evidence was provided, focusing on the contributions of government and humanitarian recovery 
programming in reducing vulnerability, building resilience and increasing livelihood opportunities.  
Using the RDR-AF model, the assessment of the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake found that the 
recovery programming did not achieve the goal of resilient disaster recovery. While recovery 
programming contributed to reductions in visible manifestations of vulnerability through 
improvements in quality of building construction, and increased awareness of hazards and 
earthquake-resistant building standards, the root causes of vulnerability were not addressed, and 
many villagers suffer from ongoing lack of access to assets and resources. While resilience to 
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future disasters has been improved in some forms (i.e. housing strength, improved disaster 
management structures and social capital networks), resilience in other forms (i.e. savings and 
financial capital, economic conditions) has decreased due to the strain of recovery from the 2006 
earthquake. Moreover, many aspects of vulnerability and resilience have remained the same, 
including human capital and access to services. The research also found that livelihood initiatives 
were largely ineffective as villagers lacked appropriate skills, networks and linkages to be able to 
connect with markets. Ongoing issues with environmental change and degradation have heavily 
impacted vulnerability levels in some villages, particularly in Klaten.  
On the other hand, successful livelihood initiatives in Puton provided evidence to support the 
notion that disasters provide a ‘window of opportunity’ to implement developmental changes to 
decrease vulnerability and increase resilience to future disaster events. In order to achieve this 
objective, recovery programming needs to take a long-term, holistic and diverse approach that 
recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of local capacities and engages the community in their 
own recovery. Unfortunately, the results indicate that the humanitarian response system is not 
effectively structured to take advantage of the opportunities provided by disaster events. This 
suggests major structural changes are required before resilient disaster recovery approaches can be 
implemented on the ground level.   
8.1.2 Question Two: Resilient Disaster Recovery as an Assessment Framework 
The second research question explored the extent to which the Resilient Disaster Recovery 
Assessment Framework was an effective tool for evaluating long-term recovery programming. The 
RDR-AF was found to be a successful method for evaluating recovery efforts through the 
integration of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods concepts. This approach goes 
beyond traditional methods for evaluating humanitarian and development programming by setting 
forth a conceptualization of what resilient disaster recovery would look like: compared to 
conventional approaches where the focus is on evaluating objectives within the context of specific 
programs, the RDR-AF offers an opportunity to compare the impacts of the recovery programming 
to an idealized understanding of what effective recovery could accomplish. Moreover, the RDR-
AF approach highlights long-term evaluation of recovery initiatives, focusing specifically on the 
sustainability of recovery programming once supportive structures have been removed. This also 
emphasized initiatives that target the root causes of vulnerability as opposed to visible 
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manifestations of risk. The RDR-AF approach offers an important contribution through the 
development of a holistic evaluation framework that can be applied to the post-disaster setting.  
Additionally, the use of the three concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods 
were found to each be important contributions to the model of resilient disaster recovery. The 
integration of three key concepts from the hazards and development literature provided a 
comprehensive approach allowing for a holistic understanding of the needs and conditions of 
impacted villagers. The results of the assessment and analysis of the 2006 Yogyakarta recovery 
effort highlighted how the RDR-AF model was an effective conceptualization of resilient disaster 
recovery and allowed for a holistic understanding of disaster recovery processes. 
The research contributed to further understanding and refinement of the inter-relationships between 
the three concepts, specifically between concepts of vulnerability and resilience, as well as 
resilience and sustainable livelihoods. In terms of the linkages between vulnerability and 
resilience, the results supported the use of two X-Y continuums that form a quadrant, as 
highlighted in Figure 2.6. The complexity of the relationship was highlighted through a discussion 
of variables and factors that could contribute to both increased vulnerability and increased 
resilience. The relationship between resilience and sustainable livelihoods was also found to be 
multifaceted and complex. The mutually reinforcing nature of sustainable livelihoods and 
resilience was highlighted, although it was recognized that the nature of the relationship would be 
filtered through the specific context of disaster damages, capital levels and agency processes. This 
provided an important contribution to further understanding on the relationships and 
interconnections between the three concepts used to form the conceptualization of resilient disaster 
recovery.  
8.1.3 Question Three: Contributions to Recovery Theory and Literature 
The third research question involved using the evidence from the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake 
recovery programming in order to inform and contribute to further understanding of disaster 
recovery. Of all the phases of the disaster cycle, recovery has been the least well researched and 
the poorest understood (Barton, 1969; Coppola, 2007; Edgington, 2010). The current literature on 
disaster recovery was reviewed in chapter two, and the evidence from this research was used to 
either support or contribute to further understanding of current knowledge.  
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The findings associated with disaster recovery theory indicate that some of the current knowledge 
was reflected in the case study: particularly, public responses to disaster events were driven by 
both rational and symbolic assessments of government and humanitarian responses. Additionally, 
further understanding of recovery processes was highlighted: the evidence suggested that recovery 
is highly contextual and dependent on local customs and capacities, as well as the characteristics of 
the hazard and associated impacts. The capacity of local governments to respond to the disaster 
and the role of humanitarian organizations was influenced by pre-existing conditions as well as the 
nature of disaster impacts. This implied that there is difficulty in making generalized statements 
regarding the characteristics of all recovery programming; instead, the characteristics of recovery 
are highly dependent on place and context.  
The research also contributed to new knowledge in the area of disaster recovery. The role of civil 
society and the private sector was highlighted as a strong arena for recovery processes which have 
generally been neglected by humanitarian organizations and by previous research. The impact of 
recovery on conflicts was highlighted as both a process of pre-existing conditions, as well as the 
successful implementation of community-driven reconstruction programs. In this way, the 
recovery process itself acted as a catalyst for reducing social conflicts and animosities in some 
villages. In other villages, similar to the results found in Geipel’s (1982) study, the nature of pre-
existing conflict and the recovery programming did not contribute to reduction in conflicts, instead, 
the disaster acted as a catalyst to further entrench social frictions. These findings were used to 
refine the understanding and conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery.  
8.1.4 Question Four: Conceptualizing Resilient Disaster Recovery  
Finally, the research provided a refined conceptualization of resilient disaster recovery derived 
from both the literature as well as empirical evidence from the research. This contributed to further 
understanding of resilient disaster recovery as a process, highlighting the impacts on vulnerabilities 
and resiliencies associated with the seven livelihood capitals. The conceptualization of resilient 
disaster recovery as a process depicted how the disaster, variety of actors involved in the recovery 
process, as well as the process of recovering itself, should all contribute to improvements in access 
to the seven capital levels. To this end, the outcome of resilient disaster recovery would include 
reductions in all forms of vulnerability and resilience, as well as improved sustainability of 
livelihood activities.   
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8.2 Recommendations  
The research specifically set out to conceptualize resilient disaster recovery as the basis for an 
evaluative framework to assess long-term disaster recovery programming. Through the 
implementation of the RDR-AF model for evaluating disaster recovery initiatives, the results of the 
research suggest several recommendations for improving the effectiveness of recovery 
programming, particularly in the livelihoods sector. The following section provides an overview of 
the practical recommendations for future recovery programming. This begins with 
recommendations specifically related to earthquake events, before broadening to include strategies 
that would be useful for a variety of hazards and disasters in different locations.  
Specifically in the case of earthquake events, the research suggested there were several areas where 
lessons learned could be implemented for future recovery efforts. The following section highlights 
issues with regards to the sheltering sector, including temporary and permanent housing 
reconstruction: 
- The decision on whether to implement a one-step versus a two-step housing solution 
should be delineated by local, provincial and national governments as part of their disaster 
management planning in order to help promote quick decision-making in the post-disaster 
period.  
- Locally applicable temporary and permanent housing solutions should be outlined in 
disaster management planning strategies prior to disaster events, particularly for areas with 
high-risk of earthquakes. This will help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
sheltering program, and limit the necessity for time-consuming consensus-building and 
shelter strategy development in the post-disaster period.  
- Strategies to promote quick rebuilding of permanent housing (i.e. the construction 
deadlines for each phase of funding) should be carefully considered in conjunction with 
local strategies for recovery (i.e. the use of gotong royong). This will help to ensure that 
communities can make full use of local capacities and strengths in order to promote full 
recovery.  
With regards to livelihood programming, there are several recommendations for implementation 
based on the results of the research. These include: 
- Humanitarian and government agencies should place a higher emphasis on funding for 
livelihood programming.  
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- Funding and strategies for livelihood programming should be commenced earlier in the 
recovery period, as opposed to waiting until permanent housing (in the case of earthquake 
reconstruction) has been completed.  
- Livelihood programming should be based on a careful assessment of local capacities and 
strengths. Without a clear understanding of local access to various capitals, there is a 
higher degree of risk that recovery programming will not meet the full needs of local 
villagers and households and may limit the impact and sustainability of livelihood 
programming. 
- Livelihood programming should take a four-pronged approach, whereby there is an 
emphasis on training and skill development, the provision of capital and credit facilities, 
development of networks and linkages to market facilities, as well as implementing a range 
of skills and business activity training/programs within each village. This will help 
promote livelihood programming that fully supports villagers and allows multiple 
households to take advantage of recovery initiatives, particularly when beginning new 
entrepreneurial activities.    
- Implementing a range of skills and business activity training/programs within each village 
will help support economic development, limit competition between entrepreneurial 
businesses, and provide a range of options for households to explore their strengths. This 
will also help to avoid market saturation and allow households to achieve the full potential 
of production and markets.   
- Livelihood programming should also focus on developing a range of secondary income 
strategies to support households through periods of seasonal unemployment, thereby 
promoting stable income levels.   
In terms of the humanitarian response system, the research highlighted funding and accountability 
structures as an ongoing issue preventing long-term intervention strategies that seek to reduce 
vulnerability and build resilience to future disaster events. Therefore, the following 
recommendations are made: 
- Funding structures for humanitarian response organizations should shift to emphasize long-
term solutions, as opposed to short-term deliverables, in order to effectively use the 
‘window of opportunity’ provided by disaster events and reduce vulnerability to future 
disasters. 
- Increased accountability for response and recovery programming towards meeting the 
needs of local populations and contributing to ongoing vulnerability reduction and capacity 
building activities. This would suggest increased accountability towards beneficiaries, as 
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well as funders, who should be interested in seeing their donations contribute to long-term, 
sustainable solutions. 
Linking government and humanitarian responses, the Yogyakarta earthquake case study provided 
some key insights on strategies to improve response and recovery strategies for future disaster 
events: 
- Symbolic gestures must be rooted in the context of damages and available funding in order 
to reduce the likelihood of false statements and confusion among impacted populations.  
- Government and humanitarian organizations should place greater emphasis on 
psychological recovery in order to improve psychological recovery and increase emotional 
capacity to rebuild, as well as respond to future disasters.   
- Increased focus on addressing the root causes of vulnerability, as opposed to visible 
manifestations of vulnerability. To achieve this recommendation, a multi-scalar approach 
to recovery which focuses on local conditions as well as policy contexts at broader scales is 
required. This may help to ensure increased sustainability of recovery operations and 
improve the overall effectiveness of recovery programming.  
- Further incorporation of concepts of resilience in recovery programming would help to 
address opportunities for change and increase ability to cope and respond to future hazards 
and disasters.  
- Monitoring of recovery programming should incorporate a follow-up component whereby 
assessment occurs following the completion of assistance, in order to fully understand the 
long-term implications of the recovery program. 
8.3 Future Research 
Based on the results of the research and comments from villagers, government officials, academics 
and NGO practitioners, there are several areas that require further insight and research. These 
issues particularly focus on improving the implementation of recovery programming and 
increasing knowledge and efficiencies associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation. While the 
recommendations are derived from the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake recovery context, further 
understanding in these identified areas would be useful for disaster recovery programs in other 
regions as well.   
In the context of earthquake events, further understanding of the role of transitional housing is 
required in order to determine the effectiveness of a two-step housing solution. Two-step housing 
solutions may increase safety, security, improve living conditions during the reconstruction phase, 
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reduce the pressure for immediate reconstruction and provide the time and forum for discussions 
and training on construction standards and community planning (E-02). This approach understands 
housing as social construct, whereby constructing earthquake-resistant housing is regarded as a 
sociological process. On the other hand, evidence from this research suggests villagers were eager 
to return to permanent housing as quickly as possible and the time spent living in transitional 
housing may have been limited. Thus, further research is required on the processes of one-step 
versus two-step housing solutions and comparisons in conditions of vulnerability between those 
households that received transitional housing compared to those who did not.  
When providing humanitarian assistance, aid organizations have long struggled to reach a balance 
between providing assistance and relief without creating a context in which households become 
dependent on aid. In the case of the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake recovery program, there was 
discussion over the amount of assistance provided for housing reconstruction. While housing for 
some, particularly the poorest, was improved in quality and style, for others, the limited funding 
meant that households had to sell assets and use savings to complete the housing reconstruction 
process. Although the recovery program was established with the assumption that households 
would have to contribute to their own recovery, in cases where households have been unable to re-
accumulate savings and assets, this has contributed to increased vulnerability to further stresses 
and shocks, and a reduction in ability to pay for other services, such as health and education. Thus, 
further research is required into how community-based reconstruction programming can provide 
sufficient aid and resources to reduce vulnerability to future disasters, while still maintaining an 
approach that recognizes impacted populations should contribute to their own recovery.  
The research also highlighted the limited impacts of micro-financing institutions for providing 
assistance to households in terms of recovering their livelihood activities. Households were either 
using loans to provide for daily living needs or were unable to take on loans due to the risk 
involved. This suggests that micro-financing may not be an appropriate livelihood strategy to 
address the needs of the poorest in disaster-affected communities (E-02; E-07). In order to 
contribute to effective implementation of micro financing as a poverty-reduction tool, further 
research on successful implementations of micro-financing programs for low-capital, low-skill 
households is required.  
Further research is also required into how recovery programming and interventions to strengthen 
government capacity can be implemented while maintaining local and social resiliencies. 
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Strengthening the government capacity to prepare and respond to hazards and disasters should be 
complementary to local strategies for resilience-building, yet this research has indicated this is not 
always the case. Reductions of vulnerabilities should occur in conjunction with resilience-building, 
although in some cases, there may be difficulties. For example, government initiatives to 
implement community-based reconstruction programs based on strict deadlines to ensure 
completion of reconstruction in a timely manner limited the use of gotong royong in many 
communities, thereby reducing the value of this important social resource for implementing the 
reconstruction program.  
Another area for research involves the inclusion of traditional knowledge during disaster recovery. 
In the Yogyakarta context, traditional settlement locations, building materials and style of housing 
has undergone rapid transformations over the past half-century. Due to a loss of traditional 
knowledge regarding risk reduction techniques, households are locating in increasingly risky 
environments, and rejecting traditional bamboo and wooden housing structures in favour of more 
‘modern’ cement housing. Further knowledge on how to maintain important aspects of local 
knowledge for disaster risk reduction within the context of changing social needs is required.  
8.4 Conclusion  
The research set forth to conceptualize the process of resilient disaster recovery. This contributed 
to further knowledge on conceptualizing and evaluating recovery programs, but also highlighted 
how improvements could be made to future disaster recovery efforts. Although these 
recommendations attempted to highlight general strategies for future disasters, it should also be 
noted that disaster recovery processes and experiences are highly dependent on local context. Pre-
existing social, economic and political conditions, as well as the characteristics and impacts of the 
disaster will dictate how resilient disaster recovery can be implemented. Thus, this research should 
serve as a guideline for understanding recovery, although the contextual differences between 
different places should be acknowledged. 
Returning to ideas expressed in the introductory chapter where disasters were characterized by 
“exposure to hazard, massive personal and societal loss, and profound and enduring life change” 
(Shultz, Espinel, Galea, & Reissman, 2006, p. 69), the following observations can be made. First, 
exposure to hazards represents an ongoing issue for human societies. Although structural and non-
structural mitigation methods can be employed to reduce exposure or increase the capacity to 
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absorb the impacts, it should be recognized that societies must adapt to the environments in which 
they live. This was noted by one interviewee who noted that “humans should live in balance and 
harmony with the environment they live in so that they can easily adapt and adjust the way they 
live” (HI 04-021). Furthermore, although large-scale disaster events result in massive personal and 
societal loss, these events may present an opportunity to implement large-scale transformations 
that may not be possible during non-recovery periods. While disaster events may be characterized 
by profound life change, implementation of resilient disaster recovery promotes change in the form 
of adaptation and transformation. Resilient disaster recovery promotes the idea that individuals, 
households, and communities will be armed with a variety of tools to resist against future hazards 
and develop into a more resilient form. This adaptation should facilitate improved capacity to cope 






APPENDIX 1 - Research Participant Information 
Household Interview Participants 




01-001 May 24, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul  Indonesian 
01-002 May 24, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-003 May 24, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-004 May 24, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-005 May 25, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul  Indonesian 
01-006 May 24, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-007 May 25, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-008 May 25, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-009 May 25, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul  Javanese 
01-010 May 25, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-011 May 25, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-012 May 25, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-013 May 27, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul  Indonesian 
01-014 May 27, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-015 May 27, 2011 n/a Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-016 Jan. 27, 2011 May 27, 2011 Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-017 Feb. 3, 2011 May 27, 2011 Puton, Bantul  Indonesian 
01-018 Feb. 2, 2011 May 27, 2011 Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-019 Jan. 25, 2011 May 25, 2011 Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-020 Jan. 25, 2011 May 25, 2011 Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-021 Jan. 25, 2011 May 25, 2011 Puton, Bantul  Indonesian 
01-022 Jan. 27, 2011 May 27, 2011 Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-023 Jan. 26, 2011 May 27, 2011 Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-024 Jan. 24, 2011 June 8, 2011 Puton, Bantul Indonesian 
01-025 Jan. 26, 2011 May 27, 2011 Puton, Bantul  Indonesian 
02-001 Feb. 7, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul  Indonesian 
02-002 Feb. 4, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-003 Feb. 4, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-004 Feb. 7, 2011 June 8, 2011 Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-005 Feb. 9, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul  Indonesian 
02-006 Feb. 9, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-007 Feb. 9, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-008 Feb. 9, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-009 Feb. 14, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul  Indonesian 
02-010 Feb. 14, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-011 Feb. 14, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-012 Feb. 14, 2011 June 6, 2011 Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-013 June 6, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul  Indonesian  
02-014 June 6, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul Javanese 
02-016 June 8, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-017 June 8, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-018 June 9, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul  Indonesian 
02-019 June 8, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
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Household Interview Participants – Cont’d  




02-020 June 8, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-021  June 6, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul Javanese 
02-022 June 8, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul  Indonesian 
02-023 June 9, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-024 June 9, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul Indonesian 
02-025 June 9, 2011 n/a Kategan, Bantul Javanese 
03-001 March 3, 2011 June 13, 2011 Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-002 March 2, 2011 June 13, 2011 Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-003 March 2, 2011 June 13, 2011 Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-004 March 6, 2011 June 13, 2011 Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-005 March 6, 2011 June 13, 2011 Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-006 March 6, 2011 June 13, 2011 Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-007 March 6, 2011 June 13, 2011 Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-008 June 16, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-009 June 16, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Javanese 
03-010 June 16, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-011 June 18, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-012 June 18, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Javanese 
03-013 June 18, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-014 June 16, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-015 June 16, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-016 June 16, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-017 June 16, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-018 June 18, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-019 June 18, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-020 June 18, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-021 June 18, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-022 June 18, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-023 June 18, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
03-024 June 18, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Javanese  
03-025 June 16, 2011 n/a Ngandong, Klaten Indonesian 
04-001 April 4, 2011 May 30, 2011 Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-003 June 1, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-004 March, 2011 May 30, 2011 Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-005 April 4, 2011 June 3, 2011 Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-006 March 17, 2011 June 1, 2011 Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-007 April 5, 2011 May 30, 2011 Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-008 April 5, 2011 June 1, 2011 Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-009 April 5, 2011 June 1, 2011 Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-010 June 1, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-011 April 7, 2011 June 1, 2011 Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-012 June 1, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-013 April 4, 2011 June 3, 2011 Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-014 May 30, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-015 May 30, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
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Household Interview Participants – Cont’d   




04-016 May 30, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-017 May 30, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-018 May 30, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-019 May 30, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-020 May 30, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-021 May 30, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-022 May 30, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-023 June 1, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-024 June 1, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
04-025 June 3, 2011 n/a Wonokromo, Bantul Indonesian 
05-001 April 11, 2011 June 14, 2011 Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten  Indonesian 
05-002 April 11, 2011 June 14, 2011 Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-003 April 11, 2011 June 14, 2011 Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-004 April 12, 2011 June 14, 2011 Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-005 April 12, 2011 June 15, 2011 Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-006 April 12, 2011 June 15, 2011 Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-007 April 13, 2011 June, 2011 Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-008 June 20, 2011 n/a Sumberejo, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-010 April 13, 2011 June, 2011 Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-011 June 20, 2011 n/a Sumberejo, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-012 April 14, 2011 June, 2011 Sumberejo, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-013 April 14, 2011 June, 2011 Sumberejo, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-014 April 14, 2011 June, 2011 Sumberejo, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-015 June 20, 2011 n/a Sumberejo, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-016 June 20, 2011 n/a Sumberejo, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-017 June 15, 2011 n/a Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-018 June 15, 2011 n/a Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-019 June 15, 2011 n/a Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-020 June 15, 2011 n/a Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-021 June 15, 2011 n/a Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-022 June 15, 2011 n/a Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-023 June 20, 2011 n/a Sumberejo, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-024 June 20, 2011 n/a Sumberejo, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-025 June 20, 2011 n/a Sumberejo, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-026 April 13, 2011 June, 2011 Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 
05-027 April 13, 2011 June, 2011 Cabakan, Sengon, Klaten Indonesian 












FG-01 February 6, 2011 7 Puton Indonesian 
FG-02 February 27, 2011 11 Kategan Indonesian 
FG-03 March 18, 2011 9 Ngandong Indonesian 
FG-04 April 11, 2011 9 Wonokromo Indonesian 
FG-05 April 8, 2011 9 Sengon Indonesian  
 
Community Meetings 
Meeting No. Date Location Language 
CM-01 Dec. 2010 – Apr. 2011 Puton Indonesian 
CM-02 Dec. 2010 – Apr. 2011 Kategan Indonesian 
CM-03 Feb. – Apr. 2011 Ngandong Indonesian 
CM-04 Dec. 2010 – Apr. 2011 Wonokromo Indonesian 









E-01 April 29, 2011 Yogyakarta City English 
E-02 May 11, 2011 Bantul, Yogyakarta English 
E-03 May 23, 2011 Yogyakarta City English 
E-04 June 1, 2011 Yogyakarta City English 
E-05 May 16, 2011 Skype interview English 
E-06 April 20, 2011 Yogyakarta City English 






 E-08 April 30, 2011 Yogyakarta City English 
E-09 May 3, 2011 Yogyakarta City English 
E-10 May 16, 2011 Yogyakarta City English 
E-11 May 11, 2011 Yogyakarta City English 






E-13 May 6, 2011 Bantul, Yogyakarta Indonesian 
E-14 May 12, 2011 Yogyakarta City English 
E-15 May 16, 2011 Sleman, Yogyakarta English 
E-16 June 9, 2011 Bantul, Yogyakarta English 





APPENDIX 2 – Household Interview Question Guide 
 
Date ___________________ Location __________________________ Survey No _______ 
Oral Consent Obtained (Time): ____________________________________________________ 
Introduction Questions 
Can you tell us a little bit about yourself (age, highest level of education, occupation?) 
Can you tell us a little bit about your household (i.e. other household members, who is head of 
household, education levels of other members) 
How long have you lived in your village? 
Specific to 2006 Earthquake recovery 
Can you describe your experience during and after the 2006 earthquake? 
- What was your experience during and right after the earthquake? What did you do? 
- Where did you live in the weeks/months following the disaster? 
- Where did your food and income come from? 
- How long after the earthquake did you start earning an income again?  
o If a long time – why did it take you so long to start earning an income again? 
- What type of job did this income come from? 
- Was this the same income source you earned income from before the earthquake? 
- How long did you live in temporary housing (and what type)? 
- How long did it take you to rebuild your permanent house? 
- Did you wait for government funding before rebuilding your permanent house or did 
you start rebuilding with your own money/savings? 
- Did you use gotong royong to rebuild your permanent house? 
- Would you say your permanent house is finished? 
- At what point would you say that the recovery effort was finished? 
What type of assistance did you receive to help recover? 
- Where did you receive the assistance from? 
- How long did the assistance last (i.e. how long did the food aid last? At what point did 
you have to start paying for food again?) 
How well did this assistance meet your needs? 
- Were you satisfied with the immediate response and aid provided? 
- Were there any items that you needed or wanted that you didn’t get? 
- Within your community, do you feel the aid was distributed fairly? Why or why not? 
- Thinking of all the areas affected by the earthquake disaster, do you think the aid was 
distributed fairly? Why or why not? 
Thinking of the 2006 recovery effort, would you describe it as successful? Why or why not? What 
do you think could have been done to make the recovery effort more successful? 
- Would you say that you have now recovered from the disaster? 
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- What aspects of the recovery do you think could have been done better? 
- What was done well? 
- Was there a program or funding you wanted from the government or NGOs that you 
didn’t get? 
- Are there any problems in your community that didn’t exist before the earthquake? 
- What do you think is better about your community since the earthquake? 
- Do you think your home is earthquake resistant? 
- Have you made any additions to your permanent house? If yes, did you use the same 
construction guidelines?  
- Do you plan to make any additions to your house? If so, would you use the same 
construction guidelines? 
- What did you learn from the earthquake disaster about yourself? 
- What did you learn from the earthquake disaster about reducing vulnerability? 
What inspired you or gave you strength to recover after the earthquake? 
General Questions: 
Can you describe your livelihood activities?  
- In what ways do you earn income? 
- Is this your only source of income for your household? If no – what other sources of 
income do you have? 
- Are there any challenges to completing your livelihood activities? 
- Would you like to increase your income? 
- How could you increase your income? 
- What is preventing you from increasing your income? 
- Have there been any changes in your income or livelihood activities comparing before 
and after the earthquake? 
Where are you getting your food from? 
- What type of food are you growing/raising to eat? Growing anything to sell? 
- What type of food do you purchase? 
- What is the percentage of food you grow yourself versus purchasing? 
- Have there been any changes in food sources comparing before and after the 
earthquake? 
Thinking about education – what level of education would you like your children to receive (or 
have received)? 
- If children have finished school but not higher education – why did your children only 
complete that level of education? Did you want them to go on? What prevented them 
from going on to higher education? 
- If children are still young – what level would you like your children to complete at 
school? Will you be able to help your children obtain that level of education? What 
would prevent your children from attending school to that level? 
Thinking about health aspects – are you satisfied with healthcare availability?  
- Do you have JAMKESMAS? 
- If you don’t have it – do you think you should have it? If so, why don’t you have it? 
- If you don’t have it – can you afford healthcare services? 
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- If you couldn’t afford the healthcare, what would you do? 
How satisfied are you with the government?  
- In the dusun, are you satisfied with the local government? 
- If you had a problem, what would you do? 
- Do you feel your problem could be resolved at the community (dusun) government 
level? 
- What about the desa government or the regency government? Do you feel satisfied 
with the way they run things? 
- Are you satisfied with the central government?  
Thinking about the local economy, do you feel that it is strong? 
- Are there many jobs available? 
- Is the income from the jobs good? 
- What are some of the problems with the local economy? 
- Is the price of food and other goods affordable for you? 
- Is there any difference in the local economy comparing before and after the 
earthquake? 
Hazards General Questions: 
What do you think causes earthquakes? 
What do you think causes disaster events?  
Do you think humans have any role in disasters? 
What are the main types of hazards that could occur in this community? 
What do you do to try to minimize the impacts of those disasters? What do you think still needs to 
be done to reduce vulnerability to future disaster events? 
Do you feel prepared to deal with another disaster event? Why or why not? 
Do you belong to any social/community organizations? Can you talk a little bit about those 
organizations? 
Do you have access to affordable, clean water? Garbage and sanitation? Electricity? Is your access 
to these items the same or different compared to before the earthquake? 
Do you have access to a motorbike? Is this necessary for your occupation? 
Do you have access to a handphone? Is this necessary for your occupation? 
Do you have access to credit and loans? Micro-credit? 
Do you have savings? Did you have savings before the earthquake? Did you use any of your 
savings to recover from the earthquake disaster? If so, what are you saving for? How long could 
your savings sustain your household in the event of a disaster event? 
Do you believe that climate change has impacted you or your community at all? In what ways does 
unpredictable weather impact you and this community? 
Do you have access to any social programming to improve the quality of your life? Any 




APPENDIX 3 – Focus Group Question Guide 
2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake Questions 
For these questions, please try to think about you and your community’s experiences with the 2006 
earthquake event.  
1. What aspects of the recovery effort from the 2006 earthquake do you think were well 
done? 
2. What aspects of the recovery effort from the 2006 earthquake could have been improved? 
3. Do you think certain villagers had more difficulty recovering than others? If yes, what led 
to these differences? What could be done to reduce some of those difficulties? 
4. What was done (or could have been done) to help the community recovery faster? 
5. In what ways did the community adapt or transform after the earthquake event that could 
help build capacity to respond to future disaster events? 
6. What was done (or could potentially be done) to help villagers absorb the impacts (to 
minimize impacts) of future earthquake events? 
7. How would you describe successful disaster recovery?  
8. Do you think there are other interpretations of successful disaster recovery? If so, what are 
they?  
9. Did you witness any conflict during the recovery effort regarding the direction the recovery 
effort should take? If so, how were these conflicts resolved? Do you think all community 
members felt satisfied? 
General Questions 
10. What do you think are the biggest concerns (not just hazards related – all areas) facing your 
sub-village? What do you think can be done to try to remedy these concerns? 
11. In what ways could the local economy be improved in this dusun? 
12. What could be done to raise the living standards of poorer members of this dusun? 
13. The issue of unreliable or insecure income has been raised as an important issue...what do 
you think could be done to improve the security of income? 
14. What do you think are some of the underlying causes of poverty and low standards of 
living in this area? 
15. If you had access to unlimited funds, what types of programs or initiatives would you like 






APPENDIX 4 – Expert Interview Question Guide  
1. Please explain your organization’s role during the recovery effort from the 2006 
Yogyakarta earthquake: 
2. What aspects of the recovery effort (in general or specific to your organization) do you 
think were well done? 
3. What aspects of the recovery effort (in general or specific to your organization) could have 
been improved? 
4. Overall, how would you assess the recovery effort? Do you think it was successful? Why 
or why not? 
5. How would you describe successful disaster recovery?  
6. Can you explain what makes a person, household or community vulnerable to disaster 
events? 
7. Can you explain what makes a person, household or community resilient to disaster 
events? 
8. What do you think is the relationship between vulnerability and resilience? 
9. What is the role of sustainable livelihoods during disaster recovery? 
10. How do sustainable livelihoods contribute to resilient households and communities? 
11. Do you think that concepts of vulnerability, resilience and sustainable livelihoods are 





APPENDIX 5 - Sustainable Livelihoods Capital Rankings 
CAPITAL: 
VILLAGE SCORES 






Education levels 0 0 1 0.5 0.5 
Skill levels 0.5 0 1 1 0.5 
Health levels 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 
Hazard knowledge 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Disaster preparedness levels 1 0 0.5 0.5 0 






Family Networks - external 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 
Family Networks - internal 1 1 1 1 1 
Social harmony 1 1 0 1 0.5 
External networks - formal 1 0 1 0.5 0 
External networks - informal  0.5 0 1 1 0 







Strength of housing 1 1 1 1 1 
Awareness of building standards 1 1 1 1 1 
Electricity, water & sanitation 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 
Replacement of production tools  0.5 0 0.5 0 0 
Irrigation systems  1 1 0 0 0.5 






 Levels of savings/assets 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.5 
Access to credit 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 
Employment levels 0.5 0 1 1 0 
Level of income 0.5 0 1 0.5 0 
Stability of income  0.5 0 1 0.5 0 






Access to natural resources 0 0 0 0 0 
Access to agricultural land 1 1 0 1 1 
Quality of agricultural land 1 1 0 0 0 
Climate variability impacts  0.5 0.5 1 0 0 
Risk of hazards 0 0.5 0 0 0 







Strength of local leadership 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 
Levels of corruption 1 1 0 1 0 
Accountability  0 0 1 0.5 0 
Aid distribution 1 1 0.5 1 0 
Innovative programming 1 0 1 0.5 0 







Religious faith 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 
Use of gotong royong - emergency 1 1 0.5 1 1 
Use of gotong royong - permanent 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.5 
Javanese philosophy nrimo 1 1 1 1 1 
Familial + kinship networks 1 1 1 1 1 




APPENDIX 6 - Strengths and Weaknesses of Various Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches 







1997 White Paper on 
International 
Development - DFID 
committed to 
supporting policies 
and actions that 
promote SL in the 
context of poverty 
elimination 
Six guiding principles, including 
people centred, responsive and 
participatory, multi-level, 
partnership, various types of 
sustainability, dynamic. Additional 
principles being considered holistic 
and strength-based as well as 
integration of rights based 




Sustained effort and 
commitment of resources 
to promote SLA and 
cross-sectoral work - 
broad integration and 
understanding of SL 
approaches - strong 
support for SLA among 
senior management 
SLA key in identifying 
and addressing the needs 




Continuing development of 
SLA at a meso and macro level, 
integration of new forms of 
analysis. Increasing emphasis 
on PIP's. Strengthening micro-
macro linkages across DFID 
divisions, integration of 
livelihoods into health and 
education sectors, addressing 
gender, power relations and 
politics 
EC 2001 
EC Policy and 
Approach to Rural 
Development: 
Fighting Rural 
Poverty, DG Dev.  
Incorporates some livelihood 
analysis by drawing on SLF and 
acknowledges the importance of 




Range of activities 
supported 




Understanding and accepting of 
the SL Core concepts and 
mainstreaming of SL principles 






in response to inter-
agency Siena 
Livelihoods Forum 
SL principles align with FAO 
strategic framework. Core FAO 
principles are: multidisciplinary 
approach to food security, 
empowerment of rural people 
through participation in 
community planning, sustainable 
management of resources, 







FAO meeting corporate 
strategies by enhancing 
the quality, relevance 
and impact of FAO's 
normative work and 
assistance initiatives 
FOA is a decentralized 
technical agency, largely 
organized by sector, the 
challenge is to build cross-
sectoral teams and raise 
awareness across a wide range 
of countries, languages and 
cultures 
IFAD 2001 
Post Siena, a 
Memorandum of 
Understanding with 




Learning Trust Fund 
(SLDLTF) 
Framework draws on SL principles 
of partnership, participation, 
building on people's existing skills 
and livelihoods strategies - also 
emphasizes access to access and 







capacity of the poor is 
based on partnership  
The value of stakeholder 
consultation during 
design to promote 
increased understanding 
and ownership 
Implementing the shift from 
rigid programmes when 
working with national 
governments - development of 




Adopted SL as part of 
Sustainable Human 
Development agenda. 
SL unit in its Social 
Development and 
Poverty Elimination 
Division - but 
disbanded in 2001 
People-centred, participatory 
approaches, holistic vision of 
development, empowerment, use 
of appropriate technology, 







Emphasis on technology 




lessons/good practice in 





governance issues into a 
holistic framework for 
analysis and 
programming 
Establishing SLA at the 
country and decentralized level 
through inclusive and 
comprehensible programmes so 




Learning Group and 
World Development 
Report (2000/01) with 
influences from other 
donors 
Draws on the early work of 
Chambers and Chambers & 
Conway - emphasis on 





Seeking ways to adapt 
the terminology and 
content of SLA to fit in 
with its other strategic 
objectives (e.g. human 





dimensional nature of 
poverty, emphasizing 
the importance of assets 
rather than income - 
helped draw links 
between operational and 
policy level activities 
Greater critical mass of staff 
needs, familiarization of SLA if 
the approach is to be adopted 
more broadly. Finding 
appropriate and practical ways 
to use multi-sectoral SLA with 
governments and ministries 
WFP 1999 
Key themes in policy 
directive 'Enabling 
Development' (ED) 
align with SL 
principles. Post Siena, 
an Institutional 
Strategy Paper 
outlined a WFP/DFID 
partnership to 
increase use of SLA 
in WFP programming 
cycle 
ED addresses exclusion of poor 
and marginalized groups by using 
food aid as an 'enabler'. ID is 
people-centred and participatory in 
approach, examines vulnerability 
and focuses on enabling the poor 





Only one intervention 
tool - food aid. ED uses 
temporary food aid to 
enable to chronic poor to 
escape the hunger trap 
Aims to incorporate 
SLA at the country level 
in order to improve 
targeting of food 
insecure households, 
identify broader range of 
partners and address 
linkages between FAO 
food assistance activities 
and national policies 
Budgetary and human 
resources required to 
familiarize a large organization 
with the SL principles and 
language, through capacity 
building and training 
CARE 1994 
CARE Long Range 
Strategic Plan 
Four principles of HLS: people, 
holistic, disasters and development 





Emphasis on the 
household and 
vulnerability to natural 
disasters. Principles of 
accountability and social 
justice 
Opportunity to combine 
disaster reduction and 
development 
interventions in one 
assistance strategy  
HQ-driven conceptual 





Adapted version of 
DFID's SLA, 
emerged from best 






Distills SL principles into six 
governance issues: at the micro 
level - the involvement of poor 
people, existence of local service 
providers; meso - effective 
management by local government, 
provision of support and 
supervision; macro - strategic 





social - also 
included as 
strengths/weakne
sses of SWOT 
analysis 
The use of six 
governance issues and 
how they relate to SL 
principles. Greater 
prominence is given to 
opportunities, the 
disaggregation of PIP's. 
The use of an amended 
SLF as a tool in 
community-based 
planning 
SLF has been used as a 
checklist of principles. 
Development planning 
using SLA linked 
participation with actors 
at provincial level and 
national policy, so 
creating micro-macro 
links 
Ensure all partners have a 
common understanding of SL 
language and core concepts. 
Not thinking that holistic 
analysis needs holistic actions - 
linking bottom-up elements 
with strategic work 
Oxfam 1993/94 
Early adopter of SL 
principles - since 
1994 has integrated 
SL into a rights-based 
framework - Global 
Charter for Basic 
Rights 
Strategic plan outlines ‘sustainable 
livelihoods' as a social and 
economic right. Stresses four 
dimensions - economic (markets, 
credit), social (networks, gender 
equity), institutional (capacity 
building, access to services and 
technology, political freedom), and 
ecological (quality and availability 




Increasing emphasis on 
roles of markets and 
trade in the livelihoods 
of poor people 
SLF/A has potential to 
enhance policy 
advocacy work 
The integration of SL and 




HEA describes the economy of a 
defined population and analyses 
the assets, capacities and 
opportunities available to poor 
people 










HEA complements SLA 
and can be used to 
operationalize the SL 
framework 
Through SLA the 
promotion of more 
strategic and transparent 
approaches to social 
protection, poverty 
mitigation and targeting 
of assistance 
Many of the causes of 
livelihood insecurity identified 
are the result of global actions 
and cannot be resolved through 





arose from SID's 
efforts to support 
networks that 
promote sustainable 
livelihoods and social 
justice 
Core principles - local people are 
the main actors in social 
transformation, complementary 
actions are key, 
collective/individual empowerment 
requires social energy and political 




maintaining a lasting 
commitment to SLA 
requires institutional 
mechanisms that ensure 
the accountability of 
agencies to local people 
and responsiveness to 
their demands 
SL Programme use to 
promote, strengthen and 
multiply grassroots 
initiatives and local 
innovations by 
establishing networks 
Developing effective ways to 
draw lessons from positive 
local processes using SLA and 
scaling these up to the meso 
and macro levels 




APPENDIX 7: Review of Selected Vulnerability, Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Methods 
Assessment 
Method 












 - incorporation of both vulnerability and 
capacity 
 - holistic approach recognizes the 
uniqueness of each place 
 - localized nature of this approach limits the ability to 
examine larger-scale processes impacting vulnerability 
and capacity 
 - lack of consistent set of indicators 
 - physical characteristics converged into category with 











 - importance of analyzing hazards is 
recognized and provided own step in the 
framework 
 - designed to be conducted before 
hazardous event acknowledges that 
vulnerability existed before hazard 
 - focus on both micro and macro scale 
processes that impact vulnerability 
 - broadness of coverage and lack of indicators places 
effectiveness of VCA on practitioners at local level  








 - implementation of a 'right's based' 
approach focuses beyond the scale of the 
community into the realm of policy-issues 
and activitism 
 - provides communities with a method for 
addressing local concerns 
 - focuses on power relations 
 - analyzes vulnerability at a variety of scales 
while still recognizing importance of place 
 - understanding of vulnerability is limited and focuses 
almost exclusively on poverty, ignoring issues such as 
preparedness and experience 
 - focus on poverty and livelihood strategies limits risk 
factors to those affecting income-generating activities 
 - does not explicitly recognize the importance of 









 - recognizes the importance of including 
conflict hazards and struggles associated 
with access to resources 
 - explores vulnerability both in terms of 
social processes and biophysical processes 
 - examines power hierarchies, including 
gender inequalities 
 - capacities analysis is limited, focusing almost 
exclusively on disaster management and government 
institutions 
 - limited acknowledgement of the role of individuals 
and households in capacity building 
 - scale of analysis is regional, perhaps ignoring 











 - by linking vulnerability analysis to 
everyday conditions of the household, this 
approach explicitly links vulnerability to 
pre-existing conditions 
 - as the hazard assessment step seeks to 
address issues and risk for the future, this 
approach has more appeal than the 
assessment methods that focus solely on 
historical hazards 
 - use of food economy zones, as opposed to 
bureaucratic boundaries 
 - explicit focus on food security limits the impact of 
this model to other forms of hazards besides drought 
and famine 
 - as the approach sets out of framework for collecting 
and analyzing information, with limited information 
on conducting and FEA, the skill of the practitioners is 











 - integrates the CVA approach with 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) 
methods - evolved categories of analysis 
explicitly acknowledge the link between 
disasters and development  
- other categories focus on perceptions, 
experience, and knowledge 
 - used in conjunction with other tools, implying some 
information is missing  
- limited recognition of the importance of hazards and 
biophysical aspects of vulnerability  





Smith, Barrett & Box 1999 
 - inexpensive and convenient method for 
identifying and prioritizing risks within 
areas with diverse populations, ethnicities 
and ecologies 
 - using participatory research methods, 
explicitly acknowledges the role of local 
knowledge and coping strategies 
 - information was coded and geographically 
referenced using a GPS in order to map the 
representations of risk provided 
 - focuses on populations in arid and semi-arid 
biophysical conditions, although approach could be 
used in other areas 
 - PRM focuses on perceived risks, with limited 
analysis of vulnerability (although the authors note 
that the populations studied were already some of the 
most vulnerable groups) 
 - although coping strategies and solutions were 







 - guidelines outline specific information 
required at each level of analysis  
- scale of analysis moves from local through 
to international levels, providing 
opportunities to examine both micro and 
macro-scale processes  
- involves representatives from community 
at all levels of analysis  
- empowering approach that facilitates 
dialogue  
- focus on development of action plans 
- focus on capacities seems secondary to focus on 
vulnerabilities  
- push for action plans does not seem to explicitly 
acknowledge the role of local and existing coping 
strategies  
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